Bridging the gap: The ‘revolutionary’ strategy of the Strong Egypt Party as a new attempt towards overcoming the secular/Islamist cleavage

ABSTRACT

The 2011 revolution provided the Egyptian ‘third way’ between Islamism and secularism with an opportunity to enter the political scene. Following the 2012 presidential election, this current was divided into a wasaty trend following a ‘possibilist’ strategy within the Mursī administration, and another trend gathered around the figure of ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Abūl-Futūh and following a ‘revolutionary’ strategy with the aim to overcome the secular/Islamist cleavage by mobilizing revolutionaries from both sides against the remnants of Mubārak’s regime. This article shows how the difference between these two trends – both born from the reformist wing of the Muslim Brotherhood – is rooted in a generational divide. While the wasaty leaders left the Islamist organization in the mid-1990s, when their project was about to enter official politics, the younger generation did so only after the departure of Mubārak, with the objective to pursue the ‘revolution’s goals’.

KEYWORDS:

• Egypt
• Abūl-Futūh
• Islamism
• secularism
• social cleavages

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Following Rokkan and Lipset (1967) we consider a social cleavage to be a long-lasting political division rooted in the social structure of a given society.

2. Interview with a responsible of Abūl-Futūh’s campaign (Online: November 2020).

3. We use the term divide following Bartolini (2011) to indicate ‘something less’ than a full cleavage. The ‘revolutionary youth’ existed as a structured group sharing common values that created a sense of collective identity. Moreover, it was shaping the electoral behaviour of its members. Nevertheless, it lacked in longevity, as generations are, by definition, unable to survive the individuals which composed them.

4. Moreover, the Building and Development Party (Salafi) had a more social program as well, but nevertheless supported Mursī’s administration. It was argued that even the Freedom and Justice Party’s program was more social than the Wasat’s, as stated during our interview with a member of Abūl-Futūh’s staff (Cairo: June 22, 2011).

5. See the analysis of the ‘Revolution Continues’ coalition’s manifesto in Steuer (2021).

6. We use this word as an analogy with a faction of the French socialist movement led by Paul Brousse, which was called the ‘possibilists’. As reformists, the possibilists opposed the Marxist vision of Jules Guesde (Stafford, 1971).

7. https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/grants_manual/hi/ethics/h2020_hi_ethics-data-protection_en.pdf : 6–10.

8. Some of them eventually became the founders of the Salafi Call in Alexandria.

9. Some others created the Islamic Group (al-gamā‘a al-islāmiyya), which entered a path of violent struggle against the state until the mid-1990s, when its leaders – defeated and imprisoned – renounced violence and expressed their desire to found a legal political party.

10. In an interview just after the official inception of the FJP, one of its leaders argued that the subordination of the party to the parent organization was a necessity for the time being (Cairo: May 2, 2011).

11. The term ‘cultivation’ as used by Kandil (2014).

12. Shūrā is an Arabic term used to refer to the act of consulting or consultation prior to decision making. The term is considered part of Muslim convictions as it is used and evoked repeatedly in the Quran, making the practices of shūrā an act closer to worship.

13. Interview with a responsible of Abūl-Futūh’s campaign (Online: October 2020).

14. Interview with a responsible of Abūl-Futūh’s campaign (Cairo: 2015).

15. Interview with a responsible of Abūl-Futūh’s campaign (Online: October 2020).

16. Literally meaning ‘family’, but in the Brotherhood’s vocabulary, this term refers to the sections of the organization.

17. On 19 November 2011, violent clashes erupted between demonstrators and the police at the entrance of Cairo’s Muhammad Mahmūd Street, which leads from Tahrīr Square to the building of the Ministry of Interior. The fights lasted for days and resulted in several dozens of casualties. Demonstrators were asking for the stepping down of the SCAF, and the creation of a ‘Public Salvation Committee’ – which would include civilian political forces beside representatives of the army – managing the transitory period.

18. ’Live with Dr. Abdel Moneim Abul-Futuh the Ex-presidential Candidate’. Al Jazeera Mubasher, February 11, 2018. https://youtu.be/ag7QbqQ5pVM.

19. Interview with a responsible of Abūl-Futūh’s campaign (Online: November 2020).

20. Interview with a responsible of the SEP (Online: December 2020).

21. ’Live with Dr. Abdel Moneim Abūl-Futūh’. op. cit.

22. Khālid ‘Ālī is also Abūl-Futūh’s lawyer, representing him in front of the Egyptian judiciary.

23. Interview with a responsible of the Wasat Party (Cairo: April 21, 2011); interview with a responsible of the Labour Party (Cairo: April 23, 2011); interview with a young Wasat activist (Cairo: May 3, 2011); interview with a young Wasat executive (Cairo: May 9, 2011).

24. Interview with a member of Abūl-Futūh’s staff (Cairo: June 22, 2011).

25. Personal observation (Suez: December 18, 2011).

26. Mada Masr (August 18, 2011): https://www.madamasr.com/ar/2020/08/18/feature/سياسة/أبو-الفتوح-بين-عزلتين/.

27. Al-Masry Al-Yawm (October 21, 2012): https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/226380.

28. Interview with a young Wasat executive (Cairo: May 9, 2011). At that time, the ECP was also discussing this possibility, as appears in our interview with a member of Abūl-Futūh’s staff (Cairo: June 22, 2011).

29. Interview with a young member of the Wasat Party (Tanta: January 8, 2012).

30. Interview with a candidate of the Wasat Party (Suez: December 18, 2011).

31. Interview with two leaders of the Wasat Party (Cairo: June 2, 2013).

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Interview with a Wasat representative in the Parliament (Cairo: June 3, 2013).

Additional information

Funding

This article benefited from the financial support of the ERC funded project (convention No. 695674): 'Political and socio-institutional change in North Africa. Competition of models and diversity of trajectories' (TARICA).