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Abstract
Despite growing evidence that projects undertaken to combat climate change currently produce human rights concerns, legal and institutional frameworks for addressing such impacts have not been exhaustively explored and communicated. A 2014 report of the International Bar Association (IBA), Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption, takes a commendable step in filling this gap. It puts forward a functional rights-based risk management approach, through which corporations can be mandated to protect, respect and fulfil human rights in the execution of climate actions and projects. This article evaluates the key contributions of the IBA report to debates on the legal obligations of private actors to integrate human rights principles into the design, financing and implementation of climate projects. The article also considers practical and logistical concerns that must be clarified and addressed to further enhance the utility and relevance of the IBA proposal on corporate risk management in climate actions.
Notes
1 See generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Human Rights in the Climate Change Regime’ (2010) 1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 211 (where the author identifies areas where current climate change regimes may cause human rights violations in local communities. These include some projects under the Clean Development Mechanism, large hydropower and biomass projects, use of biofuels, choices on energy and adaptation, and REDD+ projects); see also D Olawuyi, ‘Fostering Accountability in Large-Scale Environmental Projects: Lessons from CDM and REDD+ Projects’ in J Wouters and others (eds), The Role of Voice, Social Contract, and Accountability (Vol 6, The World Bank Legal Review 2015) 127–47; G Terry, ‘No Climate Justice Without Gender Justice: An Overview of the Issues’ (2009) 17 Gender & Development 5; I Rowlands, ‘The Kyoto Protocol's “Clean Development Mechanism”: A Sustainability Assessment’ (2001) 22 Third World Quarterly 795; D Olawuyi and I Ajibade, ‘Climate Change Impacts on Housing and Property Rights in Nigeria and Panama: Toward a Rights-Based Approach to Adaptation and Mitigation’ in Dominic Stucker and Elena Lopez-Gunn (eds), Adaptation to Climate Change through Water Resources Management: Capacity, Equity and Sustainability (Routledge 2014).
2 See K Taylor, ‘Improving Substantive and Procedural Protections for Indigenous Rights in REDD+ Projects: Possible Lessons from Brazil’ (2015) 5(1) Afe Babalola University Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 32. See also A Long, ‘REDD+ and Indigenous Peoples in Brazil’ in RS Abate and EA Kronk (eds), Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: The Search for Legal Remedies (Edward Elgar 2013) 151.
3 See generally R Abate, ‘Corporate Responsibility and Climate Justice: A Proposal for a Polluter-Financed Relocation Fund for Federally Recognized Tribes Imperiled by Climate Change’ (2015) 25(1) Fordham Envtl L Rev 10.
4 See International Bar Association, Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption, Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report (International Bar Association 2014) (IBA report) 147–53.
5 UN Human Rights Council Res 7/23, in UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on Its Seventh Session’ (14 July 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/78, at 65.
6 UN Human Rights Council Res 10/4, in UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on Its Tenth Session, (31 March 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/L.11, at 15.
7 See Philippe Cullet, ‘Rethinking the Legal Regime for Climate Change: The Human Rights and Equity Imperative’ in Steffen Böhm and Siddhartha Dabhi (eds), Upsetting the Offset – The Political Economy of Carbon Markets (MayFly Books 2009) 292–306; see also P Cullet, ‘The Kyoto Protocol and Vulnerability: Human Rights and Equity Dimensions’ in Stephen Humphreys (ed), Human Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2010) 183–206; D Olawuyi, ‘Towards a Transparent and Accountable Clean Development Mechanism: Legal and Institutional Imperatives’ (2012) 2(2) Nordic Environmental Law Journal 33.
8 International Shared Vision on Long-Term Cooperative Action, Cancun Long-Term Cooperative Action Outcome, para 8. UNFCCC https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf accessed 15 April 2014.
9 UN Human Rights Council Res 18/22, in UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on Its Eighteenth Session’ (30 September 2011) A/HRC/RES/18/22.
10 UNFCCC, ‘Input to the High-Level Panel for the CDM Policy Dialogue: Background Paper by the Secretariat’ (22 December 2011) http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Notes/gov/info_note23.pdf accessed 10 May 2015.
