Paths Towards Large, Unilateral Climate Policies: Policy-Seeking, Attenuated Accountability and Second-Order Government Assertiveness

Abstract

Conventional collective action theory predicts that significant greenhouse gas cuts require a global approach. Nevertheless, policies imposing unilateral absolute emission cuts in the form of cap-and-trade have entered into force in five jurisdictions: the European Union (EU), nine US northeast states, Tokyo, California and Australia. This study examines under what conditions such absolute, quantitative regulations of greenhouse gas emissions have been established and identifies causal commonalities. For all the five jurisdictions, an elevated concern with climate change among policy-makers, coupled with expectations of co-benefits from emission cuts, motivated the regulation. For the four supra- and subnational entities, a relatively low probability of being replaced in elections facilitated policy-seeking behaviour among elected officials, while a desire to expand the influence of one’s own level of government constituted an additional motivating factor. The study suggests that a path with less electoral contestation is more likely to result in the introduction of strong domestic climate policy, although it is also possible to introduce similar legislation under greater public controversy. Consequently, we may expect second-order governments to be more successful in introducing carbon constraints, justifying their efforts to introduce their own climate policies rather than waiting for national governments to act.

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Endre Tvinnereim

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Endre Tvinnereim is Senior Researcher at the Uni Rokkan Centre and Director of the Bergen Programme on Governance and Climate. He previously worked as Senior Analyst at Point Carbon, a carbon and energy market analysis firm. Tvinnereim holds a PhD in Political Science from Harvard University (2005) and a BA in the same field from Columbia University (1997). The author can be contacted by email at [email protected].