Somali Passport Service Providers Competing for Bribes: Which Government Body Is Taking More?

Abstract

This research investigates the prevalence of corruption and use of intermediaries at immigration sites, the municipality, and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Mogadishu, Somalia. Through an online survey, 80 responses were recorded from residents in Mogadishu who work in academia, businesses, and international NGOs. Five anonymous civil servants were interviewed over telephone to further learn about the difficulties and potential solutions to the corruption problem. The statistical analysis revealed that Immigration is relatively less corrupted. This is due to changes in management and administrative reforms, ability to challenge fraudulent temptation of staff through call centers, and having better institutional and staff capacities than the other two institutions in question. Furthermore, direct supervision from the Ministry of Internal Security at the site of immigration with relatively enhanced working conditions with higher salaries allows for better functioning compared to Mogadishu Municipality, which is a local authority, and CID, a subdivision of an underpaid police department. Alternatively, more than half of the citizens use an intermediary to obtain their passports, birth certificates, and criminal record letters. According to the binary regression analysis, male applicants are more likely to use an intermediary than females.

Keywords:

• Bribe
• corruption
• intermediary
• passport
• Somalia

Data availability statement

The questionnaire data are stored on Google Drive and SPSS and are accessible to the interested readers and researchers upon request in a condition that in such occasions any personal information of the respondents will be removed to protect their privacy.

The interview data in the Appendices section were anonymized to safeguard the respondents who may face intimidations as they are affiliated and employed in the institutions examined in this study.

Analysis, discussion, and findings on corruption and intermediary

For a citizen to apply for a passport, he or she goes through a complicated process. First, the individual travels to Mogadishu municipality to obtain a birth certificate. Then, he or she visits the CID to obtain a criminal record letter. After visiting the above mentioned places, the final visit is to the immigration office to finalize the passport application process. This process is depicted as a flow chart in Figure 1. The citizen has to pay money in the form of a bribe at all these locations.

Figure 1. Legalized process for a citizen to obtain a passport with formal payments.

Note: The amounts of formal fees, $15 at Mogadishu municipality, $10 at CID, and $108 at Somali immigration are released by each government body (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Concept map on background of corruption and intermediary to obtain a passport in Somalia. Figure 2 depicts the skeleton of this research including dependent and independent variables. It also defines the main concepts.

Analysis of corruption in the passport application process in Mogadishu

Compute feature of SPSS was used to determine the number of respondents who paid bribes in all the three government bodies, and those who paid in none. In the following formula, D implies dummy variable. D_Paid Everywhere implies individuals who paid in all the three government bodies, whereas D_Paid nowhere implies individuals who did not pay bribe in any of the three government bodies. Moreover, D_Paid immigration implies individuals who paid bribe only at the immigration site, whereas D_Paid Municipality implies individuals who paid bribe only at the municipality site and D_Paid CID implies individuals who paid bribe only at the CID. In addition, 1 was coded as yes and 0 as no. $$D\_\mathit{paid}\_\mathit{everywhere}=D\_\mathit{paid}\_\mathit{Immigration}·D\_\mathit{paid}\_\mathit{Municipality}·D\_\mathit{paid}\_\mathit{CID}.$$ $$D\_\mathit{paid}\_\mathit{nowhere}=\left(1-D\_\mathit{paid}\_\mathit{Immigration}\right)·\left(1-D\_\mathit{paid}\_\mathit{Municipality}\right)·\left(1-D\_\mathit{paid}\_\mathit{CID}\right)$$

From Table 3, it can be deduced that 20% of respondents paid bribe to all the three government bodies involved in the passport application process—immigration, municipality, and CID.

Table 3. Ratio of respondents who paid bribe everywhere.

From Table 4, it can be deduced that 32.5% of the respondents did not pay bribe at any of the three government bodies.

Table 4. Ratio of respondents who paid bribe nowhere.

