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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes how the legal sources of nonproliferation regimes define “dual-use items,” a concept that lacks a universal and fixed definition despite its importance to international security and trade. The analysis shows how these legally binding and soft-law sources approach dual-use goods and technologies differently and classifies them based on the criteria they employ to define the potential uses of these strategic items: the dichotomies of peaceful versus non-peaceful and civil versus military, and the intentionality criterion. The article also traces the expansion of the concept beyond a concern with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It analyzes how the existence of multiple criteria to define such items affects their international control. It also considers the evolution that this notion may undergo, which may call into question the standards of legal certainty that the international regime of dual-use items aims to provide.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and the editorial team of the Nonproliferation Review for their helpful comments, as well as Milagros Álvarez-Verdugo and Alexandros Tokhi for their comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the organizations with which she is affiliated. All mistakes remain the responsibility of the author.
Notes
1 Caitríona McLeish, “Reflecting on the Problem of Dual Use,” in Caitríona McLeish and Brian Rappert, eds., A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of Research (London: Earthscan, 2007), pp. 189–208; David Resnik, “What Is Dual Use Research? A Response to Miller and Selgelid,” Science and Engineering Ethics, Vol. 15 (2009), pp. 3–5; Brian Rappert and Michael J. Selgelid, eds., On the Dual Uses of Science and Ethics: Principles, Practices, and Prospects (Canberra: ANU Press, 2013); Quentin Michel, “Dual-Use Exports Require a Common Definition,” in Friends of Europe, ed., Dual-Use Technologies in the European Union: Prospects for the Future (Brussels: Friends of Europe, 2015), pp. 40–42.
2 Samuel A.W. Evans, “Revising Export Control Lists,” Flemish Peace Institute, 2014, p. 3, <https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/en/report/revising-export-control-lists/>.
3 Ian Anthony, “The Evolution of Dual-Use Technology Controls: A Historical Perspective,” in Oliver Meier, ed., Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation: Between Control and Cooperation (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 27.
4 Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, “Not Lost in Contestation: How Norm Entrepreneurs Frame Norm Development in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2018), p. 356.
5 Andreas Persbo and Angela Woodward, “Detection, Deterrence and Confidence-Building: Improving Multilateral Technology Controls,” in Meier, Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation, pp. 77–95; Johannes Rath, Monique Ischi, and Dana Perkins, “Evolution of Different Dual-Use Concepts in International and National Law and Its Implications on Research Ethics and Governance,” Science and Engineering Ethics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2014), pp. 769–90.
6 Sibylle Bauer and Mark Bromley, “The Dual-Use Export Control Policy Review: Balancing Security, Trade and Academic Freedom in a Changing World,” EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, EU Non-Proliferation Paper No. 48, March 2016, <www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EUNPC_no-48.pdf>; Namira Negm, Transfer of Nuclear Technology under International Law: Case Study of Iraq, Iran and Israel (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009); Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Seema Gahlaut, “Multilateral Export Control Regimes: Operations, Successes, Failures and the Challenges Ahead,” in Daniel H. Joyner, ed., Non-Proliferation Export Controls: Origins, Challenges, and Proposals for Strengthening (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), p. 246; Quentin Michel, Sylvain Paile, Marina Tsukanova, and Andrea Viski, Controlling the Trade of Dual-Use Goods (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013); Scott Jones, Michael D. Beck, and Seema Gahlaut, “Trade Controls and International Security,” in Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner, eds., Combating WMDs: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009), pp. 118–35.
7 National Research Council of the National Academies, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism [“The Fink Report”] (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004), <www.nap.edu/catalog/10827/biotechnology-research-in-an-age-of-terrorism>; Ronald M. Atlas and Malcolm R. Dando, “The Dual-Use Dilemma for the Life Sciences: Perspectives, Conundrums, and Global Solutions,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2006), pp. 276–86; Jo L. Husbands, “The Challenge of Framing for Efforts to Mitigate the Risks of ‘Dual Use’ Research in the Life Sciences,” Futures, No. 102 (2018), pp. 104–13; Gregory Koblentz and Filippa Lentzos, Risks, Trade-offs and Responsible Science (Oslo: International Law and Policy Institute, 2016), <www.filippalentzos.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/21st-century-biodefence.pdf>; Jonathan B. Tucker, Innovation, Dual Use, and Security: Managing the Risks of Emerging Biological and Chemical Technologies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).
