Rethinking change in Japan's security policy: punctuated equilibrium theory and Japan's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

ABSTRACT

Change in Japanese foreign and security policy has long been characterized as “incremental”. However, Japan’s response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine provides an opportunity to reconsider this paradigm. In the aftermath of the 2014 annexation of Crimea, then-Prime Minister Abe Shinzō chose not to put Crimea on the agenda, prioritizing instead relations with Russia. However, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio responded to the 2022 invasion by increasing ties with NATO, promising to double Japan’s military spending, and acquiring capabilities that were once considered off-limits, including cruise missiles. This dramatic policy shift is analyzed using punctuated equilibrium theory (PET). We find that the 2022 invasion became a focusing event, shifting public and elite opinion in unison. Where Crimea was played down, Ukraine was clearly linked to Asia, to a possible invasion of Taiwan, and as a threat to the entire liberal international order under which Japan had prospered. We argue that overall change in Japan’s policy has not been continuous, rather, focusing events, such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 9/11, and the 2012 “national security crisis” have precipitated fundamental change. Thus, we conclude that PET provides a better understanding of policy change than incrementalism.

KEYWORDS:

• Security policy
• foreign policy
• punctuated equilibrium theory
• Japan
• Russia
• incrementalism

Recalibrating Japan’s security posture

Since Japan’s defeat and occupation in 1945, its security relations with Asia have remained weak, while its ties with the West are stronger. Aside from the obvious import of the US–Japan alliance, Japan was also a founding member of the G7, and remains its only non-Western member. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Japan’s geographical gap was further narrowed in 2022, when Kishida Fumio became the first Japanese prime minister to attend the annual NATO summit. He attended again in 2023, where NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told him that “no other partner is closer to NATO than Japan” (Prime Minister’s Office of Japan 2022a). Considering that Japan is located on the other side of the globe, is ostensibly constrained by a pacifist constitution, and that its military has not fired a shot in anger since 1945, this is a remarkable state of affairs. It serves to highlight the dramatic changes to Japan’s security policy since the end of the Cold War. In 1991, Japan faced criticism from many Western states, including the US and the UK, for its response to the first Gulf War (Reid 1991). In line with its pacifist constitution, Japan did not send munitions or materiel, opting instead for so-called “chequebook diplomacy” – financial aid. The final insult came when Kuwait published a letter of thanks addressed to all the friendly countries which helped liberate it. Japan was not on the list. In the intervening years, while keeping the pacifist constitution in place, policymakers have pushed the idea that Japan should “normalise” (Ōzawa 1993). Structural realists and social constructivists in International Relations have since debated whether Japan has indeed departed from its postwar pacifism, and, if so, to what extend its pacifist norms and institutions have functioned as safeguards to set the pace and direction of change in Tokyo’s post-Cold War security system (Hatakeyama 2021; Hughes 2004, 2017; Oros 2017; Samuels 2007; Singh 2020; Soeya and Welch 2011).

Three decades into this debate, the country’s postwar security posture has changed beyond recognition – leading some scholars to conclude that “Japan’s pacifism is dead” (Gustafsson, Hagström, and Hanssen 2018). Troops have been deployed abroad, first under UN auspices but later as part of the US-led “Coalition of the Willing”. Taking stock of the changes implemented under the leadership of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo since his return to power in 2012, including the establishment of a National Security Council (NSC), issuing of a National Security Strategy (NSS), modernization of defence capabilities, and the crafting of new security partnerships across the Indo-Pacific, scholars have postulated Japan’s “restoration” (Pyle 2018), a “new era in Japanese statecraft” (Green 2022), and Japan’s emergence as a “global military power” (Hughes 2022) as a result of the “Abe doctrine” (Akimoto 2018; Hughes 2015). Still, the pace and manner of change in Japan’s security policy is often described as “incremental” (Singh 2015). “Incrementalism” is said to characterize almost all aspects of Japan’s security policy, from “the incremental militarization of Japan’s remote southwestern islands” (Liff 2018) to cyber-defence (Kallender and Hughes 2016).

While Prime Minister Kishida was traditionally seen as a dove, and Japan was hesitant to join the sanctions regime following Crimea's annexation in 2014, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has, according to some analysts, changed everything. Tokyo is currently experiencing “an historic break with the norms that have governed Japan’s defence policy since 1945” (Ward and Koshino 2023, see also Sakaki 2023). The accelerated shift in Japan's security system can be attributed to a combination of factors involving Russia and China, compelling Tokyo to navigate a new and complex security environment. Prime Minister Kishida, in his address to the Shangri-la Dialogue in 2022, candidly acknowledged these challenges, stating that “Ukraine today might be the East Asia of tomorrow” (Prime Minister’s Office of Japan 2022a). This shift marks the breaking of long-standing taboos; not only is defence spending set to double, but Japan will also acquire fully offensive capabilities, exemplified by the inclusion of long-range cruise missiles, and Abe’s push for Japan entering a nuclear sharing deal with the US. Japan is now venturing into the realm of military space and advancing its cyber warfare capabilities.

By the end of 2022, Kishida's administration, through a revised NSS, a National Defense Strategy (NDS, formerly National Defense Program Guidelines), and a Defense Buildup Program, has called for enhanced defence capabilities and international security cooperation (National Security Council 2022; Asahi Shinbun 2023b). The new NSS integrates defence planning across various domains, ranging from coast guard operations to counter-strike capabilities, and encompassing economic security. Kishida has committed to boost defence spending by 43 trillion yen to 2 per cent of GDP over the course of five years (aligned with NATO's spending targets); though, the new spending target includes formerly separate budget items, such as scientific research, infrastructure and Japan’s Coast Guard. Many of the changes had been deliberated before Kishida came to power, and the precise details of the tax-based financing plan for these measures remain subjects of contention (Hornung and Liff 2023; Le 2023). Still, the 2022 document represents a significant progression beyond the 2013 version formulated by the Abe government, aimed at establishing the groundwork for a coherent strategic outlook.

