Russia’s War on Ukraine and the Dilemmas of Historical Research

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine, escalating a conflict that had been ongoing since Russia had seized Crimea in the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution in Kyiv in 2014. In the intervening period, fighting had continued in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, but the invasion saw hundreds of tanks and thousands of troops cross the Ukrainian borders and head towards Kyiv. Widespread bombing accompanied the ground invasion with cities and towns across Ukraine hit directly or affected indirectly by the conflict. Approaching two years on, the conflict shows no sign of ending. Russia’s offensive quickly ground to a halt in the face of determined Ukrainian resistance that forced the invading troops to retreat from many areas, but it is clear that Putin has no intention of withdrawing. Similarly, Ukraine’s counter-offensive in 2023 has faced stubborn resistance and is making very slow progress. All the time, huge numbers continue to lose their lives daily in the struggle, cities across Ukraine face periodic attacks and thousands of Ukrainians remain as refugees across Europe, fleeing the conflict and seeking a safer life.

Putin has frequently invoked history in various forms to justify and legitimate his invasion. From long treatises on the alleged historical unity of Russia and Ukraine to derogatory slurs comparing Ukrainian politicians to Nazis, with frequent asides referencing the Cold War to attack the support of the ‘West’ for Ukraine, Putin uses and abuses history to serve his political ends.¹ Of particular interest to this journal is the centrality of the revolutionary period to his narrative. For Putin, there is no ‘historical basis’ for the idea of Ukraine as nation separate from Russia prior to the Russian Revolution. Modern Ukraine, he contends repeatedly, was carved out by the Bolsheviks with the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922; it was ‘Lenin’s Ukraine’, artificially created without the assent of the people. In doing so, the Bolsheviks committed a crime against the people in these areas and created a ‘dangerous time bomb’. Now posing a real threat to Russia, Putin goes on, this artificial creation needs to be countered and reversed.² This, of course, discounts centuries of Ukrainian history, and the strength of Ukrainian nationalism during the revolution and civil war that left the Bolsheviks with few options other than to seek a solution in the federalism inherent – on paper at least – in the conception of the USSR (particularly when allied to persistent nationalism elsewhere across the former Russian Empire). Nevertheless, Putin’s narrative has been taken up in the media and extended by supporters with greater detail on the events of the revolutionary period that seemingly prove the Bolsheviks’ manipulation of national sentiments.³ All this, moreover, supplements Putin’s general portrayal of the Russian Revolution as a negative event; a symptom of state weakness that led to destruction, internal division and international weakness before Russia’s status was revived under the Soviet Union.⁴ Indeed, Putin warned specifically against such a blow as experienced in 1917 during his panicked speech when faced by the revolt of Evgenii Prigozhin, the leader of Wagner mercenary group, in June 2023.⁵ Continuing the analogies to 1917, commentators outside of Russia debated the similarities and differences between Prigozhin’s revolt and that of Kornilov in 1917,⁶ while Putin’s vision for Russia is seemingly reflected in the rebuilding of statues to Feliks Dzherzhinskii, the head of the Cheka, across Russia.⁷

Analogies aside, this manipulation of history – across centuries and involving multiple, if interrelated, topics – makes the need for informed and nuanced historical accounts ever more urgent. If, on the one hand, historical research seems marginal and redundant when faced with the horrific accounts and images of destruction, suffering and death emerging from Ukraine then, on the other hand, it never seems more important to do all that is possible to utilize well-researched historical analysis to challenge Putin’s manipulation of history as well as the frequent distortions, misunderstandings and outright falsities that frequent the public discourse surrounding the conflict. Of course, not all our individual research topics are directly relevant to the war and the conflict over the history surrounding it. But the importance of systematic and informed research is the key underlying principle that needs defending and promoting, while all topics help foster a greater understanding that bridges the chasms that emerge between countries and cultures during such a conflict.

At the same time, it is clear that the war has made such research increasingly difficult to conduct. Access to archives and libraries in Russia is now much harder than before, if not impossible (and undesirable) for most researchers. Access to similar resources in Belarus has always been more difficult and is now largely impossible. Archives and libraries in Ukraine remain open, but many have been affected physically and materially by the conflict, while access to others is heavily dependent on the ebb and flow of the war. This impact was evident immediately, with archives closed, research trips cancelled, and conferences and collaborations involving Russians ended, in limbo or made more difficult. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that scholars interested in the region across various disciplines have been exploring this impact and the various possibilities for the future in numerous online articles and forums as well as seminars and conference panels.⁸

It seems pertinent, then, that Revolutionary Russia joins the fray, exploring the impact of the war on research into Russian history, particularly the late Imperial, revolutionary and early Soviet periods that form the focus of the journal’s interests. With this aim, we asked six historians, all of whom have worked on aspects of these periods, to offer their thoughts on the impact of the current war on historical research. Contributors were not provided with any other objectives or asked any guiding questions; instead, they were permitted the leeway to use the format of a short essay to explore whatever concerns them. The results share certain similarities: unsurprisingly, the practical difficulties governing on-the-ground research across the region are touched on to a greater or lesser extent in all the pieces. Otherwise, the emphases taken by the different authors vary. Nevertheless, most remain positive, both about the importance of historical research (despite the immediate horrors of war and the seemingly unbridgeable and increasingly divisive public discourse) and the ability of historians to conduct meaningful research despite the problems posed by the conflict.

