Afghanistan Under the Taliban

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and much of Afghanistan in 2021, a deeply ideological movement had taken control of a massive territory–and was clearly there to stay. It is, of course, not the first time, in neither recent nor more ancient history, that a ‘revolutionary’ ideological movement had managed to do so. H A Hellyer explores how historical precedents and interpretations might impact the interactions between the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan and other Islamic communities.◼

Three key aspects underpin the background to this article and distinguish the Taliban from other extremist groups that have made similar takeovers. First, the Taliban had a deep ‘revolutionary’ fervour towards their own particular interpretation of Islam–an interpretation that has been harshly criticised by many Muslim communities and Islamic scholars worldwide.¹ Second, the Taliban combined that fervour with a demand to be recognised as the rightful rulers of Afghanistan, and to be integrated into the international order.² And finally, the Taliban faced a challenge internally in Afghanistan from a movement that was even more extreme than themselves: the (so-called) Islamic State.

Those three factors led to a movement that is fervently committed to its own religious frame of reference, while facing a contest internally on the basis of another appeal to religious ideas; but it is also a movement that may be considering the reaction of the international community, in terms of how it engages with that challenge.

Given that the core legitimacy claim of the Taliban’s takeover is that they purport to implement Islamic law, there are questions that are deeply pertinent. What might the self-styled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) practically, in terms of policy, commit to, in terms of rebellious and counter-rebellious activities? How does the IEA look at the protection traditionally afforded by Islamic religious scholars when it comes to different kinds of rebels? Are there options that might be proposed from within the Islamic legal tradition, that the Taliban might take seriously, and which view positively the notion of preferring prevention, rather than repression, of such rebellious activity?

Given the nature of UK, EU and, more broadly, Western relations with the IEA, which continues to be deeply problematic for understandable reasons, this article does not propose direct engagement with the IEA or the Taliban. Rather, the policy relevance that arises from considering these questions lies in understanding how the answers might impact external engagement with third parties that do have relations with the Taliban, if indeed they have any impact.

Taliban members lay their weapons down as they pray inside a mosque in Kabul, Afghanistan, September 2021. Courtesy of AP Photo / Felipe Dana / Alamy

This article addresses these questions, against the background of existing IEA counterterrorism and counterextremism tactics and techniques, and an understanding of an overview of some of the existing literature on Islamic law when it comes to these questions, which ought to be considered by external stakeholders if and when they engage with the IEA in trying to minimise or prevent abuses.

Classical Notions of Islamic Jurisprudence

Schools of Law

Islamic jurisprudence (shari’a) is an extensive and longstanding tradition of ethically and juristically oriented discussions on a variety of different questions. It is wide ranging in its ambit of consideration but it is also incredibly diverse in terms of the answers it offers on different questions, which makes a discussion around ‘what is the correct shari’a position on this’ rather complex.

In the abstract, the primary sources of the shari’a are the Qur’an and the practice (sunna) of the Prophet Muhammad. One should note ‘in the abstract’, because these sources may be interpreted quite differently by different scholastic authorities. As such, secondary sources come into play, which include consensus (ijma) and many others, depending on the school of law (madhhab) that is being utilised.

Approaches to different questions will differ according to the school of law being utilised, but there will also be variety within individual schools of law on various questions. There might be, for example, the relied upon opinion (mu’tamad) in the Hanafi school of law but, within the school, there might be other opinions that are still considered to be valid for jurists to prefer as an approach on a particular issue in a particular situation.

As such, there is a broad variety of legal solutions and considerations that exist within the wide corpus of the Islamic legal tradition. Which shari’i opinion (opinion of what the shari’a actually stipulates in a given context) prevails will depend greatly on the context.

For example: a Hanafi student of their school of law will be encouraged to learn and practise as much as possible the relied upon opinions of their school. This is so they can actually learn the school as it has been developed and passed down through history. However, a Hanafi specialist jurist may well give other opinions in response to questions, when they feel that the questioner’s situation calls for relying on another opinion in the school, and, in some cases, going outside of the school altogether, although relying on authentic opinions in other schools. When it comes to state-backed opinions in a court setting, for example, different religious authorities in the Hanafi tradition have often been very comfortable with not restricting themselves to a single school of law as the norm; these discussions around going outside of one’s schools have been vigorously debated, particularly in the past 200 years.