Despite this, recent change in Japan’s national defence posture, including the new NSS, has been described in “incremental” terms: “evolutionary rather than revolutionary” (Watanbe 2023; see also Tatsumi 2023a). This raises a number of questions: Do Kishida’s reforms truly represent a dramatic break with the past, or are these changes in line with the “incremental” drift of Japanese security policymaking since the end of the Cold War? Relatedly, what does this mean for the characterization of change in Japanese security policy – is the era of “incrementalism” over, and if so, what concept better characterizes change in Japanese security policy today? In this article, we attempt to answer these questions through detailed analysis of Japan’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by drawing on punctuated equilibrium theory (PET). PET describes how policies remain stable for long periods, only to experience dramatic changes in response to external shocks and/or shifts in public opinion. Rather than viewing it as incremental change, the article finds that Kishida's ongoing dramatic shift is better understood through PET. Furthermore, it also suggests that PET may provide a more nuanced understanding of Japanese policy change in recent decades, including major shifts after Gulf War I and 9/11.

To develop our argument, the article proceeds as follows: the next section elaborates on the characterization of “incremental” change in the literature on Japanese security policy. This is followed by an outline of PET, especially in respect to foreign and security policy. This section continues with a preliminary analysis of Japan’s reaction to Gulf War I, 9/11; and Abe’s (2012) “national security crisis”, demonstrating that PET may have more explanatory power than “incrementalism” when understanding Japanese policy change. This is followed by an outline of Japan-Russia relations, focusing on the decade prior to the invasion, especially on Japan’s response to the annexation of Crimea. Using this as a foundation, the article then examines and analyzes Japan’s response to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, finding that it appears to be a clear case of punctuated equilibrium. The article concludes with a summary and directions for future research.

Incremental change in Japanese security policy

Scholars observe that Japan's security policy is characterized by an incremental and evolutionary approach, with an emphasis on gradual adjustment and a broadening of its security stance over time (Hosoya 2016; Liff 2018; Oros 2008; Singh 2015). This is due to several factors, though the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in power for most of the last 70 years, is key. Since the LDP was formed in 1955, its political dominance has translated into policy influence. During the Cold War, this dominance was entrenched as foreign policy consensus in the form of the “Yoshida doctrine”, which carefully balanced Japan’s focus on postwar economic recovery and growth with a low-profile defence posture, deflecting pressure for all-out remilitarization while placing Japan firmly under protection of the US nuclear umbrella (Hoshiro 2022).

This policy dominance has resulted in close links between and harmonization of policy preferences with the bureaucracy (Muramatsu and Krauss 1984). Meanwhile, the LDP's foreign and security policy course sought to tie Japan to the US while upholding pacifist norms and practices. These practices include a ban on arms exports, adherence to the three non-nuclear principles, non-military use of space, and a prohibition on the Japan Self-Defence Forces’ overseas deployment, policies formulated in the 1960s and 1970s. This, combined with the LDP's efforts to revise the postwar status quo, has led to internal divisions within the party and between parties, structuring postwar domestic politics (Igarashi 1985). Furthermore, the endurance of the LDP lengthens time horizons – if you know you will win the next election, policies do not have to be forced through on short notice. Signs of “erosion” of anti-militaristic principles emerged in the late 1980s largely attributed to the Nakasone administration’s attempt to recalibrate Japan’s security posture and to strengthen the US–Japan alliance (Hook 1988). Yet, public opinion, which historically has not been in favour of major security reform or of Japan taking a lead role in global (or even regional) security, further slows down the pace of change, as do the institutional restraints imposed by Japan’s pacifist constitution. Recent scholarship argues that far-reaching change is constrained by a number of factors, including fiscal and demographic limitations on military expansion, as well as public distrust of revisionist leaders such as Abe (Le 2021; Suzuki and Wallace 2018). Geopolitical vulnerability and the persistence of domestic limitations on the flexibility of Japan’s military policymaking are constants to which Japan’s leaders have grown accustomed, resulting in a continued preference for tentative, incremental approaches to change.

However, an increasing number of scholars argue that recent changes in Japan’s defence posture, together with deepening integration of the alliance with the US, represents something more than incrementalism as usual. As such, the Abe administration was pushing “for unprecedented industrial and operational military cooperation and integration with the United States” which has moved “power aggregation across the Japan-US alliance beyond its traditional boundaries” (Grønning 2018). The broader Abe doctrine “breaks fundamentally from the past trajectory” with Japan taking on a role as a “primary actor in international affairs” (Hughes, Patalano, and Ward 2021). This came as the Abe administration “arguably conducted the most significant strategic reset of Japanese foreign and security policy since the 1950s” (Patalano 2020, also Pugliese and Patalano 2020). This scholarship thus concludes that change in Japanese foreign policy during the post-Cold War era proceeds both in “incremental, even imperceptible, yet cumulatively significant steps, and at other times in rapid and major jolts forward” (Hughes 2022, 9) – a description which bears striking resemblance to PET.

Much of the “incrementalism” literature above was written before the 2022 Ukraine war, and some even before Abe’s 2014 re-interpretation of the constitution enabling Japan’s exercise of collective self-defence. But as Hughes and others show, the last decade has made it increasingly difficult to claim that Japan’s security stance is not radically transformed. We build on this literature by arguing that incrementalism is neither the optimal framework for understanding change in Japan’s policy today, but it also may not be the optimal framework for understanding it at least since the end of the Cold War.

Re-thinking incrementalism: punctuated equilibrium theory

As we have shown, the incrementalist paradigm dominated the study of Japan’s foreign policy for decades. This trend ran in tandem with incrementalism’s decades long dominance in the study of policy change more broadly (Howlett and Migone 2011). Lindblom’s (1959) seminal article, “The Science of Muddling Through” criticized the then dominant “rational-comprehensive” approach, which saw policymakers as rational actors making decisions based on efficient cost–benefit analyzes of all available options. However, by the 1980s empirical studies were clear that, while incrementalism was part of the story, it did not fully explain the reality of policy-change. In 1993, Baumgartner and Jones proposed an alternative model, punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), which remains the dominant model of policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

PET posits that policy change occurs through long periods of stability punctuated by short bursts of significant change. It challenged the prevailing assumption of incremental policy change, emphasizing the role of external shocks or critical events in precipitating policy shifts. The theory suggests that policy stability is the norm, punctuated by infrequent dramatic change. Policy stability was due to the development of “policy monopolies”, comprising networks of actors including politicians, government agencies, and interest groups. These monopolies prefer policy stability and the maintenance of the status quo. However, policy change does happen, and sometimes dramatically. They put forward two key processes to explain such change: issue and problem definition (“policy images” in the original 1993 formulation) and agenda-setting. Issue definition refers to the process of identifying, clarifying, and framing a specific issue as a policy problem requiring policy action. Agenda-setting describes the process by which certain issues are brought to the attention (by media, politicians, advocacy groups) of the public at the expense of other issues. An additional key idea here is the focusing events, which capture the attention of both the public and of policymakers, concentrate attention on a particular issue, creating a policy window in which policy entrepreneurs can push their agenda (Birkland 1997). This can then lead to a problem definition and a policy response as outlined above.

