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ABSTRACT
This article challenges conventional accounts of the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries’ role in the Arab Spring, emphasizing the very different bargaining versus containing logic through which the countries’ autocrats maintained political control of the military. Whereas traditional approaches emphasize the common outcome that neither military fired on protesters, this article highlights three areas of difference in military behavior: the militaries’ role in repression (beyond nor firing on protesters); managing the regime crises; and removing or sustaining the regime. In so doing, it also argues against interpretations of the Tunisian military that it remained loyal or passive. To the contrary, the article shows how the Tunisian military was a decidedly political actor, playing a profound role in ending the regime.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Eva Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring’, Comparative Politics 44/2 (January 2015), 180–209; William C. Taylor, Military responses to the Arab uprisings and the future of civil-military relations in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Derek Lutterbeck, ‘Arab uprisings, armed forces and civil-military relations’, Armed Forces and Society 39/1 (2013), 28–52. Michael Makara, ‘Coup-proofing, military defection, and the Arab Spring’, Democracy and Security 9 (2013), 334–359.
2 Eva Bellin, ‘The Puzzle of Democratic Divergence’, Political Science Quarterly 448 (Fall 2018); Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring Pathways of Repression and Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Ibrahim Sharquish, ‘Tunisia’s Lessons for the Middle East’, Foreign Affairs, 17 September 2013; Marina Ottaway, ‘Egypt and Tunisia: Democratic Transitions and the Problem of Power’, Wilson CentersMiddle East Program, 18 April 2014.
3 See Steven Cook, ‘The calculations of Tunisia’s military’, Foreign Policy Magazine, January 20, 2011; Teije Hidde Donker, ‘Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity’, Centre on Social Movement Studies (COSMOS), STP Working Paper 12 (2012), 22; Taylor, Military Responses.
4 Also see Risa Brooks and Peter B. White, ‘Oust the Leader, Keep the Regime?: Autocratic Civil-Military Relations and Coup Behavior in the Tunisian and Egyptian Militaries during the 2011 Arab Spring’, Security Studies 31/1 (21 February 2022), 118–151.
5 Risa Brooks, ‘Integrating the Civil-Military Relations Subfield’, Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019), 379–398.
6 Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East’; Lutterbeck, ‘Arab uprisings’; Makara, ‘Coup-proofing’.
7 Risa Brooks, Political-military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Adelphi Paper 324 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); James Quinlivin, ‘Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the Middle East’, International Security 24 (1999), 131–165; Erica De Bruin, How to Prevent Coups D’Etat: Counterbalancing and regime survival (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2020).
8 See Hicham Bou Nassif, ‘How Coup-Proofing Behavior Pre-Determined the Military Elite’s Behavior in the Arab Spring’, Political Science Quarterly 130/2 (2015); Holger Albrecht, ‘Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes amid the Arab Uprisings’, Mediterranean Politics 20/1 (2015); Makara, ‘Coup-proofing’.
9 Bou Nassif, ‘How Coup-Proofing Behavior Pre-Determined’.
10 Makara, ‘Coup-Proofing’.
11 On its marginalized status also see Risa Brooks, ‘Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the Ben Ali Regime in 2011’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/2 (2013), 205–220; Kevin Koehler, ‘Political Militaries in Popular Uprisings: A comparative perspective on the Arab Spring’, International Political Science Review 38/3 (2017), 363–377.
12 Alejandro Pachon, ‘Loyalty and Defection: Misunderstanding Civil-Military Relations in Tunisia During the Arab Spring’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 37/4 (2014), 508–531; Amy Austin Holmes and Kevin Koehler, ‘Myths of Military Defection in Egypt and Tunisia’, Mediterranean Politics 25/1 (2018), 45–70. Kevin Koehler has highlighted the ‘inaction’ of the Tunisian military during the 2011 regime crisis, but nonetheless portrays it as a passive actor. Kevin Koehler, ‘Political Militaries in Popular Uprisings’.
13 Cook, ‘Calculations of Tunisia’s military’; Taylor, Military Responses; Donker, ‘Tunisia’, 22.
14 Hicham Bou Nassif, Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2022).
15 Yazid Sayigh, ‘Above the State: The Officers’ Republic in Egypt’, Carnegie Middle East Center 2012.
16 See Robert Springborg, ‘The Field Marshal and the President: Civil-military relations in Egypt Today’, MERIP 147 (July-Aug 1987).