11 As noted by the UNFCCC: ‘While a condition of registering each CDM project is the receipt of a letter from the host country government confirming that the project assists it to achieve sustainable development, there are frequently voiced concerns that this stage in the process is a formality, and that national governments frequently issue such letters without proper investigation and/or appropriate regard to concerns raised by stakeholders. In extreme cases, it has been alleged that CDM projects, despite having been issued with such letters, have been the scene of environmental damages or human rights abuses.’ UNFCCC, ‘Terms of Reference for the Policy Dialogue on the Clean Development Mechanism’ (2012), cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/S/D/9/SD94R1COMGNYTP3BIW7QAZ5UH026KJ/eb64_repan01.pdf?t=VVN8bTN0ZXg5fDDM3LBP1KZGmNsZihzMWYmh accessed 10 May 2015.
12 CDM Policy Dialogue, ‘Climate Change, Carbon Markets and the CDM: A Call to Action: Recommendations of the High Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue’ (2012) www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/report/ues_en.pdf accessed 10 January 2015.
13 Ibid.
14 UNFCCC, ‘Negotiating Text’ (Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action Second Session, part eight, 8–13 February 2015 Geneva, Switzerland).
15 Ibid.
16 See Stephen Humphreys (ed), Human Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2010) 16; S Jodoin, ‘From Copenhagen to Cancun: A Changing Climate for Human Rights in the UNFCCC?’ (January 2011) CISDL & IDLO Sustainable Development Law on Climate Change Working Paper Series http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/v.php?id=17552, accessed 19 December 2015.
17 See n 1.
18 For discussions on these approaches, see Ronal Gainza-Carmenates and others, ‘Stakeholder-based Scenarios for Post-2012 Climate Policy: A Participatory Approach’ (2009) 3 Carbon & Climate L Rev 248; Anna Spain, ‘Beyond Adjudication: Resolving International Resource Disputes in an Era of Climate Change’ (2011) 30 Stan Envtl LJ 343 at 346; Anne Parsons, ‘Human Rights and Climate Change: Shifting the Burden to the State?’(2009) 9(2) Sustainable Development L & Policy 22; Stephen P Marks, ‘The Human Rights Framework for Development: Seven Approaches’ (2003) François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights Working Paper No 18; Stephen J Turner, A Substantive Environmental Right: An Examination of the Legal Obligations of Decision-Makers towards the Environment (Kluwer Law International 2009) at 1; David Adam, ‘Climate Change in Court’ (2011) 1 Nature Climate Change 127; Eric A Posner, ‘Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal’ (2007) 155 U Pa L Rev 1925; Marilyn Averill, ‘Linking Climate Litigation and Human Rights’ (2009) 18 RECIEL 139; Shi-Ling Hsu, ‘A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation Through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit’ (2008) 79 U Colo L Rev 701; Hari M Osofsky, ‘The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory Governance’ (2005) 83 Wash ULQ 1789; Stephen J Turner, ‘Factors in the Development of a Global Substantive Environmental Right’ (2013) 3(5) Oñati Socio-Legal Series 893.
19 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, A/HRC/17/31(2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf, accessed 19 December 2015.
20 See John H Knox, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, Mapping Report (30 December 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/25/53, para 26.
21 IBA report (n 4) 148–49.
22 S Walker, ‘Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade-Related Policies’ in M Gehring and MC Cordonier-Segger, Sustainable Development in World Trade Law (Kluwer Law International 2005) 217–56.
23 IBA report (n 4) 147.
24 Ibid, at 149–50.
25 For example, environmental groups in Nigeria have alleged that the Kwale CDM project was approved by the Nigerian government without a valid environmental impact assessment (EIA) process. Allegedly, the EIA for this project was conducted as a smokescreen, after the project had already been approved by the Nigerian government. Furthermore, community leaders sought to know whether project proponents would utilise associated gas, as was laid out in the project design document, or the cheaper non-associated gas in the gas recovery and utilisation phase of the project. Additionally, there were claims that in its previous independent power plant projects, the project proponent utilised easier to process and less expensive non-associated gas instead of the agreed-on associated gas. These questions were not adequately answered, which consequently fuelled public mistrust about CDM implementation in Nigeria in general. Furthermore, the public consultation process for the project was allegedly deceptive, as community leaders were told by the Nigerian government that the project was an electrical power project aimed at bringing electricity to the community. See F Onojiribholo, ‘Kwale Chief Laments Plight of Communities’ Daily Independent (Lagos, 16 August 2011), also F Allen, P Bond and K Sharife, The CDM in Africa Can't Deliver the Money: Report to the United Nations CDM Executive Board ‘Call for Inputs on the Policy Dialogue’ (Report by the University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society, Durban, South Africa 21 January 2012 about CDM flaws in South Africa and Nigeria); also Carbon Trade Watch, ‘Groups Slam Nigeria's Submission of Gas Flare Reductions for Carbon Credits’ (29 March 2006).
