EU Policy towards Ukraine: Entering Geopolitical Competition over European Order

ABSTRACT

Since 2004, competition between the European Union (EU) and Russia over the European political, economic and security order intensified sporadically, with a focal point in Ukraine. The EU’s main mitigation tactic in response to this competition used to be denial, but in 2022, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this approach became untenable. As a result, the EU entered the competition as an emerging geopolitical actor in three important respects: engaging in a conflict over the European order; utilising its (still limited) hard power; and extending its geographical borders. Most importantly, the EU is actively trying to shape the future of the European order that was challenged by Russia’s war against Ukraine. While pursuing its goals predominantly through civilian means, the EU has also taken major steps to strengthen its hard power capabilities and contributed military assistance. Furthermore, by granting candidate country status to Ukraine, it took a clear stance on its future borders, while these were violently contested.

KEYWORDS:

• EU foreign and security policy
• geopolitics
• multipolar competition
• Ukraine
• Russia

Acknowledgements

This article is an expanded and revised version of a report published within the JOINT project to which Assem Dandashly and Gergana Noutcheva contributed. JOINT has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement N. 959143 (www.jointproject.eu). This publication reflects only the views of the authors and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

Notes

1 See the Introduction to this Special Issue (Alcaro and Dijkstra 2024).

2 It might be more accurate to define the EU-Russia competition over Ukraine as ‘bipolar’ rather than ‘multipolar’. We have chosen, however, to use the concept of ‘multipolar competition’, as it refers to the broader discussion about power dynamics between ‘poles’ being central to international relations. Furthermore, although the article focuses on EU-Russia competition, it also points to the broader multipolar ramifications of the war in Ukraine.

3 See the Introduction to this Special Issue (Alcaro and Dijkstra 2024).

4 The semi-structured guide for the interviews contained questions on the EU’s policy toward Ukraine since 2014 and especially after the full-scale invasion in 2022. Apart from two, all interviews with Ukrainian stakeholders had to be conducted online via Zoom due to issues of security and accessibility. The interviews were conducted with informed consent.

5 Interview with CivSoc2, 2022.

6 Until January 2023, the US was by far the largest donor to Ukraine with EUR 25.11 billion in financial aid, EUR 3.72 billion in humanitarian aid and EUR 44.34 billion in military aid (Statista 2023).

7 Interviews with CivSoc1, CivSoc4, Gov1, Gov2, MP1 and MP3, 2022.

8 Interview with MP2, 2022.

9 Interviews with CivSoc3 and Gov1, 2022.

10 Interview with Gov3, 2022.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kristi Raik

Kristi Raik is Deputy Director and Head of the Foreign Policy Programme at the International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn, Estonia.

Steven Blockmans

Steven Blockmans is Senior Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium, and at the International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn, Estonia.

Anna Osypchuk

Anna Osypchuk is Associate Professor and Director for Research at the School for Policy Analysis of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine.

Anton Suslov

Anton Suslov is Senior Lecturer and Analyst at the School for Policy Analysis, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine.