Gendered advocacy coalitions and the Istanbul Convention: a comparative analysis of Bulgaria and Poland

ABSTRACT

The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, known as the Istanbul Convention or IC, is a contested issue in Central and Eastern Europe. This article investigates this matter further by focusing specifically on Bulgaria and Poland using the most similar systems design; the former country has not ratified the convention, but the latter has. In this article, we draw on the literature on gender politics and public policy and on law and society studies to refine the advocacy coalition framework and propose a novel perspective on (non-)ratification that accentuates the role of anti-gender and feminist advocacy coalitions. Specifically, this article links the (non-)ratification of the IC to the complex modes of interaction between partisan, societal, and legal actors who make up adversarial advocacy coalitions. This article also highlights that deep core beliefs widen the cultural cleavage, with the traditional being pitted against the feminist in this case, thereby instigating “culture wars” in both countries.

KEYWORDS:

• Istanbul Convention
• gender
• feminism
• women’s rights
• gendered advocacy coalitions

Introduction

The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, known as the Istanbul Convention or IC, is a human rights treaty that was adopted in May 2011 and has been in force since August 2014. The IC became the first European treaty to specifically target different forms of gender-based violence. Its provisions encompass not only criminal justice responses (prosecution) but also awareness raising (prevention) and the provision of social support measures to victims such as shelters, medical services, counseling, and legal aid (protection) (McQuigg 2017; Niemi, Peroni, and Stoyanova 2020). Though 37 member states of the Council of Europe have ratified the IC, eight member states have not done so.¹

Why are some states willing to ratify the IC, whereas others are not? This article explores this matter further by focusing on a case of non-ratification in Bulgaria and one of ratification in Poland. Methodologically, the most similar systems design assumes that a number of variables common to both countries are held constant, allowing for the identification of the key independent variable, which in this article is gendered advocacy coalitions. Theoretically, this article refines the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) using insights from the literature on gender politics and public policy and on law and society studies. Gender politics and public policy lenses tend to focus on the role of gender and feminism in politics, political analysis, and policymaking (Kantola and Lombardo 2017; Mazur 2002). The study of law and society approaches law as deeply embedded in both history and society (Mather 2011). Subsequently, this article hypothesizes that a strong feminist advocacy coalition is needed for a country to ratify the IC. Ultimately, non-ratification results from the existence of a strong anti-gender advocacy coalition.

Violence against women and domestic violence are global problems with devastating social, health, and economic consequences (Htun and Weldon 2018; True 2012). Femicide is a silent epidemic (Council of Europe 2021). In fact, the importance of this topic has been highlighted in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the sudden rise in domestic violence. The pandemic has exposed how common this serious human rights abuse is (Council of Europe 2021). Yet, despite a growing consensus about the necessity of combating gender-based violence, there is some opposition to the IC in times of democratic backsliding. In May 2020, the Hungarian parliament blocked the IC’s ratification. Elsewhere, in March 2021, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan decided to withdraw Turkey from the IC, under Article 80. In the same month, during the run-up to the Bulgarian parliamentary elections, the Bulgarian National Movement used the slogan “We stopped the Istanbul Convention.” In Poland, since the right-wing populist Law and Justice party came to power in October 2015, the revocation of the IC has been discussed.

This article contributes to the scholarly literature in several respects. First, it refines the ACF to examine unexplored questions about the role of deep core beliefs concerning gender in the formation of advocacy coalitions and the role of legal actors within such coalitions. Moreover, it adds a new hypothesis to Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible’s (2009) ACF theory. Second, the article demonstrates that the IC has become a contested issue and that its politicization has widened a cultural cleavage and intensified the so-called “culture wars” in Central and Eastern Europe. The sociologist James Davison Hunter coined the term “culture wars” in his seminal 1991 book and argued that this phenomenon was about a clash between orthodox and progressive worldviews (Hunter 1991). Finally, the article’s use of comparative politics, policy, and methods introduces a new dimension to existing studies on domestic violence in psychology, anthropology, public health, and criminology. The need for this new perspective is paramount. Given the severity of the problem, with one in three women in Europe having experienced physical and/or sexual violence (Council of Europe 2021), it is important to understand how public policies might tackle this serious human rights abuse.

Literature review

This article considers the ratification of the IC in the context of the gender politics and public policy literature rather than international relations (IR) scholarship, which is traditionally associated with such analyses. For example, Valentine Berthet (2022) uses constructivist IR theory on norms to explain the opposition to the European Union (EU) ratification of the IC in the European Parliament. However, this approach does not explain the complex domestic dynamics deriving from the formation of gendered coalitions. Instead, the feminist scholarship elucidates the normative dynamics and actors involved in the adoption of women’s rights laws (feminist policies).