PET has been developed and refined over time (Jone and Baumgartner 2005; Casey 2024; True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007). While there is a wealth of studies focused on domestic policymaking, to date there has been “very little attention for PET in a foreign policy context” (Joly and Richter 2019). This can be explained by the difference between domestic and foreign policy issues. Foreign policy is traditionally less politicised, and the public is less-well versed, as the issues are more removed from daily life, and thus less salient. Therefore, foreign policy is more likely to be left in the hands of policy elites with a preference for stability and incremental change. However, focusing events such as terrorist attacks, humanitarian disasters, and war, can drive policy change. To be clear, it is not these events themselves that cause policy change, rather, it is their use by policy entrepreneurs to implement pre-existing policy preferences (Hay 1999; Joly and Richter 2022; Maslow and Wirth 2021).

Pet and change in Japan’s security policy

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a major focusing event for Japan (Purrington 1992; Yamaguchi 1992). Japan, which had become the world’s richest country, faced international criticism for failing to defend the international order from which it had benefited so much. Shortly after the Iraqi invasion – but before the US-led coalition responded – Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, with the support of LDP Secretary General Ozawa Ichirō, attempted to pass a law enabling the dispatch of Japanese troops under the auspices of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Heavily contested, the “UN Peace Cooperation Law”, failed to pass the Diet at first but was eventually passed in revised form as the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992. Following tensions in 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, and North Korea’s Taepodong missile launch in 1998 over Japanese airspace – Japan’s “sputnik shock” (Green 2001, 22) – discussion over strengthening Japan’s defence capabilities gained further momentum. Two months later, the Obuchi government approved a plan to put two surveillance satellites into orbit (Mason 2014; Oros 2008).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US were a dramatic focusing event for Japanese policymakers. Then Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō used the terror attacks to deepen cooperation with the US and engage in counterterrorism measures through the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (Pekkanen and Krauss 2005). Thus battling the trauma infused by the international criticism of its response to the 1991 Gulf War, Japan sent troops abroad, first to refuel ships in support of the UNSC-mandated NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan since 2001, and later as part of the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq, the first time to do so without a UN mandate but an exercise of “de facto collective self-defense” (Samuels 2007, 94). Koizumi also concentrated security policymaking in the Cabinet Secretariat and the Prime Minister’s Office (Kantei) as core executive (Shinoda 2005). Furthermore, the DPRK’s missile and nuclear threats prompted Tokyo to introduce ballistic missile defence in 2003. During Abe’s first term as Prime Minister the Defence Agency was upgraded to full ministerial status, becoming the Ministry of Defence in 2007. Given that Japan’s constitution explicitly prohibits the use of force, or even the maintenance of “land, sea, and air forces”, and the role of the military in Japan’s imperial expansion, ignoring and even assassinating civilian leaders. In sum, this cumulated to a major transformation of the postwar state.

Japan’s security landscape underwent another transformative moment when Abe and the LDP returned to power in 2012. During the election Abe spoke of a multitude of crises, more notably a “national security crisis” (Maslow and Wirth 2021). This “crisis” was a result of China’s military rise and North Korean bellicose behaviour, and also of the incumbent Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led government’s foreign policy stewardship from 2009 to 2012, which he characterized as a “defeat” and “failure” (O’Shea 2021). Thus, he formed a “crisis breakthrough cabinet”, which would introduce drastic security reforms including collective self-defence, increased military spending, and perhaps most importantly, constitutional revision – amending or revising the pacifist Article 9 and making Japan a “normal” nation (Abe 2013a). The US had long exerted pressure on Japan to assume a more active role as an ally, thus, these changes would also restore faith in the US–Japan alliance, again eroded by the DPJ. Abe proclaimed that “Japan is back” vowing to prevent his nation from descending into “second tier” status in managing international security affairs alongside the US (Abe 2013b).

In order to restore and strengthen Japan, and to explicitly prohibit China from turning the South China Sea into “Lake Beijing”, Abe introduced his own strategic doctrine starting with his outline of a “Democratic Security Diamond” (Abe 2012). Supplanting the longstanding Yoshida doctrine, which had guided Japan through the postwar and early post-Cold War eras, this new strategic framework, termed “proactive pacifism”, was articulated within the ambit of the 2013 NSS. Initial domestic opposition to the “Abe doctrine” was quickly alleviated by China’s proclamation of an Air Defence Identification Zone during the same year, covering the territory of the Senkaku islands controlled by Japan but claimed by Beijing (and Taiwan) as the Diaoyu (or Tiaoyutai, respectively) islands.

Abe’s security reform prompted the establishment of a National Security Council, to facilitate a whole-of-government approach to defence planning and intelligence (Chijiwa 2022; Fukushima and Samuels 2018). New legislation was enacted to safeguard state secrets, fostering increased confidence among Japan’s intelligence community and its security partners and allies. The Abe administration halted the decline in Japan’s defence spending and new National Defense Program Guidelines and Medium Term Defense Program shifted military spending from the obviously defensive (ballistic missile defence) to offensive (F-35 fighter jets, aircraft carriers) weapons systems to bolster national defence. Moreover, the Abe administration lifted a long-standing ban on arms exports (Sakaki and Maslow 2020). In response to China’s military build-up, Japan has diversified its security partnerships (most importantly with Australia, now considered a quasi-alliance, and India), and upgraded defence relationships with Southeast Asian countries as part of Tokyo’s own “pivot to Asia,” which in 2016 crystallized into the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) vision (Wallace 2019). Focusing on partners that share the same values as Japan, this strategic manoeuvre aimed to counterbalance the expanding influence of China and thus to secure the liberal international order (Green 2022; Koga 2020) and provided the groundwork for Abe to orchestrate a new geopolitical arena, sparking a worldwide shift in discussions on security that centred around the Indo-Pacific. FOIP was accompanied by the crafting of a new security architecture in the form of Quad, connecting Japan to Australia, India, and the US and thus helping to internationalise Tokyo’s security agenda. Perhaps most strikingly, in 2014 the pacifist constitution has been bypassed through “reinterpretation”, enabling Japan to participate in “collective self-defence” operations in support of its US ally (and potentially collaborate with other “friendly countries” including Taiwan; see Pugliese 2023) as part of the new doctrine of “proactive pacifism” (Liff 2017).

