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ABSTRACT
This article examines the contributions of police to the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in United Nations (UN) peace operations. Drawing on field research in four missions where police have had to implement PoC mandates in challenging and unprecedented ways, I identify lessons associated with emerging practice. The article contributes to debates about non-military forms of civilian protection arguing that police – at once uniformed and civilian, coercive but also community-oriented – offer unique contributions to PoC. It also highlights the need for a systematic evaluation of what works and what does not for protection through policing to be harnessed in future missions.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewers, the editors and Dr Shannon Zimmerman for their constructive feedback and helpful suggestions that helped refine this manuscript.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Others have sought to theorise the mechanisms through which they can coerce, persuade and induce better protection (Howard Citation2019).
2. Interviews/focus groups lasted approximately 60–90 minutes and selection utilised ‘snowball sampling’ identifying respondents by asking initial sample of respondents to recommend other actors for interview.
3. The field research informing this paper meets national and international guidelines for research with human participants and was approved by the RMIT University College Human Ethics Advisory Network (Approval reference #: CHEAN B 21,048-08/17). In accordance with this approval, informed written or verbal (on interview recording) consent was obtained from all participants. All interview data in this paper are anonymised and non-identifiable.
4. NB: In transitional authority missions in Kosovo in 1999/2000, duplicated in Timor-Leste the following year, UNPOL were furnished with executive mandate. This proved to be a short-term development though the authorisation of ‘Urgent Temporary Measures’ in MINUSCA today echoes these – albeit more circumscribed – executive policing functions. An “executive mandate” for UNPOL refers to situations where UNPOL are authorised to assume full policing responsibilities while the host-state police and other law enforcement agencies regain functional self-sufficiency. This provides UN police with power to arrest, search, detain and carry arms under the authority of the Security Council rather than with consent of a sovereign host government. It includes conducting investigations, carrying out special operations, and maintaining public order. See: (Dwan Citation2002).
5. From 2,539 in 1999 to over 10,500 in 2019. NB: The number of UNPOL deployed reached a high water-mark in 2010 when over 17,000 UNPOL were authorised by the Security Council.
6. Figures as per 31 March 2020. NB: In 2007 a small (20 pax) Standing Police Capacity (SPC) was created. To provide mission start-up capacity and support on-going missions through short fly-in-fly-out support roles. Though the SPC can make important contributions to UNPOL efforts (e.g., support with a particular legislative process on rule of law, conduct an evaluation of programming or specific units) these usually only indirectly relate to POC.
7. Interview with former UN DPKO official – New York, February 2020.
8. Interviews with police advisors to various member states’ permanent mission to the UN – New York, USA, February 2017.
9. Interview with former UN DPKO official – New York, February 2020.
10. Interview with senior UNPD official – New York, February 2017.
11. Interviews with police advisors to various member states’ permanent mission to the UN – New York, USA, November 2019. See also: (UN Citation2019b). Proceedings of 8661st meeting of the UN Security Council, 6 November 2019, https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8661.
12. Kirschner and Miller (Citation2019) and Johansson and Hultman (2019) find that UN police reduce conflict-related sexual violence and Di Salvatore (Citation2019) finds that only UNPOL can reduce criminal violence.
13. The UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support originally developed an operational concept for PoC in 2010. It was codified in the 2015 PoC policy (UN Citation2015b, para. 30), which was updated in 2019 (UN 2019a, para. 40). NB: a 2020 Handbook (UN Citation2020b) further elaborates guidance for these different components.
14. Interviews with UNPOL officials – Bamako, Mali and Kinshasa, DRC, 2018–2019.
15. Interviews with UNPOL officials – Bamako, Mali and Kinshasa, DRC, 2018–2019.
16. Interviews with MINUSCA officials and Central African national law enforcement officials – Bangui, CAR, August 2019.
17. Interviews with UNPOL official – CAR 2019.
18. Interviews with UNPOL official – Bentiu, South Sudan, 2018.
19. Interviews with UNPOL officials – CAR and South Sudan, 2018–2019.
20. Interviews with UNPOL official – Bria, CAR, 2019.
21. Interviews with MINUSCA officials – Bria, CAR, August 2019.
22. Focus groups with IDP camp residents and armed group representatives – Bria, CAR, August 2019.
23. Focus group with armed group representatives – Bria, CAR, August 2019.
24. Interviews with UNPOL officials – CAR, South Sudan & Mali, 2018–2019.
25. NB: the use of force by UNPOL is governed by Directives on the Use of Force (DUF).
26. See below section on ‘Militarisation of (international) policing) for further discussion of FPUs vis-à-vis IPOs.
27. The other two functions being: (i) Protect United Nations personnel and property; and, (ii) Support police operations that require a formed response or specialised capacity above the capability of IPOs.
28. NB: once incidents are characteristed by sustained use of firearms of heavy weaponry there should be a withdrawal of UNPOL and a handover of command and control and responsibility for PoC to the military component. See: UN DPKO/DFS Policy (revised) on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, para 51.
29. Interview with MONUSCO UNPOL official – Kinshasa, DRC, June 2018. NB: Similar situations arose in Mali during 2018 general election.
30. ‘Temporary’ only in name having been in place since 2014.