Beyond these theoretical considerations, there is also the reality that sometimes the world moves and theory catches up. Theoretical discussions over certain issues might have indicated that this route or that route was more in keeping with the ethical stipulations enjoined by the Islamic tradition, but then the world changes and the theory has to try to find a way to make sense of what has happened. It is also often the case that the jurist will recognise something as binding, even if morally reprehensible or even forbidden. So, for example–a ‘three-fold divorce’, which is regarded as religiously impermissible (haram) by many jurists, will still be viewed as having effectively ended the marriage contract.

Updating

There are other considerations to keep in mind as well, which are particularly pertinent in the 21st century, and that is that the world of the jurist as it was in the 1700s or even earlier is very different from the world of today’s jurist. Many Islamic scholars also recognise this, which is why there is meant to be independent reasoning (ijtihad) that is inbuilt into the schools of law, and why the schools of law are not merely the sum of their founders (such as Imam Abu Hanifa or Imam al-Shafi’i) but the entire inheritance of discussions and developments until the present day.

There are three main challenges in terms of the modern age when it comes to these discussions. As noted, the school of law does engage in updating mechanisms; it is not ‘stuck’ in the 8th century. But these challenges exist that have not hitherto been entirely dealt with:

1. Colonial/post-colonial impacts on institutions of learning: the colonial period created massive pressures on all institutions of learning in Muslim communities, especially those that were under colonial rule.³

2. The purist Salafi/Wahhabi movement has created other challenges from within.⁴

3. The modern age has meant that the rate and pace of change is unlike anything that came before it. The amount of change in 10 years in the 21st century, due to technological advances, is probably akin to more like 100 years in the 17th or 18th centuries.⁵

These all have impacts on how Islamic educational systems respond to change and this will impact a slew of different areas from economics to politics.

Indeed, one contemporary academic, Khaled Abou el Fadl, argues that:

The law of rebellion, as a systematic and coherent body of discourse, in all probability developed in the late second/eighth century and continued to be restated, rearticulated, and reconstructed within the same framework until the eleventh/seventeenth century. With the advent of the age of colonialism and modernity, the discourses on rebellion, but not necessarily the law of rebellion, were co-opted by Muslim activists and underwent major reconstructions. In the modern age, the classical juristic rules that deal with the treatment of rebels have been, to a large extent, ignored.⁶

As such, the real-life consequences of these theoretical arguments do vary.

Rebellion and Counter-rebellion: How Should Rebels, Brigands and Khawarij Be Dealt With?

Modern political and theological discussions have sometimes touched on these issues. Contributions include: comparisons between different Islamic classical religious authorities’ attitude to rebellion and the potential to complement public international law (Badar and Sabuj⁷); rebellion discourses (Tabassum⁸); and rebellion and violence more generally in Islamic law (Abou El Fadl⁹). There are further discussions to be found elsewhere, but these effectively summarise the main discussions to a degree that suffices for the purpose of this article.

The literature reviewed suggests a distinction between martial conflicts that are between Muslims and those that are deemed to be between Muslims and non-Muslims. Moreover, there are particular types of intra-Muslim conflicts that are considered to be in a particular type of category, called ‘rebels’ or ‘bugha’.¹⁰

In general, it is forbidden for faithful Muslims to engage in armed combat against each other. However, if it does happen, there could be Muslims that engage in combat because of tribal reasons, for example, or other kinds of wholly illegitimate causes. Such conflicts are treated by the jurists as very different from those conflicts with Muslims who rely on a ‘plausible interpretation’ (ta’wil muhtamal).¹¹

In practice, however, when groups rebelling against any authority were deemed to be rejecting ‘the very logic upon which the order of society is established’, lengthy debates took place over their status as rebels or otherwise, even when they had a plausible interpretation, that is to say, an ideology.¹² If they were categorised as rebels, they were to be engaged with in a certain fashion that is far more benign.¹³

Of course, the question of who designates the combatants–and what designation they come up with–is a rather political one and quite subjective; there does not seem to be an objective yardstick in this regard. Jurists were reluctant to consider rebellion based on a legitimate grievance due to a perceived injustice in the same vein as more selfish base desires.

