Boon, bane, or business as usual: Perceptions of the economic consequences of peacekeeping withdrawal from Liberia

Abstract

Existing studies show that the deployment of a peacekeeping operation (PKO) can provide an economic boost to the host state and its population. Some of those studies also suggest that such a boost is unsustainable and that peacekeeping exit may trigger economic downturn within host states. If that is the case, however, do some locals feel the adverse economic effects of PKO exit more than others? In this article, we argue that individuals who come to directly or indirectly depend on economic opportunities that emerge following the deployment of peacekeepers are particularly likely to experience negative economic effects after PKO exit. However, those effects may be partly mitigated through individuals’ economic actions and/or their access to new sources of outside support after the exit of peacekeepers. We test our argument on original data gathered through a large-scale household survey of Monrovia, Liberia, conducted in early 2020. We also draw on qualitative interview data. After noting an overall downturn in Liberia’s economy after 2018 (when the UN Mission in Liberia closed), we find broad support for our claims in the survey data, albeit qualified by nuances in a secondary, disaggregated analysis. We conclude by highlighting implications of our study for the planning and management of peacekeeping withdrawal.

Los estudios existentes demuestran que el despliegue de una operación de mantenimiento de la paz (OMP) puede proporcionar un impulso económico al Estado receptor y a su población. Algunos de esos estudios también sugieren que ese impulso resulta insostenible y que la finalización de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz puede llegar a desencadenar una recesión económica en los Estados receptores. Sin embargo, si ese es el caso, ¿existen algunos ciudadanos que noten en mayor medida los efectos económicos adversos derivados de la finalización de una OMP con relación al resto de la población? En este artículo, argumentamos que las personas que llegan a depender directa o indirectamente de las oportunidades económicas que surgen tras el despliegue del personal de mantenimiento de la paz tienen una mayor probabilidad de experimentar efectos económicos negativos después de la finalización de una OMP. Sin embargo, esos efectos pueden mitigarse, en parte, mediante las medidas económicas adoptadas por los ciudadanos y/o su acceso a nuevas fuentes de apoyo externo después de la partida del personal de mantenimiento de la paz. Ponemos a prueba nuestro argumento usando datos originales, que fueron recopilados a través de una encuesta realizada a gran escala en hogares de Monrovia, Liberia, a principios de 2020. También, nos basamos en datos cualitativos obtenidos de entrevistas. Observamos una desaceleración general de la economía de Liberia después de 2018 (cuando se cerró la Misión de las Naciones Unidas en Liberia), la cual proporciona un amplio apoyo a nuestras afirmaciones en los datos de la encuesta. Sin embargo, encontramos matices para este apoyo al realizar un análisis secundario y desagregado. Concluimos destacando las consecuencias que tiene nuestro estudio para la planificación y la gestión de la retirada de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz.

Des études existantes montrent que le déploiement d’opérations de maintien de la paix (OMP) peut stimuler l’État hôte et sa population sur le plan économique. Certaines d’entre elles suggèrent que cet effet n’est pas durable et que la fin de l’OMP peut avoir des effets négatifs sur l’économie des États hôtes. Néanmoins, si tel est le cas, certains résidents ressentent-ils ces effets plus que d’autres? Dans cet article, nous affirmons que les personnes qui finissent par dépendre directement ou indirectement des opportunités économiques créées par le déploiement de l’OMP auront plus de chances de ressentir des effets économiques négatifs quand cette opération prend fin. Toutefois, ces effets peuvent être atténués en partie par les actions économiques individuelles et/ou l’accès à de nouvelles ressources d’aide extérieure après la fin de l’OMP. Nous évaluons notre argument grâce à des données inédites collectées à l’aide d’un sondage de grande échelle auprès de particuliers de Monrovia, au Libéria, mené au début de l’année 2020. Nous nous fondons également sur des données qualitatives d’entretiens. Nous notons une récession généralisée au Libéria après 2018 (quand la mission de l’ONU au Libéria a pris fin), puis nous trouvons nombre d’éléments pour venir étayer nos arguments dans les données de sondage, malgré qu’ils soient nuancés par une analyse ventilée secondaire. En conclusion, nous soulignons les implications de notre étude pour la planification et l’organisation de la fin des OMP.

Keywords:

• Peacekeeping
• peacekeeping economies
• United Nations
• Liberia

Acknowledgements

We thank colleagues for comments on previous drafts of this paper, along with participants at events where we presented earlier versions of the study (the annual ISA conference, 2021, and public events hosted by King’s College, London, and the University of Queensland). We also thank the Folke Bernadotte Academy and the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (Project Ref: ES/S009590/1) for their funding support. We are very thankful to Kou Gbaintor-Johnson and her colleagues at the Center for Action, Research and Training in Liberia for enumerating the survey. We also thank Cameron Mailhot for his assistance with programming and fielding the survey, and Maline Meiske for her work in cleaning the survey data. Finally, we are grateful to Priscilla Torres for her assistance in preparing maps that we present in Appendix (supplementary material).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Replication

Replication materials for this article are available at: https://ora.ox.ac.uk.

Notes

1 With the notable exception of contributions to Caplan (2012).

2 For further details on the survey, see Appendix (supplementary material).

3 These responses were removed from the sample.

4 Cornell University IRB approval is filed under IRB1911009186; Oxford University approval is filed under CUREC R57153 and C1A19033.

5 University of Liberia – Pacific Institute for Research & Evaluation, Institutional Review Board, Protocol # 19-12-192.

6 Interviews with an economist with an international organization (IO), an executive of a Liberian owned business, representatives of a leading civil society organization, and anonymous interviewees.

7 Also, interviews with an embassy official, and anonymous interviewees.

8 According to an interview with a UN national staff member (in mid-2019), around 40–45% of UN national staff who had been employed by UNMIL were unemployed. High unemployment was also recognized in another interview with UN officials.

9 Interviews with Liberian business executives, an economist with an IO, and anonymous interviewees.

10 Interviews with an economist with an IO, and anonymous interviewees.

11 Interviews with an economist with an IO, a UN official, a Liberian business executive, and anonymous interviewees.

12 While we did not pre-specify our indices when developing the survey, they were developed and revised prior to running the final analyses reported.

13 Around 7.5% reported economic interactions, about 5.5% interacted with UNMIL for their healthcare, and just over 5% relied on UNMIL for community support.

14 We coded open-ended answers according to whether respondents reported missing themes related to security; economic livelihood; community support/human rights; and positive peacebuilding.

15 Interviews with representatives of a leading civil society organization, and a representative of an IO.

16 The responses ‘Saved it’ and ‘Put it in a business’ were closed-ended. The responses relating to putting savings into property, education, or other diversification measures were open-ended responses, which were then coded by the authors.

17 Because the response ‘Stayed the same’ could mean that the individuals never experienced remittances or NGO support, in the Appendix (supplementary material), we run the analysis without these responses.

18 A model with enumeration fixed effects is in the Appendix (supplementary material).

19 This is not included as a part of the index because the interaction does not signify dependency.

20 See for example, Cinelli, Forney, and Pearl (2022).

21 The Appendix (supplementary material) presents results if dependency and mitigation are measured in a dichotomous way, and also disaggregates each component of the index and interacts them with each other.

22 The Appendix (supplementary material) provides further descriptive statistics and a comparison of our results with those of the Beber et al. (2019) survey, conducted in Liberia in 2012.

23 In a further analysis provided in the Appendix (supplementary material), we analyze determinants of dependency and mitigation measures.

24 Interviews with two Liberian business executives.

25 Interview with a UN national staff.

26 Interview with anonymous interviewees.