The Impact of AI on Strategic Stability is What States Make of It: Comparing US and Russian Discourses

References

• Acton, J. M. 2013. “Reclaiming Strategic Stability.” In Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations, edited by E. A. Colby and M. S. Gerson, 117–146. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press.
   Google Scholar
• Acton, J. M., ed. 2017. Entanglement: Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
   Google Scholar
• Adamsky, D. 2010. The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP.
   Google Scholar
• Adler, E. 2013. “Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates.” In Handbook of International Relations, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. A. Simmons, 112–144. 2nd ed. London: SAGE Publications.
   Google Scholar
• Allison, D. M., and S. Herzog. 2020. “‘What About China?’ and the Threat to US–Russian Nuclear Arms Control.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76 (4): 200–205. doi:10.1080/00963402.2020.1778370.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Altmann, J., and F. Sauer. 2017. “Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability.” Survival 59 (5): 117–142. doi:10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Arbatov, A. 2021. “Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee for or Threat to Strategic Stability?” In NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020, edited by F. Osinga and T. Sweijs, 65–86. The Hague: TMC Asser Press.
   Google Scholar
• Arbatov, A. 2022. “The Ukrainian Crisis and Strategic Stability.” Russian International Affairs Council. July 18, 2022. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/the-ukrainian-crisis-and-strategic-stability/.
   Google Scholar
• Arbatov, A., and V. Dvorkin. 2011. “Strategic Stability Before and After the Cold War.” World Economy and International Relations 3: 3–11. doi:10.20542/0131-2227-2011-3-3-11.
   Google Scholar
• Arbatov, A., V. Dvorkin, and P. Topychkanov. 2017. “Entanglement as a New Security Threat: A Russian Perspective.” In Entanglement: Chinese and Russian Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, edited by J. M. Acton, 11–45. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
   Google Scholar
• Arsenal Otechestva, 2018. “Iskusstvennyi Intellekt: Problemy I Puti Resheniya [Artificial Intelligence: Problems and Solutions].” March 27, 2018. https://arsenal-otechestva.ru/article/1010-iskusstvennyj-intellekt-problemy-i-puti-resheniya.
   Google Scholar
• Baldus, J. 2022. “Doomsday Machines? Nukes, Nuclear Verification and Artificial Intelligence.” In Armament, Arms Control and Artificial Intelligence, edited by T. Reinhold and N. Schörnig, 101–116. Cham: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• BBC News Russian. 2019. “Putin Vzyalsya Za Iskusstvennyi Intellekt. Chto Obsuzhdali Na Pervom Soveschanii [Putin Took Up Artificial Intelligence. What Was Discussed at the First Meeting].” BBC News Russian, May 30, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-48463710.
   Google Scholar
• Becker, U., H. Müller, and S. Wisotzki. 2008. “Democracy and Nuclear Arms Control—Destiny or Ambiguity?” Security Studies 17 (4): 810–854. doi:10.1080/09636410802507941.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bendett, S. 2023. “The AI Wave in Defense Innovation: Russia.” Responsible AI in the Military Domain Summit. The Hague, 15 February 2023.
   Google Scholar
• Bode, I., H. Huelss, A. Nadibaidze, G. Qiao-Franco, and T. F. A. Watts. 2023. “Prospects for the Global Governance of Autonomous Weapons: Comparing Chinese, Russian, and US Practices.” Ethics and Information Technology 25: 5. doi:10.1007/s10676-023-09678-x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bode, I., and A. Nadibaidze. 2022. “AI and Drones in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Challenging the Expectations?”. The AutoNorms Blog. April 4, 2022. https://www.autonorms.eu/ai-and-drones-in-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-challenging-the-expectations/.
   Google Scholar
• Bollfrass, A. K., and S. Herzog. 2022. “The War in Ukraine and Global Nuclear Order.” Survival 64 (4): 7–32. doi:10.1080/00396338.2022.2103255.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boulanin, V. 2019. “Introduction.” In The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, edited by V. Boulanin, 3–9. Vol. I. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Boulanin, V., L. Saalman, P. Topychkanov, F. Su, and M. Peldan Carlsson. 2020. Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Bugos, S. 2022. “Despite Challenges, US-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Has Its Benefits.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 78 (6): 334–338. doi:10.1080/00963402.2022.2132741.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Canfil, J. K., and E. B. Kania . 2022. “Mapping State Participation in Military AI Governance Discussions.” In The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, edited by J. B. Bullock, Chen, Y. C., J. Himmelreich , V. M. Hudson, A. Korinek, M. M. Young, Zhang, B. Oxford: Oxford UP. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.54.