Indeed, Hanafi jurists are said to have argued that rebels are sinners–because violence in this fashion is unjustified–but they are not criminals because their motivations are not self-centred or egoistic.¹⁴ The Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudama noted that rebels are not morally decrepit (fasiq) but they are wrong in how they interpret the shari’a, and the authorities are right to resist and correct them.

Crucially, the jurists do not insist that the rebels must be independent interpreters of the law (mujtahidun). That means that a much lower level of religious literacy is required to be viewed as having the ability to form a justification that might be wrong but does still put them into the category of rebel.

There are other considerations to be met in terms of being considered a rebel, which are, again, somewhat vague and inconclusive, but pragmatic. Jurists discuss the need for the rebel to have enough power–they cannot be one or two people but rather a substantial and significant fighting force that cannot be easily dispatched. This has obvious consequences; if the power aspect was not included in the category then any individual could claim to be a rebel and thus receive benevolent treatment and not be treated as a criminal.

The distinguishing aspects of the rebel are: that they are unwilling (by force) to accept the authority of the Muslim domain as legitimate; that they have a sincerely held and reasonable interpretation of Islamic law that would direct them as such; and that they have such power that it would not be easy to dispatch them. Al-Shafi’i (an important legal authority) has more or less the same three conditions.

This was an important facet of Islamic tradition that the jurists had to recognise–because there was precedent from the earliest Muslim community that showed that rebellion could not be regarded as sinful and criminal. Otherwise, the Companions of the Prophet could not have rebelled against other Companions (as happened during the reign of Ali b Abi Talib, for example); nor could Husayn b Ali have done the same regarding Yazid b Mu’awiya.

However, the most relevant aspect of the rebel is that the ruling authority (the hakim, the imam, the caliph or whatever the title of the ruling leader of the Muslim domain is) declares them as such. The designation is ultimately a political decision. The political authority is supposed to designate in accordance with the legal conditions but it is their decision to make.

Importantly, if the rebels repent and accept the writ of the government then they ought not to be punished by the government for the damage they inflicted, according to very senior authorities, including Imam al-Shaybani (one of the pre-eminent authorities in the Hanafi school of law).

A famous statement from Ali b Abi Talib is instructive here. When he was asked if the rebels in the Battle of the Camel (which were made up of many Companions) were unbelievers, he is reported as having said no. He was asked if they were hypocrites and he is reported as having said no because hypocrites rarely mention God. He was then asked, ‘So, what are they?’ He is reported as having replied, ‘They are our brethren, who have treated us unjustly (unjustly being “bagha”)’.¹⁵

Al-Shafi’i, one of the most famous jurists in early Islamic law, stipulates about rebels:

It is not proper to claim that a rebel’s blood may be spilled without exception. Rather, one should say that if a rebel refuses to comply with a law that applies to him or rises and fights while aided by a group of rebels, we may fight him either to protect ourselves or to insure compliance with what is demanded of him. If the rebel is killed during the fight, we are not liable for his blood because it has become legal to kill him under these [limited] circumstances. But if the rebel retreats, or abandons his defiance, or is captured, or is wounded, or becomes ill so that he can no longer fight, it is no longer permissible to kill him. Because of the aforementioned, one cannot say that [as a matter of principle] a rebel’s blood may be shed. [This is exactly why] a rebel may not be killed if he stops fighting or is captured or wounded.¹⁶

Khawarij, Bughat and Muharibun

Khawarij were often, but not always, treated as a different type of category from bugha. Within the books of traditional Islamic jurisprudence, there were sometimes chapters on such political matters that distinguished between those guilty of ‘khuruj’ (the khawarij) and those guilty of rebellion (ahl al-bugha). Unlike the bughat, according to this tradition if Khawarij take up arms, many jurists would argue them to be in the category of brigands (muharibun) and their treatment will be far less lenient than that applied to rebels (bughat).