From Table 5, it can be deduced that 26.3% of the sample paid bribe at the immigration while applying for passport.

Table 5. D_Paid bribe at immigration.

Table 6 depicts that 53.8% of the sample paid bribe at the municipality to acquire a birth certificate as part of the passport application process.

Table 6. D_Paid bribe at municipality.

Table 7 shows 80 responses to the question of whether the citizen has paid bribe at the CID in which 52.5% of the sample paid bribe at the CID when they are applying for the criminal record letter as part of the passport application process.

Table 7. D_Paid bribe at CID.

The number of people who paid bribe at immigration is relatively low when compared to the responses of municipality and CID, thereby suggesting that immigration is relatively less corrupted than the other two entities.

Table 8 compares individuals who were asked to pay bribes at the immigration counter with those who did not do so using two-way tables, also known as cross tabulation. Six people paid bribes despite not being asked for them. The respondents said that they could not access the service or it would take longer than usual, provided that they did not pay bribes. Corbacho et al. (2016), Sadigov (2017), and Tavits (2010) found high tolerance of corruption in Azerbaijan and other countries and found exposure to bribe incidents and normalcy of corrupt behavior among peers as reasons for people’s tolerance for corruption.

Table 8. D_Asked bribe at immigration * D_Paid bribe at immigration crosstabulation.

From Table 9, it can be deduced that 13 applicants paid a bribe at the municipality of Mogadishu despite the fact that they were among the 34 applicants who were not asked to pay a bribe. This reveals how the culture of corruption is deep-rooted among the citizens.

Table 9. D_Asked bribe at municipality * D_Paid bribe at municipality crosstabulation.

Table 10 follows suit depicting five people who paid bribe voluntarily at CID without being asked. Individuals have adopted the notion that they will gain a prompt service if they pay bribes.

Table 10. D_Asked bribe at CID * D_Paid bribe at CID crosstabulation.

In Table 11, logit regression was used to test how respondent’s age, marital status, and D_Passport Urgency affected respondents’ choice of choosing not to pay bribe to any of the three government bodies. The study also tested if students applying for passport for educational purposes are more likely to refuse to pay bribe to any of the government bodies. These results show that no variables were significant in explaining the decision not to pay a bribe.

Table 11. Estimation result of logit regression (paid nowhere against five independent variables).

Note: In the Logit regression analysis for bribery and intermediaries, the control variables (age, gender, and marital status) and the highlighted variables (urgency, education as a reason to apply for the passport, and future needs as a reason to apply for the passport) are used to test their relationship with either bribery or intermediary use. These factors are used to demonstrate or refute the hypothesis that married and older respondents are less likely to commit corruption than single young respondents. Another purpose is to prove the notion that men are more likely than women to engage in corruption. Furthermore, the author is interested in determining if young individuals who apply for passports for educational reasons are more likely to engage in corruption than those who apply for passports for other reasons, such as traveling on a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. It is believed that those who intend to participate in religious activities, such as pilgrims, are less likely to pay bribes.

Table 12 demonstrates that individuals applying for a passport just for future needs without any specified reason are more likely to refrain from paying bribe to any of the government bodies. However, D_Passport Urgency, age, gender, and marital status did not necessarily affect respondents’ decision of not paying bribe. It was found respondents who applied for a passport for future needs (not immediate need) are likely to pay no bribe anywhere (5% significance level).

Table 12. Estimation result of logit regression (paid nowhere against five independent variables).

The logit regression analysis in Table 13 shows that married respondents are more likely to pay bribe to all the three government bodies. Alternatively, gender, D_Passport Urgency, age, and application of passport for educational purposes did not significantly effect of respondents’ tendency to pay bribe.

Table 13. Estimation result of logit regression (paid everywhere against five independent variables).

The logit regression analysis in Table 14 shows a non-significant correlation between respondents’ gender, age, and D_Passport Urgency with their behavior of paying bribes in all the three government bodies. Single respondents are found less likely to bribe everywhere at 5% significance level. Similarly, applying for a passport just for future purposes without urgent or specified reason did not necessarily affect their decision to pay bribe.