In safeguarding Japan’s security interests, Abe strategically invested considerable political capital in cultivating a strong rapport with the Trump administration during his presidential tenure and thus prevent any potential disruptions within the security alliance (O’Shea and Maslow 2021). Abe’s initial strategy for containing China’s regional influence also involved enhancing ties with Russia under Putin’s leadership. This effort aimed to prevent the emergence of a Moscow-Beijing coalition that could coordinate military and foreign policies in opposition to Japan and, by extension, the US-led security framework in the Indo-Pacific. By the time he left office, Abe had transformed not only Japanese security policy, but also the policy preferences of the policy monopoly itself. The historic domination by liberal-conservatives within the LDP (Kishida’s own Kochikai faction, also the Heisei Kenkyūkai faction) had been shattered as Abe’s brand of a new (i.e. revisionist) conservatism was now the status quo (Nakakita 2014; Nakano 2015).

Reflecting on these examples, we can tentatively conclude that Japan’s security and foreign policy change has not been purely incremental, but has instead been marked by distinct, significant shifts influenced by specific external events and strategic leadership decisions. In response to the embarrassing aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Japanese leaders enabled the dispatch of troops overseas for the first time since 1945. The aftermath of 9/11 further tested Japan, prompting it to adjust its security and foreign policy in line with global, but especially US, reactions. Finally, after Abe’s “national security crisis”, Japan’s security policy marked a departure from the past Yoshida doctrine. Internal and external balancing reflected Abe’s desire to “normalise” Japan, in response to China’s increasingly assertive regional and international role. In assessing this trajectory, we argue that while Japan’s foreign policy has periods of gradual change, it is the major external events that catalyze more drastic shifts. This observation suggests that PET provides the best lens with which to analyze Japan’s foreign policy shifts. With this in mind, we turn now to outline and analyze in-depth Japan’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine using PET.

(Mis-)Managing Russia

Japan and Russia share a complex and fraught history. The two empires clashed over dominance of Northeast Asia in the late nineteenth century, leading to war in 1904-1905. In the last days of World War II, the Soviet Union abrogated a non-aggression pact, and the subsequent occupation of Japanese territory, including long-held islands to the north of Hokkaido, continues to dominate relations to this day. Specifically, the so-called “Northern Territories” dispute, over three main islands and one island group, has prevented the two sides from signing a formal peace treaty. Japan claims that these islands are historically Japanese and must be returned before any peace treaty is signed – the so-called “four island” solution – whereas the USSR, and Russia as its successor state, has argued for developing relations first, and considering the issue later.

Aside from the territorial dispute, postwar Japan’s role as a US security ally guided by an anti-communist conservative elite, inevitably led to complexities in Tokyo’s diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, and relations were still frosty in 2012 when Abe returned to power. As we have shown above, revision of Japan’s postwar regime was a key component of Abe’s policy agenda, and central to this commitment was the resolution of the territorial dispute and normalisation of relations with Russia. There were obvious incentives for doing so: the 2011 Fukushima nuclear meltdown and subsequent shuttering of nuclear power plants spurred import-dependent Japan to diversify its energy mix (Yennie-Lindgren 2018). Meanwhile, Sino-Japanese relations were at a nadir, and improved relations with Russia presented an apparent opportunity to “detach” Russia from China. Thus, economic cooperation and the territorial dispute were subservient to the goal of incorporating Moscow into Tokyo’s broader China strategy (Brown 2023).

Abe’s relentless pursuit of Putin mirrored his approach to Trump, and both relationships were characterized by flattery and deference – as well as concessions. Abe moderated the four-island claim, appearing to accept the so-called “two plus alpha” resolution: Japan gives up its claim on the larger two islands, but gets “alpha”, which could mean joint development, special access rights, or other concessions. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was not seen as hugely consequential in Japan. The public already had a long-standing negative feeling towards Russia, and this event barely moved the needle. At the international level, Japan was a laggard in implementing sanctions. Moreover, Abe intensified his push to develop relations after Crimea, referred to as the “new approach” (Yennie-Lindgren 2018). He attended the 2014 Sochi Olympics, announcing a much-vaunted 8-point economic cooperation plan which included investment in the Russian Far East and oil and gas development. After the Games, Putin seized Crimea. Yet, Abe continued his embrace of Putin. He attended the annual Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok from 2016 to 2019. He even invited Putin to his home prefecture of Yamaguchi, where Putin duly kept him waiting for three hours – a long time even by Putin’s standards.

Ultimately, concessions were not reciprocated, rather, Russia continuously moved the goalposts. In 2019 Putin stated that the existence of the US–Japan alliance, the bedrock of Japan’s security policy for seventy years, was the main obstacle to a Peace Treaty. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Lavrov rolled back Russia’s position on the disputed islands, urging Japan to “accept the result” of World War II and recognise Russian sovereignty over all of the islands in order to sign a peace treaty. Furthermore, China and Russia upgraded their relations to the level of “comprehensive strategic partnership”, and from 2018 expanded joint exercises in the seas and air around Japan (Weitz 2021). Despite all this, Russia continued to push Japan for deeper economic cooperation.

The failure of Abe’s Russia policy was predetermined – as early as 2016, analysts were remarking on how Putin had “humiliated” and “outplayed” Abe (Komaki 2020; Topaloff 2016), and following his resignation in August 2020, there were immediate calls for a “reset” of Japan’s Russia policy (Akita 2020). One might imagine that Abe’s Russia policy would hinder Kishida’s dramatic shift after the invasion. However, the long-term impact was mitigated by the fact that (a) Japan was hardly alone in pursuing Putin post-Crimea, witness Germany’s continuation of Ostpolitik and its reluctance to scrap Nord Stream 2 until the tanks were practically rolling into Ukraine (Forsberg 2016), and (b) both Kishida and Suga Yoshihide, prime minister from 2020 to 2021.

