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ABSTRACT
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is a unique case study of the use of warning intelligence. The article shows that whilst Russia’s invasion has sparked a wave of interest on aspects of intelligence, including the use of open source and ‘prebuttal’, the fundamentals of warning intelligence – the forewarning of major threats in a timely manner so policymakers and officials can respond – remain the same as they have always have. The article also suggests that whilst both sides of the conflict had intelligence advantages at the start, intelligence only becomes a significant force multiplier if the consumer sees value in it and uses it. For Russia, significant intelligence advantages were not fully exploited with the effect that they lost the initiative. Ukraine, whilst initially taken by surprise at the tactical and operational level, was able to use intelligence to its advantage. This, we argue, had long lasting implications for the course of the first period of the conflict.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the anonymous contributors and reviewers for their help with this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Handel, War, Strategy, and Intelligence, 237–39.
2. Ibid., 229.
3. Betts, ”Analysis, War, and Decision”, 61–89.
4. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, 151.
5. Grabo, Warning Intelligence.
6. Ibid., 2.
7. Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 17.
8. Ibid, 19.
9. Grabo, Warning Intelligence, 14.
10. See, Turner, Why Secret Intelligence Fails and Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails.
11. ”How do we define intelligence failure?.”
12. Bar-Joseph and McDermott, Intelligence Success & Failure, 11.
13. Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep.
14. Lebow, ”Revisiting the Falklands Intelligence Failures”, 68–73.
15. ”U.S. spy agencies deny failure on Crimea Seizure.”
16. ”How open source intelligence has shaped.”
17. Erwin, ”Commercial spy satellites.”
18. Lomas, ”The death of secret intelligence? Think again.”
19. Shane Harris, e. al., ”Road to war.”
20. HC. 287, 42.
21. Ibid., 37.
22. Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence, 32–35.
23. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, 2.
24. Ibid., 23.
25. Corera, ”Ukraine: Inside the spies’ attempts to stop the war.”
26. ”Russia orders troops to withdraw from Ukraine border.”
27. ”Russia amasses troops near U.S. ally Ukraine.”
28. Samuels, ”Biden emphasizes ‘unwavering commitment’ to Ukraine”.
29. ”Steady increase in Russian troops in Crimea on Ukraine Border.”
30. Kofman, ”Zapad 2021: What We Learned From Russia’s Massive Military Drills.”
31. Kofman, ”Zapad-2021: What to Expect from Russia’s Strategic Military Exercise.”
32. Foer, The Last Politician, 223.
33. Harris and Sonne, ”Russia planning massive military offensive.”
34. Ryan and Khurshudyan, ”Top U.S., Russian diplomats trade blame.”
35. Johnson, ”NATO’s Big Concern From Russia’s Zapad Exercise.”
36. Shipman, ”How Ben Wallace fought ‘securocrats’.”
37. Stewart, ”EXCLUSIVE Russia moves blood supplies.”
38. International Security and Estonia, January 2022.
39. Ibid.
40. Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence, 12–13.
41. Foer, The Last Politician, 289; Shuster, The Showman, 208.
42. Ward and Forgey, ”Putin could attack Ukraine on Feb. 16.”
43. Forgey and Ward, ”White House warns Russian invasion ‘threat is immediate’”.
44. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise.
45. Goodman, ”The Dog That Didn’t Bark”, 529–551.
46. Goodman, ”The Joint Intelligence Committee.”
47. ”White House’s Sullivan says US prepared for dialogue with Russia.”
48. Macias, ”Biden believes Putin has decided to attack Ukraine.”
49. Stewart, ”EXCLUSIVE Russia moves.”
50. Baume, ”France spooked by intelligence failures.”
51. Herb, et. al., ”Blinken says meeting with Lavrov is off.”
52. Ward and Forgey, ”Putin could attack.”
53. Merchet, ”Le directeur du renseignement militaire remercié pour cause d’Ukraine.”
54. Keiger, ”Who’s to blame for France’s catastrophic intelligence failure in Ukraine?.”
55. ”Guerre en Ukraine : « le rouleau compresseur » russe risque de finir par passer, selon le chef d’état-major des armées.”