26 Several reports have been released by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression that recognise Access to Information (ATI) as part of the right to freedom of expression. Though not binding, these reports provide normative interpretations of the right to information as one of the most essential elements of freedom of speech and expression. According to the Special Rapporteur, ‘The right to seek, receive and impart information imposes a positive obligation on States to ensure access to information, particularly with regard to information held by Government in all types of storage and retrieval systems … ’. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (28 January 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/40, para 1. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur, Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (4 February 1997) UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/31; Report of the Special Rapporteur, Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (14 December 1995) UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/31, para 35. Joint Declaration of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression of 26 November 1999 www.article19.org/pdfs/igo-documents/three-mandates-dec-1999.pdf accessed 12 May 2015. See also Joint Declaration of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression of 6 December 2004 www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/9A56F80984C8BD5EC1256F6B005C47F0?opendocument accessed 12 May 2015; and the Joint Declaration of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression of 19 December 2006 www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/four-mandates-dec-2006.pdf accessed 12 May 2015.
27 See Article 19, ‘A Model Freedom of Information Law’ www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/modelfoilaw.pdf accessed 12 May 2015; Article 19, ‘The Johannesburg Principles: Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information’ (1996) www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.pdf accessed 12 May 2012; Article 19, ‘“Who Wants to Forget?” Truth and Access to Information about Past Human Rights Violations’ (2000) www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/freedom-of-information-truth-commissions.pdf accessed 12 May 2015; Centre for Policy Alternatives, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, ‘Global Trends on the Right to Information: A Survey of South Asia’ (2001) www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/south-asia-foi-survey.pdf accessed 12 May 2015.
28 As far back as 1766, the Government of Sweden enacted the Freedom of the Press Act, which allows Swedish citizens to access public data. This was followed by Finland many years later when it came up with the Publicity of Documents Act in 1951; Denmark's Public Access Act in 1970 and the Dutch Administrative Transparency Act of 1978. See M Halstuk and B Chamberlin, ‘The Freedom of Information Act 1966–2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection Over the Public Interest in Knowing What the Government's Up To’ (2006) 11 Communication Law and Policy 511. See also the UK's Freedom of Information Act 2000 www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/contents accessed 12 December 2014; Canada's Freedom of Information Act 1982; the United States’ Freedom of Information Act of 1966, New Zealand's Access to Information Act, Chapter A-1. See Birkinshaw, ‘Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental Human Rights’, Administrative Law Review, 58 (2006), 177 at 210.
29 The Preamble to the Nigerian Act states that it is enacted to make ‘public records and information more freely available, provide for public access to public records and information, protect public records and information to the extent consistent with the public interest … ’. However a number of journalists and human rights advocates have been arrested for requesting information under the FOI Act. Similarly, the Act is replete with more exception sections and clauses that tend to deny access to information than those that grant it, a situation which allows government agencies to deny information access. For example, while only two sections (sections 1 and 3) deal with access to information, ten sections (sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 28) deny the public access to information. Also, the time limit provided for in the law for granting or refusal of requests as provided for in section 4 of the Act is very short. The cost of requesting information is also very high. These problems were discussed in the recent case of Nigerian Contract Monitoring Coalition v The Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) (2012) FHC/ABJ. See generally, ‘Nigeria's Access to Information Law Is Not Working’ (4 December 2012) http://icirnigeria.org/nigerias-access-to-information-law-is-not-working/, accessed 12 January 2015; see also ‘Nigeria: Reality of the Freedom of Information Act’ Daily Trust (Lagos, 17 September 2012).
30 IBA report (n 4) 151.
31 EB Weiss, ‘Accountability and International Law: Reflections from Water Projects’ (Lecture delivered at the University of Oxford, 23 February 2015); see also O Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (2002) 11(8) Yale Law Journal 1935; S Kuyama and M Fowler (eds), Envisioning Reform: Enhancing UN Accountability in the Twenty-first Century (United Nations University Press 2009) 5–8. A. Johl and S. Duyck, 'Promoting Human Rights in the Future Climate Regime', Ethics, Policy and Environment, 15(3) (2012), 300.