8 Caitríona McLeish and Paul Nightingale, “The Impact of Dual Use Controls on UK Science: Results from a Pilot Study,” SPRU Electronic Working Paper Series, No. 132, 2005, <www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/documents/sewp132.pdf>; Seumas Miller and Michael J. Selgelid, “Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-Use Dilemma in the Biological Sciences,” Science and Engineering Ethics, Vol. 13 (2007), pp. 523–80; Resnik, “What Is Dual Use Research?” pp. 3–5; Samuel A.W. Evans, “The Use and Abuse of Science and Technology: Rethinking Dual-Use,” Sam Weiss Evans’ Research, 2018, <https://evansresearch.org/2018/10/the-use-and-abuse-of-science-and-technology-rethinking-dual-use/>; Rath et al., “Evolution of Different Dual-Use Concepts,” pp. 770–88.
9 Rath et al., “Evolution of Different Dual-Use Concepts,” p. 770; Anthony, “The Evolution of Dual-Use Technology Controls,” p. 25; McLeish, “Reflecting on the Problem of Dual-Use,” p. 200.
10 Koos Van Der Bruggen, “Possibilities, Intentions and Threats: Dual Use in the Life Sciences Reconsidered,” Science and Engineering Ethics, Vol. 18 (2012), p. 754.
11 Samuel A.W. Evans, Technological Ambiguity & the Wassenaar Arrangement (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2009).
12 Malcolm R. Dando, Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Amitav Mallik, “Technology and Security in the 21st Century: A Demand-Side Perspective,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Research Report No. 20, 2004, <www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/RR/SIPRIRR20.pdf>.
13 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, May 23, 1969, Article 31.
14 Conference of the States Parties [to the Chemical Weapons Convention], “Decision: Technical Change to Schedule 1(A) of the Annex on Chemicals to the Chemical Weapons Convention,” C-24/DEC.4, November 27, 2019. Decisions by the meetings of states parties of the BWC or the widely accepted INFCIRC documents and guidance series regarding the NPT by the IAEA are also valid examples.
15 Jeffrey W. Knopf, “After Diffusion: Challenges to Enforcing Nonproliferation and Disarmament Norms,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2018), p. 371.
16 Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker, The Evolving International Regime of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2007), pp. 25–39.
17 Milagros Álvarez-Verdugo, Incidencia del Consejo de Seguridad sobre el régimen jurídico de las armas nucleares [Impact of the Security Council on the legal regime for nuclear weapons] (Barcelona: Bosch, 2007), p. 21.
18 Braden Goddard, Alexander Solodov, and Vitaly Fedchenko, “IAEA ‘Significant Quantity’ Values: Time for a Closer Look?” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 23, Nos. 5–6 (2017), pp. 677–89.
19 The reference in Article V of the NPT to “any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions” should be understood as an exception to this statement.
20 Fritz W. Schmidt, “NPT Export Controls and the Zangger Committee,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7. No. 3 (2000), pp. 136–45.
21 Peter Pella, The Midlife Crisis of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (San Rafael, CA: Morgan & Claypool, 2016), p. 15.
22 Defined in IAEA, “Memorandum B. 2”, INFCIRC/209/Rev.5, March 5, 2020, <https://zanggercommittee.org/download/18.6a32cf891717bf4c02d11/1672310882188/infcirc209r5.pdf>.
23 Negm, Transfer of Nuclear Technology under International Law, p. 114.
24 Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 88–90.
25 Piers D. Millett, “The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,” Revue Scientifique et Technique, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2006), p. 37.
26 Julian Perry Robinson, “Chemical and Biological Weapons,” in Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner, eds., Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009), p. 75.
27 John Hart and Vitaly Fedchenko, “WMD Inspection and Verification Regimes,” in Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner, eds., Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009), p. 98.
28 Trevor Findlay, Peace through Chemistry: The New Chemical Weapons Convention (Canberra: Australian National University, 1993), pp. 5–12.
29 Daniel Feakes, “The Adoption of the Convention and the Work of the Preparatory Commission,” in Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer, and Ralf Trapp, eds., The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 17.
30 Jean Pascal Zanders, The Future of the CWC in the Post-destruction Phase (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2013), p. 10, <www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/ISS_15-The_future_of_the_CWC_in_the_post-destruction_phase_0.pdf>.
31 Mohamed Daooudi, John Hart, Ajey Lele, and Ralf Trapp, “The Future of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Policy and Planning Aspects,” SIPRI Policy Paper No. 35, 2013, <www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP35.pdf>.
32 Graham S. Pearson, Nicholas A. Sims, and Malcolm R. Dando, Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Eighth Review Conference (Bradford: Division of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2016).