56. Cuoco, ”Le directeur du renseignement militaire’; Compte rendu Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Compte rendu, 12.
57. Merchant, ”Le directeur du renseignement.”
58. Cooper, et. al., ”Troop Deaths and Injuries in Ukraine War Near 500,000.”
59. Merchant, ”Le directeur du renseignement.”
60. #DFS2023: Sicherheitspolitisches Gespräch mit BND-Präsident Dr. Bruno Kahl.
61. Rinke, ”Germany’s spy chief says Moscow has yet to make final decision.”
62. ”BND-Präsident Kahl in Ukraine von russischem Angriff überrascht.”
63. #DFS2023: Sicherheitspolitisches Gespräch.
64. Foer, The Last Politician, 295.
65. Moody, ”German efficiency? Not in the shady, inept BND spy agency.”
66. ”Strack-Zimmermann kritisiert Geheimdienst’; ”BND-Chef könnte Absetzung drohen.”
67. Freedman, Command, 361–399. Also read Ramani, Putin’s War on Ukraine.
68. Plokhy, The Russo-Ukrainian War, 157.
69. Zabrodskyi, et. al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting, 22.
70. Ibid., 1.
71. Collins, et. al., ”The Battle for Hostomel Airport.”
72. Schuster, The Showman, 11.
73. Pfeffer, ””We Were Born in Revolution.”
74. Foer, The Last Politician, 273.
75. Onuch and Hale, The Zelensky Effect, 235.
76. ”Ukraine crisis: Don’t create panic, Zelensky tells West.”
77. Plokhy, The Russo-Ukrainian War, 146.
78. Harris, et. al., ”Road to war.”
79. Shuster, The Showman, 213.
80. Ibid., 75, 216.
81. Kramer and Santora, ”Zelensky Removes His Top General.”
82. Shuster, ”I Spent a Year with Zelensky.”
83. Shuster, The Showman, 13–14.
84. Skorkin, ”Traitors in the Ranks.”
85. ”Senate Select Committee Holds Hearing on Worldwide Threats.”
86. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack.
87. Ibid., 23–4.
88. Bertrand, et. al., ”CIA director despatched to Moscow”; ”Press Release: Defence Secretary meets Russian counterpart in Moscow.”
89. Shipman, ”How Ben Wallace fought ‘securocrats’”; Seldon and Newell, Johnson at 10, 425–6.
90. Harris, et. al., ”Road to war.”
91. Banco, et. al., ”Something Was Badly Wrong.”
92. ”The Role of Intelligence at a Transformational Moment.”
93. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects, 8–9.
94. ”US warns Russian invasion could see Kyiv fall in days.”
95. Banco, et. al., ”Something was badly wrong.”
96. Shuster, The Showman, 208.
97. ”Zelensky declines US offer to evacuate Kyiv.”
98. ”Senate Select Committee Holds Hearing on Worldwide Threats.”
99. Barnes, et. al., ”Leaked Documents Reveal Depth of U.S. Spy Efforts.”
100. Agrawal, ”Former NATO Chief: We ‘Overestimated’ Russia’s Military.”
101. O’Hanlon, ”What US intelligence got wrong on Ukraine.”
102. Barnes, ”Pentagon Pressed to Review How it Judges an Ally’s Will to Fight.”
103. Renz, Russia’s Military Revival, 67.
104. Galeotti, Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine.
105. Renz, ”Western Estimates of Russian Military Capabilities”, 10.
106. Senate Select Committee Holds Hearing on Worldwide Threats.”
107. Foer, The Last Politician, 224.
108. Schwartz and Sevastopulo, ”A real stroke of genius.”
109. Read Dylan and Maguire, ”Secret Intelligence and Public Diplomacy.”
110. ”US accuses Russia of recruiting officials in attempt to take over Ukrainian government.”
111. ”Kremlin plan to install pro-Russian leadership in Ukraine exposed.”