32 See EB Weiss, ‘Accountability and International Law: Reflections from Water Projects’ (Lecture delivered at the University of Oxford, 23 February 2015); see also O Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (2002) 11(8) Yale Law Journal 1935; S Kuyama and M Fowler (eds), Envisioning Reform: Enhancing UN Accountability in the Twenty-first Century (United Nations University Press 2009) 5–8.
33 See EB Weiss, ‘On Being Accountable in a Kaleidoscopic World’ (2011) 1 Asian Journal of International Law 21; see also EB Weiss, P Lallas and A Herken, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel: Participation and Accountability’ in Kuyama and Fowler (eds), Envisioning Reform (n 32) 271.
34 See R Keohane, ‘Global Governance and Democratic Accountability’ in D Held and M Koenig-Archibugi (eds), Global Governance and Public Accountability (Blackwell Publishing 2005); see also S Nanwani, ‘Improving Accountability at the Asian Development Bank’ in Kuyama and Fowler (eds), Envisioning Reform (n 32) 271.
35 Carbon Market Watch. “Human Rights: How lessons learnt from the CDM can inform the design of New Market Mechanisms.” (2013) Side event report, http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/summary-report_HR_final.pdf, accessed 19 December, 2015; see also Climate Connections, ‘Carbon Trade Group Backs Call to Check Credits on Human Rights’ http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-13/carbon-trade-group-backs-call-to-check-credits-on-human-rights, accessed 19 December, 2015.
36 See E Brown Weiss (n 30); see also Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (n 946); Johl and Duyck (n 31); Olawuyi, ‘Towards a Transparent and Accountable Clean Development Mechanism’ (n 7).
37 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Public Sector Transparency and Accountability: Making It Happen (OECD 2002) 7. See also One World Trust, 2011 Pathways to Accountability II, The Revised Global Accountability Framework oneworldtrust.org/publications/doc_download/470-pathways-to-accountability-ii accessed 12 March 2015.
38 In the 1980s, similar concerns began to emerge on how development projects sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) were producing negative environmental and social impacts in developing countries. These included environmental pollution, unsafe dams and projects, mass displacement of citizens from their homes to allow for projects, concentration of projects in poor and vulnerable communities, and the lack of participation by citizens in project planning and implementation. The World Bank responded in September 1993 by establishing the WBIP to serve as an independent investigative forum through which individuals or communities who believe that they are, or are likely to be, harmed by a World Bank funded project are able to bring their concerns directly before the World Bank. The WBIP serves as a fact-finding body with the power to review Bank funded projects and to determine whether World Bank management is complying with its own operational policies and procedures in the design, appraisal and implementation of projects. The Panel has the mandate of ensuring that projects funded by the Bank are not leading to adverse social and environmental consequences to the people in countries or communities where the projects are situated. See IBRD Inspection Panel, ‘Panel Operating Procedures’ (19 August 1994) www.worldbank.org/inspectionpanel accessed 23 October 2015. See also D Clark, A Citizen's Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel (2nd edn, Center for International Environmental Law 1999) www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/ppif/WB%20Inspection%20Panel%20Citizens%20Guide%201999.pdf accessed 23 October 2015.
39 D Clark, ‘The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 205.
40 E Carrasco and A Guernsey, ‘The World Bank's Inspection Panel: Promoting True Accountability Through Arbitration’ (2008) 41(3) Cornell International Law Journal 578; L Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Compliance with International Standards – The Contribution of the World Bank Inspection Panel’ in G Alfredsson and R Ring (eds), The Inspection Panel of the World Bank: A Different Complaints Procedure (Martinus Nijoff Publishers 2001); AR Sureda, ‘Process Integrity and Institutional Independence in International Organizations: The Inspection Panel and the Sanctions Committee of the World Bank’ in L Boisson de Chazournes, CPR Romano and R Mackenzie (eds), International Organizations and International Dispute Settlement (Transnational Publishers 2002); D Hunter, ‘Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the Interests of Project-Affected People’ (2003) 4(1) Chicago Journal of International Law 201.