Table 14. Estimation result of logit regression (paid everywhere against five independent variables).

Finally, variables, such as urgency of application, average age, gender, marital status, education, and future needs as purposes to apply for passport have been employed to present the likelihood and distribution of paying bribes everywhere or nowhere. Other variables that may be significant for people’s decision on bribe can be individual’s moral campus, integrity, and religiousness, among others, which are not tested in this study. The refusal of bribes among the three institutions can be attributed to many factors which are not studied here including a person’s income and their ability to pay bribe, morals, civil servants’ and citizen’s integrity, and institutional level of corruption. Married respondents’ higher rates of corruption can be linked to their relatively higher incomes.

Comparison of three government bodies

Since p-value is <5%, we conclude that there is statistically significant difference in the mean level of corruption among the three institutions. However, Table 15 compares the three government bodies to assess which among them is relatively highly corrupted. From the sample considered, 29 individuals had paid bribe at the immigration, whereas 44–46 individuals paid bribe at municipality and CID, respectively. Due to their roles in examining, verifying eligibility, and supplying supporting documentation for applications, these three agencies are the focus of the study’s investigation. They are also responsible for checking applicants’ birth, residence, and criminal histories. They are essentially the only organizations that passport applicants should contact during the application procedure.

Table 15. Comparison of bribes paid at three different government bodies.

Table

Table 16. Intermediary use at the immigration.

The data reveals that an average person, who paid any positive amount of bribe, spends ∼$41 as bribe at the immigration, $15 at municipality, and $14 at CID, respectively (conditional averages). The bribe amount is higher at the immigration since the passport document is relatively more expensive than the birth certificate and criminal record letter. If we take all respondents including those who did not paid bribe at all into account, the amount (unconditional average) would be $14.9 at the immigration and $8.40 each at the municipality and CID.

For every dollar a citizen spends on passport, they spend $0.38 as a bribe in parallel. With every dollar a citizen spends for a birth certificate, $1.02 is given as a bribe. Similarly, every dollar spent for a criminal record letter, $1.46 is given as a bribe. In CID and municipality, individuals spend more on bribe than on the actual service. This implies that individuals pay ∼30% of the overall service cost as a bribe. Alternatively, if we assume that all members of the sample pay bribes, it implies that for every dollar a citizen spends on a passport, a citizen pays $0.14 as bribe, $0.56 as bribe for every dollar spent for a birth certificate, and $0.84 as bribe for every dollar spent for a criminal record letter. As a result, if we test the following null and alternative hypotheses:

H₀: The three government entities that are involved in the passport issuance process have the same prevalence of corruption.

H₁: The three government entities that are involved in the passport issuance process have different level of corruption.

Our response is that we accept H₁ and reject H₀. In addition, it is determined that immigration is less compromised than the other two entities in terms of the frequency of bribe payments and the ratio of bribe to formal fee. Whether or not the lower frequency is reflected (unconditional average or conditional average), the ratio at immigration is the lowest of the three government entities.

Reforms Implemented

Anonymous interviews of civil servants revealed that the immigration site is less corrupt than the other two government agencies. To explain this, let us go back to the development of Somalia’s public sector in the last 10 years with focus on Immigration and Naturalization Department (IND). The reestablishment of Somalia’s public sector was inaugurated in 2012, upon the election of the first non-transitional president. IND is not exceptional. The state re-established the following functions after the 2010s: recruiting educated staff, building workable offices, and following the written and legal procedures. Moreover, Farmajo’s administration from 2017 to 2022 added other administrative and modernization reforms:

1. Sustaining the salary payment for state personnel who were in the service for the past five years has a positive impact on their integrity and economic level.

2. A complaints center has been launched where citizens can file an objection against certain malpractices of IND officers. This center is run by the directors and senior officers who also have decision-making authority, instilling fear for non-compliant officers.