The literature highlights that feminist policies are adopted when there is a critical mass of women participating in the policymaking process (Kittilson 2008; Mazur 2002). Other factors include the presence of critical actors who initiate policy proposals, state feminism, and left-wing governments (Krook and Childs 2010; Mazur 2002). Moreover, feminist organizations and movements take an active role in combating violence against women (Htun and Weldon 2018).

Recent contributions have underlined a global pushback against women’s rights. Scholars highlight that illiberalism and rising authoritarian populism endorse anti-feminist and anti-gender rhetoric (Graff and Korolczuk 2022). Moreover, “gender ideology” is seen as a threat by right-wing and far-right parties (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). In some Central and Eastern European countries, the IC has encountered resistance because it has been understood as requiring states to change their concept of family (Niemi, Peroni, and Stoyanova 2020). According to Ciarán Burke and Alexandra Molitorisová (2019), opposition to the IC can be explained by a genuine incompatibility between constitutional provisions and the IC, the translation of gender, and the so-called “war on gender.”

Regarding Bulgaria, several studies have demonstrated the role of conservative values in generating anti-gender sentiments and opposition to the IC (Ilcheva 2020; Krizsán and Roggeband 2021; Popova, Koev, and Popova 2020), especially on social media (Bankov 2020; Darakchi 2019). All such studies assume an implicit link between the widespread societal opposition to the IC and the failed attempt at ratification, but do not explore that link in substantial detail. This article contributes to the literature by applying new insights to the decision of Bulgaria’s Constitutional Court and exploring the complex relationship between law, society, and gender.

With respect to Poland, Katarzyna Sękowska-Kozłowska (2020) argues that the IC became a key element of the war on gender between conservative and liberal movements and that it is still the subject of ideological, rather than substantive, discussion. However, she does not explain ratification. Moreover, chapters by Katarzyna Pokorna-Ignatowicz (2014) and Dariusz Baran (2014) present an initial contestation, but they do not engage with the ratification process. Andrea Krizsán and Conny Roggeband (2021) examine resistance to the IC using critical frame analysis, but they do not consider advocacy coalitions.

Overall, the literature thus far has overlooked three important aspects. First, the domestic dynamics around treaty ratification are complex; multiple actors, with deep core beliefs, are involved in the ratification process. Second, the IC has been interpreted differently depending on the belief system. Third, though recent contributions to gender and politics scholarship engage with anti-gender movements, they do not offer a comprehensive framework to explain (non-)ratification. To close this gap, we propose a framework presented in the next section.

Conceptual and theoretical framework

This article proposes a theoretical framework based on the ACF, which provides insights into the dynamics of “policy subsystems,” including the policy actors, their belief systems, strategies of advocacy coalitions, and the processes of policy change within those subsystems (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2018; Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier and Weible 2009). Policy change can result from external shocks or policy learning (Sabatier 1988), in addition to an internal shock path and a negotiated agreement path (Sabatier and Weible 2009).

We refine the ACF to explore questions pertaining to the ratification of international human rights treaties. We employ insights from law and society scholarship to understand the formation of advocacy coalitions in human rights policy subsystems and to examine the types of resources that those coalitions employ to attain their policy goals. The study of law and society problematizes the depoliticized image of legal rules and approaches law as being deeply embedded within the social practices of a particular community (Mather 2011, 289). Thus, ratification should be examined in the context of the broader dynamics taking place within a society. This is complemented by insights from gender politics and public policy scholarship to understand the role of gender in the formation of advocacy coalitions. First, cultural and social beliefs influence gender (in)equality worldwide (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Specifically, gendered social and economic inequalities make women more vulnerable to violence and abuse (True 2012). Second, the notion of gender has several meanings. These two points are linked to deep core beliefs about the role of women in society, as well as the clash between traditional and progressive ideas and identity. In the remainder of this section, we first define concepts and subsequently present our hypothesis.

Concepts

Actors in the policymaking process can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions “composed of people from various organizations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert” (Sabatier 1988, 133). The ACF holds that the subsystem can be “affected by any actor directly or indirectly influencing subsystem affairs, including government officials, representatives of the private sector, NGO [non-governmental organization] members, media members, academics, lobbyists and even members of courts” (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2018, 139).