Following Abe's resignation in August 2020, he maintained a significant influence within his faction, which is the largest within the LDP. This influence played a crucial role in shaping Kishida's foreign policy agenda for 2021. Kishida, originally associated with the traditionally liberal and dovish Kochikai faction, underwent a transformation during his campaign for the LDP presidency in 2021, adopting a more hawkish stance on foreign and national security policy (Mainichi Shinbun 2021). He remained open to dialogue with Russia, due to geo-strategic, economic and energy reasons and consideration for Abe, who’s support was instrumental in mobilizing LDP-internal support for Kishida’s election as party president and thus prime minister.

Japan’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

After a substantial build-up of troops along Russia’s border with Ukraine in late 2021 and Western endeavours to dissuade military action through diplomatic channels and complete intelligence disclosure regarding Russia’s intentions, Putin initiated his invasion on 24 February 2022. The domestic context in 2022 differed dramatically from the 2014 annexation, the sheer scale and almost anachronistic nature of the invasion had shocked Japanese public opinion, and the invasion itself became an obvious focusing event. In a February 2023 survey, merely 5 per cent of Japanese respondents conveyed positive sentiments toward Russia, and only 3.1 per cent believed that Japan-Russia relations were in a favourable state. This marked a historic low in bilateral relations (Kyodo 2023). Also, contrary to Abe’s struggle in addressing the 2014 Crimea annexation, Kishida had comparatively fewer diplomatic stakes when dealing with Russia (Tsuruoka 2023). The result was that, when faced with his first major post-invasion decision, the question of whether to follow Japan’s Western partners in the new sanctions regime, Kishida ended the “new approach” to Russia and went all-in with the West.

This decision was initially questioned by many members of the policy monopoly, including foreign ministry officials, LDP politicians, and Kantei officials, reluctant to jettison a decade of perceived gains in Russia relations, and thus lose the wedge between China and Russia. According to the Asahi Shimbun, MOFA officials argued that imposing sanctions on Russia would leave Japan exposed after a Russian victory, left to face re-armed China, North Korea, and Russia (Asahi Shimbun 2022). Some LDP members made similar arguments, warning that “when Russia wins the war, we will find ourselves in hell”. Even Kantei officials warned that imposing sanctions would be “like cutting off all ties from the negotiations”. That a plethora of experts were advising Kishida to soften the line on sanctions indicates that the “new approach”, despite its failure, had become mainstream. However, while Abe remained a powerful figure, it was clear that the invasion was a focusing event and a binary choice was emerging: deeper integration with the West or the maintenance of relations with Russia – a pariah state which had led Japan up the garden path for the last decade.

A feeble response to Russia’s actions would have brought back memories of Gulf War I, harming relations with the West, distancing Japan from its G7 partners and even damaging the US alliance. It would also have compromised Kishida’s reputation as a resolute leader and proficient foreign policy expert within the domestic sphere. The policy monopoly’s initial questioning of sanctions quickly gave way to an embrace Kishida’s far-reaching security policy shift. Thus, Kishida pushed ahead with the sanctions and jettisoned Abe’s decade of investment in Russia. This was a major break with what had been the new LDP policy consensus but his overall security policy reforms followed the preferences of the revisionist policy monopoly. While the groundwork for the security policy changes outlined below was laid down in the Abe era, the invasion of Ukraine provided the focusing event, combined with the public perception of Kishida as a pragmatic conservative as compared to the much more divisive “culture warrior Abe” (Fahey 2022), helped eliminate remaining constraints on Japan's defence posture. This change signifies a significant shift away from postwar pacifism in Japan, guided by a well-defined blueprint.

In a press conference on 25 February 2022, Kishida called Russia’s actions a “clear violation of international law” and “an act that shakes the very foundations of the international order” (Prime Minister’s Office of Japan 2022b). The Constitutional Democratic Party leader Izumi Kenta immediately expressed his support for swift sanctions against Russia (CDP 2022). In a resolution passed on March 1, the Diet’s House of Representatives condemned Putin’s aggression as a “serious violation of international law” and “a grave violation of the UN Charter”, calling the invasion “unacceptable” act that could “shake the very foundations of the international order, not only in Europe, but also in Asia” (House of Representatives 2022). This illustrates that policymakers have moved quickly not only to support the Kishida government’s overall response to the crisis but also to connect the war in Europe to Japan’s own regional security concerns.

Though difficult to assess in terms of its depth, the invasion of Ukraine did give rise to a schism within Japan’s academic circles (Hosaka 2023). Noted experts in Russian and East European studies, among them University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus Wada Haruki, interpreted Kishida’s policy response as a catalyst for prolonging the conflict. Their stance called for diplomatic endeavours aimed at swiftly negotiating a ceasefire (Kitano 2023). However, this proposition encountered resistance from younger IR scholars. They viewed such an approach as carrying a substantial risk of legitimizing Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and validating Putin’s regime. Instead, these emerging scholars advocated for a more resolute stance against Russia, which encompassed implementing sanctions and providing military support to Ukraine (Suzuki 2023). This ongoing discourse within Japan highlights a profound intergenerational and interdisciplinary division. The younger scholars, many educated in the field of International Relations, stand in alignment with Japan’s present policy trajectory, while the older generation of experts with academic backgrounds in history and area studies showcases a contrasting perspective.

Defense and security reforms

The “Russia factor” played a pivotal role in reshaping Japan’s national defence strategy. Japan’s response to this situation involved a significant recalibration of its defence posture. While discussions regarding the revision of Japan’s national security stance had commenced prior to the invasion, it quickly emerged as a central influence in shaping these discussions. The invasion of Ukraine was linked to Taiwan, and a defeat of Russia with deterring China. However, the issue definition was not limited to “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow”-rhetoric. Rather, the situation Ukraine found itself in – without sufficient capabilities or allies to deter Russia – was also linked directly to Japan’s own deterrence. Defense Minister Hamada Yasukazu articulated the necessity of re-evaluating Japan’s National Security Strategy. He emphasized that “Ukraine did not have sufficient defense capabilities nor enough allies nor a nuclear umbrella […] It could not deter a Russia that had a massive military arsenal and a clear intention to invade” (Asahi Shinbun 2023a). Hamada stressed that the international community tends to support nations that demonstrate a commitment to self-defence. Consequently, he stated “There is a need to display the will and capability to protect our nation” (Asahi Shinbun 2023a). As a result, the Russo-Chinese factors became intertwined within Japan's security discourse post-Putin's invasion. In fact, as we have seen from the House of Representative’s March resolution, the crisis was used swiftly to amplify security concerns over Taiwan. In a meeting with British PM Boris Johnson in May 2022, Kishida expressed his concerns of Russia’s invasion being replicated in the Indo-Pacific, stressing that “Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is critical not only for Japan's security but also for the stability of international society” (Reuters 2022). Already then Kishida argued that “Ukraine may be East Asia tomorrow” – a statement he would repeat at June’s Shangri-la meeting and throughout the year.

