Depleted Uranium in Ukraine: Lessons from the Balkans and Iraq

INTRODUCTION

With the news that the United Kingdom and the United States will be shipping Depleted Uranium ammunition to the Ukrainian military, and the knowledge that Russia also has Depleted Uranium weapons in its arsenal, it is clear that Depleted Uranium will be used in the war in Ukraine. Depleted Uranium has been used in many wars, including in Iraq and the Balkans. Many questions remain about the long-term impact of Depleted Uranium in Iraq and the Balkans, and determining the level of harm done to civilian populations and veterans remains difficult. Analyzing how Depleted Uranium was used, how it was studied, and how it was cleaned up can provide lessons to Ukraine, especially in dealing with risk education. This paper will ultimately conclude that the primary reason this weapon’s impact is not fully understood is not because of the nature of the weapon, but rather because of a lack of attention paid to it, and therefore also a lack of funding in its study and clearance. It will argue that Ukraine would do well to avoid making this mistake and give priority to Depleted Uranium research, clearance, and risk education provided to local populations near strike sites.

When Yugoslavia began to collapse at the end of the Cold War, various regions responded by declaring their independence. The government in Belgrade, led by Slobodan Milosevic, refused to let them go, and a series of wars, genocides, and ethnic cleansing campaigns occurred across the former Yugoslavia as a result. NATO forces intervened, essentially breaking the power of the Yugoslavian military in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo (Traynor 2006). In the process of destroying the Yugoslavian military’s capacity to subjugate BiH and Kosovo, NATO used Depleted Uranium against enemy positions and armor (Cullen and Weir 2010).

Iraq was affected by Depleted Uranium in both the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, and the 2003 Invasion by US/UK led Coalition Forces. It is estimated that about 300 tons of Depleted Uranium was used in the Persian Gulf War and an unknown amount was used following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq (Bruess and Snell 2020).

In 2022, Vladimir Putin announced the invasion of Ukraine, explicitly saying that, “Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood,” (Reuters 2022, 1). Russian forces failed to take Kyiv, and combined casualties are now possibly over 300,000 (Faulconbridge 2023). NATO countries have decided to supply Ukrainian forces with Depleted Uranium in hopes of breaking a stalemate in the war (Copp 2023). It is also possible that Russian forces have used Depleted Uranium in Ukraine as well, as Depleted Uranium has been part of their arsenal for years (Peck 2018).

Research on Depleted Uranium

In the immediate aftermath of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, questions began to arise about the health impacts from Depleted Uranium usage. These questions had been growing since Depleted Uranium was first used on a large scale in the Persian Gulf War, and initial reports of higher rates of cancer among soldiers that served in the Gulf and the Balkans saw higher levels of media coverage. In 1999, Depleted Uranium was the main story for 60 min, one of the top ten most watched shows in the USA at the time (Klein 1999, “D. U.”). In 2001, it would reach its zenith in reporting, with over 5000 stories about it (global.factiva.com). However, reporting on the issue largely disparaged the idea that it caused real harm, with Wall Street Journal editorials calling it “hypochondria” (Stephens 2001, 1) and “Kremlin propaganda,” (Socor 2001, 1). Even the 60 min episode from 1999 warned that the issue might be seen as siding with the Milosevic and Hussein regimes if groups opposing Depleted Uranium’s usage were not careful. This ties in with Elvira Rosert’s argument that salience is a key factor in whether a taboo is formed around a weapon. Rosert defines “salience” as “the amount of attention granted to an issue,” (Rosert 2019, 78) and it is clear that, while attention may have been granted to Depleted Uranium weapons at the time, the kind of attention it was getting meant that simply being covered was not enough. For taboo creation, not all publicity is good publicity.

This has similar modern day echoes, as the Putin regime is arguing that Depleted Uranium is dangerous and should not be used, and Ukraine’s allies are arguing it is safe, with the UK saying that independent scientists have “assessed that any impact to personal health and the environment from the use of depleted uranium munitions is likely to be low,” (Gozzi 2023, 1). Again, it should be noted that Russia uses Depleted Uranium too. Indeed, the International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (ICBUW) researched Russian language publications and discovered that many penetrators that the Russian government had claimed were tungsten, were actually alloys that mixed tungsten and Depleted Uranium, including the Svinets-2 (3БМ-70) penetrators (Kukin 2023).