In this article, we examine partisan, societal, and legal actors. Partisan actors include political parties in parliament and presidents. They can be key players, especially if they have veto power. Meanwhile, societal actors include civil society organizations, which encompass religious and women’s organizations, scientists, and community groups. Such actors have the capacity to put pressure on partisan and legal actors. Legal actors have instituted a “professional monopoly” over legal interpretation (Bourdieu 1987, 834–835), which makes them important actors in advocacy coalitions formed around questions of ratifying legal rules.

The ACF underscores the importance of shared beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) and holds that individuals are boundedly rational; they simplify the world through their pre-existing belief systems. Specifically, the ACF differentiates between deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs, with the former defined as follows: “Deep core beliefs encompass very general normative and ontological assumptions about human nature, the relative priority of fundamental values such as liberty and equality, [and] the relative priority of the welfare of different groups” (Sabatier and Weible 2009, 194). Meanwhile, policy core beliefs are “applications of deep core beliefs that span an entire policy subsystem” (Sabatier and Weible 2009, 194). The latter are specific to the policy issue at hand.

We argue that pre-existing deep core beliefs enable the formation of advocacy coalitions on the matter of ratifying international treaties because legal conventions are always in need of interpretation, which is constructed against the background of the pre-existing norms in society (Kratochwil 2001). Consequently, a cultural cleavage within society can result in ardent disputes over the interpretation of legal rules and hinder efforts at dialogue.

This article explores the deep core beliefs of actors on questions of gender, which are crucial to understanding the policy core beliefs of actors regarding IC ratification. Karen Beckwith (2005) acknowledges that definitions of gender range from a simple synonym for sex to culturally specific dynamic interactions. In fact, gender, as a social construct, refers to norms, beliefs, and roles associated with being a woman or a man (Kantola and Lombardo 2017). Hawkesworth (2013) proposes that gender as an analytical category requires the study of how power operates to produce sex, gender, and sexuality in specific circumstances. In the context of democratic backsliding, gender as a scholarly concept is contested and lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and queer (LGBTQ+) identities are rejected by right-wing and far-right populists (Gwiazda 2021).

Recognizing gender complexity and the importance of women’s emancipation, feminist beliefs pertain to women’s rights, women’s empowerment, and gender equality. This liberal type of feminist beliefs aligns with the Western human rights tradition and the ideas of progress and improving women’s situation through the incremental inclusion of international women’s rights into national legal codes. Hence, liberal feminist core beliefs are egalitarian, European, and pro-gender. It is worth noting that in Central and Eastern Europe, liberal feminists tend to support pro-gender views because of their solidarity with LGBTQ+ people and their shared opposition to a backlash against gender equality, in contrast to other circumstances in which some liberal feminists might be viewed as anti-gender (such as the recognition of trans women). However, the limited scope of this article precludes a thorough exploration of feminism. Instead, it focuses specifically on one issue of feminist concern – namely, the ratification of the IC as a mechanism for combating gender-based violence.

Conversely, anti-gender beliefs are linked to traditional, nationalist, and religious deep core beliefs. They derive from conservative notions of the nation, the family, and tradition and can become ultra-conservative in their dogmatism. These beliefs are associated with protecting traditional and Christian values, morality, gender roles, and notions of the heteronormative family against the perceived foreign influence of the “corrupt West,” the “homosexual lobby,” and radical feminists (Graff and Korolczuk 2022; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). They fuel the contestation of gender-related issues, gender identities, and gender awareness (Gwiazda 2021).

Consequently, we argue that gendered advocacy coalitions are determined by gender and how actors interpret it. Moreover, we differentiate between feminist advocacy coalitions and anti-gender advocacy coalitions. Feminist advocacy coalitions are composed of actors who share liberal feminist deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs. Meanwhile, anti-gender advocacy coalitions are composed of actors who share anti-gender deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs.

Coalitions have a variety of resources at their disposal. According to Sabatier and Weible (2009), these include (1) formal legal resources, (2) public opinion, (3) information, (4) mobilizable supporters, (5) financial resources (which can be used to acquire other resources), and (6) skillful leadership. We argue that resources are hierarchically arranged, depending on their impact. We distinguish between primary resources, which are formal legal resources (such as the formal legal authority to make policy decisions or veto decisions); and secondary resources (such as public opinion, information, mobilizable supporters, financial resources, and skillful leadership), which are diffused but facilitate primary resources.

Hypothesis

The formation of a strong feminist advocacy coalition is needed in a country for it to ratify the IC. Non-ratification results from the presence of a strong anti-gender advocacy coalition. The strength of a coalition is determined by its size and resources.