   Google Scholar
• Carrozza, I., N. Marsh, and G. M. Reichberg. 2022. Dual-Use AI Technology in China, the US and the EU. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo.
   Google Scholar
• Chyba, C. F. 2020. “New Technologies & Strategic Stability.” Daedalus 149 (2): 150–170. doi:10.1162/daed_a_01795.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cimbala, S. J., and J. Scouras. 2002. A New Nuclear Century: Strategic Stability and Arms Control. Westport, CT: Praeger.
   Google Scholar
• Colby, E. A. 2013. “Defining Strategic Stability: Reconciling Stability and Deterrence.” In Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations, edited by M. S. Gerson and E. A. Colby, 47–84. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cox, J., and H. Williams. 2021. “The Unavoidable Technology: How Artificial Intelligence Can Strengthen Nuclear Stability.” The Washington Quarterly 44 (1): 69–85. doi:10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893019.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Drezner, D. W. 2019. “Technological Change and International Relations.” International Relations 33 (2): 286–303. doi:10.1177/0047117819834629.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Epstein, C. 2010. “Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Politics.” European Journal of International Relations 17 (2): 327–350. doi:10.1177/1354066109350055.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Executive Office of the President. 2019. “Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence (Executive Order 13859).” Federal Register. February 11, 2019. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/14/2019-02544/maintaining-american-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence.
   Google Scholar
• Favaro, M. 2022. “Strengthening the Osce’s Role in Strategic Stability.” Atlantic Council. January 12, 2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/strategic-insights-memos/strengthening-the-osces-role-in-strategic-stability/.
   Google Scholar
• Favaro, M. 2023 .”Responsible Adoption of AI in the Nuclear Domain.” Responsible AI in the Military Domain Summit. 16 February 2023. The Hague. .
   Google Scholar
• Ford, C. A. 2020. “Strategic Stability and the Global Race for Technology Leadership.” Arms Control and International Security Papers I (21): 9. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/T-paper-series-Strategic-Stability-and-Tech-508.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Fritsch, S. 2014. “Conceptualizing the Ambivalent Role of Technology in International Relations: Between Systemic Change and Continuity.” In The Global Politics of Science and Technology, edited by M. Mayer , M. Carpes, and Knoblich, R., 115–138. Vol. 1. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• Garant.ru. 2019. “Ukaz Prezidenta RF Ot 10 Oktyabrya 2019 G. № 490 ‘O Razvitii Iskusstvennogo Intellekta V Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation from 10 October 2019 No. 490 ‘On the Development of AI in the Russian Federation’].” October 14, 2019. https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/72738946/#1000.
   Google Scholar
• Garcia, Z. 2017. “Strategic Stability in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenge of the Second Nuclear Age and the Logic of Stability Interdependence.” Comparative Strategy 36 (4): 354–365. doi:10.1080/01495933.2017.1361207.
   Google Scholar
• Geist, E., and A. Lohn. 2018. How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War?. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
   Google Scholar
• Gibbons, R. D., and S. Herzog. 2022. “Durable Institution Under Fire? The NPT Confronts Emerging Multipolarity.” Contemporary Security Policy 43 (1): 50–79. doi:10.1080/13523260.2021.1998294.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gorenburg, D., A. Fink, S. Bendett, and J. Edmonds. 2022. A Technological Divorce: The Impact of Sanctions and the End of Cooperation on Russia’s Technology and AI Sector. Arlington, VA: CNA.
   Google Scholar
• Götz, E. 2019. “Strategic Imperatives, Status Aspirations, or Domestic Interests? Explaining Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Policy.” International Politics 56 (6): 810–827. doi:10.1057/s41311-018-0168-7.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Government of Russia. 2021. “Yury Borisov Provel Soveschaniye O Razvitii Tehnologiyi Iskusstvennogo Intellekta V Interesah Oborony [Yury Borisov Held a Meeting on the Development of AI Technologies for Defense Interests].” April 13, 2021. http://government.ru/news/41953/.