However, in the over 20 years since the end of the Kosovo campaign, the case against Depleted Uranium has only grown stronger. Alexandra C. Miller of the United States Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) released many studies showing the negative impact of Depleted Uranium on human cell cultures and animals, concluding in 2009 that, “These in vitro and in vivo investigations have not only demonstrated the neoplastic transforming ability, the mutagenicity and the genotoxicity of DU, but also the neurotoxicity of DU. …Chronic internal exposure studies in vivo have demonstrated that DU is leukemogenic and neurotoxic,” (Miller 2009, 3021).

Allegations that the use of Depleted Uranium in the Persian Gulf War negatively affected civilians and veterans have been around for decades, including in Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović’s 2001 article in Peace Review (Nikolić-Ristanović 2001, 580). However, these allegations were difficult to prove at the time. More recently, a series of studies in Iraq have shown direct links to Depleted Uranium exposure and health issues. A team of scientists based in Iraq took 60 people who had leukemia and 60 people who were healthy and used a CR-39 track detector to discover the amount of Depleted Uranium in their blood. They found that, “The independent sample t Test confirmed statistically significant difference in the uranium concentration between the leukemia patients and healthy group (p < 0.001),” (Al-Hamzawi, Jaafar, and Tawfiq 2014, 1270). In 2020, Mozhgan Savabieasfahani et al. released a study showing that the proximity to a US military base had a significant correspondence with higher levels of Depleted Uranium and Thorium (a direct product of Depleted Uranium decay) in the teeth and hair of children. Using Tallil Air Base in Nasiriyah as their case study, they found that living closer to the base created both a statistically significant increase in having a child with a congenital birth defect and a statistically significant increase in the amount of thorium and uranium found in the hair samples of the children. They also noticed a statistically significant correlation between levels of thorium and uranium in the hair samples and the risk of congenital anomalies. Savabieasfahani et al. believed that this exposure was likely caused by Depleted Uranium products being ignited in on-base burn pits, (Savabieasfahani, Basher Ahamadani, and Mahdavi Damghani 2020).

While these Iraqi studies have faced criticism for bias (especially for issues related to confounding variables), this criticism must be tempered by the fact that the research is being done in a conflict area. Regardless of the criticism, Depleted Uranium is classified by the International Agency for Research on Cancer as a Group I carcinogen, defined as “limited evidence in humans and sufficient evidence in experimental animals,” (Surdyk et al. 2021, 1).

Research from the Balkans has also grown as the years have gone on. Shortly after NATO’s interdiction in Kosovo, a number of studies began in the early 2000s. One study found that testicular cancer among men in Eastern Croatia is 3.5 times higher than among prewar populations. The authors attributed this to Depleted Uranium usage (Sudarjevic et al. 2014). Another found that hematological malignancies (bone and immune system cancers, like leukemia), had all increased since the end of the war in Kosovo in 1999. By 2015, cases were 82% higher than they had been before the war, and specifically, “Gjakova and Peja, the first and third most exposed regions to DU ordnance ranked first and second… Prishtina, Gjilan and Ferizaj, regions with the least number of rounds/km2, were characterized by a decline of incidence rates,” (Latifi-Pupovci et al. 2020, 1). The authors urged caution, however, and said that more research was required (Latifi-Pupovci et al. 2020, 9). Lind et al. did a test with DU samples from Kosovo (and Kuwait) where they placed them in simulated stomach acid. The researchers found that 73–96% of the DU particles dissolved within a week. This suggests that, if ingested orally, Depleted Uranium would be largely bioaccessible to human beings (Lind et al. 2009).