113. Barnes and Sanger, ”Accurate U.S. intelligence did not stop Putin, but it gave Biden big advantages.”
114. Rogan, ”Fooling ourselves.”
115. Michaels, ”Ukraine: The Daily Intelligence Event.”
116. NATO, Joint Publication 2–01.3.
117. UK MOD, Joint Doctrine Publication 2–00.
118. Grau and Bartles, The Russian Way of War.
119. Higgins and Plokhy. ”Russia thought it was invading the Ukraine of 2014.”
120. Dixon, ”In Long Speech, Putin recognizes two Ukrainian regions as independent.”
121. Putin ”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.”
122. Sabbagh and Smith, ”Putin advisers ‘afraid to tell him truth’.”
123. Roth, ”’It’s not rational’: Putin’s bizarre speech wrecks his once pragmatic image”.
124. Baker, ”Ukraine said Russian troops brought parade uniforms to Kyiv.”
125. Reynolds and Watling, ”Ukraine Through Russia’s Eyes.”
126. Watling, et. al., Preliminary Lessons from Russia’s Unconventional Operations, 4–19
127. ”Putin purges 150 FSB officers.”
128. ”’Tell me straight’: Putin berates own spy chief.”
129. Gioe and Dylan, ”Putin’s KGB past didn’t help him.”
130. Marson, ”Putin Thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly.”
131. ”Destination Disaster: Russia’s Failure at Hostomel”, 13 April 2022.
132. Vershinin, ”Feeding the Bear.”
133. Gioe and Dylan, ”Putin’s KGB past.”
135. Fiore, ”Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical Group.”
136. Ibid.
138. Horton and Harris, ”Russian troops’ tendency to talk on unsecured lines is proving costly.”
139. Ford, and Hoskins. Radical War.
140. Axe, ”Russians are being slaughtered trying to take Avdiivka.”
141. Axe, ”Ukraine is Losing Several S-300 Anti-Air Launchers A Week.”
142. Thomas, ”Russia’s Electronic Warfare Force.”
143. Erwin, ”Commercial spy satellites put Russia’s Ukraine invasion in the public eye.”
144. Waterfield, ”Ukraine crisis: Satellite data firm asks for war images.”
145. Burke, “The Issues in the Collection, Verification and Actionability.”
146. Bertrand and Lillis, ”US officials say Biden administration is sharing intelligence with Ukraine.”
147. ”How did Ukraine destroy the Moskva, a large Russian warship?.”
148. Barnes, et. al., ”U.S. Intelligence is Helping Ukraine.”
150. Herszenhorn and Mcleary, ”Ukraine’s ‘iron general’.”
151. Borger, ”US intelligence told to keep quiet.”
152. ”Interview with Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Budanov.”
153. Gady, “Ukraine’s army must shed its Soviet legacy.”
154. Lillis, ”Russia has lost.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Kristian Gustafson
Kristian Gustafson is a Reader in Intelligence & War. Dr. Gustafson is deputy director of the Brunel Centre for Intelligence & Security Studies and has conducted consultancy and advisory work for the MOD’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, including an integral role in developing UK Joint Intelligence Doctrine.
Dan Lomas
Dan Lomas is Assistant Professor at the University of Nottingham. He specialises in contemporary UK intelligence and is currently co-editing a history of UK intelligence reviews for Edinburgh University Press, and writing a history of UK security vetting for Bloomsbury. He was previously at Brunel University London.
Steven Wagner
Steven Wagner is a Senior Lecturer in international security at Brunel University London. Dr. Wagner is a historian of intelligence, security, empire, and the modern Middle East.
Neveen Shaaban Abdalla
Dr. Neveen Shaaban Abdalla is a lecturer in international relations (defense and intelligence) at Brunel University London. Dr. Abdalla specializes in terrorism and counterterrorism and security in the Middle East and North Africa.
Philip H. J. Davies
Prof. Philip H.J. Davies is the director of the Brunel University Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies. Professor Davies has written extensively on U.K. and U.S. intelligence, joint intelligence doctrine, and counterintelligence.