Feminist advocacy coalitions are expected to support ratification because the IC aims to “protect women against all forms of violence, and prevent, prosecute and eliminate violence against women and … promote substantive equality between women and men” (Article 1). This represents an archetypal feminist demand. Thus, a feminist coalition is pro-IC. Conversely, anti-gender advocacy coalitions interpret the IC from the perspective of (ultra-)conservative deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs related to gender. The supposed “gender ideology” of the IC is seen as a threat to the traditional heteronormative family and Christian values.

For the treaty to be ratified, the feminist advocacy coalition needs to be strong. Ratification is more likely to happen when the size of the coalition and the resources at its disposal are substantial. The size of the coalition refers to majorities within partisan, societal, and legal actors. The larger the coalition size, the stronger its claim that it represents the policy core beliefs of society as a whole. Access to primary resources is indispensable for ratification. Since an international treaty must be voted upon in parliament and should obtain the president’s endorsement, or be approved by the constitutional court, formal legal authority is key to ratification. Consequently, two types of primary resources could be used by coalitions to obtain ratification: (1) voting power in parliament and presidential approval, if required, and/or (2) the power of the constitutional court to declare the constitutionality of the IC. The constitutional court does not necessarily have to be involved, but if it is, it makes the most authoritative decision. Though insufficient on their own to ensure ratification, secondary resources are important because the adoption of new legal rules needs to be socially validated or legitimized in the eyes of society. Both legal experts and society at large participate in the “interpretative community” of legal practice (Johnstone 2011).

Thus, a coalition is strong when it has a majority of the actors who have access to primary resources. Its access to secondary resources and the majority of the societal actors is important because they legitimize the decision, but again, they are not sufficient to ensure ratification. Conversely, a weak coalition is one that is small in size and lacks access to primary resources.

Overall, our framework proposes several new ideas. First, gendered advocacy coalitions can be divided into feminist and anti-gender coalitions. Second, we engage with an unexplored question about the role of legal actors in advocacy coalitions, if the matter is referred to them. Third, we differentiate between primary and secondary resources, and focus on the former as most pertinent to ratification. Finally, policy change results from the establishment of a strong coalition rather than the factors proposed by Sabatier and Weible (2009).

Methodology

This article uses a comparative method based on the most similar systems design. This design begins with similarities but then attempts to explain different outcomes (Landman and Carvalho 2017). Here, both countries, Bulgaria and Poland, are member states of the Council of Europe and the EU. They are parliamentary democracies with a communist legacy and traditionally conservative societies. When the issue of IC ratification arose, center-right coalitions were in power in both countries. Bulgaria ultimately did not ratify the IC, whereas Poland did. Crucially, our study responds to Hank C. Jenkins-Smith et al.’s (2018) call to develop systematic comparisons of policy subsystems across countries.

Using process tracing, this qualitative research involves a detailed analysis of coalition formation, actors’ beliefs, and the size and resources of coalitions. Process tracing is a research method used to identify actors, understand how a particular set of policy decisions unfolds over time, and explain the causes of policy decisions. According to Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen (2013, 1), it entails “using detailed, within-case empirical analysis of how a causal mechanism operate[s] in real-world cases.” We use process tracing to demonstrate the importance of advocacy coalitions for the ratification of the IC. However, with respect to legal decisions, it is worth noting that societal norms and beliefs should not be understood as causes of a specific court decision in the classic positivist sense. Rather, they contribute to the articulation of legal rules by simultaneously constraining and enabling different forms of legal reasoning, essentially providing the normative structure within which the interpretation, contestation, and justification of legal rules take place.

This in-depth study is based on primary and secondary data. Primary sources in Bulgarian and Polish were examined using content analysis. Pertinently, a qualitative content analysis ascribes meaning to text through its interpretation by a researcher (Schreier 2012). For the analysis of the Bulgarian case, the primary data included statements made during the 2018 public discussion of the IC at Sofia University, more than 50 submissions to parliament, the legal opinions submitted to the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, and that court’s decision. For the Polish case, the primary data included parliamentary debates and bills accessed through archives on the website of the Sejm, Poland’s parliament; roll-call votes in parliament; and press releases from the Polish Press Agency, Wirtualna Polska (a Polish online news agency), Gazeta Wyborcza (a Warsaw-based daily newspaper), and TVN24 (a Polish news channel). The websites of the Women’s Congress, the Women’s Rights Center, the Polish Episcopate, and Ordo Iuris (a Polish Catholic organization) were consulted for additional information on the Polish case. Meanwhile, secondary sources included scholarly literature.