3. The Immigration IT system captures all data and processes from entry of applicant’s information up to the completion of the process upon the issuance. The system has virtual surveillance where senior management can monitor whose table and systematic works are not fast enough to meet the timeline of the designated tasks.

4. Another reform made is that since 2018, the Ministry of Finance is the one collecting fees of immigration services instead of the immigration officers. In connection, passport applicants can now be provided with an invoice to pay directly into a designated government account. In turn, they were provided with a receipt by the revenue department. At this point, applicants were reluctant to pay extra bribes even though it still happens.

5. Site supervision has been strengthened as complaints can be filed to the designated center. This supervision is supported by surveillance cameras in key operational areas where close monitoring is necessary. One more important case is that there were few times where corrupt practices of the process recorded via hidden cameras were leaked to the media, triggering the management to increase the level of monitoring and control of bribery.

6. Meeting the deadline whether bribe is paid or not made the applicants indifferent and hence, less is paid to IND compared to the municipality and CID.

7. New offices are built in last three years, passport applications centers are expanded leading to reduction in the queuing and waiting time. This makes the applicants to not think about paying for time length or escaping the queue.

8. Because the Ministry of Internal Security directly regulates immigration, the level of surveillance and oversight is higher compared to CID, a police subdivision, and the municipality, a local institution.

9. The officials in this department receive a higher pay than CID police officers and Mogadishu Municipality employees, which helps reduce the frequency and scope of corruption in the immigration.

These reforms that were institutionalized at the IND rather than municipality and CID contributed efficiency at IND (Anonymous, 2022).²

Thus, the author recommends salary increment for the staff in the examined institutions in this study. Even though Gong and Wu (2012) and Navot et al. (2016) found evidence that increasing civil servants’ pay contributes to corruption, Somalia’s case is a bit different. To give some context, Mogadishu, the capital city where this study was conducted, is infamously categorized into a danger zone (where ISIS and Al-shabaab have a relatively strong presence), semi-green zone (where the government has a relatively strong presence, hence a bit safe), and green zone (where it is highly safe and houses international organizations and embassies).

Although the danger zone is relatively less expensive, even with the current average salary, these staff still cannot afford to survive in this zone, let alone the semi-green and green zones. Therefore, the case here is not about salary increment but a matter of life or death.

Follow-up questions regarding job security, pay, and recruitment system to the interviewees indicate that public servants are hired based on recommendations from the minister, Director General, member of Parliament, or any other politician who is most likely from their clan. It is quite common for ministers to recruit their kinsmen to the ministry. In addition, to dodge the public eye, they ask other ministries to recruit their relatives while doing the same for the other ministers. Occasionally, the positions are advertised for mere formality and to impress donors like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations Development Programme, among others. On education, applicants need to have either intermediate-level education, high school diploma, or undergraduate degree to become a civil servant. However, because many citizens can meet this requirement, the person that the minister or another politician picks will get the job. It is critical to mention that there were cases wherein unqualified applicants bought certificates or claimed that they graduated before the civil war and lost their certificates. Unfortunately, they get away with this and end up in the bureaucracy.

Usually, advanced degrees like Master’s or Ph.D. do not matter in terms of promotion. However, if a civil servant is promoted to a directorate level, their salary will increase not because of the advanced degree and experience they earned but because of their new position and connections. Civil servants with Bachelor’s, Master’s, and Ph.D. degrees and 1 year or 30 years of experience fall into the same category of Grade A and receive $700, and the promotion does not depend on any of these factors. Moreover, civil servants with high school diploma receive $500. Coming to this study, the staffs in these three institutions are not direct civil servants because they did not go through Somalia’s National Civil Service Commission. The staffs at the CID and immigration fall in the category of armies, especially the police and intelligence unit, and those in the municipality were independently recruited by the municipality itself. The feedback received from the follow-up interviews implied that Mogadishu Municipality has the lowest job security and it is frequent for mayors to change the old staff and recruit new ones. Therefore, this perpetuates municipality staff to loot and seek for instant funds to survive after the job that they may lose any minute. On the contrary, the immigration and CID staffs enjoy much better job security because they cannot be fired easily as they are part of the army. The municipality and immigration staffs do not have a salary scale. Their pay ranges from $70, $100, up to $1,000 monthly (averaging $300–$400) and depends on one’s connection with the immigration director, Mogadishu mayor, or any other politician with influence. In contrast, most of the staff at the CID are police officers who fall under one of the most underpaid government staff and receive $200 monthly ($150 as cash and $50 as in-kind). Again, this justifies the rampant corruption at the CID found in this study. It needs to be mentioned that this amount is the entry level, which gets higher as the police personnel go up with the rank hierarchy.

Analysis on the findings of intermediary use in the passport application process

There are two types of intermediaries in the Somali passport application process: (1) The first group has connections in the municipality, CID, and immigration. They demand bribes from the applicants in exchange for expediting the application process. (2) The second group consists of the applicants’ friends, friends of friends, and/or family members who have contacts within government bodies. Due to the fact that they are either friends or family, the second component is less likely to demand payment from the candidates.

Respondents were asked if they had used an intermediary or a third person at the immigration during the passport application process. Approximately 61.3% of the sample received assistance from someone they know or through connections to complete the process.

In another dummy variable, respondents were asked if they used a third person to obtain the birth certificate from Mogadishu municipality. Table 17 reveals that 62.5% of the sample used a connection to obtain a birth certificate from the local government in Mogadishu.

Table 17. Intermediary usage for municipality.

Table 18 shows that ∼51.2% of the sample used an intermediary at the CID to obtain a criminal record letter.

Table 18. Intermediary usage at CID.

From Tables 16–18, it can be deduced that intermediary use is relatively less prevalent at the CID than at the immigration and municipality.

Table 19 shows that 36.3% respondents used connections or intermediaries at all the three government entities during the passport application process. $$\text{Used Intermediary Everywhere}= D\_\mathit{Intermediary}\_\mathit{Immigration} * \mathrm{D}\_\mathrm{Intermediary}\_\mathrm{Municipality}*\mathrm{D}\_\mathrm{Intermediary}\_\mathrm{CID}$$

Table 19. Used intermediaries everywhere.

Table 20 shows that 18.8% respondents did not use any intermediary in the involved institutions during the passport application process. $$\text{Used Intermediary Everywhere}{=1-D\_\mathit{Intermediary}\_\mathit{Immigration}}^{\mathrm{*}}\left(1-D\_\mathit{Intermediary}\_\mathit{Municipality} \right)\mathrm{*}{\left(1-D\_\mathit{Intermediary}\_C\mathrm{I}D \right)}^{\mathrm{*}}$$

Table 20. Used intermediaries nowhere.

In Table 21, logit regression analysis reveals that individuals applying for passport for educational purpose are less likely to use an intermediary. However, other variables, including passport urgency, gender, marital status, and age, do not significantly affect the respondents’ decision of whether to use an intermediary.

Table 21. Estimation result of logit regression (D_Used intermediaries nowhere against five independent variables).

From Table 22, it can be deduced that individuals applying for passport for future purposes without any urgent or specified reason are less likely to use an intermediary. Conversely, respondents’ age, gender, marital status, and D_Passport Urgency do not necessarily affect their decision of not using an intermediary.

Table 22. Estimation result of logit regression (D_Used intermediaries nowhere against five independent variables).

The logit regression analysis in Table 23 reveals that males are more likely to use an intermediary than females. This is understandable considering that majority of the government staff members are male owing to the country’s gender inequality. In this case, it is easier for men to have access and connections in government centers. Alternatively, respondents’ age, marital status, and D_Passport Urgency did not significantly affect their decision of using an intermediary. Similarly, students applying for passport for overseas educational purposes did not significantly affect their decision of using an intermediary.

