Sharing non-observational knowledge

ABSTRACT

One can know without observation what one is up to, but can one know without observation what someone else is up to? I explore two strategies for defending the claim that one can. The first strategy relies on the fact that one can know what someone is doing by accepting what they tell one about what they are doing. It proposes that testimony can preserve the credentials of a piece of knowledge so that if a benefactor has non-observational knowledge, then a recipient of their testimony can acquire non-observational knowledge by accepting it. The second strategy appeals to the existence of collective activities. It proposes that where a number of people engage in a collective activity, each can know what each is up to, and that knowledge can be had without observation. My goal is to set out both strategies. A secondary aim is to suggest grounds for greater optimism about the prospects of the first strategy than the second.

KEYWORDS:

• Non-observational knowledge
• Anscombe
• Burge
• collective activity
• testimony

Acknowledgements

I’m grateful for comments or discussion to Olle Blomberg, Thomas Crowther, Julien Dutant, Naomi Eilan, Keith Hossack, Hemdat Lerman, Eliot Michaelson, Eylem Özaltun, Sebastian Rödl, Johannes Roessler, Glenda Satne, Hamid Taieb, Mark Textor, and two anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.