Comparative analysis

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria, the anti-gender advocacy coalition was stronger than the feminist advocacy coalition, meaning that it was both larger in size and more capable of making use of primary resources – namely, the Constitutional Court’s authority to declare the constitutionality of the IC. Societal actors from both advocacy coalitions – feminist and anti-gender – relied on secondary resources, such as mobilizable supporters, information, and public opinion.

The feminist advocacy coalition was formed by societal actors such as the Bulgarian Fund for Women, whose deep core beliefs centered around the protection of women’s rights. In 2015, the coalition mobilized secondary resources to promote the ratification of the IC. The Association of Women Lawyers in Bulgaria made a declaration calling on the Bulgarian government to ratify the IC (National Assembly 2018a). At the time, the main party actor was a coalition government of Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), a center-right party member of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament, and the Reformist Block, a liberal center-right formation. The lobbying of feminist organizations was successful, and in April 2016, Bulgaria signed the IC. However, when the time came to ratify it, the coalition government had changed, affecting the primary resources available to the feminist advocacy coalition.

After the 2017 parliamentary elections, GERB formed a coalition government with the conservative nationalists from the United Patriots. The main opposition power in the 2017–2021 parliament was the center-left Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). In January 2018, the GERB-led government proposed a bill in parliament to ratify the IC (National Assembly 2018b). The policy core belief of the partisan and societal actors in the feminist advocacy coalition – that Bulgaria should ratify the IC – was fueled by deep core beliefs supporting gender equality and EU cooperation. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ekaterina Zaharieva argued that the IC would “elevate” Bulgarian laws to “the best” European models of legislation (Constitutional Court 2018b, 15).

Following the Bulgarian government’s declaration of its plans, the opposing anti-gender advocacy coalition quickly mobilized around partisan and societal actors with conservative deep core beliefs about family, traditions, and sovereignty (Darakchi 2019, 1217–1222; Valchev 2022). The newly formed anti-gender coalition saw the IC as a foreign attempt to introduce “gender ideology” and destroy the moral fabric of Bulgarian society (Public Discussion Transcript 2018). It then quickly mobilized secondary resources to stop ratification, including an open letter signed by more than 50 civil society organizations (Society and Values Association 2017). In public statements, the United Patriots argued that the IC contained concerning provisions regarding the education system and required Bulgaria to accept transgender refugees (Mediapool 2017).

Such statements turned the IC and its ratification into one of the most popular topics in the country, with 86 percent of Bulgarians having at least heard about it (Gallup International 2018). The impressive popularity of the debate helped to attract more participants – both partisan and societal – to the two advocacy coalitions. Societal actors from both advocacy coalitions made submissions to parliament and participated in the public discussion of the IC, organized by parliament’s chair on January 23, 2018, at Sofia University. Many NGO representatives from the feminist coalition used this discussion to share their first-hand experience of working with victims of domestic violence and to illustrate problems in the Bulgarian institutional framework (Public Discussion Transcript 2018). In an open letter, 287 university lecturers argued that the IC would bind the Bulgarian government to taking more active measures to tackle the problem (National Assembly 2018d). The anti-gender coalition employed secondary resources as well. In particular, parents formed citizen initiatives to express concern that the IC would encourage children to choose their own gender (Public Discussion Transcript 2018). In addition, an open letter signed by 47 civil society organizations argued that the IC would result in the legalization of same-sex marriage (National Assembly 2018c, 2).

At the societal level, the anti-gender coalition appeared larger in size compared to its feminist counterpart. An opinion poll showed that 58 percent of respondents were against ratification and only 19 percent were in favor (Gallup International 2018). During the public discussion, about 68 percent of the participants were against ratification. While societal actors from both coalitions used secondary resources, such as public opinion, information, and mobilizable supporters, the larger size of the anti-gender coalition enabled it to capture more resources and have more influence. The anti-gender coalition’s size and access to resources reinforced its strength. As the anti-gender coalition grew larger, it became more vocal and, hence, more capable of mobilizing supporters and steering public opinion. In turn, the ability to influence public opinion in particular enabled the anti-gender coalition to grow further.

In parliament, the main partisan actor supporting ratification was GERB. Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Justice, all from GERB, sought to employ secondary resources, such as skillful leadership, to convince the public through media statements that the IC was only intended to protect people from domestic violence. However, that strategy failed to change public opinion, possibly because, at that point in 2018, the GERB-led government saw a general decline in trust among the electorate (Alpha Research 2019). At the same time, the main opposition party, the BSP, opposed the IC, sharing the concerns of the anti-gender societal actors. Thus, the BSP took the position of a conservative left-wing party, departing from the position of the Party of European Socialists (PES) in the European Parliament. The inability of the PES to convince the BSP to change its stance on the IC shows the importance of examining the preferences of domestic-level actors to understand pre-ratification dynamics.