While rebels might fight against the Muslim authority with arms, they are not guilty of the same kind of unacceptable positions as Khawarij, which includes the idea that failing to do an obligatory (wajib) act necessarily constitutes disbelief (kufr); the idea that committing a major sin constitutes disbelief (kufr); and it is necessary to fight against Muslims who disagree with their heretical positions.

However, as noted, if the Khawarij do not take arms, they will be left alone–but if they do take arms they’ll be considered by many jurists as brigands. In this regard, according to this tradition of legal thought, benevolence is not mandated to the same extent, although Islamic law generally grants the right of the political authority to use force only in legitimate fashions.

By reiterating and emphasizing the treatment due to legally recognizable rebels, jurists of the traditional trend emphasized the difference between rebels who accept the legitimacy of Sunni Muslim society but rebel against the political order, and rebels who accept neither the legitimacy of the political order nor the society it rules. By emphasizing the lenient treatment to be given to rebels, Muslim jurists tacitly condemned groups that pursue indiscriminate slaughter and lawlessness.¹⁷

Unlike the rebels, however, who are not to be punished for the damage they caused during their rebellion, brigands are treated as criminals.

In general, many jurists accorded combatant status to rebels, with some arguing that this also served as an incentive for them to comply with the laws of war. If they upheld the Islamic law and were considered as rebels, rather than brigands, and failed in their rebellion, many jurists argued they would not be punished except for their violations of the laws of war.¹⁸

It should be noted, however, that there are many discussions on this point in the literature. The likes of Imam al-Ghazali argued that the Khawarij’s interpretation of Islam is not to be given any recognition because it is clearly erroneous. Some argue (including, it seems, Imam al-Shafi’) that there continues to be a difference between brigand and a Khariji, and that the Khariji may well be considered as a rebel, rather than a brigand (it may be that this revolves around different types of Khawarij). In this regard, the key distinction seems to rest on whether or not those who commit violence are motivated by a religious interpretation or by selfish interests. Some of them argued that if they repent and surrender before being captured by the ruler, they may be excused for their violence against the ruling authority, but there is still liability for acts carried out against private individuals. There are also discussions around what repentance entails–some jurists even creatively argued that fleeing from battle was a form of repentance.

Some later jurists, in what Abou el-Fadl describes as the ‘revisionist trend’, have other considerations.²⁰ They say that the methods of the rebels will distinguish them from being treated either as rebels or bandits/brigands; if their methods are similar to the acts of bandits, they are to be treated as the latter. Others from the same revisionist trend argue that, so long as the rebels are motivated by a reasonable religious interpretation, they are to be treated as rebels. Of course, a key aspect of the rebel is that they cannot be treated with the punishment of execution if off the battlefield, but even this is questioned by noted religious scholars who provide for the execution of rebel prisoners if the rebel remains persistent and repentance is not established.

The Efforts of the Taliban’s Emirate Against Rebels

The so-called ‘Islamic State Khorasan Province’ (ISKP) has been a thorn in the side of the Taliban/IEA for as long as it has existed, but particularly since the Taliban have taken responsibility for the governance of the entire country. To some extent, the two groups are competing for the same audience, but the Taliban have been effective in targeting ISKP in Afghanistan. As far as the ISKP is concerned, it is fighting in a just war, which would put it into the category of bughat, if one recognised the legitimacy of Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

Moreover, the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud (son of the famed resistance leader against the Soviets and the Taliban, Ahmad Shah Massoud), held out against Taliban rule after the Taliban’s taking of Kabul. While it does not appear to hold any actual territory at present, the NRF continues to engage in guerrilla attacks against the Taliban.²¹

The main technique of the Taliban in Afghanistan with regards to existing dissent is remarkably consistent. With the NRF, no real negotiations were engaged in and all the territory was wrested successfully from the NRF (which had been centred in the Panjshir Valley). With the ISKP, it is not clear if negotiations would ever have been entertained by the ISKP itself, and the Taliban focused their ‘soft power’ approach on the Salafi community in Afghanistan, to try to hold back recruits going over to the ISKP. In other words, the Taliban focused on taking, and consolidating, power.

