Success and Failure in Terrorist Investigations: Research and Lessons from Northern Ireland

Abstract

Police investigations of terrorist incidents are rarely straightforward. This paper reports the findings of research that looked at low-level paramilitary attacks in Northern Ireland which have taken place during the ceasefire era. Of 500 incidents studied, 28 were followed by the arrest of suspects. The study examines what factors were important for linking later arrests with other features of the incident. These results are discussed in terms of the wider implications for the successful investigation of paramilitary offences and in terms of the specific implications for investigative policing within Northern Ireland.

Notes

 1. For discussion of both these events and their impact see < http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4532073.stm>.

 2. For example, see Chris Ryder, RUC 1922-2000 (London: Arrow, 2000); and Andrew Silke, ‘Bitter Harvests: The Royal Ulster Constabulary's Response to Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland’, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2000) pp. 27–46.

 3. C. Wellford and J. Cronin, An analysis of Variables Affecting the Clearance of Homicides: A Multistate Study (Washington, DC: Justice Research and Statistics Association, 1999), p. 6.

 4. T. Gabor, M. Baril, M. Cusson, D. Elie, M. LeBlanc and A. Normandeau, Armed Robbery: Cops, Robbers, and Victims (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1987).

 5. Wellford and Cronin.

 6. R. Bachman, ‘Victim's Perceptions of Initial Police Responses to Robbery and Aggravated Assault: Does Race Matter?’, Journal of Quantitative Criminology, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1996), pp. 363–90.

 7. C. Connolly, S. Huzurbazar and T. Routh-McGee, ‘Multiple Parties in Domestic Violence Situations and Arrest’, Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2000), pp. 181–8.

 8. Gabor, et al.

 9. Gabor

10. Gabor

11. Gabor, p. 140.

12. For a relevant general discussion of the evidence on these points, see Andrew Silke, ‘Cheshire-cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research’, Psychology, Crime, and Law, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1998), pp. 51–69. More recently, Marc Sageman has provided similar evidence but this time within the context of extreme Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda. See: Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

13. Bruce Hoffman, ‘Why Terrorists Don't Claim Credit’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1–6.

14. Bruce Hoffman, ‘Why Terrorists Don't Claim Credit’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1997), p. 5.

15. See Andrew Silke, ‘In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part one: Extortion and Blackmail’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.21 (1998), pp. 331–61.

16. For more on this, see Rachel Monaghan, ‘“An Imperfect Peace”: Paramilitary “Punishments” in Northern Ireland’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2004), pp. 439–61.

17. ‘Beating Gangs Escape the Law’, News Letter, 15 March 1997, p. 8.

18. For more on the Wright case, see: Jim McDowell, Godfathers: Inside Northern Ireland's Drugs Racket (Dublin: Gill and McMillan, 2001); and also Andrew Silke, ‘Drink, Drugs and Rock'n'Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part Two’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2002), pp. 107–27. A good account of the circumstances surrounding Wright's death in prison can be found in Chris Anderson, The Billy Boy: The Life and Death of LVF Leader Billy Wright (London: Mainstream, 2002) though it is worth noting that this book is less satisfactory in the account it gives of Wright's activities prior to his imprisonment.

19. Gabor et al.

20. Bachman.

21. Gabor et al.

22. Gabor et al

23. Connolly et al.

24. Connolly et al

25. Bachman.