33 Ralf Trapp, “Convergence at the Intersection of Chemistry and Biology: Implications for the Regime Prohibiting Chemical and Biological Weapons,” Policy Paper 6, Biochemical Security 2030 Project, July 2014, <https://biochemsec2030dotorg.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/trapp-paper-6-online-version.pdf>.
34 Hart and Fedchenko, “WMD Inspection and Verification Regimes,” p. 98; Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, “Article II: Definitions and Criteria,” in Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer, and Ralf Trapp, eds., The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 77.
35 For example, the CWC does not interfere with the legitimate production and trade of chlorine, despite its being the first toxic chemical used on a large scale in the First World War.
36 Article II.1.b and c complete the CWC's definition of chemical weapons.
37 Krutzsch and Trapp, “Article II,” p. 77.
38 Daooudi et al., “The Future of the Chemical Weapons Convention.”
39 Ralf Trapp, “Annex on Chemicals,” in Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer, and Ralf Trapp, eds., The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 431–44.
40 Bryan R. Early, Mark T. Nance, and M. Patrick Cottrell, “Global Governance at the Energy–Security Nexus: Lessons from UNSCR 1540,” Energy Research & Social Science, Vol. 24 (2017), pp. 94–101, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.12.007>; Álvarez-Verdugo, Incidencia del Consejo de Seguridad sobre el régimen jurídico de las armas nucleares, p. 11.
41 Hanne Veel, “1540 and the 2016 Comprehensive Review: A Brief History of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in Light of the 2016 Comprehensive Review,” International Law and Policy Institute, Background Paper 18, 2016, p. 4; Peter Crail, “Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Risk-Based Approach,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), p. 357; Robinson, “Chemical and Biological Weapons,” p. 80.
42 The reference to non-state actors is one of its main contributions, a concept that must be cautiously handled, since it encompasses a wide range of entities depending on the context in which it is used. After UNSCR 1540, subsequent CWC and BWC Review Conferences also started addressing the risk of terrorism. See Richard T. Cupitt, “Capstone and Mortar: Notes on the Creation of UNSCR 1540,” 1540 Compass, No. 6 (2014), p. 5; Rath et al., “Evolution of Different Dual-Use Concepts,” p. 776.
43 Jones et al., “Trade Controls and International Security,” p. 126.
44 Álvarez-Verdugo, Incidencia del Consejo de Seguridad sobre el régimen jurídico de las armas nucleares, p. 13.
45 Masahiko Asada, “Security Council Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Terrorism: Effectiveness and Legitimacy in International Legislation,” Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 13 (2008), pp. 303–32. In legal terms, the adoption of UNSCR 1540 is part of a practice initiated three years earlier when the UNSC adopted Resolution 1372 (2001).
46 UNSC resolutions in this group are S/RES/1673 (2006), S/RES/1810 (2008), S/RES/1977 (2011), S/RES/205 (2012), and S/RES/2325 (2016).
47 Jones et al., “Trade Controls and International Security,” pp. 118–23.
48 The intentionality criterion covering malevolent, terrorist-related purposes can be found in IAEA, INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part2, July 2022 (Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines), Provision 1, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r12p2.pdf>); Australia Group Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items, 2015, Provision 1, <www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/guidelines.html>; Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, as amended in December 2019, Paragraph I.5, <www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2021/12/Public-Docs-Vol-I-Founding-Documents.pdf>; MTCR, Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers, 2003, Provision 3.F, <https://mtcr.info/guidelines-for-sensitive-missile-relevant-transfers/>.
49 Rath et al., “Evolution of Different Dual-Use Concepts,” p. 771.
50 Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 29.
51 At the time, India characterized it as a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” Giorgio Franceschini, “Keeping Nuclear Cooperation Peaceful,” in Meier, Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation, p. 103; Anthony, “The Evolution of Dual-Use Technology Controls,” p. 29.
52 Pella, The Midlife Crisis, pp. 4–14.
53 NSG, “Public Statement: Plenary Meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” June 14–15, 2018, <http://nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/NSG_Public_statement_2018_final.pdf>. Gonzalo de Salazar Serantes, a diplomat and expert on military and dual-use export controls, has a similar understanding. He considers the main purpose of the group to be “to ensure that the peaceful trade of equipment for the production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear technology for military purposes or to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices.” Gonzalo De Salazar Serantes, Guerra, paz y civilización [War, peace, and civilization] (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, 2016), p. 422 (author’s translation). While use in nuclear weapons is not permitted, there are certain “non-proscribed” military applications of nuclear energy—notably, the use of nuclear reactors to propel submarines.