Against the background of polarized debate within civil society, the failure to demonstrate skillful leadership and the growing strength of the anti-gender coalition in parliament – which included opposition parties (the BSP) and coalition partners (the United Patriots) – GERB decided to leave the ultimate decision to the Constitutional Court. On February 8, 2018, 75 GERB deputies asked the Constitutional Court to pronounce on the compatibility of the IC with the Bulgarian constitution.

The Constitutional Court’s decision became the most important primary resource in the Bulgarian case. Societal actors from both advocacy coalitions employed information strategies by submitting expert opinions to the Constitutional Court and promoting their policy core beliefs. The Bulgarian Fund for Women submitted that the IC was compatible with the Bulgarian constitution. However, three legal experts argued that the term “gender” was incompatible with the term “пол” (“sex”) contained in the constitution (Constitutional Court 2018a). The latter set of submissions proved more influential with regard to the decision of the judicial majority.

Commentators have suggested that the Constitutional Court’s decision to declare the IC incompatible with the Bulgarian constitution was politicized and determined by the preferences of conservative societal actors (Ilcheva 2020, 57; Krizsán and Roggeband 2021, 82). While this view has some merit, it risks an arbitrary separation of “genuine” legal decisions versus “politicized” legal decisions. In practice, all forms of legal reasoning are political because the interpretation of the law is always influenced by the judges’ deep core beliefs about (1) the appropriate functioning of society and (2) the role of law therein. Consequently, all interpretations of legal rules are ideological and socially embedded.

At the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, the conflict between the majority of judges, who declared the IC unconstitutional, and the dissenting judges reflected two ideological tensions. The first juxtaposed liberal-internationalist deep core beliefs against conservative ones. The majority of judges interpreted the term “пол” as referring only to the biological sexes, which on this count made the constitution incompatible with the IC’s recognition of socially constructed gender roles (Constitutional Court 2018c). By contrast, the dissenting judges considered the term “пол” to have both biological and social aspects, and they criticized their colleagues for preventing Bulgaria from “standing next to the majority of civilized and democratic European countries” in combating violence (Constitutional Court 2018d).

The second ideological tension, often neglected in analyses, concerned the judges’ deep core beliefs about the role of law in society. The majority adopted a socially engaged vision of their mandate, arguing that a binary understanding of the sexes ensured “clarity, indisputableness, stability, and security” in social relationships, such as marriage and parenthood (Constitutional Court 2018c, 48). According to the majority of judges, losing the ability to “differentiate between a woman and a man” would have had negative implications for society, including with regard to combating violence (Constitutional Court 2018c, 55). Meanwhile, the dissenting judges adopted a minimalist vision of their mandates – to determine whether specific legal rules (in this case, the IC) were compatible with the constitution – without engaging in further deliberations about the appropriateness of those legal rules for governing society. From this perspective, assessing the “cultural” implications of the IC fell outside the Constitutional Court’s mandate (Constitutional Court 2018d, 2018e). This line of reasoning reflects a contractual model of society, in which law serves the limited function of preserving public order. By contrast, the judicial majority’s reasoning presents the rule of law as the foundation of a strong civic community, by upholding collective values (Duff 1993, 382–383). From the judicial majority’s perspective, the IC was a foreign document that would have confused Bulgarian society. Consequently, the judicial majority sided with the anti-gender advocacy coalition.

Poland

In Poland, the feminist advocacy coalition was stronger than the anti-gender advocacy coalition. The former was larger in size and had access to primary resources, though both coalitions used secondary resources, and, indeed, the anti-gender coalition was very active. Partisan actors, alongside societal actors, were key to ratification in Poland.

Following the 2011 parliamentary elections, the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) and Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) coalition government, led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, was appointed for a second consecutive term by President Bronisław Komorowski (a former PO deputy). PO is a centrist liberal party with a small conservative faction. Established in 2001, it was in government from 2007 to 2015. PO is pro-European and endorses gender equality. Its representatives took part in the drafting of the IC (Sękowska-Kozłowska 2020). Meanwhile, the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) is a right-wing populist party; it was established in 2001 under the leadership of twin brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński and won elections in 2007, 2015, and 2019. As a socially conservative party, it promotes national and traditional values derived from the teachings of the Catholic Church and fights “gender ideology.” The Palikot Movement (later called Your Movement) was a libertarian, anti-clerical center-left party. The PSL is an agrarian party established in 1990, and it was PO’s coalition partner between 2007 and 2015. The Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD), established in 1991 as a successor to the Communist Party, has become a modern social democratic and pro-European party with a progressive agenda supporting women’s and LGBTQ+ rights.

