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ABSTRACT
This article discusses the legal position of an Artificial Intelligence Entity (AIE) that is able to create something novel, like an artwork. Rather than examining a fictitious being, I inquire the position of human beings, comparing it with that of a conceivable AIE. The nature of an AIE in terms of matter and mind is compared with that of a human being, after which it is inquired whether it may, like a human being, be deemed a legal person. This analysis serves as a prelude to the question of whether an AIE may be a copyright owner.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Sheikh Solaiman, ‘Legal Personality of Robots, Corporations, Idols and Chimpanzees: A Quest for Legitimacy’ (2017) 25 Artificial Intelligence and Law 155, 171, 172.
2 Cf., e.g., Hubert Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do (MIT Press, 1992) 3, 77, 78.
3 John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science (Harvard University Press, 1984) 28; cf. The Rediscovery of the Mind (MIT Press, 2002) 7.
4 Such as – in a particular field – the chess computer Deep Blue.
5 Searle (n 3) 30, 31.
6 ibid 31.
7 ibid 31; cf. Pentti Haikonen, ‘On Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness’ (2020) 7 Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 73, 76.
8 Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Little, Brown and Company, 1991) 438.
9 Searle (n 3) 35, 36.
10 Eric Schwitzgebel and Mara Garza, ‘A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences’ (2015) 39 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 98, 104.
11 Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland, ‘Could a Machine Think?’ (1990) 262 Scientific American 32, 37. Cf. Lawrence Solum, ‘Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences’ (1992) 70 North Carolina Law Review 1231, 1265, and Steven Livingston and Mathias Risse, ‘The Future Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Humans and Human Rights’ (2019) 33 Ethics & International Affairs 141, 149.
12 Churchland and Churchland (n 11) 36, 37.
13 Giorgio Buttazzo, ‘Artificial Consciousness: Utopia or Real Possibility?’ (2001) 34 Computer 24, 26.
14 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Penguin Books, 1990 [1949]) 50.
15 Ryle (n 14) 57; cf. 161 and 190.
16 ‘Matter’ is in fact an abstract notion, and according to some (notably, George Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1949 [1710]) pt 1, ss 17 (47, 48) and 35 (56)) even an untenable one. It is used here merely as the (possibly fictitious) counterpart to ‘mind’ (which may itself be equally fictitious).
17 For a fictional illustration of what is meant, I refer to the deactivation procedure of HAL 9000 in the film 2001: A Space Odyssey.
18 For a discussion of this issue, see Jasper Doomen, ‘Cornering “Free Will”’ (2011) 32 Journal of Mind and Behavior 165.
19 “Autonomie ist […] der Grund der Würde der menschlichen und jeder vernünftigen Natur.”, Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Kant’s collected writings. First section: works, vol. 4. Georg Reimer, 1903 [1785]) 436.
20 “[…] die Beschaffenheit des Willens, dadurch derselbe ihm selbst (unabhängig von aller Beschaffenheit der Gegenstände des Wollens) ein Gesetz ist.”, Kant (n 19) 440.
21 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Kant’s collected writings. First section: works, vol. 5. Georg Reimer, 1908 [1788]) 87.
22 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Kant’s collected writings. First section: works, vol. 3. Georg Reimer, 1911 [1781/1787]), A 532 ff./B 560 ff., A 702/B 730, A 800 ff./B 828 ff.
23 Kant (n 19) 436.
24 ibid 449; Kant (n 21) 132.
25 Cf. Solum (n 11) 1257.
26 Solum (n 11) 1260; Solum considers self-consciousness as a necessary condition for legal personhood (ibid 1264).
27 John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (The Works of John Locke, vol. 1. Rivington et al., 1824 [1690]) Book 2, ch. 27, s 9 (333).
28 Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, ‘After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’ (2013) 39 Journal of Medical Ethics 261, 262.
29 “[…] die sogenannte physische Person eine künstliche Konstruktion der Rechtswissenschaft ist, […] auch sie nur eine “juristische” Person ist.” Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1992 [1960]) 176; cf. 193.
30 Kelsen (n 29) 178.
31 Cf. Gerald Spindler, ‘Copyright Law and Artificial Intelligence’ (2019) 50 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 1049, 1050.
32 Francisco Andrade and others, ‘Contracting Agents: Legal Personality and Representation’ (2007) 15 Artificial Intelligence and Law 357, 362.
33 Joanna Bryson, Mihailis Diamantis and Thomas Grant, ‘Of, for, and by the People: The Legal Lacuna of synthetic Persons’ (2017) 25 Artificial Intelligence and Law 273, 274.
34 Cf. Solum (n 11) 1260.
35 Mark Coeckelbergh, ‘Robot Rights? Towards a Social-Relational Justification of Moral Consideration’ (2010) 12 Ethics and Information Technology 209, 211; cf. Tyler Jaynes, ‘Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligence: Citizenship as the Exception to the Rule’ (2020) 35 AI & Society 343, 347, 348, and Schwitzgebel and Garza (n 10) 106, 107.
36 Cf. Martin Miernicki and Irene Ng (Huang Ying), ‘Artificial Intelligence and Moral Rights’ (2021) 36 AI & Society 319, 322.
37 Spindler (n 31) 1049.
38 ibid 1050.
39 Cf. Adam Andreotta, ‘The Hard Problem of AI Rights’ (2021) 36 AI & Society 19, 25: “The problem […] with grounding AI rights in consciousness is not […] that it is a mysterious ‘occult’ property. The problem is an epistemological one – that is, how we can know whether consciousness exists in other creatures, and furthermore, how we know what those experiences are like.”
40 Jani Ihalainen, ‘Computer Creativity: Artificial Intelligence and Copyright’ (2018) 13 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 724, 727.
41 Daniel Gervais, ‘Is Intellectual Property Law Ready for Artificial Intelligence?’ (2020) 69 GRUR International 117.