54 IAEA, INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part2 (corrected), February 2018, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r10p2c.pdf>.
55 IAEA, INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part2, July 29, 2022, Provision 1, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r12p2.pdf>.
56 Munich Economic Summit, “Political Declaration: Shaping the New Partnership,” 28 Weekly Comp. Pres. Documents 1213, 1219 (13/07/1992), quoted in Barry J. Hurewitz, “Non-proliferation and Free Access to Outer Space: The Dual-Use Conflict between the Outer Space Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime,” High Technology Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1994), p. 225.
57 Evans, “Revising Export Control Lists,” p. 32.
58 Oliver Meier and Iris Hunger, “Between Control and Cooperation: Technology Transfers and the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, 2014, p. 35, <https://d-nb.info/1195565380/34>.
59 “If a Category I item is included in a system, that system will also be considered as Category I, except when the incorporated item cannot be separated, removed or duplicated.” MTCR/TEM/2018/Annex), March 22, 2018, Introduction 1(a), <http://mtcr.info/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/MTCR-TEM-Technical_Annex_2018-03-22.pdf>.
60 Javed Ali, “Chemical Weapons and the Iran–Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No, 1 (2001), p. 50.
61 Meier and Hunger, “Between Control and Cooperation,” p. 21.
62 Ian J. Stewart, “Examining Intangible Controls,” Project Alpha, King’s College London, 2016, <www.kcl.ac.uk/csss/assets/itt-case-studies-part-2-1.pdf >; Kolja Brockmann and Robert Kelley, “The Challenge of Emerging Technologies to Non-proliferation Efforts: Controlling Additive Manufacturing and Intangible Transfers of Technology,” SIPRI, 2018, <www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/sipri1804_3d_printing_brockmann.pdf>.
63 AG, “Australia Group Common Control Lists,” n.d., <https://australiagroup.net/en/controllists.html>.
64 James I. Seevaratnam, “The Australia Group: Origins, Accomplishments and Challenges,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 401–15.
65 WA, Guidelines and Procedures; Michael L. Lipson, “The Reincarnation of COCOM: Explaining Post-Cold War Export Controls,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1999), pp. 33–51.
66 WA, List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, December 4, 2013, WA-LIST (13) 1, <www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2019/consolidated/WA-LIST%20%2813%29%201.pdf>.
67 WA, List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, WA-LIST (19) 1, December 5, 2019 <www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2020/12/Public-Docs-Vol-II-2020-List-of-DU-Goods-and-Technologies-and-Munitions-List-Dec-20-3.pdf>.
68 Evans, “Revising Export Control Lists,” p. 19.
69 Mark Bromley, “Export Controls, Human Security and Cyber-surveillance Technology: Examining the Proposed Changes to the EU Dual-Use Regulation,” SIPRI, 2017, p. 49.
70 Quentin Michel, Christos Charatsis, Lia Caponetti, Sylvain Paile, and Emanuela Marrone, “Do Academic Activities Contribute to WMD Proliferation?” European Studies Unit, University of Liège, 2018; Bauer and Bromley, “The Dual-Use Export Control Policy Review”; Samuel A.W. Evans and Walter D. Valdivia, “Export Controls and the Tensions between Academic Freedom and National Security,” Minerva, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2012), pp. 169–90; Christos Charatsis, “Setting the Publication of ‘Dual-Use Research’ under the Export Authorisation Process: The H5N1 Case,” Strategic Trade Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2015), pp. 56–72.
71 Emma Scott, Ross Peel, Felix Ruechardt, and Nick Mitchell, “Catalogue of Case Studies on Intangible Technology Transfers from Universities and Research Institutes,” Centre for Science and Security Studies, King’s College London, 2020, <www.kcl.ac.uk/csss/assets/itt-case-studies-2020.pdf>.
72 WA, List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List.
73 WA, Public Documents: Volume II. List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, WA-LIST (18) 1, December 6, 2018, p. 221, <www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2019/consolidated/WA-DOC-18-PUB-001-Public-Docs-Vol-II-2018-List-of-DU-Goods-and-Technologies-and-Munitions-List-Dec-18.pdf>.
74 The EU dual-use export control regulation adopted in the spring of 2021 includes cyber-surveillance technology as dual use and incorporates human-rights violations as an explicit justification for controlling certain non-WMD-related exports. European Parliament and Council, “Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2021 Setting up a Union Regime for the Control of Exports, Brokering, Technical Assistance, Transit and Transfer of Dual-Use Items (Recast),” Official Journal of the European Union, L 206 (2021), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0821&from=EN>.