   Google Scholar
• Hagel, C. 2014. “The Defense Innovation Initiative.” US Department of Defense. November 15, 2014. https://defenseinnovationmarketplace.dtic.mil/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/DefenseInnovationInitiative.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Haner, J., and D. Garcia. 2019. “The Artificial Intelligence Arms Race: Trends and World Leaders in Autonomous Weapons Development.” Global Policy 10 (3): 331–337. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12713.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hansen, L. 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Hine, E., and L. Floridi. 2022. “Artificial Intelligence with American Values and Chinese Characteristics: A Comparative Analysis of American and Chinese Governmental AI Policies.” AI & SOCIETY. doi:10.1007/s00146-022-01499-8.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Holland, S., and A. Mohammed. 2023. “US to Stop Exchanging Nuclear Data with Russia After Moscow’s Treaty Suspension.” Reuters. March 28, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-will-not-give-moscow-nuclear-data-after-russian-treaty-suspension-white-house-2023-03-28/.
   Google Scholar
• Holzscheiter, A. 2014. “Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations.” International Studies Perspectives 15 (2): 142–162. doi:10.1111/insp.12005.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Horowitz, M. C. 2019. “Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Stability.” In The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk: Euro-Atlantic Perspectives, edited by V. Boulanin, 79–83. Vol. I. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Horowitz, M. C., G. C. Allen, E. B. Kania, and P. Scharre. 2018. Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security.
   Google Scholar
• Horowitz, M. C., and L. Kahn. 2021. “How Joe Biden Can Use Confidence-Building Measures for Military Uses of AI.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 77 (1): 33–35. doi:10.1080/00963402.2020.1860331.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hruby, J., and N. Miller. 2021. Assessing and Managing the Benefits and Risks of Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear-Weapon Systems. NTI Paper. htts://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/assessing-and-managing-the-benefits-and-risks-of-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-weapon-systems/.
   Google Scholar
• Hymans, J. E. C. 2006. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
   Google Scholar
• Il’nitskyi, A., and A. Losev. 2019. “Iskusstvennyi Intellekt — Ugrozy I Vozmozhnosti [Artificial Intelligence — Threats and Opportunities].” Arsenal Otechestva 4 (42). https://arsenal-otechestva.ru/article/1269- iskusstvennyj-intellekt-ugrozy-i- vozmozhnosti.
   Google Scholar
• Interfax. 2021. “Shoigu Zayavil, Chto Drony I Boevye Roboty Stali Seriyeznoi Voyennoi Siloi [Shoigu Declared That Drones and Combat Robots Have Become a Serious Military Force].” Interfax. August 6, 2021. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/782876.
   Google Scholar
• Interfax . 2022. “Medvedev Prizval protivostoyat’ Popytkam Zapada peremanivat’ Spetsialistov Iz RF [Medvedev Urged to Resist the West’s Attempts to Poach Specialists from Russia].” Interfax, June 21, 2022. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/847308.
   Google Scholar
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 2022. Artificial Intelligence for Accelerating Nuclear Applications, Science and Technology. Vienna: IAEA.
   Google Scholar
• Istomin, I. 2023. “Technological Uncertainty and Strategic Stability.” In The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, edited by J. Berghofer, A. Futter, C. Häusler, M. Hoell, and J. Nosál, 89–108. Cham: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• Izvestia. 2020. “Putin Obsudil S Sovbezom Svyazannye S Iskusstvennym Intellektom Ugrozy [Putin Discussed Threats Related to AI with the Security Council].” Izvestia, December 18, 2020. https://iz.ru/1101740/2020-12-18/putin-obsudil-s-sb-rf-ugrozy-natcbezopasnosti.
   Google Scholar
• Johnson, J. 2019a. “The AI-Cyber Nexus: Implications for Military Escalation, Deterrence and Strategic Stability.” Journal of Cyber Policy 4 (3): 442–460. doi:10.1080/23738871.2019.1701693.
   Google Scholar
• Johnson, J. 2019b. “Artificial Intelligence & Future Warfare: Implications for International Security.” Defense & Security Analysis 35 (2): 147–169. doi:10.1080/14751798.2019.1600800.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Johnson, J. 2019c. “The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability, Escalation and Nuclear Security.” In The 2019 UK PONI Papers, edited by S. Dudin and C. Wiley, 43–47. London: Royal United Services Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Johnson, J. 2020. “Artificial Intelligence: A Threat to Strategic Stability.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14 (1): 16–39.