The battle is also an ideological one–the ISKP accuses the Taliban of being deviants and apostates. In turn, the Taliban–which seeks to be part of the international order²²–considers the ISKP to be ‘khawarij’.²³

One of the more recent rebellions discussed by jurists was the Wahhabi/purist Salafi uprising against the Ottomans in the 19^th century. One of the most noted authorities of the Hanafi school in recent history, Ibn Abidin, was active during that time and had rather harsh words to say about the Wahhabis, claiming them to be the ‘Khawarij’ of the modern age. But it is interesting how he then describes the consequences of that. Many authorities would use the label of ‘Khawarij’ to claim the group should be treated like bandits, but Ibn Abidin goes out of his way to note that, in his opinion, most jurists considered Khawarij to be rebels, not bandits. The contemporary Maliki jurist al-Sawi likewise had a lot of negative things to say about the Wahhabis but despite calling them Hizb al-Shaytan (party of the devil), he still does not outright call them bandits.

The ambiguity is interesting, because the Wahhabi movement was extremely puritanical and certainly could be described easily as Khawarij. That these jurists and others did not insist they were thus also bandits/brigands is very interesting, because it raises the question if any group can ever be described as such. If the Wahhabis could not be, who could?

When considering the Taliban and their rule in Afghanistan, this lies at the heart of the matter. From the outset, any strategy of engagement with the Taliban based on Islamic law has a fundamental flaw at heart–because it presumes a singular frame of reference, which does not exist, and it assumes an objective standard that the Taliban will consider themselves obliged to uphold, which they clearly do not. Islamic law is remarkably pluralistic, even in its historically normative traditional form; it has multiple schools of law and, on a certain level, they are identified as equally ‘valid’, even if not equally ‘correct’ (depending on which school one holds to). Moreover, even within the schools of law, there are differing opinions. On top of that, there are scores of non-normative approaches and without compulsory enforcement of any approach as law, all of these opinions might just be taken up by anyone.

When it comes to the Taliban, the original (core) component is strongly influenced by Pakistan’s Deobandis–a conservative religious movement unique to the Indian subcontinent. While claiming to uphold Hanafi jurisprudence, Hanafis in other parts of the Muslim world differ from the Deobandis in several ways; so, one can imagine how different the Taliban might be from other Muslim approaches worldwide.²⁴

Moreover, there are already clear differences that have arisen between Taliban in Afghanistan and Deobandi figures in Pakistan. Taqi Uthmani, one of the most significant Deobandi figures internationally, urged the Taliban to reopen girls schools²⁵ and condemned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s²⁶ fighting against the official authorities in Pakistan, claiming that Pakistan should already be considered an Islamic state, and that armed movement against it would have no religious sanction. In response, the Taliban continued their educational policy and one of the Taliban’s most prominent authorities, Zahid Aziz Khel, publicly rejected Uthmani’s characterisation of Pakistan.²⁷

Indeed, when Qatar tried to impress upon the Taliban the need to adjust their religious approaches in different ways on women’s rights, the Qataris had the advantage of being from the second Salafi state of the Muslim world (the first being Saudi Arabia) and housing many activist-oriented Muslim scholars in Doha. Despite many Taliban senior personnel taking full advantage of the freedoms that existed in Qatar (and elsewhere), there was no shift on the ground in Afghanistan. For whatever reason–and there may be multiple ones–the Taliban have chosen this course of action and there does not seem to be much in the way of change upon the horizon.

Likewise, when it comes to shifting approaches by the Taliban on dealing with rebels or those who oppose them in Afghanistan, it should be expected that regardless of traditionally normative Islamic law, the Taliban will likely uphold their own approach based on whatever they choose; indeed, they have made this very clear in their engagements with other Deobandis, Hanafis, Salafis and Muslims writ large, as detailed above.