75 This phenomenon is comparable to what scholars of international relations call “forum shopping.” Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal, “Rising Powers and Forum Shopping,” paper prepared for the Workshop on Informal Governance, International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, March 26–29, 2014; Amandine Orsini, Jean-Frédéric Morin, and Oran Young, “Regime Complexes: A Buzz, a Boom or a Boost for Global Governance?” Global Governance, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2013), pp. 27–39. “Forum shopping” can occur when the lists of the different regimes overlap and a state is deciding whether to join one or several forums. Thus, Part 2 of the NSG guidelines overlaps with the dual-use list of the WA, which also overlaps with goods covered by the MTCR. The WA ammunition list also overlaps with part of the AG list, which, in turn, overlaps with the entire CWC list. D.J. van Beek, “A Practical Way to Implement Export Control Lists in Developing Countries,” 1540 Compass, No. 4 (2013), pp. 23–26, </www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/research/disarmament/dualuse/pdf-archive-att/pdfs/cits-a-practical-way-to-implement-export-control-lists-in-developing-countries-english.pdf>.
76 De Salazar Serantes, Guerra, paz y civilización, p. 419.
77 According to this general principle, if an activity entails a risk of causing serious harm to security, the public, or the environment, and if there is no consensus among experts on whether or not such harm will result, decision makers should not proceed. In this sense, see Suzanne Uniacke, “The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Ethics of Dual-Use,” in Brian Rappert and Michael J. Selgelid, eds., On the Dual Uses of Science and Ethics: Principles, Practices, and Prospects (Canberra: ANU Press, 2013), p. 159; Steve Clarke, “The Precautionary Principle and the Dual-Use Dilemma,” in Brian Rappert and Michael J. Selgelid, eds., On the Dual Uses of Science and Ethics: Principles, Practices, and Prospects (Canberra: ANU Press, 2013), pp. 223–26.
78 For instance, the US system refers to catch-all controls as the “enhanced proliferation control initiative” (EPCI). Although such a term is not defined in the Export Administration Regulations, nowadays EPCI refers to catch-all controls, requiring that items not specifically listed on the Commerce Control List obtain an authorization whenever the end use, or the end user, is believed to be of proliferation concern. Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR, Section 744.
79 The EU Export Control Regulation has its catch-all clause in Article 4 (as well as Article 5 and Article 9). The clause requires that member states inform other EU national authorities as well as the European Commission of their decision to deny an export or to impose an authorization requirement for nonlisted items. European Parliament and Council, “Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2021.”
80 Multilateral export-control regimes foresee a catch-all within their guidelines: point 5 of the Zangger Committee Guidelines (IAEA, INFCIRC/209/Rev.5, March 2020), point 5 of the NSG Guidelines (IAEA, INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part2, July 2022), point 7 of the AG Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items, 2015, and point 7 of the MTCR Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers, 2003.
81 Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2004), pp. 5–49.
82 Quentin Michel and Lia Caponetti, Introduction to International Strategic Trade Control Regimes (Liège: University of Liège, 2017), p. 86.
83 Sibylle Bauer and Ivana Mićić, “Controls on Security-Related International Transfers,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 453–54.
84 For more on this potential new technology-control regime that would cover other technologies that could be weaponized—that is, used strategically as weapons by enemy states—see James A. Lewis, “Notes on Creating an Export Control Regime,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 15 December 2022, <www.csis.org/analysis/notes-creating-export-control-regime>; Kevin Wolf and Emily S. Weinstein, “COCOM’s daughter?” World ECR, No. 109 (2022), pp. 24–28; Ian Stewart, “Export Controls in an Era of Strategic Competition: Implications for the Existing Landscape and the Need for a New Multilateral Trade Review Regime,” Strategic Trade Review, Vol. 9, No. 10 (2023), pp. 37–50, <https://strategictraderesearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Ian-Stewart-Export-Controls.pdf>.
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Ana Sánchez-Cobaleda
Ana Sánchez Cobaleda is a postdoctoral researcher in international and EU law at the University of Barcelona (UB) and a legal adviser to the EU P2P (partner-to-partner) export-control program for dual-use goods. She studied law at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg and at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, from which she graduated, and she holds an MA in international cooperation and development and an LlM in international public law from UB. She is an alumna of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency’s International School of Nuclear Law and a member of the Chaudfontaine Group on strategic trade controls. She has conducted her research on nonproliferation, export controls, and European security at the University of Leiden, EsadeGeo, the University of Geneva, and KU Leuven, among others.