   Google Scholar
• Johnson, J. 2021. “The End of Military-Techno Pax Americana? Washington’s Strategic Responses to Chinese AI-Enabled Military Technology.” The Pacific Review 34 (3): 351–378. doi:10.1080/09512748.2019.1676299.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Johnson, J. 2022. “Inadvertent Escalation in the Age of Intelligence Machines: A New Model for Nuclear Risk in the Digital Age.” European Journal of International Security 7 (3): 337–359. doi:10.1017/eis.2021.23.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Johnson, J. 2023. AI and the Bomb: Nuclear Strategy and Risk in the Digital Age. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Kahn, L. A. 2023. Risky Incrementalism: Defense AI in the United States. Hamburg: Defense AI Observatory.
   Google Scholar
• Kallenborn, Z. 2022. “Giving an AI Control of Nuclear Weapons: What Could Possibly Go Wrong?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1, 2022. https://thebulletin.org/2022/02/giving-an-ai-control-of-nuclear-weapons-what-could-possibly-go-wrong/.
   Google Scholar
• Karaganov, S. A., and D. V. Suslov. 2019. The New Understanding and Ways to Strengthen Multilateral Strategic Stability. Moscow: Higher School of Economics.
   Google Scholar
• Kosal, M. E., ed. 2020. Disruptive and Game Changing Technologies in Modern Warfare: Development, Use, and Proliferation. Cham: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• Kozyulin, V. 2019. Militarization of AI: A Russian Perspective. Muscatine, IA: Stanley Center for Peace and Security.
   Google Scholar
• Kristensen, H. M., and M. Korda. 2022a. “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2022.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 78 (2): 98–121. doi:10.1080/00963402.2022.2038907.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kristensen, H. M., and M. Korda. 2022b. “World Nuclear Forces.” In SIPRI Yearbook 2022, 341–432. Stockholm: Oxford UP.
   Google Scholar
• Kristensen, H. M., and M. Korda. 2023. “United States Nuclear Weapons, 2023.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79 (1): 28–52. doi:10.1080/00963402.2022.2156686.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kristensen, H. M., M. Korda, and E. Reynolds. 2023. “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79 (2): 108–133. doi:10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lipschutz, R. D. 1995. “On Security.” In On Security, edited by R. D. Lipschutz, 1–23. New York: Columbia UP.
   Google Scholar
• Logan, D. C. 2022. “The Nuclear Balance is What States Make of It.” International Security 46 (4): 172–215. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00434.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Loukianova Fink, A. , and O. Oliker. 2020. “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World: Guarantors of Sovereignty, Great Power Status & More.” Daedalus 149 (2): 37–55. doi:10.1162/daed_a_01788.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lupovici, A. 2010. “The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory-Toward a New Research Agenda.” International Studies Quarterly 54 (3): 705–732. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00606.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lupovici, A. 2021. “The Dual-Use Security Dilemma and the Social Construction of Insecurity.” Contemporary Security Policy 42 (3): 257–285. doi:10.1080/13523260.2020.1866845.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Maas, M. M. 2019. “How Viable is International Arms Control for Military Artificial Intelligence? Three Lessons from Nuclear Weapons.” Contemporary Security Policy 40 (3): 285–311. doi:10.1080/13523260.2019.1576464.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Maurer, J. D. 2018. “The Purposes of Arms Control.” Texas National Security Review 2 (1): 9–27. doi:10.26153/tsw/870.
   Google Scholar
• Mori, S. 2018. “US Defense Innovation and Artificial Intelligence.” Asia-Pacific Review 25 (2): 16–44. doi:10.1080/13439006.2018.1545488.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nadibaidze, A. 2022a. Russian Perceptions of Military AI, Automation, and Autonomy. Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Nadibaidze, A. 2022b. “Understanding Russia’s Efforts at Technological Sovereignty.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 8, 2022. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/09/understanding-russias-efforts-at-technological-sovereignty/.
   Google Scholar
• National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. 2021. “Final Report.” https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2018. “Nuclear Posture Review.” February 2018. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
   Google Scholar
• Payne, K. 2021. I, Warbot: The Dawn of Artificially Intelligent Conflict. London: Hurst.