The forum starts with the contribution by Olena Palko who points out the Russo-centrism of Western academia that often essentializes the Romanov empire and Soviet Union as Russia. Palko argues that the archival revolution in Russia at least wasn’t that revolutionary and was limited by continued restrictions to access to sources, while in the republics, including Ukraine, access was usually less restrictive. She also challenges us to question the myths of Russia's common origin with Ukraine.

Alison Smith explores the significance of doing research on Imperial Russia at this moment. Smith argues that the Imperial turn that began over a decade ago has shown the complexity of the empire and the recent calls to decolonize our field should be seen as pushing this movement forward. Smith also provides some avenues to continue research and scholarship without accessing archives and libraries in Russia.

George Gilbert extends Smith’s discussion of doing research on the empire at this moment. Gilbert discusses possible avenues, and pitfalls, for research on the late Imperial period. He notes that this is not a return to the Cold War era – there are more primary resources available now, even though Western scholars cannot physically visit the archives, and more scholarship on which to build.

Also focusing heavily on the practicalities of conducting research into the region, Matthew Rendle explores the legacy of the post-Soviet ‘archival revolution’. Despite the fears of some that the field has returned to the restrictive conditions that were faced by researchers under the USSR, Rendle argues that the legacy of the archival revolution has been far more durable. New approaches have transformed our understanding of the revolutionary period, while the post-1991 years have seen a steady increase in the number of sources available without travelling to Russia (particularly when allied to recent digitization projects). Clearly these are no substitutes for unrestricted access, but equally clearly there is plenty of scope for further research, even if research questions will require an even greater accommodation with the available sources than normal.

Aaron Retish looks at access to primary resources in Russia’s regions. Like Rendle, Retish finds that there is an abundance of sources available for Western scholars to draw on when researching topics beyond the centre, and that it is still possible to produce significant scholarship and to train students. He notes, however, that available sources are themselves problematic and that we need to be conscious of why they are accessible. Retish argues that studying the regions is especially important now as their diverse histories complicates the dominant narrative from the urban capitals. He notes that studying the regions is also important for maintaining professional ties with colleagues beyond the centre.

Sarah Slye concludes this forum by looking at the state of archival access and higher education in Georgia today. In an extended history of post-Soviet Georgia, Slye documents a push and pull between a democratic, Western-facing politics and society and a more authoritarian path similar to Russia. The country’s growing authoritarian tendencies and Russia’s war in Ukraine has brought a regression in academic freedom and threatened access to the archives.

All the contributors show how the war has reshaped Western scholars’ research on the region, but they all conclude that it is still possible to produce serious scholarship, despite the restrictive conditions. The impracticalities of doing historical research seem trivial in the face of the huge loss of life and general suffering in Ukraine and the continued crackdown on dissent in Russia and Georgia. The scholarship that we produce, though, should remind us that historians can be a powerful counter force to the Kremlin’s manipulation of history and to the authoritarian tilt there and elsewhere across the region and the world.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Matthew Rendle

Matthew Rendle is an Associate Professor of Russian History at the University of Exeter. He is the author of two books, two edited collections, and numerous articles on the revolutionary period in Russian history including, most recently, The State versus The People: Revolutionary Justice in Russia's Civil War, 1917-1922 (Oxford University Press, 2020).

Aaron B. Retish

Aaron B. Retish is Professor of Russian history at Wayne State University. He is the author of Russia's Peasants in Revolution and Civil War and co-editor of three books, including, most recently, Social Control under Stalin and Khrushchev: The Phantom of a Well-Ordered State.

Notes

1 For an accessible survey focused on Ukraine, see Reid, ‘Putin’s War on History’.

2 See, variously, Putin’s essay ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’; his address recognizing the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, 21 February 2022, at http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828; his speech celebrating their formal annexation, 30 September 2022, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465; and even his comments in a recent meeting, 3 November 2023, at https://tass.ru/politika/19196009. All accessed on 29 November 2023.

3 See, for instance, the articles by Nepogodin for RT: ‘How Lenin’s Bolsheviks’; and ‘Doomed to Fail’.

4 Rendle and Lively, ‘The Antirevolutionary Commemoration’.

5 Putin’s speech, 24 June 2023, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71496 [last accessed 29 November 2023].

6 Zubok, ‘Russia’s New Time of Troubles’.

7 Robinson, ‘The Politics of Commemoration’; and Faulconbridge, ‘Iron Felix’.

8 As good, indicative examples, see the editorials ‘Through the Glass, Darkly’; and ‘Coping with Disaster’; and the forum on the war’s impact on research on nineteenth-century Russian cultural change in Ab Imperio, 2022, no. 2.