41 IBA report (n 4) 152–53.
42 IBA report (n 4) 153.
43 Equator Principles (EP) are a set of risk management principles adopted by over 80 commercial banks worldwide for reviewing, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in projects. The aim is to ensure that projects that violate environmental and social goals are not funded by participating banks. See ‘The Equator Principles: A Financial Industry Benchmark for Determining, Assessing and Managing Environmental and Social Risk in Projects’ (June 2013) www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf accessed 1 October 2015. The Thun group of Banks is an informal group of bank representatives that have been discussing the meaning of the UN's ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework. The group was formed in May 2011 in Thun, Switzerland with the aim of developing practical approaches through which commercial banks may integrate and implement human rights standards in project funding. See Thun group of Banks, ‘UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (The Thun Group of Banks, Discussion Paper for Banks on Implications of Principles 16–21 October 2013).
44 Estimates suggest that US$139–175bn per year will be needed in 2030 to fund carbon mitigation projects, while $70–100bn per year will be needed to fund adaptation. See UNFCCC, ‘Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change: An Update’ (Nov 2008) Document No FCCC/TP/2008/7 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/tp/07.pdf accessed 21 May 2015.
45 See J Tyson, ‘The World Bank's Carbon Fund: Undermining Indigenous Rights or Saving the Planet?’ www.devex.com/news/the-world-bank-s-carbon-fund-undermining-indigenous-rights-or-saving-the-planet-85809 accessed 23 May 2015; also Long, ‘REDD+ and Indigenous Peoples in Brazil’ (n 2) 151.
46 In response to these criticisms, the GEF in 2011 released the GEF Policy on Environmental and Social Safeguards (GEF Safeguards Policy), a set of environmental and social safeguard policies to prevent or mitigate unintended human and environmental harms in funded carbon projects. These policies have however failed to address concerns on transparency and accountability GEF Policy on Agency Minimum Standards on Environmental and Social Safeguards, GEF/C.41/10/Rev.1 (2011), https://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/C.41.10.Rev_1.Policy_on_Environmental_and_Social_Safeguards.Final%20of%20Nov%2018.pdf, accessed 19 December 2015. See A Ballesteros and others, Power, Responsibility and Accountability: Re-thinking the Legitimacy of Institutions for Climate Finance (World Resources Institute 2010); J Werksman, ‘Consolidating Global Environmental Governance: New Lessons for the GEF?’ in N Kanie and P Haas (eds), Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance (United Nations University Press 2004) 35–50; J Werksman, ‘Consolidating Governance of the Global Commons: Insights from the Global Environment Facility’ (1995) 6 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 27; C Streck, ‘Financing Climate Change: Institutional Aspects of a Post-2012 Framework’ (Paper prepared for World Wildlife Fund, WWF, April 2009), para 3(D), 20; D Reed and others, ‘The Institutional Architecture for Financing a Global Climate Deal: An Options Paper’ (June 2009) www.usclimatenetwork.org/resource-database/Options%20Paper%20Final%20May%2028.pdf accessed 19 December 2015; B Müller, ‘2009 Bonn Seminar: On Future Financial Architecture & Governance’ (European Capacity Building Initiative (ecbi) Policy Brief, July 2009) www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/documents/ecbiBrief-2009BonnSeminar.pdf accessed 23 June 2015.
47 V Beattie, ‘The Future of Corporate Reporting: A Review Article’ (2000) 7(1) Irish Accounting Review 1; Trevor D Wilmshurst and Geoffrey R Frost, ‘Corporate Environmental Reporting: A Test of Legitimacy Theory’ (2000) 13 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 10.
48 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Disclosure of the Impact of Corporations on Society: Current Trends and Issues (2004) http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteteb20037_en.pdf accessed 25 June 2015.
49 See V Beattie, ‘The Future of Corporate Reporting: A Review Article’ (2000) 7(1) Irish Accounting Review 1; Trevor D Wilmshurst and Geoffrey R Frost, ‘Corporate Environmental Reporting: A Test of Legitimacy Theory’ (2000) 13 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 10.
50 G Aras and D Crowther, ‘Corporate Sustainability Reporting: A Study in Disingenuity?’ (2009) 87(1) Journal of Business Ethics 279; J Unerman, ‘Methodological Issues – Reflections on Quantification in Corporate Social Reporting Content Analysis’ (2000) 13 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 667.
51 Laura P Hartman, Robert S Rubin and K Kathy Dhanda, ‘The Communication of Corporate Social Responsibility: United States and European Union Multinational Corporations’ (2007) 74 Journal of Business Ethics 373.
52 This framework was developed by GRI, a non-profit organisation that develops and promotes reporting best practices for voluntary use by organisations reporting on economic, social and environmental compliance. See Global Reporting Initiative www.globalreporting.org/standards/reporting-framework-overview/Pages/default.aspx accessed 25 October 2015.
53 The IIRC was formed in August 2010 with the objective of creating a globally accepted framework for corporate reporting in an integrated manner. Its integrated reporting framework seeks to ‘promote a more cohesive and efficient approach to corporate reporting and aims to improve the quality of information available to providers of financial capital to enable a more efficient and productive allocation of capital’. See International Integrated Reporting Council http://integratedreporting.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/13-12-08-THE-INTERNATIONAL-IR-FRAMEWORK-2-1.pdf accessed 25 October 2015.
54 The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB)’s sustainability accounting standard is a set of standards designed for assessing the key, systemic sustainability issues facing key industries www.sasb.org accessed 21 August 2015.
55 See Equator Principles (June 2006), also Equator Principles III (2013), http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/ep3, accessed 19 December 2015.
56 Although NGOs are formally only observers at a number of United Nations conferences including climate change conferences, with no right to vote and with restricted access to the corridors, plenary sessions and some contact groups, many scholars agree that NGOs still make a great difference in global environmental politics. NGOs and interest groups have played active roles in putting pressure on international gatekeepers to support environmental negotiation processes. One frequently cited example is how environmental NGOs (ENGOs) contributed to drafting UNFCCC at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 by participating in government delegations, lobbying, building public pressure and contributing to content and structure of the negotiation text. The influence and roles of NGOs in international law making can therefore not be sidelined. NGOs such as Green Peace International, Amnesty International, Down to Earth Group, Earth Right and Earth Justice can play extensive roles in creating international awareness on the need to address the human rights impacts of climate change actions or projects. For example Green Peace International and Down to Earth Group have already launched a series of projects that highlight these concerns. If stakeholders or government in a developing country, for example Nigeria, can develop a detailed amendment proposal based on the legal framework discussed in the IBA report and seek the support of these NGOs on the importance of protecting the respect for human rights in climate change actions, a coordinated awareness drive would be generated that could result in widespread support for countries to integrate human rights principles into the international climate change regime. See K Rietig, ‘Public Pressure versus Lobbying – How Do Environmental NGOs Matter Most in Climate Negotiations?’ (2011) Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper 70; M. Betsill, 'Environmental NGOs and the Kyoto Protocol Negotiations: 1995 to 1997', in M. Betsill and E. Corell (eds), NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organization in International Environmental Agreements (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2008) 177–206; M Betsill and E Corell, ‘NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis’ (2001) 1(4) Global Environmental Politics 65; C Carpenter, ‘Businesses, Green Groups and the Media: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Climate Change Debate’ (2001) 77 International Affairs 313; M. Betsill, ‘A Comparative Look at NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations’ Global Environmental Politics 1(4) (2001) 86–107. B Arts, The Political Influence of Global NGOs, Case Studies on the Climate and Biodiversity Conventions (International Books 1998); K Raustiala, ‘Nonstate Actors in the Global Climate Regime’ in U Luterbacher and D Sprinz (eds), International Relations and Global Climate Change (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 2001); S Oberthür and others, Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Environmental Governance: Legal Basis and Practical Experience (Erich Schmidt Verlag 2002); S Andresen and L Gulbrandsen, ‘The Roles of NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance’ in J Hovi, O Stokke and G Ulfstein, Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance (Earthscan 2005) 169.
57 W Sterk, ‘House Cleaning in Doha: UN Climate Summit Delivers Second Life for Kyoto but No Deal to Revive Carbon Market’ (2013) Carbon Mechanisms Review 10, where the author rightly argues that international negotiations can rarely result in decisions that have not been previously prepared nationally, and that the current situation is that most key countries have no appetite to undergo the fundamental economic and ecologic transformation that is necessary to revive carbon markets under current climate change regimes.
58 The 21st Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP 21 or CMP 11 will be held in Paris, France from 30 November to 11 December 2015. The objective of the conference is to achieve a legally binding and universal agreement on climate change. See Paris 2015 Climate Conference www.cop21.gouv.fr/en accessed 25 July 2015.