   Google Scholar
• Petrov, I. 2021. “Shoigu Postavil Zadachu Po Vnedreniyu Iskusstvennogo Intellekta V Oruzhie [Shoigu Set the Task of Integrating AI into Weapons].” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 9, 2021. https://rg.ru/2021/02/09/shojgu-postavil-zadachu-po-vnedreniiu-iskusstvennogo-intellekta-v-oruzhie.html.
   Google Scholar
• President of Russia. 2020a. “Artificial Intelligence Conference.” December 4, 2020. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64545.
   Google Scholar
• President of Russia. P2020b.“Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii Ot 02.06.2020 G. № 355 [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation from 02.06.2020 no. 355].” 2 June 2020. http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/45562.
   Google Scholar
• President of Russia, 2022a. “Artificial Intelligence Conference.” November 24, 2022. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69927.
   Google Scholar
• President of Russia, 2022b. “Meeting of Defense Ministry Board.” December 21, 2022. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70159.
   Google Scholar
• President of the United States. 2020. “National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies.” https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/National-Strategy-for-CET.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Puscas, I. 2022. Confidence-Building Measures for Artificial Intelligence: A Framing Paper. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.
   Google Scholar
• Rautenbach, P. 2023. “Keeping Humans in the Loop is Not Enough to Make AI Safe for Nuclear Weapons.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 16, 2023. https://thebulletin.org/2023/02/keeping-humans-in-the-loop-is-not-enough-to-make-ai-safe-for-nuclear-weapons/.
   Google Scholar
• RIA Novosti, 2018. “Lavrov: Rossiya Ne Podpishet Dogovor O Zapreshchenii Yadernogo Oruzhiya [Lavrov: Russia Will Not Sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons].” March 17, 2018. https://ria.ru/20180317/1516592142.html.
   Google Scholar
• RIA Novosti, 2021a. “Putin Prizval razvivat’ Sistemy Iskusstvennogo Intellekta V Voyennoy Sfere [Putin Called for Developing AI Systems in the Military Sphere].” December 21, 2021. https://ria.ru/20211221/putin-1764712935.html.
   Google Scholar
• RIA Novosti, 2021b. “V Minoborony Uvereny, Chto Rossiya Mozhet lidirovat’ V Sfere II [The MoD is Certain That Russia Can Lead in the Sphere of AI].” August 23, 2021. https://ria.ru/20210823/tekhnologii-1746915840.html.
   Google Scholar
• Rickli, J. M. 2019. “The Destabilizing Prospects of Artificial Intelligence for Nuclear Strategy, Deterrence and Stability.” In The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, edited by V. Boulanin, 91–98. Vol. I. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Rogers, J., M. Korda, and H. M. Kristensen. 2022. “The Long View: Strategic Arms Control After the New START Treaty.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 78 (6): 347–368. doi:10.1080/00963402.2022.2133287.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Romashkina, N. P., A. S. Markov, and D. V. Stefanovich. 2020. International Security, Strategic Stability and Information Technologies. Moscow: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations.
   Google Scholar
• Rubin, Lawrence, and A. N. Stulberg, eds. 2018. The End of Strategic Stability? Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Regional Rivalries. Washington, DC: Georgetown UP.
   Google Scholar
• Russian Federation. 2023. Concept of Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Development and Use of Weapons Systems with Artificial Intelligence Technologies. 7 March 2023. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2023/gge/documents/Russia_March2023.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Sauer, F. 2020. “Stepping Back from the Brink: Why Multilateral Regulation of Autonomy in Weapons Systems is Difficult, Yet Imperative and Feasible.” International Review of the Red Cross 102 (913): 235–259. doi:10.1017/S1816383120000466.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Savelyev, A. G., and O. M. Alexandria. 2022. “What Factors Affect Strategic Stability?” Russia in Global Affairs 20 (1): 93–111. doi:10.31278/1810-6374-2022-20-1-93-111.
   Google Scholar
• Scharre, P. 2018. Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War. New York: W.W. Norton.
   Google Scholar
• Scharre, P. 2021. “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory.” Texas National Security Review 4 (3). https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/.
   Google Scholar
• Scharre, P. 2023. Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. New York: W. W. Norton.
   Google Scholar
• Schelling, T. C. 1958. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1342.html.