17 Tewflik Aclimandos, ‘Reforming the Egyptian Security Services’, Arab Reform Initiative, n.d.; Kareem Fahim and Mayy El Sheikh, ‘Egypt lifts a junior corps impatient over military failure’, The New York Times, 14 August 2012; Brooks, ‘Political-Military Relations’; Clement Henry and Robert Springborg, ‘Why Egypt’s Military Will Not Be Able to Govern’, Foreign Affairs 21/104 (2011).
18 Quote appears in Omar Ashour, From Bad Cop to Good Cop: The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in Egypt (Brookings Institution, 2012); Hazem Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: The Road to Revolt in Egypt (Verso, 2012). Also see Ahmed Hashim, ‘The Egyptian Military, Part Two: From Mubarak Onward’, Middle East Policy 18/4 (2011), 106–128; Steven Cook, Ruling Without Governing (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).
19 Ahmed Morsy, ‘The Military Crowds out civilian business in Egypt’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 24 June 2014.
20 For a list of the military’s income streams see Sayigh, Owners of the Republic, p. 318.
21 Ahmed Aboulenein, ‘Egypt’s Deep State gets back to business’, The World, 14 January 2015; Zeinab Abul-Magd, Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).
22 Zeinab Abul-Magd, ‘The Army and The Economy in Egypt’, Jadaliyya, December 2011.
23 Sayigh, ‘Above the State’.
24 Tewfik Aclimandos, ‘Egyptian army: Defining a new political and societal pact’, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 24 February 2011.
25 Cook, Ruling But not Governing..
26 Abul-Magd, Militarizing the Nation.
27 Stefan Roll, ‘Managing Change: How Egypt’s Military Leadership Shaped the Transformation’, Mediterranean Politics 21/1 (2015), 23–43. Sayigh, ‘Above the State’.
28 Hicham Bou Nassif, ‘Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards of Egypt’s Military Elite, 1981–2011’, Middle East Journal 67/4 (2013), 509–30; Sayigh, ‘Above the State’; Abul-Magd, Militarizing the Nation.
29 Robert Springborg, Egypt (Polity, 2018), 51.
30 In the 1960s, President Gamal Abdel Nasser had relied on the MoI under the leadership of Zakaria Mohieddin to counter the military. Nasser then seized on the military’s unpopularity following its calamitous performance in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war to create the CSF in early 1969 (Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, 92).
31 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies; Samer Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship (Stanford, 2011), 65.
32 This might make it seem that the military’s influence was declining. For example, there was a drop in the percent of GDP allocated to the defense budget from 1990–2010. See. Yet, the military’s significant off-budget revenue from its economic activities means that the official defense budget alone (long modest by regional standards) is not a reliable indicator of the military’s resources; the budget also excludes important expenditures, such as arms procurement, as well as revenue from $1.3 annual billion U.S. foreign aid. On these issues see Alexandra Kuimova, ‘Understanding Egyptian Military Expenditure’, SIPRI background paper (October 2020). Also, despite the MoI’s growing influence and resources, it was not a true rival to the military. For example, while comparing the number of personnel in the MoI’s paramilitary Central Security Forces, estimated at between 350,000–450,000 forces, with the 450,000 strong military, might make it appear that the two were comparable, in quality of personnel, equipment and training, the CSF was demonstrably inferior to the military (e.g., the CSF got inferior conscripts passed over by the military). This inadequacy was apparent in the CSF’s performance in managing the 2011 protests (Kandil Soldiers, Spies, 92–93, 236–237). In the final period of Mubarak’s rule, the formal budget for paramilitary forces in the MoI tended to be about a quarter of that for the military. Kuimova, ‘Understanding Miliary Expenditure’, 17.
33 L.B. Ware, ‘The Role of the Military in the Post-Bourguiba Era’, Middle East Journal 39/1 (Winter 1985), 27–47.
34 Michele Penner Angrist, ‘Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia’, The Middle East Journal 67/4 (2013), 550; Clement Henry, Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (Boston: Little Brown, 1970).
35 With the exception of 1987–1991. See Grewal, ‘A Quiet Revolution’. Also see Peter B. White, ‘Crises and Crisis Generations: The Long-Term Impact of International Crises on Military Political Participation’, Security Studies 26/4 (October–December 2017), 575–605.
36 Transparency International U.K., ‘Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index: Report on Tunisia’, August 2012.
37 Anthony H. Cordesman, A Tragedy of Arms: Military and Security Developments in the Maghreb (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 265.
38 Cordesman, A Tragedy of arms; Derek Lutterbeck, ‘After the fall: security sector reform in post-Ben Ali Tunisia’, Arab Reform Initiative, 20 October 2012, 19.
39 Yezid Sayigh, ‘Agencies of Coercion: Armies and Internal Security Forces’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 43/3 (2011), 403–405.
