Fencing the bear? Explaining US foreign policy towards Russian interventions

ABSTRACT

Despite the burgeoning literature on Russia’s renewed power politics, little attention has been paid to the fact that US reactions towards Russia’s military interventions were all but coherent. The USA has chosen weak measures in Georgia in 2008 (shaming) compared to its assertive response in Ukraine in 2014 (sanctions, hard deterrence). This article assesses the explanatory power of neorealist, liberal and constructivist theories for the variation in US reactions towards Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Our argument is that the constructivist perspective explains the cases best as it highlights the power and communality of normative assessments. The Ukraine crisis was perceived by the USA as a violation of core international norms, especially the non-use of force and the principle of territorial integrity. Relevant international norm carriers shared this assessment of the conflict. In contrast, the perception of the Georgian war centred on the issue of democracy promotion. While democracy is an important aim of US foreign policy, it does not summon the same normative importance as general principles of international law. Furthermore, the perception of the Georgian war remained contested among Western allies, which decreased the communality of the normative assessment.

KEYWORDS:

• US security policy
• US-Russian relations
• Ukraine crisis
• military interventions
• foreign policy theories
• constructivism

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Sarah Wagner, Helge Staff, Jürgen Wilzewski, Lukas Herr, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and advice.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Florian Böller is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Kaiserslautern, Germany. His research interests include US foreign policy, transatlantic relations, and parliamentary control of foreign policy.

Sebastian Werle is a Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science, University of Kaiserslautern, Germany. In his research, he focuses on policy change in US security policy, military interventions, and theories of international relations.

ORCiD

Florian Böller http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0386-4758

Notes

1. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 5 (September/October 2014), pp.77–89; Stephen M. Walt, ‘Why Arming Kiev Is a Really, Really Bad Idea’, Foreign Policy, (9 February 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/how-not-to-save-ukraine-arming-kiev-is-a-bad-idea/ (accessed 6 June 2016).

2. For an overview on realist accounts for Russia’s foreign policy see Elias Götz, ‘Putin, the State, and War: The Causes of Russia’s Near Abroad Assertion Revisited’, International Studies Review, (2016), early view.

3. See Emmanuel Karagiannis, ‘The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and Goals’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2014), pp.400–20; Roy Allison, ‘Russian “Deniable” Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules’, International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6 (2014), pp.1255–97.

4. Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk, ‘Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization? Russia’s Role in Georgia and Ukraine’, Democratization, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2015), pp.459–78.

5. While already numerous theory-driven studies explored Russia’s foreign policy in the context of Ukraine (see notes 1–3), most analyses on the ‘West’ remained policy oriented. See for the few articles with theoretical scope on the EU Niklas Nováky, ‘Why so Soft? The European Union in Ukraine’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2015), pp.244–66; on NATO-Russia relations Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme Herd, ‘Russia and NATO: From Windows of Opportunities to Closed Doors’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2015), pp.41–57; on US-Russian relations Charles E. Ziegler, ‘Russian-American Relations: From Tsarism to Putin’, International Politics, Vol. 51, No. 6 (2014), pp.671–92.

6. Kathleen Parker, ‘An American Triumph at Oslo’, Washington Post, 10 December 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/10/AR2009121003638.html (accessed 6 June 2016).

7. White House, National Security Strategy. February 2015 (Washington, DC, 2015), p.2.

8. See Sam C. Sarkesian, John A. Williams and Stephen J. Cimbala, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes & Politics (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2013), p.6; Margaret G. Hermann, ‘The Study of American Foreign Policy’, in Steven W. Hook and Christopher M. Jones (eds), Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy (New York, NY, London: Routledge, 2012), pp.9–11.

9. Shaming strategies can be used by states as a soft power tool against adversaries. See Karl Gustafsson, ‘How to Make Former Aggressors Repent Through Shaming and Praising: The Case of Sino-Japanese Relations’, Global Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2015), pp.315–24.

10. Robert Nalbandov, ‘Battle of Two Logics: Appropriateness and Consequentiality in Russian Interventions in Georgia’, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2009), pp.26–9.

11. White House, ‘Factsheet: European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners’, 3 June 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-and-other-us-efforts-support (accessed 6 June 2016). At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO members also agreed to strengthen the alliance’s collective defense capabilities, for example, by establishing the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.

12. See for a neoclassical realist analysis Ziegler, ‘Russian-American Relations’ (note 5); for cognitive approaches see Tuomas Forsberg, ‘Status Conflicts Between Russia and the West: Perceptions and Emotional Biases’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 47, No. 3–4 (2014), pp.323–31.

13. Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2000), p.39.

14. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: Norton, 2001), p.34.

15. Colin Elman, ‘Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?’, Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1996), p.24.

16. Ibid., p.9.

17. Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’, in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), p.119.

18. See for a discussion of balancing under unipolarity, David A. Lake, ‘Great Power Hierarchies and Strategies in Twenty-First Century World Politics’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2013), pp.555–79.

19. Major allies include NATO partners, Israel, Japan and South Korea. To all of these states the US is committed by security treaties. Neorealists criticize liberals for widening the scope of vital interests. See Brian C. Schmidt, ‘The Primacy of National Security’, in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (eds), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.188–203.

20. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p.25.

21. Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), p.516.

22. Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988), pp.427–60.

23. Corinna Freund and Volker Rittberger, ‘Utilitarian-liberal Foreign Policy Theory’, in Volker Rittberger (ed.), German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), p.74.

24. David P. Houghton, ‘Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach’, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2007), pp.24–45.

25. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), p.893.

26. Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, ‘Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda’, International Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2000), p.69.

27. Wesley W. Widmaier, ‘Constructing Foreign Policy Crises: Interpretive Leadership in the Cold War and War on Terrorism’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 4 (2007), pp.779–94.

28. Bock et al. identify several examples of Western ‘violations of Russian security concerns’, including the Kosovo, Iraq and Libya interventions, support for the color revolutions, US missile defense plans, and the eastward expansion of NATO. Andreas M. Bock, Ingo Henneberg and Friedrich Plank, ‘If You Compress the Spring, It Will Snap Back Hard: The Ukrainian Crisis and the Balance of Threat Theory’, International Journal, Vol. 70, No. 1 (2015), p.104.

29. Götz, ‘Putin, the State, and War’ (note 2).

30. For an overview on Russia’s great power politics see Cristian Nitoiu, ‘Aspiration to Great Power Status: Russia’s Path to Assertiveness in the International Arena under Putin’, Political Studies Review, (2016), early view; for neorealist accounts on the intervention in Georgia see Emmanuel Karagiannis, ‘The 2008 Russian-Georgian War Via the Lens of Offensive Realism’, European Security Vol. 22, No. 1 (2013), pp.74–93; Hans Mauritzen and Anders Wivel, Explaining Foreign Policy: International Diplomacy and the Russo-Georgian War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012), p.92; for Ukraine see Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis’ (note 1); Sumantra Maitra, ‘Realism in Russian Foreign Policy: The Crimea Case’, CLAWS Journal (Summer 2014), pp.116–128; Götz, ‘Putin, the State, and War’ (note 2); Bock et al., ‘If You Compress’ (note 28).

31. White House, ‘National Security Strategy’ (note 7), p.i.

32. See Stephen M. Walt, ‘NATO Owes Putin a Big Thank You’, Foreign Policy, 4 September 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/04/nato-owes-putin-a-big-thank-you (accessed 6 June 2016).

33. The Atlantic, ‘The Obama Doctrine’ (April 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ (accessed 16 June 2016); Stephen Walt, ‘What Would a Realist World Have Looked Like?’ 8 January 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/08/what-would-a-realist-world-have-looked-like-iraq-syria-iran-obama-bush-clinton/ (accessed 16 June 2016); see for the case of Georgia Mauritzen and Wivel, ‘Explaining Foreign Policy’ (note 30), p.108.

34. See then-NATO Secretary General Rasmussen’s assessment in September 2014: ‘I don’t think Russia poses an imminent threat to NATO Allies for the very reason that Russia knows that we have an Article 5 in our NATO Treaty that protects any Ally against attack.’ NATO, ‘A Force for Freedom: Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at Carnegie Europe’, 15 September 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_113063.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 6 June 2016).

35. Regarding the influence of honor see Andrei P. Tsygankov and Matthew Tarver-Wahlquist, ‘Duelling Honors: Power, Identity and the Russia-Georgia Divide’, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2009), pp.307–26.

36. Kimberly Marten, ‘Putin’s Choices: Explaining Russian Foreign Policy and Intervention in Ukraine’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2015), p.191.

37. Although the summit declaration holds that Georgia and Ukraine ‘will become NATO members’, the statement was explicitly non-committal and widely seen as a defeat for the Bush administration’s push towards NATO expansion. See Alexander Motyl, ‘Five Fatal Flaws in Realist Analysis of Russia and Ukraine’, 3 March 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/03/five-fatal-flaws-in-realist-analysis-of-russia-and-ukraine/ (accessed 6 June 2016); NATO, ‘Bucharest Summit Declaration – Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008’, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed 6 June 2016).

38. See Mauritzen and Wivel, ‘Explaining Foreign Policy’ (note 30), pp.105–7. Nota bene the authors introduce additional arguments why the US was actually underbalancing in the Georgian case. However, incentives such as preserving the ‘political project of the unipole’ stretch the analytical scope of neorealism.

39. Ilan Berman, ‘Paradise Lost in Crimea: How Russia is Paying for the Annexation’, Foreign Affairs (2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2015-09-08/paradise-lost-crimea (accessed 6 June 2016).

40. See Dmitri Trenin, The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 2014).

41. See Michael B. Bishku, ‘The South Caucasus Republics: Relations with the U.S. and the EU’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2015), p.46. See Asmus' more or less realist assessment of the outcome of the Georgia crisis. Ronald Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.221. The argument also applies to NATO’s internal cohesion which was strengthened as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis. A partial exception in this context is Armenia’s continued alignment with Russia.

42. US Census, ‘Foreign Trade Database’, 2015, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/index.html (accessed 6 June 2016).

43. For the difference between Obama and Bush on Russia see Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), p.271.

44. Jonathan Monten, ‘The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy’, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2005), pp.112–56.

45. Jim Nichol, Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), p.34.

46. Cheney was accused by Russia for pushing Georgia to start the war in order to increase McCain’s chances during the 2008 presidential campaign. In fact, the Bush administration frequently warned Saakashvili not to get trapped into hostilities with Russia. See Asmus, ‘A Little War’ (note 41), p.151.

47. White House, ‘President Bush Concerned by Escalation of Violence in Georgia’, 9 August 2008, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080809-2.html (accessed 6 June 2016).

48. White House, ‘President Bush Discusses Situation in Georgia’, 11 August 2008, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080811-1.html (accessed 6 June 2016).

49. White House, ‘President Bush Discusses Situation in Georgia’, 15 August 2008, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080815.html (accessed 6 June 2016).

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. While labeling Russia as the aggressor in the crisis and underscoring the importance of Georgia’s territorial integrity in his response to the conflict, Bush did not explicitly refer to other potential norm violations (such as the non-use of force or the non-intervention in internal affairs). When on 26 August 2008, Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, the US president repeated his demand to respect Georgia’s sovereignty and accused Russia of violating the six-point cease-fire agreement of 16 August 2008 and previous UN Security Council Resolutions. See White House, ‘President Bush Discusses Situation in Georgia’, 16 August 2008, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080816-1.html (accessed 6 June 2016).

53. White House, ‘Statement by the President on Ukraine’, 28 February 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/28/statement-president-ukraine (accessed 6 June 2016).

54. White House, ‘Readout of President Obama’s Call with President Putin’, 1 March 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/01/readout-president-obama-s-call-president-putin (accessed 6 June 2016).

55. White House, ‘Statement by the President on Ukraine’, 6 March 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/06/statement-president-ukraine (accessed 6 June 2016).

56. Ibid.

57. Alexander Gilder, ‘Ukrainian Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity – Has it Been Breached?’, Legal Issues, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2015), pp.23–40.

58. Daniele Archibugi and Mariano Croce, ‘Legality and Legitimacy of Exporting Democracy’, in Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer and Vesselin Popovski (eds), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.414–38.

59. Pew, ‘America’s Place in the World 2013’ (2013), http://www.people-press.org/files/2013/12/12-3-13-APW-VI-release.pdf, p.27.

60. The question of the initiation of the war was debated, for example, during congressional hearings in September 2008. In September 2009, the Tagliavini Report stated, that Georgia’s shelling of Tskhinvali ‘marked the beginning of the large-scale armed conflict’. See William J. Burns, ‘Georgia and Russia. Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2008/109825.htm (accessed 6 June 2016); Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, ‘Report’, September 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20091007030130/http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf (accessed 6 June 2016).

61. See John Kerry’s press statement after meeting with UK and Ukrainian foreign ministers. US Department of State, ‘U.S./U.K./Ukraine Press Statement on the Budapest Memorandum Meeting’, 5 March 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/222949.htm (accessed 6 June 2016).

62. See for a more detailed account on EU reactions Nováky, ‘Why so Soft’ (note 5).

63. NATO, ‘North Atlantic Council Statement on the Situation in Ukraine’, 2 March 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_107681.htm (accessed 6 June 2016).

64. Reuters, ‘G7 Leaders Tell Russia to Halt Crimea Referendum’, 12 March 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-g-idUSBREA2B0JI20140312 (accessed 6 June 2016).

65. President of Estonia, ‘Joint Declaration of Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish Presidents on the situation in Georgia’, 9 August 2008, https://president.ee/en/media/press-releases/1721-joint-declaration-of-estonian-latvian-lithuanian-and-polish-presidents-on-the-situation-in-georgia/index.html (accessed 6 June 2016).

66. NATO, ‘Statement – Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels’, 19 August 2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_29950.htm (accessed 6 June 2016).

67. Massimo Franco, ‘Russian Praise and the Conflict of Allies’, Corriere Della Sera, 3 September 2008; Ellen Barry and Graham Bowley, ‘Rice Presses for Pullout as Georgia Signs Cease-Fire’, New York Times, 15 August 2008.

68. Trine Flockhart, ‘Complex Socialization: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2006), pp.89–118.

69. Studies show that security concerns generate more public support for military interventions and that the US public does regard security threats as more important than universal values. See Richard C. Eichenberg, ‘Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981–2005’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2005), pp.140–77.

70. During the nomination hearing for the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford told senators, that ‘Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security’. In an unusual move, the Obama administration distanced itself from Dunford’s comments soon after. Chicago Tribune, ‘Joint Chiefs Nominee: Russia Biggest Threat to US Security’, 9 July 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-joint-chiefs-russia-threat-20150709-story.html (accessed 6 June 2016).

71. See Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); see also note 30.

72. Julie Mertus, Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008); Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), p.124.

73. For an overview on the liberal argument see Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, ‘Who Lost Russia (This Time)? Vladimir Putin’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp.167–87; for the realist critique see Colin Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015), p.67–72.

74. White House, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya’, 28 March 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya (accessed 6 June 2016).