   Google Scholar
• Schörnig, N. 2022. “Artificial Intelligence as an Arms Control Tool: Opportunities and Challenges.” In Armament, Arms Control and Artificial Intelligence, edited by T. Reinhold and N. Schörnig, 57–72. Cham: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• Sharikov, P. 2018. “Artificial Intelligence, Cyberattack, and Nuclear Weapons—A Dangerous Combination.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74 (6): 368–373. doi:10.1080/00963402.2018.1533185.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sokova, E. 2020. “Disruptive Technologies and Nuclear Weapons.” New Perspectives 28 (3): 292–297. doi:10.1177/2336825X20934975.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Suslov, D. V. 2020. “S – Strategic Stability.” Russia in Global Affairs 18 (1): 122–128. doi:10.31278/1810-6374-2020-18-1-122-128.
   Google Scholar
• TASS. 2022a. “Shoigu Zayavil, Chto Rossiya Voyuet Ne Tol’ko S Ukrainoyi, No I S Kollektivnym Zapadom [Shoigu Declared That Russia is Hting Not Only with Ukraine but Also with the Collective West].” TASS. September 21, 2022. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/15817047.
   Google Scholar
• TASS. 2022b. “V MO Rasskazali Ob Intellektualizatsii Rossiyiskih Vooruzhenyi [The MoD Talked About the Intellectualization of Russian Weapons].” TASS. August 25, 2022. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/15557335?.
   Google Scholar
• TASS, 2023. Shoigu: Sistemu Upravleniya I Svyazi VS RF Usovershenstvuyut S Primeneniem Tehnologiyi II [Shoigu: The Control and Communications System of the Russian Armed Forces Will Be Improved Using AI Technologies]. TASS, January 10, 2023. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/16766161
   Google Scholar
• Tatum, D. S. . 2018. “Discourse, Genealogy and Methods of Text Selection in International Relations.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 31 (3–4): 344–364. doi:10.1080/09557571.2018.1518971.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tertrais, B. 2022. Real and Imagined Challenges to Strategic Stability. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.
   Google Scholar
• Trenin, D. 2019. Strategic Stability in the Changing World. Moscow and Washington, DC: Carnegie Moscow Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
   Google Scholar
• UN News. 2022. “Humanity’s Just One Misunderstanding Away from ‘Nuclear Annihilation’ Warns UN Chief.” August 1, 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1123752.
   Google Scholar
• US and USSR. 1990. “Soviet-United States Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability.” George H.W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum, June 1, 1990. https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/1938.
   Google Scholar
• US Department of Defense. 2014. “‘Defense Innovation Days’ Opening Keynote (Southeastern New England Defense Industry Alliance).” September 3, 2014. https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/605602/defense-innovation-days-opening-keynote-southeastern-new-england-defense-indust/.
   Google Scholar
• US Department of Defense. 2016. “Remarks by Deputy Secretary Work on Third Offset Strategy.” April 28, 2016. https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/753482/remarks-by-deputy-secretary-work-on-third-offset-strategy/.
   Google Scholar
• US Department of Defense. 2019. “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity.” https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF.
   Google Scholar
• US Department of Defense., 2022. “2022 Nuclear Defense Strategy of the United States of America.” October 27, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.
   Google Scholar
• US Department of State. 2021. “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s (NSCAI) Global Emerging Technology Summit.” July 13, 2021. https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-national-security-commission-on-artificial-intelligences-nscai-global-emerging-technology-summit/.
   Google Scholar
• US Department of State. 2023. “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy.” February 16, 2023. https://www.state.gov/political-declaration-on- responsible-military-use-of-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomy/.
   Google Scholar
• Wachs, L. 2021. “Revival of the ‘Dead Hand’? Russian Political and Military Elites’ Debates on AI and Autonomy in Conventional and Nuclear Forces.” In The 2021 UK PONI Papers, edited by A. Alecsandru, 11–18. London: Royal United Services Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Wendt, A. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46 (2): 391–425. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027764.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• The White House. 2017. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” December 2017. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• The White House 2022. National Security Strategy. October 12, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Wohlstetter, A. 1959. “The Delicate Balance of Terror.” Foreign Affairs 37 (2): 211–234. doi:10.2307/20029345.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wyatt, A. 2020. “Charting Great Power Progress Toward a Lethal Autonomous Weapon System Demonstration Point.” Defence Studies 20 (1): 1–20. doi:10.1080/14702436.2019.1698956.
   Google Scholar
• Zysk, K. 2023. High Hopes Amid Hard Realities: Defense AI in Russia. Hamburg: Defense AI Observatory.
   Google Scholar