31. See: UN Security Council resolutions 2149 (2014), 2217(2015) and 2301 (2016).
32. Interviews with senior mission leaders and UNPOL officials in MINUSCA – Bria, CAR, August 2019.
33. Interview with senior mission leader MINUSCA – Bangui, CAR, August 2019.
34. Interview with UNPOL official – Malakal, South Sudan, December 2018.
35. For people deemed to pose a serious threat – i.e., cases that involve violence, sexual assault, or other serious threats.
36. Interviews with UNPOL officials in MINUSMA – Mopti, Mali, April 2017.
37. Interviews with UNPOL officials in UNMISS (Bentiu, South Sudan,December 2018), MINUSCA (Bangui, CAR, August 2019).
38. Interviews with MINUSMA UNPOL officials and Malian Police Commissioner – Bamako, Mali, August 2019.
39. Interview with JTFB Deputy Commander – Bangui, CAR, August 2019.
40. NB: the inclusion of UNMISS in the sample of cases for this study would certainly have increased this percentage average.
41. ‘Establishing a protective environment’ is the term used by the UN to refer to efforts that work towards building a longer-term, sustainable protective environment. See (UN Citation2019a).
42. Interviews with community-based organisations – Beni and Goma, DRC, May 2018.
43. Interview with Congolese national police officials and civil society organisation – Beni, DRC, May 2018.
44. Interview with Congolese national police officials and civil society organisation – Beni, DRC, May 2018.
45. Interview with Congolese national police officials and civil society organisation – Beni, DRC, May 2018.
46. Interview with UNPOL official in MINUSCA – Bangui, CAR, August 2019.
47. Interview with UNPOL official in MINUSMA – Gao, Mali, 2017.
48. Interviews with UNHCR official – Bangui, CAR, August 2019.
49. Interviews with human rights officials – Mali, South Sudan, DRC, CAR.
50. Interview with senior UNPOL official – New York, December 2019.
51. See Note 5 above for explanation of executive policing mandates.
52. UN guidelines on the role of United Nations police in protection of civilians state that, “Security Council resolutions authorising the use of ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians are applicable to UN police, even if the resolutions do not set out the specific role intended for UN police”. (UN Citation2017b. para.32, p.9).
53. Interview with senior UNPOL official – Bamako, Mali, August 2019.
54. Interview with senior UNPOL official – Juba, South Sudan, December 2018.
55. It is important to note that another line of argument is that unclear directives on the use of force can be used as an excuse by PCCs for inaction, or at least can create the perception that inaction will not be punished while incorrect action could lead to penalties as severe as repatriation.
56. Interview with MINUSMA UNPOL official, Gao, Mali, 2017.
57. Interviews with UNMISS and MONUSCO officials – South Sudan and DRC 2018.
58. Interviews with UNPOL officials DRC, Mali, SS and CAR.
59. Focus group with community-based organisations – Beni, North Kivu, DRC, May 2018.
60. Interview with UN DPO official – New York, February 2020.
61. Interview with UNMISS, MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA officials – South Sudan, DRC, Mali, CAR, 2017–2019.
62. The JTFB saw police and military involved in highly militarised joint operation in PK5 neighbourhood that went badly wrong with negative repercussions for police access and effectiveness protecting civilian in PK5/Bangui. in the night between 7 and 8 April 2018, what was announced as joint law enforcement operation of MINUSCA, the Central African Armed Defence Forces (FACA) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) aimed at disarming and arresting some criminal groups in the PK5 area of Bangui turned into violent fire confrontation between the armed groups and the mission. (http://opiniojuris.org/2018/04/16/escalation-of-violence-in-bangui-has-minusca-become-party-to-a-conflict-in-car-and-what-would-that-mean/).
63. Focus group with MINUSCA JTFB officials – Bangui, CAR, August 2019.
64. Interviews with UNPOL officials in MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and MINUSCA – Bamako, Mali (April 2017), Goma, DRC (May 2018), Juba, South Sudan (December 2018) and Bangui, CAR (August 2019).
65. UN Police Website, 31 August 2020.
66. Focus group with community-based organisations – Mopti, Mali, 2017.
67. Interview with former senior MONUSCO official – New York, December 2019.
68. Interview with senior MONUSCO UNPOL official – Goma, DRC, June 2018.
69. Interviews with expert analyst on CAR and senior mission leaders in MINUSCA – Bangui, CAR, August 2019. Interviews with MINUSMA officials – Bamako, Mali, August 2019.
70. e.g. UNMISS, Guidelines on Informal Mitigation and Dispute Resolution Mechanism in Protection of Civilians Sites, August 2015; UN DPKO, Challenges, lessons learned and implications of the protection of civilians sites in South Sudan, 2015; UNMISS, Note of Guidance For UNMISS, Security of the IDP Population in the PoC Sites, 2014.
71. The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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Charles T. Hunt
Charles T. Hunt is Associate Professor of Global Security in the School of Global, Urban & Social Studies at RMIT University, Melbourne, and Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research in New York. Dr Hunt is Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly journal Global Responsibility to Protect and on the editorial boards of International Peacekeeping and the Journal of International Peacekeeping. His research is focused on UN peace operations and peacebuilding in conflict-affected states with recent articles published in Survival, Conflict and Cooperation, International Affairs, International Peacekeeping, and Global Governance.