Table 23. Estimation result of logit regression (D_Used intermediaries everywhere against five independent variables.

In Table 24, students applying for passport for overseas education were removed and replaced with individuals applying for passport for future needs without any urgent or specified reason. The tendency of male members to use an intermediary remains the same, and all other variables remain insignificant.

Table 24. Estimation result of logit regression (D_Used intermediaries everywhere against five independent variables).

Conclusions and recommendations

From the analysis, it was deduced that immigration is relatively less corrupt than CID and municipality. However, the bribe amount is higher at immigration than the other two government bodies owing to the price difference between documents. As a passport costs $108 and other documents costs <$20, the bribe amount is higher at immigration. Fewer corruption incidences at the immigration can be attributed to direct supervision from the Ministry of Security, reforms, and relatively better administrative structure and working conditions. These findings are consistent with similar linkage between reforms and corruption found in Tanzania and Myanmar by Bak et al. (2019) and Rahman et al. (2022).

Corruption incidents and frequencies are the highest in CID and municipality, where more than half of the citizens pay bribe to obtain their birth certificates and criminal record letters. Moreover, the use of intermediaries is also more prevalent than bribes. More than half of the citizens use an intermediary in all the three government bodies. The use of intermediaries has been increasingly prevalent in immigration and municipality compared to CID.

Data analysis reveals that individuals spend more money on bribes than the actual formal fee for criminal record letters and birth certificates. Overall, they spend ∼30% of the three documents fee as a bribe. This implies that the actual price of the three documents is $133; however, individuals pay ∼$172.9, including the estimated 30% bribe amount.

Alternatively, the use of intermediaries is also a prevalent issue in the passport application process. Intermediary use is more common than paying bribes at the immigration as individuals feel less guilty. Approximately 61.3, 62.5, and 51.2% of citizens use intermediaries at immigration, municipality, and CID, respectively. Males are more prone to use intermediaries as establishing a connection in the male dominated workforce becomes easier.

Extending the call center that is currently employed at the immigration to the CID and municipality, employment of CCTV cameras, improving recruitment system, and undercover corruption investigators can help tackle the issue of bribes at these institutions. Currently, civil servants at these institutions receive an average of $300 as a monthly salary; however, this amount is insufficient for the staff with families who need to reside in a semi-green zone due to constant security tensions in the city. Increasing their salary to $1,000–$1,300 can reduce the need for bribery. The consequences for alleged corrupted officials should be severe in the form of pay cuts, temporary or complete suspension from their jobs, etc.

This study presents data from Somalia, a country that has a very high prevalence of corruption according to Transparency International. The data also contributes to an understudied section of corruption by comparing three important institutions according to their levels of corruption. However, the data of this study covers only citizens with a relatively high income. Data from both low- and high-income classes with a larger sample size would help the government acquire an actual estimation of the amount spent by citizens on bribes monthly and yearly.

Acknowledgments

I want to thank the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) for funding my studies in Japan. I also want to thank my supervisor, Professor YAMAGATA Tatsufumi, for patiently guiding and helping me through this 2-year study.

I would like to extend my gratitude to Syed, Zakari, Naoko, Korrakoon, and other seminar mates for listening to my research progress presentations and providing valuable comments and questions, as well as the entire APU community for making my life at Beppu as memorable as possible. The author is grateful to the two anonymous peer-reviewers for reading deeply and giving very constructive and detailed feedback in the earlier version of this article.

Finally, I would like to thank Enago (www.enago.com) for the English language review.

Notes

1 Interview source, CID official, anonymized.

2 Interview source, Revenue Officer, Ministry of Finance (MoF), Anonymized.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the SIMAD University under the grant number SU-PG-2022-0045 and Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University under the Ay2022 Spring Semester Master’s Student Research Support Subsidy.