40 Bou Nassif, Endgames, 202, 205.
41 Querine Hanlon, ‘Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year After the Jasmine Revolution’, U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report, March 2012; Ahmed Hashim, ‘The Egyptian Military’, 128.
42 Jebnoun, Why Rogue Elephants Fail, 35.
43 Ware, ‘The Role of the Military’, 38; Sharan Grewal, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The Tunisian Military after Ben Ali’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 24 February 2016.
44 Christopher Alexander, ‘Back from the Democratic Brink: Authoritarianism and Civil Society in Tunisia’, Middle East Report 265 (1997), 34–8.
45 Derek Lutterbeck, ‘Tool of Rule: The Tunisian Police Under Ben Ali’, Journal of North African Studies 20/5 (2015), 813–831.
46 Bou Nassif, Endgames, 205.
47 Clement Henry and Robert Springborg, ‘The Tunisian Army: Defending the Beachhead of Democracy in the Arab World’, Huffington Post, 26 January 2011.
48 International Crisis Group, ‘Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way’, Middle East/North Africa Report 106 (April 2011), 11.
49 Ibid.; Noureddine Jebnoun, Tunisia’s National Intelligence: Why Rogue Elephants Fail to Reform (Georgetown Press, 2017), 30; David Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, ‘More officials quit Amid protest’, The New York Times, 18 January 2011.
50 Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge, 2012).
51 For example, in Egypt, the MoI’s role in administering repression of its citizens increased its budget and influence in the regime (Soliman, August of Dictatorship, p.65). It might thus seem puzzling that the Egyptian military would willingly forgo involvement in daily repression. This is due to the military’s concern about its reputation and role conceptions, which derived from the lessons drawn by its officers that the military’s politicization in the 1960s caused Egypt’s devastating performance in the 1967 war. Brooks, Shaping Strategy; Kandil Soldiers, Spies; White, ‘Crises and Crisis Generations’.
52 Alexander, ‘Back from the Democratic Brink’.
53 Noureddine Jebnoun, ‘In the Shadow of Power: Civil-Military Relations and the Tunisian Popular Uprising’, The Journal of North African Studies 19/3 (2014), 296–316.
54 Ibid., 303.
55 Roessler, ‘The Enemy Within’.
56 Jennifer Earl, ‘Tanks, Tear Gas and Movement Repression: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression’, Sociological Theory 21/1 (2003).
57 Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, ‘Hussein Tantawi’, n.d.; Al Jazeera, ‘Hussein Tantawi and Sami Anan’, 12 August 2012; David Kirkpatrick, ‘Egyptians defiant as military does little to quash protests’, The New York Times, 29 January 2011.
58 The Guardian, ‘Protests in Egypt and unrest in the Middle East-as it happened’, 25 January 2011.
59 Holmes & Kohler, ‘Myths of Defection’, 8.
60 International Crisis Group, ‘Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (1): Egypt Victorious?’, Middle East/North Africa Report 101 (February 2011), 17.
61 Ibid., 7.
62 Neil MacFarquar, ‘Egypt’s military is seen as pivotal in next step’, New York Times, January 2011; David Kirkpatrick, ‘Egyptians Defiant’.
63 Egypt Independent, ‘Egypt’s Minister of Defense joins protesters in Tahrir Square’, 30 January 2011.
64 David Kirkpatrick, ‘Mubarak’s grip on power is shaken’, The New York Times, 31 January 2011; BBC News, ‘Egypt protests: Army rules out the use of force’, January 2011.
65 Yasmine Faithi, ‘Egypt’s Battle of the Camel: the day the tide turned’, Ahram Online, February 2012.
66 International Crisis Group, ‘Egypt Victorious?’, 17.
67 Moaaz ElZoughby, ‘The dynamics of Egypt’s protest: an inside view’, Arab Reform Initiative, February 2011.
68 Gulf News, ‘Egypt vice president tells protestors to go home’, February 2011.
69 Ibid.
70 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution’, in Adam Roberts, et al., Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
71 Robert Fisk, ‘How much longer can Mubarak Cling on?’, The Independent, 31 January 2011.
72 Al Jazeera, ‘Cairo protestors stand their ground’, 30 January 2011.
73 ABC News, ‘This week’s transcript: crisis in Egypt’, 30 January 2011.
74 Gulf News, ‘Egypt vice president’.
75 Shashank Bengali, ‘Despite talk of concessions, Egyptian military cracking down’, McClatchy Newspapers, February 2011; David Kirkpatrick, ‘Facing calls to give up power, Egypt military battles crowds’, The New York Times, November 2011.