In his address to the Diet in early 2022, Kishida hinted that the “resiliency of Japanese diplomacy will be tested” and that therefore his foreign policy will be a “diplomacy anchored in realism for the new era”. In light of Russia’s invasion a month late, defence experts predicted that Kishida would move quickly to recalibrate his foreign and national security policy agenda, though others expressed “surprise” at the extent to which he sided with the US and Europe against Russia (Tatsumi 2023b). As a direct consequence, the revised NSS asserts

Japan’s security environment is as severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has easily breached the very foundation of the rules that shape the international order. The possibility cannot be precluded that a similar serious situation may arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia. (Cabinet Secretariat 2022a)

The NSS explicates that these adjustments are imperative due to Russia’s breach of the established international order, with comparable contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region a possibility. In alignment with this perspective, the new NDS explicitly communicates

amid the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII, Japan needs to squarely face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities, with a focus on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals. (Ministry of Defense 2022)

Defence planners have for a long time called for many of these changes, including counter-strike capabilities (Pugliese and Maslow 2020). Yet as can be seen from the expert panels convened for the formulation of the new NSS throughout 2022, the invasion by Russia of Ukraine had a strong impact on the direction of the debate (Asahi Shinbun 2023c). Launched in January, the first four panels were convened prior to the invasion and the remaining 10 meetings since late February, during which the debate quickly shifted towards addressing the new security environment throughout meetings until the last expert panel in July that year (Cabinet Secretariat 2022b). The Asahi Shinbun (2022) explained this shift within the LDP and the Kishida government:

party sources said that repeated recent missile launches by North Korea and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February drove home to many of those in the party and among its supporters that the global security environment had radically changed and required a new capability.

Key LDP’s defence policymaker and former defence Minister Onodera Itsunori called this is “a major change in Japan’s defense framework” and the leader of LDP’s dovish coalition partner, Komeito, argued that these changes were “the result of a fundamental review of what Japan’s defense should be so that the concerns of the public can be resolved and to respond to the recent severe changes in the national security environment” (Asahi Shinbun 2022). This contributed to the issue definition of Ukraine as something not only relevant to European security, or even Asian security writ-large, but to Japan’s own immediate national security – Japan needed to act, both to prove its willingness to its partners and to make sure that it could defend itself alone if necessary.

Embracing NATO and the EU, securing the indo-pacific

Japan has sought to enhance its ties with NATO for years. In 2007, Prime Minister Abe delivered a speech at NATO’s headquarters in Brussels, marking the first-ever visit of a Japanese prime minister to the alliance. In his address, Abe stated that he “would welcome NATO taking more interest in East Asian security affairs, including North Korea” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who was already advocating for increased alliance influence through new global partnerships, responded that “Japan and NATO allies are facing the same threats […] Those threats and challenges are of a global nature” (Fujioka and John 2007). Indeed, following his return to office as prime minister, Abe further solidified the connection between Japan and NATO as part of his “proactive pacifism” doctrine. In a speech at the North Atlantic Council in May 2014, he referred to Japan and NATO as “natural partners” (Prime Minister’s Office of Japan 2014). Ultimately, Abe’s “new approach” toward Russia contradicted his earlier intent of fortifying relations with NATO after 2014 (Tsuruoka 2019).

However, the invasion provided the focusing event for Tokyo to realign its defence strategy and broader strategic perspective. The former prime minister underscored that only a resolute policy stance against Russia could serve as a deterrent to China’s potential invasion of Taiwan, stating

We’re very concerned that what happened in Ukraine may happen in Taiwan […] To prevent that from coming to pass, the international community must speak up as one against Russia, and impose tough sanctions. That will ensure the same thing doesn’t happen in Asia. (NHK World 2022, emphasis added)

Furthermore, in October 2022, Abe employed Russia’s invasion as a catalyst to advocate for an open and unrestricted discourse on nuclear sharing, mirroring the arrangements observed in Europe (Sugimoto 2022).

Abe’s “Indo-Pacific” concept had already been picked up in strategic discussions among EU and NATO members and Kishida strategically aligned Japan’s vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” with NATO’s security perspective. This alignment encompasses the interconnection of regional security frameworks, such as Japan’s Quad initiative and emerging security frameworks like AUKUS, with the NATO alliance. Foremost among these steps was Kishida’s endeavour to strengthen cooperation with NATO (Karube 2023). To this end, he participated in the NATO summits of 2022 and 2023, while Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa attended the NATO foreign ministers’ meetings in April 2022 and April 2023. Additionally, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited Japan and Seoul in early 2023. During his visit, he underscored the significance of addressing the Russian threat, emphasizing that “This war is not just a European crisis, but the challenge to the world order” and highlighting that “Beijing is watching closely, and learning lessons that may influence its future decisions. What is happening in Europe today could happen in East Asia tomorrow”. While in Seoul, Stoltenberg went so far as to encourage South Korea to increase its military assistance to Ukraine (Murakami and Sugiyama 2023). The visit affirmed Tokyo and Seoul’s commitment to bolstering their connections with NATO.

In June 2023 the EU and Japan unveiled plans to enhance their collaboration concerning digital trade and economic security (European Commission 2023). During the Asia summit held in July, the European Union and Japan further agreed to elevate their security cooperation, especially on cyber and maritime security. The impetus for forging a closer security partnership between Japan and the EU primarily stems from the escalating military and economic presence of China. This shared concern has galvanized their mutual objective to mitigate risks in the European and Japanese markets by ensuring the uninterrupted flow of global supply chains, particularly in critical sectors such as semiconductors, thereby pre-empting potential disruptions caused by conflicts (Dominquez 2023b).