The feminist advocacy coalition was composed of partisan actors: PO’s Prime Minister Tusk; his successor, Ewa Kopacz; and the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment. The SLD, Your Movement, and some deputies from the PSL were also part of this coalition, in addition to President Komorowski. Societal actors included the Women’s Congress, Feminoteka, the Women’s Rights Center, and other feminist organizations.² This coalition was strong because of its size (with a partisan majority in parliament and presidential support) and access to primary resources – specifically, the legal authority to make policy decisions.

Debates over the IC’s ratification began in 2012. In March, the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment put the IC on the government’s agenda with the prime minister’s support (Krizsán and Roggeband 2021). Subsequently, Tusk announced the signing of the IC during a meeting with the Women’s Congress and confirmed his commitment to an audience of 7,500 women gathered for its annual congress in Warsaw (Baran 2014). The IC was then signed in December 2012 (Sękowska-Kozłowska 2020). However, there was opposition within the party from the conservative faction, including the then Minister of Justice Jarosław Gowin, who said that the IC was an “expression of feminist ideology” that “really serves to combat the traditional family and promotes homosexual relationships” (cited in Baran 2014). He was later sacked and defected from the PO to form the United Right, which became allied with the PiS before the 2015 election.

A ratification bill submitted to parliament and signed by Prime Minister Tusk justified the IC’s ratification by referring to liberal norms of anti-discrimination and human rights, as well as new issues such as economic violence and violence by ex-partners (Sejm 2014). In parliament, a government official confirmed that the IC was compatible with the Polish legal order (Sejm 2015). Furthermore, he confirmed that it did not contradict Polish tradition, culture, and religious beliefs but rather promoted egalitarian values (Sejm 2015). A male PO deputy reiterated that the IC’s main goal was “to help public authorities in Poland to combat violence against women. Around 30 percent of women experience violence. This is a huge social problem.” Similarly, a male SLD deputy said: “In 2005, the Democratic Left Alliance proposed the first anti-domestic violence policy. But this law is not enough. The Convention is needed” (Sejm 2015).

Against the backdrop of pressures coming from the anti-gender coalition (discussed below), a vote took place in the Sejm (Vote No. 40, February 6, 2015). PO, the SLD, and Your Movement voted for the ratification, whereas PiS and the United Right voted against; the PSL was split. After the Senate approval, President Komorowski signed the bill, and formal ratification was concluded in April 2015. President Komorowski reiterated that there were no reservations concerning the IC’s constitutionality and the alleged impact of “gender ideology” on the Polish legal system (Komorowski 2015). He signed the bill, and formal ratification was concluded in April 2015.

The feminist advocacy coalition had access to secondary resources – in particular, information, mobilizable supporters, and skillful leadership. Women’s Congress officials provided expert input and were present in parliament during the ratification debates (Sejm 2015). The Women’s Rights Center, Feminoteka, and “Blue Line” (an organization that helps the victims of domestic abuse) all appealed to Sejm deputies in response to delays in parliamentary committees, and subsequently an appeal led by the Women's Congress was submitted to the Senate and the president to support ratification (PAP 2015). Moreover, supporters mobilized in the streets. For example, in December 2014, the Women’s Congress organized a demonstration in front of the Sejm to draw attention to domestic violence. In February 2015, Feminoteka organized marches as part of the “One Billion Rising” campaign. Other initiatives included joint public readings of the IC and a Facebook information campaign (Krizsán and Roggeband 2021). Skillful leadership also proved to be an important secondary resource. Prime Minister Tusk expressed strong feminist sentiment (Kublik 2012) and linked his support to women’s rights (Krizsán and Roggeband 2021). His successor, Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz, actively lobbied PO deputies to vote for ratification, even threatening them with de-selection for the 2015 election (Grochal 2015).

The anti-gender advocacy coalition was composed of partisan actors – namely, the PiS and the United Right – and societal actors such as the Catholic Church and Ordo Iuris. Partisan actors expressed their views in a parliamentary debate on February 6, 2015, when a female PiS deputy said: “The Convention requires the blind fight against tradition, religion and culture seen as determinants of violence. I ask the Civic Platform: Why do you go to war with Polish culture, tradition and religion?” She continued: “The Convention requires in Article 14 to promote non-stereotypical socio-cultural roles in schools. This is brainwashing. Young children in kindergartens will have to learn affirmations for homosexual partnerships. Instead, they should learn respect for the traditional family” (Sejm 2015). A female United Right deputy, who had established the “Stop Gender Ideology” parliamentary group, said: “This is a legal monster which does not combat violence. It only meets the demands of LGBT communities” (Sejm 2015). Another United Right deputy outlined concerns about the IC’s constitutionality.