Moreover, when it comes to this particular topic, there is quite a bit of room for debate within the traditional corpus itself; if different political authorities may insist, as the literature shows, that their opponents are brigands in order to consider them as criminals that must be punished after their rebellion is put down, then why would the Taliban not take advantage of that debate within the normative corpus? By the same token, if the Wahhabi movement, which was widely considered to be the ‘Khawarij of the age’, could not be described as ‘muharibun’, and rather were treated like rebels, then it is difficult to see how any group today could be described as muharibun. Rather, it is more likely they would be described as rebels, which means the laws of dealing with rebels and rebellion would apply. The debate would not be settled.

In this regard, it may be there is only one approach to apply to these sorts of engagements, which continues to be in line with much of the international community’s approach on Afghanistan. As the International Crisis Group has argued, the Taliban’s cabinet in Kabul has positioned itself as a player within the system of nations.²⁸ There is clearly some contention on this point among the Taliban’s Amir and the Ulema who surround him, who may have different ideas. It is worth noting that the member of the cabinet closest to the Amir, Minister of Justice Abdul Hakim, in his treatise ‘The Islamic Emirate and its System’, does not discuss at all the international relations of the Emirate; which view will eventually prevail, the pragmatic one supported by the majority of the cabinet, or the senior Ulema’s, remains to be seen.²⁹ If the Taliban as rulers of Afghanistan seek to become members of the international legal and political order, then they must be under no illusion that this would entail the acceptance of the existence of international law and the organisation of the UN. If so, that would mean they also uphold basic international treaties, which would address many of the problems that many have with Afghanistan today. Muslim jurists are very clear that as Muslims must uphold their commitments, and as they accepted these legal structures, they must continue to uphold them, even if this somewhat limits their options otherwise open to them in Islamic law, as their commitments override that. It is a pragmatic, political approach, to be sure–but in the final analysis, it does not appear that there are many other alternatives available.

If the ultra-conservative Ulema who surround the Amir were to prevail instead, Afghanistan might well remain isolated and bargain some cordiality with its neighbours, while refusing any external interference. In such a case, the Emirate’s approach to armed dissidence is likely to be more rigid, if anything else because of the Amir’s concern with legitimacy as he understands it–that is dependent on strict alignment with ultra-conservative understandings of Islamic law. This is borne out by the Amir’s decision to start implementing Islamic law punishments in November 2022,³⁰ and by the growing marginalisation of the Shi’a Ulema,³¹ for example. The change seems to derive from the Amir’s disappointment with the lack of appreciation that the earlier, relatively more liberal approach had received. If true, this would suggest that even within an ultra-conservative Deobandi framework there is some room for pragmatism. Ultimately, in the event of an ultra-conservative victory, whether the Taliban decide to consider rebels ‘bugha’ or ‘khawarij’ will depend on their understanding of what best suits their interests.▪

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.◼

Additional information

Notes on contributors

H A Hellyer

H A Hellyer specialises in geopolitics, security studies, political economy and belief, and has more than 20 years of experience in governmental, corporate advisory and academic environments in Europe, the US, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. A non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he is a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI. His academic career has included positions at Harvard University’s Kennedy School and Cambridge University’s Centre for Islamic Studies.

Notes

1. See Clark B Lombardi and Andrew F March, Afghan Taliban Views on Legitimate Islamic Governance: Certainties, Ambiguities, and Areas for Compromise, Peaceworks No. 182 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2022).

2. Kate Bateman et al., ‘Taliban Seek Recognition, But Offer Few Concessions to International Concerns–Economic and Humanitarian Needs are Key Drivers of Taliban’s Overtures’, United States Institute of Peace, 28 September 2021, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/09/taliban-seek-recognition-offer-few-concessions-international-concerns>, accessed 2 December 2023.

3. Charlene Tan, ‘Colonialism, Postcolonialism, Islam, and Education’, in H Daun and R Arjmand (eds), Handbook of Islamic Education, International Handbooks of Religion and Education Vol. 7 (Cham: Springer, 2017), pp. 177–88.