76 Human Rights Watch, ‘Egypt: statements from protesters detained by Army’, February 2011.
77 Evan Hill and Muhammed Mansour, ‘Egypt’s army took part in torture and killings during revolution, report shows’, The Guardian, April 2013.
78 Ibid.
79 For an overview see Donker, ‘Tunisia’.
80 Jebnoun, ‘In the Shadow of Power’, 306.
81 Ibid., 302.
82 Bou Nassif, Endgames, 211.
83 Holmes & Koehler, ‘Myths of Defection’, 7; Jebnoun, ‘In the Shadow of Power’, 306.
84 Bou Nassif, Endgames, 214.
85 Human Rights Watch, ‘Flawed accountability: Shortcomings of Tunisia’s trial for killings during the uprising’, January 2015.
86 Craig Whitlock and Greg Jaffe, ‘Where Egypt’s military’s loyalties lie remains unclear’, Washington Post, 4 February 2011.
87 Hamza Hendawi, ‘Analysis: Military coup was behind Mubarak’s Exit’, Associated Press, 11 February 2011; International Crisis Group, ‘Egypt Victorious?’, 14.
88 Hendawi, ‘Analysis’; Anthony Shadid and David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘Egypt’s army signals transfer of power’, New York Times, February 2011.
89 Quotes appear in Hendawi, ‘Analysis’. Also see Nancy A. Youssef, ‘Analysts: 3 key moments likely drove Egypt’s military’, McClatchy Newspapers, 2011.
90 Owen, ‘Egypt’s Military’; International Crisis Group, ‘Egypt Victorious?’, 1.
91 Tewfik Aclimandos, ‘Egyptian army’.
92 Shana Marshall and Joshua Stacher, ‘Egypt’s Generals and Transnational Capital’, Middle East Report 262 (2012), 12–18; It had long opposed Gamal’s ascendancy.
93 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen.
94 Albrecht & Ohl, ‘Exit, Resistance, Loyalty’; Bou Nassif, Endgames.
95 Aclimandos, ‘Egyptian army’, 3.
96 Lally Weymouth, ‘Egyptian Generals speak about revolution, elections’, Washington Post, 18 May 2011.
97 Ibid.
98 Curtis Bell and Jun Koga Sudduth, ‘The Causes and Outcomes of Coup During Civil War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 61/7 (2017), 1432–55.
99 Weymouth, ‘Egyptian Generals speak out’.
100 Paul Owen, ‘Egypt’s military backs Hosni Mubarak and calls for protesters to go home’, The Guardian, 11 February 2011.
101 Anthony Shadid and David Kirkpatrick, ‘Mubarak refuses to step down, stoking revolt’s fury and resolve’, The New York Times, 10 February 2011.
102 Marwa l-A’asar, ‘Thousands joined Presidential Palace, Maspero protests Friday’, Daily News Egypt, 11 February 2011.
103 ABC News, ‘Egyptian protestors March on parliament’, 10 February 2011; Youssef, ‘Analysts’.
104 Youssef, ‘Analysts’.
105 Youssef, ‘Analysts’. Shadid and Kirkpatrick, ‘Mubarak Refuses to Step Down’.
106 Jebnoun, ‘In the Shadow of Power’, 303.
107 Ibid., 308.
108 Al Arabiya, ‘Al Arabiya inquiry reveals how Tunisia’s Ben Ali escaped to Saudi Arabia’, January 2012.
109 Al Arabiya, ‘Al Arabiya inquiry’; Jebnoun, ‘In the Shadow of Power’, 308.
110 Holmes and Koehler, ‘Myths of Defection’.
111 International Crisis Group, ‘Tunisia’s Way’, 11.
112 Bou Nassif, Endgames, 197, 211.
113 Brooks, ‘Subjecting the military’.
114 Peter J. Schrader and Hamadi Redissi, ‘The Upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia’, Journal of Democracy 22/3 (2011), 13.
115 Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), 153.
116 David Pion-Berlin, D. Esparza, & K. Grisham, ‘Staying quartered: Civilian Uprisings and Military Disobedience in the Twenty-1st Century’, Comparative Political Studies 47/2 (2014), 230–259.
117 International Crisis Group, ‘Tunisia’s Way’, 11.
118 Jebnoun, ‘In the Shadow of Power’.
119 Bou Nassif, Endgames, 213.
120 Holmes & Koehler, ‘Myths of Defection’, 9; Jebnoun, ‘In the Shadow of Power’, 308.
121 Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East’.
122 Aclimandos, ‘Egyptian army’; Risa Brooks, ‘The Old and The New in Egyptian Civil-Military Relations’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 6 December 2020.