During the 2023 NATO Vilnius summit, the focal point of discussions revolved around providing support for Ukraine’s defence and the formulation of a framework to deepen NATO’s collaboration with Ukraine. The NATO-Ukraine council engaged in talks concerning security assurances and the potential for Ukraine’s membership. Furthermore, significant deliberations centred on broadening NATO’s operational scope through enhanced partnerships with the Asia-Pacific 4 (AP4) nations – namely, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand – within the framework of the Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP). Kishida, in alignment with these discussions, emphasized the inseparable nature of security in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific, while Stoltenberg lauded Japan as NATO’s closest ally (Dominquez 2023a). In the run-up to the summit, there was even talk of establishing a NATO liaison office in Tokyo. However, these plans were ultimately not addressed during the meeting due to opposition from France, stemming from concerns that such actions might provoke China. This points to the limits of NATO-Japan cooperation. After all, the likelihood of NATO becoming directly involved in Indo-Pacific conflicts, or Japan intervening militarily in European war-zones, remains low. Both sides therefore aim to improve ties and bolster deterrence without either creating entanglements for themselves or worsening relations with China.

Multilateral aid to Ukraine

Prime Minister Kishida has consistently underscored the importance of Japan aligning its response to Putin with that of its G7 partners. Consequently, Japan swiftly joined an international coalition in imposing sanctions on Russia immediately following its invasion of Ukraine. These measures encompassed financial sanctions, the blacklisting of both entities and individuals, and a prohibition on the export of goods to Russia. Additionally, Japan made a commitment to curtail its import of energy resources from Russia. Putin retaliated against Japan joining international sanctions seizing gas projects on Sakhalin, in which Mitsubishi and Mitsui have invested heavily. Yet, despite such actions, the overall economic fallout for Japan was still limited as its energy dependency on Russian resources was significantly less than Europe’s – in 2022 Japan imported only 1.46 per cent of its oil and 9.5 per cent of its liquified natural gas from Russia (Japan Times 2023).

In tandem with these actions, the Kishida administration extended substantial assistance to Ukraine, comprising military equipment such as transport vehicles, bulletproof vests, medical supplies, and surveillance drones. Notably, Japan demonstrated its humanitarian commitment by welcoming 2100 Ukrainian refugees (as of January 2024, Ministry of Justice 2024). Furthermore, Japan played a pivotal role in upholding Ukraine’s infrastructure, including the provision of electricity generators. During his visit to Kyiv on 21 March, Prime Minister Kishida announced a pledge of $470 million in aid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023). By the end of 2023 Japan had donated $7 billion to Ukraine and was sending patriot missiles to the US, so that the US could send more of its own to Ukraine (Yamaguchi 2023; Sasagawa 2023). The Kishida administration also sought to leverage its role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, to rally support for the international sanctions’ framework, especially among the Global South. This manifested also in the pars diplomatic drive found expression during Japan’s hosting of the G7 meeting in Hiroshima in May 2023, where Kishida effectively encouraged participation from Global South states, notably India, Brazil, and Indonesia. This active diplomatic role stands in stark contrast to Japan’s traditional, behind-the-scenes activities.

Making sense of Japan’s response: PET or incrementalism?

In hindsight, Japan’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appears almost predetermined. It was not a foregone conclusion, however. Aside from Japan’s lukewarm response to the Crimea annexation, Japan’s energy insecurity remained unresolved, and, while the resolution of the territorial dispute seemed remote, Kishida had spoken to Putin in October 2021 and agreed to resume peace treaty negotiations. Indeed, reporting on a press conference just days before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kyodo reported that Kishida remarks “suggested unwillingness to impose punitive measures against Moscow in the event of an invasion because such Japanese action would affect negotiations for the return of the islands” (Kyodo News 2022a, 2022b). Moreover, as we have seen, the policy monopoly was initially sceptical of the rush to implement sanctions on Russia. So, how to understand the dramatic nature policy shift? We propose that PET provides a compelling explanation.

Reforms under both Koizumi and Abe centralized foreign policy decision-making in the Kantei, reducing the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While this did not exactly break the postwar bureaucratic “policy monopoly”, it did empower the prime minister, and it was Kishida himself who took the crucial decisions in the days after the invasion. However, institutional changes alone would be insufficient for substantive policy change. Abe was able to shape Japan’s foreign policy narrative, so-called “proactive pacifism”, thanks to a different focusing event. The North Korean missile and nuclear tests together with China’s maritime expansion in 2012–2013 were defined as a major national security crisis, thus providing a policy window for action, and “proactive pacifism” a logical resolution the issue.

The sheer scale and almost anachronistic, WWII-reminiscent nature of the 2022 invasion was an obvious focusing event, ensuring alignment between public and elite opinion, thus creating a public, political and bureaucratic consensus about the shift in Japan’s defence and foreign policy. The question of Kishida’s own policy preferences is relevant here. As noted, Kishida is from the traditionally more liberal wing of the LDP, and much was made of his dovish credentials when he took power. However, even before the invasion, Kishida had adopted hawkish (i.e. new mainstream) positions on issues from counterstrike capabilities to China and Taiwan. Whether he took these positions to garner support for his leadership from Abe and other LDP heavyweights, or whether he truly has converted from dove to hawk, is beyond the scope of this article. What we can say is that he moved quickly to seize the policy window and implement reforms based on a well-defined blueprint established by the policy monopoly, of which he was now firmly part.

Like Abe, Kishida faced reduced bureaucratic and institutional constraints and he also benefitted from the same freedom to communicate his vision to the public, but unlike Abe, he enjoyed a reputation as a pragmatist, rather than a nationalist. His communication was direct and clearly defined the issue: “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow”. The contrast with Japan’s response to 2014 annexation of Crimea could not be clearer. Where Crimea was a pivotal moment in European and indeed global geopolitics, in Japan it did not become a focusing event. There was no need to put it on the agenda as there already was a focusing event – the national security crisis – and major policy change was underway. Thus, Russia relations, and the possibility of economic and geopolitical gains were prioritized over a distant European conflict, and Abe even doubled-down on his overtures to Putin in the following years.