One study done by an institute at the University of Sarajevo in 2007 is of particular interest. It compared three population groups that had faced various forms of exposure in Bosnia & Herzegovina. One group was a control group that had not been exposed to any known toxins from that war, another had been exposed to toxins from the Siege of Sarajevo but not Depleted Uranium, and the final group were workers at a factory in Hadžići which been hit by Depleted Uranium projectiles. The study found that the group from Hadžići had significantly higher levels of chromosomal aberrations than either of the other groups. The researchers controlled for gender and smoking and concluded that Depleted Uranium exposure was likely the cause for the aberrations (Ibrulj, Haverić, and Haverić 2007). I was able to interview one of the authors of this article, Anja Haverić, and she noted that while they had controlled for many other variables, they had not been able to control for age in the pilot study. They had hoped, given the findings, that they would be able to do more studies and get to the bottom of what they had seen. However, as she noted, “when we finished that pilot study, and when we realized that the groups were not perfectly matched, we wanted to extend the study to the investigation, but we didn’t get any additional funding,” (Interview with Anja Haverić, 2022). Their funding had come from the Federal Ministry of Science and Education, and even though their research had found statistically significant results that showed there might be real harm to the population from Depleted Uranium, their funding was not extended due to other scientific interests at the time. The institute continued to be funded, just not the project on Depleted Uranium.

Ukraine should not make the mistake of cutting funding for research. It should also take heed of the above research and recognize that there is a reasonable amount of risk posed by Depleted Uranium. If it uses Depleted Uranium, then it should keep track of all the places where it was used, and make sure they are cleared. This has not happened to the scale that it should have in the Balkans or Iraq, and that lack of clearance may have directly contributed to the rise in cancers and birth defects in those regions.

Depleted Uranium Clearance

Clearing Depleted Uranium is no easy task. According to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), there are a number of safety procedures that have to be followed. Gloves, a high-quality mask, and an entire outer layer of disposable clothing have to be worn. Once the Depleted Uranium is found, it must be disposed of by being put in a metal box with soil (the box must be made of metal, because other materials might absorb the radiation). From there, not only is the person clearing it not supposed to touch the Depleted Uranium, they are not even supposed to touch the box that it is placed in. The box must have a warning placed on it so that no one else accidentally touches it (IMAS 2015).

This can be an incredibly expensive and time-consuming process. It is even more difficult and costly than clearing landmines, and if it is not done properly, the consequences can be severe. An internal document by the British Ministry of Defence written in 1997 (and leaked in 2001) states (Norton-Taylor 2001, 1):

All personnel… should be aware that uranium dust inhalation carries a long-term risk… [the dust] has been shown to increase the risks of developing lung, lymph and brain cancers. …Working inside a DU dust-contaminated vehicle without adequate respiratory protection will expose the worker to up to eight times the OES [the occupational exposure standard or accepted exposure level].

Indeed, after the Persian Gulf War, a group of British soldiers were sent to clear tanks that had been hit by Depleted Uranium, but they were not told that Depleted Uranium had been used and were not given proper personal protective equipment. Years later, they were experiencing severe health issues, and some had had birth defects in their children. One of these veterans, Kenny Duncan, sued the British government and, with the help of German biochemist Albrecht Schott, was able to prove in a court of law that his health issues were a result of Depleted Uranium exposure (CADU News 17, 2004).

In the Balkans, there was also a challenge posed by clearance. Darvin Lisica, a Political Science Professor at the University of Sarajevo and a Mine Action Specialist for over 20 years, led a team that attempted to do Depleted Uranium clearance in Bosnia & Herzegovina. In an interview, he told me that they had discovered 20 Depleted Uranium strike sites that needed to be cleared. The Civil Protection Team of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina was able to secure the funding to do one of them, where they found the old Depleted Uranium rounds, removed them, and thoroughly cleared the area. After their initial success, they assumed they would get the go-ahead to do the remaining 19, but their funding was pulled. Lisica noted that, to this day, there are still 19 sites that have been marked but never cleared. He also stated that, in the implemented clearance project in Hadžići, they found penetrators one to six meters in depth (Interview with Darvin Lisica, 2022).

When the United Nations Environment Program visited the Balkans and wrote on the issue in 2003, they claimed that DU penetrators will likely fully oxidize in the soil 25–35 years after being fired. They further noted that, “DU contamination of drinking water could be found at one site. DU could be clearly identified in one drinking water sample,” and that an alternative source of drinking water should be found. Although the UNEP said that levels were still low enough to not pose a risk yet, precautionary clearance should be done (UNEP 2003, 9–10).