4. H A Hellyer, ‘The Once and Future Azhar: On the Credibility of Sunni Islam’s Preeminent Institution’, ABC, 5 October 2017, <https://www.abc.net.au/religion/the-once-and-future-azhar-on-the-credibility-of-sunni-islams-pre/10095336>, accessed 2 December 2023.

5. H A Hellyer, ‘Knowledge in Its Right Place: Muslims and the Challenge of Modernity’, Renovatio, 29 August 2019, <https://renovatio.zaytuna.edu/article/knowledge-in-its-right-place>, accessed 2 December 2023.

6. Khaled Abou el Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 5.

7. Mohamed Elewa Badar and Mohammad Z Sabuj, ‘The Islamic Law of Rebellion and Its Potential to Complement Public International Law on the Use of Force’, Journal of International and Comparative Law (Vol. 6, No. 11, 2019), p. 365.

8. Sadia Tabassum, ‘Combatants, Not Bandits: The Status of Rebels in Islamic Law’, International Review of the Red Cross (Vol. 93, No. 881, March 2011), pp. 121–39.

9. el Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law, p. 5.

10. Ibid.

11. Khaled Abou el Fadl, ‘The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into Classical Sources’, The Muslim World (Vol. 89, No. 2, 1999), pp. 144–57.

12. el Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law, pp. 248–49.

13. Muhammad Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State (Lahore: Sh Muhammad Ashraf, 1945).

14. Sadia Tabassum, ‘Combatants, Not Bandits: The Status of Rebels in Islamic Law’, International Review of the Red Cross (Vol. 93, No. 881, March 2011), pp. 121–39.

15. el Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law, p. 125.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 249.

18. Tabassum, ‘Combatants, Not Bandits’; Mohamed Elewa Badar and Mohammad Z Sabuj, ‘The Islamic Law of Rebellion and Its Potential to Complement Public International Law on the Use of Force’, Journal of International and Comparative Law (Vol. 6, No. 11, 2019), p. 365.

20. el Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law.

21. Jacob Zenn, ‘Brief: National Resistance Front (NRF) Fails to Foment Unrest Against the Taliban’, Terrorism Monitor (Vol. 21, No. 7, 31 March 2023).

22. This is despite the historical relationship that the Taliban had with Al-Qa’ida, a history that remains outside of the precise confines of this article.

23. International Crisis Group, ‘Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban’, Report 326, 12 August 2022, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistans-security-challenges-under-taliban>, accessed 2 December 2023.

24. Rüdiger Lohlker, ‘Deobandis, Taliban and Modern Islam’, Parts 1, 2 and 3, RatBlog, 10 December 2021, <https://rat-blog.univie.ac.at/>, accessed 2 December 2023.

25. Tahir Kahn, ‘In Letter to Taliban Chief, Mufti Taqi Usman Urges Reopening Girls’ Schools’, Dawn, 21 April 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1686106>, accessed 2 December 2023.

26. Express Tribune, ‘Those Fighting Against State, Agencies are “Rebels”: Mufti Taqi Usman’, 24 January 2023, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2397401/those-fighting-against-state-agencies-are-rebels-mufti-taqi-usmani>, accessed 2 December 2023.

27. Hindustan Times, ‘Pak Embarrassed as Afghan Grand Mufti Calls it an “Un-Islamic” State, Backs Taliban’s “Jihad”’, 26 January 2023, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/videos/world-news/pak-embarrassed-as-afghan-grand-mufti-calls-it-an-un-islamic-state-backs-taliban-s-jihad-101674734747769.html>, accessed 2 December 2023.

28. International Crisis Group, ‘Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban’, Crisis Group Report 326, 12 August 2022.

29. Abdul Hakim al-Haqqani, ‘al-Imarah, al-Islamiyyah wa Manzumatuha’ [‘The Islamic Emirate and Its System’], April 2022.

30. The Guardian, ‘Afghan Supreme Leader Orders Full Implementation of Sharia Law’, 14 November 2022.

31. Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Rawbat Taliban ba jama’at shi’a Afghanistan be marhala hasasi rasid ast’ [‘The Taliban’s Relationship with the Shi’a Community Has Reached a Critical Stage’], BBC Farsi, 23 September 2023.