123 For overviews see International Crisis Group, ‘Lost in Translation: The World According to SCAF’, April 2012; also see Roll, ‘Managing Change’.
124 Lutterbeck, ‘After the Fall’, 7; Grewal, ‘A Quiet Revolution’; Jebnoun, ‘In the Shadow of Power’.
125 Hanlon, ‘Security Sector Reform’, 4.
126 Steffen Erdle, Ben Ali’s’ New Tunisia’(1987–2009): A Case Study of Authoritarian Modernization in the Arab world, Vol. 301 (Klaus Schwarz, 2010).
127 For one account see Brian Klaas, ‘The Long Shadow of Ben Ali’, Foreign Policy, 17 December 2013; Bara Gaaloul, ‘Back to the Barracks: The Tunisian Army Post-Revolution’, Sada (November 2011).
128 Amy Aisen Kallander, ‘Tunisia’s Post Ben Ali challenge’, MERIP, 4 February 2011.
129 Eileen Byrne and Roula Khalaf, ‘Tunisia sacks interior minister as riots continue’, Washington Post, January 2011.
130 Al Jazeera, ‘Tunisia gripped by uncertainty’, January 2011; BBC Monitoring, ‘Tunisian interim president asks Al-Jazeera to “contribute to encouraging calm”’, January 2011.
131 Ryan Rifai, ‘Timeline, Tunisia’s uprising’, Al Jazeera, 23 January 2011.
132 Al Jazeera, ‘Army on streets as militias loot’, January 2011.
133 France24, ‘Ben Ali’s wife blames general for Tunisia “coup d’état”’, 23 June 2012.
134 Brooks, ‘Abandoned at the Palace’.
135 Brooks and White, ‘Oust the Leader, Keep the Regime?’.
136 BBC Monitoring, ‘Al Arabiya TV highlights “fear and panic” in Tunisia amid looting, attacks’, January 2011; France24, ‘Gangs spread terror and chaos in Kasserine, Tunisia’, 31 January 2011. The military also interceded to prevent police abuse against civilian protesters. David Kirkpatrick, ‘General plays key role in Tunisian transition’, International Herald Tribune, January 2011.
137 Clement Henry and Robert Springborg, ‘Army Guys’, The American Interest 6/5 (May 2011); Tarek Amara and Christian Lowe, ‘Tunisia forces fight presidential guards near palace’, Reuters, January 2011; Angelique Chrisafis, ‘Confusion, fear and horror in Tunisia as the old regime’s militia carries on the fight’, The Guardian, January 2011. Adrian Bloomfield, ‘Tunisian military fights running street battles with gunmen loyal to the ousted president’, The Telegraph, January 2011; BBC News, ‘Tunis gun battles erupt after Ben Ali aide arrested’, 16 January 2011.
138 Ibid., Jeune Afrique, ‘Tunisie: que mijotait Ali Seriati?’, 28 March 2011.
139 Maghreb Confidential, ‘Ben Ali’s Militia use Libya as rear base’, January 2011.
140 Kirkpatrick and Fahim, ‘More Officials Quit’.
141 BBC News, ‘Tunis gun battles erupt’.
142 Jeune Afrique, ‘Tunisie: que mijotait Ali Seriati?’.
143 France24, ‘Ben Ali’s wife’; The New York Times, ‘Military backs new leaders in Tunisia’, 16 January 2011.
144 David Kirkpatrick, ‘Chief of Tunisian army pledges his support for “the Revolution”’, The New York Times, January 2011.
145 David Kirkpatrick, ‘General Plays Key Role’.
146 Jeune Afrique, ‘Tunisie: que mijotait Ali Seriati?’.
147 David Kirkpatrick, ‘Military backs new leaders in Tunisia’, The New York Times, January 2011; Reuters, ‘Tunisia turmoil raises risk of army takeover’, March 2011.
148 Grewal, ‘A Quiet Revolution’; Gaaloul, ‘Back to the Barracks’.
149 Issandr el Amrani, ‘Tunisia diary: Ammar’s move’, The Arabist Blog, 24 January 2011.
150 Emma Murphy, ‘Exit Ben Ali-but can Tunisia change?’, BBC News, 14 January 2011.
151 The Tunisian military’s willingness to play overtly political roles has become even more evident since 2011. See Sharan Grewal and Zachary White, ‘Executing orders or eroding democracy’, POMED, 1 December 2021.
152 Brooks, ‘Integrating the Civil-Military Relations Sub-field’.
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Risa Brooks
Risa Brooks is Allis Chalmers Professor of Political Science.