Foundations of Baghdad’s Argument that Regions Lack Constitutional Authority Over Oil and Gas Development Agreements

Abstract

Iraq’s oil wealth is well known. In recent months, the failure of that nation’s legislature to adopt a national oil law, and the interest of a variety of smaller and mid-sized international oil companies in exploiting the oil riches of the more stabile Kurdish Region, have combined to result in the Kurdish Regional Government striking oil development agreements with roughly a dozen separate entities. The legal validity of these agreements may be questioned under the terms of the Iraqi Constitution. In what follows, an effort is made to detail the most persuasive and forceful legal arguments that could be proffered by the central government to counter claims of regional governments possessing constitutional authority to enter into development agreements like those negotiated by the Kurds. In short, these arguments are based on the notion of the Constitution not assigning control over oil and gas activity to sub-central governmental entities.

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Rex J Zedalis

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Rex J Zedalis is Professor of Law and Director, Comparative and International Law Center, and Fellow, National Energy-Environment Law and Policy Institute, University of Tulsa; W B Cutting Fellow in International Law (1980–81) and JSD (1987), Columbia University. He can be contacted by e-mail at [email protected].