China’s support for Russia and its “no-limits” partnership served only to increase the issue-saliency, enabling a clear linkage between Europe and East Asia. Moreover, the Biden administration’s willingness to tie the Russia–Ukraine war to China–Taiwan security dynamics has further provided a policy window for to link the two theatres, and as we have seen, Kishida continuously linked Russia/Ukraine and China/Taiwan at NATO and EU summits, thus framing China and the Taiwan issue as a threat to the liberal international order, and garnering EU and NATO support for the FOIP initiative (Pugliese 2023). This crisis narrative reflected public concerns as immediately after Russia’s invasion, 77 per cent of the Japanese expressed deep concerns over Putin’s war spilling over to Taiwan (Nemoto 2022). Thus unlike 2014, a distant European conflict was transformed into an immediate national security crisis for Japan, as well as a broader threat to the international liberal order under which Japan has prospered, and the equilibrium of long-standing policies was punctuated.

These linkages were made domestically too, defining the issue as fundamental to Japan’s own national security and thus shoring up public support for policies that only a few years ago would have been too controversial for the public. For example, Defence Minister Hamada’s statement that Ukraine was unable to deter Russia due to insufficient capabilities and lack of allies led to the obvious conclusion that “there is a need to display the will and capability to protect our nation” (Asahi Shimbun 2023a). The public was also told, clearly, that it was important that Japan be seen as a state that is willing to defend itself, and that has the capabilities to do so – not only for deterrence, but to make sure that Japan’s partners take it seriously and offer help should such a time come.

While the notion of “punctuated equilibrium” does fit the Japanese case well, the mechanisms of PET, especially the role of the policy monopoly, require more nuance than PET as traditionally conceived. Specifically, PET ascribes the policy monopoly control and influence over policymaking, leading to an equilibrium, which is then punctuated as that monopoly’s grip is broken. However, the cases in this article show that as far back at least as 9/11, and arguably even to Gulf War I and the failed UNPKO bill, in Japan it is the policy monopoly itself that seeks to use the focusing events to punctuate the equilibrium. In quiet times, due to the well-researched constraining effect of public opinion on Japanese security policy (Midford 2011), change is slow and incremental. However, when a major event focuses attention, the policy monopoly seizes the window and implements major change. From Ozawa to Koizumi, Abe to Kishida, we can see policy elites seizing the global crises to push through radical – sometimes deeply unpopular – policies which are “required” by the issue definition of the focusing event, such as Putin’s war against Ukraine.

Japan’s security policy: changed utterly?

Before his assassination, former Prime Minister Abe acknowledged the disruptive effect of Russia’s actions on Japan’s national security, linking Europe’s security crisis to the imperative to protect Taiwan from a potential Chinese invasion, while also advocating for a nuclear sharing arrangement with the US. While Abe’s handling of Putin has manoeuvred Japan into a position that initially isolated Tokyo, the broader analysis here reveals that his “proactive pacificism” doctrine simultaneously laid the groundwork for a strong Japanese response towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, thus firmly establishing Japan as both a resolute US ally, and a semi-autonomous actor in international security affairs. With Japan’s relations with Russia now severely strained, the Kishida government had little to lose while being able to build on the momentum to further shift Japan away from its pacifist postwar security posture – thus implementing changes long debated as part of Japan’s new security strategy.

This shift is ongoing, as in December 2023 the Kishida administration further revised Japan’s arms export guidelines, allowing the shipment of licensed defence equipment. Under the new framework Japan is set to export Patriot air defence missiles to the US, while opening new pathways for similar deals with the UK and other close security partners. Indeed the 2022 NSS justified the export of lethal weapons as a measure “to contribute to the protection of a free and open international order based on the rule of law and to the realization of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region” (Dominquez and Ninivaggi 2023). This policy shift helps not only to restock arms depots constrained by Western support of Ukraine, but also to forge stronger ties with the US, NATO members. Moreover, in late 2023 Japan launched Official Security Assistance framework, using it to upgrade defence cooperation with Vietnam and the Philippines, including the provision of a coastal radar system to track China's moves in the South China Sea. Thus, the invasion of Ukraine has enabled Japan to boost develop regional security ties and boost deterrence (Baba 2023; Fujita and Nitta 2023).

The marked transformation in Japan's policy response to the Ukrainian crisis underscores the dynamic and at times unpredictable nature of policy adaptation: even days before the invasion, Kyodo assumed that it would not have a significant impact on Japan–Russia relations, let alone fundamentally transform Japan’s overall security policy. But transform it did, and in a manner that is hard to square with the incremental approach, which sees policy change as gradual and highly constrained. It is also hard to square with PET as conventionally understood. Japan, as is so often the case, does not neatly fit the theory. This makes for a valuable contribution to PET itself – the policy monopoly does not necessarily need to be broken, rather, the monopoly can use focusing events to implement policies which would otherwise be rejected by other institutional actors, and indeed the public.

We propose that PET provides a better understanding of change in Japan’s foreign and security policy than the incremental paradigm. While this analysis has focused on the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, other significant events, such as Japan's response to the first Gulf War, or the “War on Terror”, can provide further evidence, for or against, this proposition. It may be that the truth is somewhere in-between: contradictions accumulate over time in a more or less consistent manner, but external shocks – at least those that become focusing events – enable leaders to enact dramatic change. Or, it may be that the incremental approach did explain change under the Yoshida doctrine, with its emphasis on caution and maintaining a low-profile, but fails to explain the dramatic policy-shifts of the post-Cold War era.

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Notes on contributors

Paul O’Shea

Paul O'Shea is Senior Lecturer at the Centre for East and Southeast Asian Studies, Lund University. He writes about international relations in East Asia, Japanese foreign policy, and other topics such as food security, military bases, and alliances.

Sebastian Maslow

Sebastian Maslow is Senior Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations at Sendai Shirayuri Women's College, Sendai, Japan. His research interests cover contemporary Japanese politics. A long-time resident of Japan, Sebastian has commented on Japanese and East Asian security affairs for various media outlets, including The Guardian, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Deutsche Welle, The Japan Times, Financial Times, Bloomberg, and The Wall Street Journal. His research has been published in Japan Focus, Asian Survey, Asian Security, and Pacific Affairs, and the Australian Journal of International Affairs. He is the co-editor of Crisis Narratives, Institutional Change, and the Transformation of the Japanese State (SUNY Press, 2021), and Risk State: Japan’s Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Routledge, 2015).