But this clearance was largely never done. This mistake should not be repeated by Ukraine. The EOD technicians that clear Depleted Uranium should be properly protected, and clearance should be well funded. Any time Depleted Uranium is used, the location it was used needs to be noted and then clearly marked. However, that may be difficult since the Russian military also uses Depleted Uranium penetrators, and it is possible they have already used them in Ukraine without informing the public. If this is the case, populations who live in areas where battles have happened need to be well informed about the risks.

Depleted Uranium Risk Education

Much of the damage caused by Depleted Uranium has happened as a result of contaminated battlefields being picked over by people looking for scrap metal. This issue was especially acute in Iraq. Photographer Takashi Morizumi documented this issue for his book Children of the Gulf War, where he saw people in Iraq take contaminated metal directly to metalworkers who reignited it downtown in the presence of children (Morizumi 2002). In an interview with New Zealand based chemical engineer John Peet, I was told that even if a standard metal grinder was used on something contaminated with Depleted Uranium, it could produce toxic particles that could be breathed in (Peet 2021).

In an interview with Andy Lane, a British army veteran who was ordered to find and cordon off Depleted Uranium strike sites in Iraq, he said that Iraqis had figured out which sites were contaminated because scrap pickers would touch materials, get blisters on their hands, and then get ill and often die not too long after. It got to the point where their standard way of finding the sites was to, “stop at the village, find them, [ask,] ‘Have you ever had anyone get sick? Have you ever had anyone be ill? [Are] there any tanks around or vehicles that have been here since the First War?’ And then they show you where it was.” (Interview with Andy Lane, 2022). The fact that they could find Depleted Uranium sites simply by asking locals which locations caused scrap pickers to become ill shows the breadth of the problem.

This was less of an issue in the Balkans, but it still happened to an extent. For instance, when the ICBUW did a report in Bosnia & Herzegovina, they mentioned the story of a man who kept a Depleted Uranium penetrator as a souvenir because he thought it was cool that when he struck it with a metal object, it would spark. That man would die of lung cancer at the age of 45. It is unknown if the presence of the penetrator was the cause, but it certainly could not have helped (Cullen and Weir 2010, 10).

Ukraine should definitely make sure that people in areas where Depleted Uranium has been used know the risks. It is well known that Ukrainians like to take destroyed Russian tanks as trophies of victories. In fact, there is now a company that sells parts of captured Russian tanks abroad as key fobs, and these are carved out of the tanks and then smoothed with a metal grinder (Vitrfire.com 2023). If one of these tanks was contaminated with Depleted Uranium, it would not only pose a severe health risk to everyone in the factory, it might even mean exporting a toxic and radioactive substance abroad to unwitting customers. Ukrainians need to know the dangers these weapons pose to avoid that possibility.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Ukrainian government and cooperating NGOs and universities need to take the threat of Depleted Uranium very seriously. Any places where it was used need to be well marked, the population in those areas need to be educated on the risk posed by Depleted Uranium, and the strike sites need to be cleared as quickly and thoroughly as possible. Materials for Depleted Uranium risk education need to be made and taught along with mine and explosive ordnance risk education. If there is an opportunity for research, it needs to be well funded and long lasting. If a pilot study shows there is a chance of harm, funding should not be ended. Keeping in mind that it is possible the Russians may also use Depleted Uranium and not share their strike site locations, all areas should be treated with caution. PPE needs to be well provided to those cleaning the sites and IMAS standards should be strictly adhered to. If proper precautions are not taken, then there is a risk that the EOD technicians doing clearance could face health issues like the ones that Kenny Duncan and his team faced. The threat posed by Depleted Uranium should not be overstated, but it should not be understated either. Taking it seriously from the beginning could save Ukrainian lives in the years to come.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Matthew Fuller

Matt Fuller (he/him) is a PhD candidate at the University of Otago in New Zealand. He earned his IMAS Level Three Explosives Ordnance Disposal Certification from MAT Kosovo in 2022. Previously he was a Lecturer of Philosophy at St. Philip’s College in San Antonio, Texas. His focus is on ethics, post-conflict peacebuilding, and disarmament. E-mail: [email protected]