However, it was a societal actor, the Catholic Church, that set the anti-gender tone at the time of the debate over the signing of the IC, which was reiterated in the ratification process. The Presidium of the Conference of the Polish Episcopate outlined:

The Convention is based on ideological and false assumptions. It implies in Article 12 that violence against women is based on religion, tradition, and culture; introduces in Article 3 the definition of gender and presupposes that gender can be chosen; and promotes in Article 14 non-stereotypical gender roles, that is, homosexuality and transsexualism. (Episkopat 2012)

Subsequently, the Catholic Daily warned that the IC would implement “gender ideology” and LGBTQ+ policies (Baran 2014). Following the Church’s opinion, other Catholic organizations, including the Polish Women’s Forum and the Polish Federation of Life Protection Movements, became part of the anti-gender coalition. Moreover, Ordo Iuris offered its own interpretation of IC norms in a socially conservative and pseudo-legal way. In its 2014 report, it condemned the IC, stating that “it challenges the traditional family and the rights of parents to raise their children according to their beliefs; liberalizes abortion; discriminates against men; and is unconstitutional because the Convention’s axiological system implies activities in the field of social engineering” (Ordo Iuris 2014, 1).

Though the anti-gender advocacy coalition at the time was weak because of its small size, lack of formal legal authority, and lack of primary resources, it nevertheless made itself heard and made the most of secondary resources. There was also a widespread disinformation campaign organized in churches about the IC’s threats. The PiS leadership skillfully used its connection with the Catholic Church to mobilize supporters (the majority of PiS voters are regular churchgoers). Other anti-gender activities included “Stop Gender Ideology” demonstrations and a series of petitions questioning the IC’s constitutionality (Ordo Iuris 2014). Moreover, pro-life organizations issued a statement calling on Sejm deputies to reject the IC (Krizsán and Roggeband 2021). Yet, without significant primary resources, such efforts were ineffective.

Discussion and conclusion

This article has examined the impact of gendered advocacy coalitions on the ratification of the IC. It has argued that the formation of a strong feminist advocacy coalition explained ratification in Poland, while non-ratification in Bulgaria resulted from the presence of a strong anti-gender advocacy coalition. This main thesis is complemented by nuanced theoretical and empirical insights.

First, the article has shown that deep core beliefs inform the ways in which legal rules, such as the IC, are interpreted in practice and how gendered coalitions are formed. While the ACF explores the role of deep core and policy beliefs in the formation of advocacy coalitions, it has not accounted for gender issues and how a cultural cleavage leads to the formation of advocacy coalitions.

In Bulgaria, the anti-gender coalition interpreted the term “gender stereotypes” as being synonymous with tradition. By contrast, from a feminist perspective, the existence of “gender stereotypes” led to oppression and violence against women under the guise of biological differences. For those with pro-European sentiments, this term further connoted regression toward Bulgaria’s authoritarian past, contrasting with European modernity and democracy. In Poland, (ultra-)conservative, traditional, and anti-gender beliefs together formed the foundations of the anti-gender advocacy coalition. Its advocates claimed to draw on traditional Christian values derived from the teachings of the Catholic Church. These beliefs included a heteronormative family model, traditional gender norms, and the protection of the nation against “gender ideology.” However, beliefs in liberal feminist, legal, and European norms were the founding components of the feminist advocacy coalition. Members of this coalition underscored the importance of combating violence against women and enriching the Polish legal order with European human rights norms. Moreover, further characteristics of gendered advocacy coalitions have been discerned. Feminist coalitions can be explicitly feminist by highlighting women’s rights and gender equality, or implicitly feminist by not referring expressly to feminism but still endorsing the IC. Anti-gender coalitions are anti-gender in three ways: they are anti-feminist (rejecting the IC and criticizing feminism), they are anti-LGBTQ+ (criticizing homosexuality and transgender identities), and they are against the notion of gender (altogether or beyond its binary understanding). Furthermore, deep core beliefs widen the cultural cleavage which gives rise to two antagonistic advocacy coalitions. In Central and Eastern Europe, the IC has come to serve as an ideological battleground where, on the one side, there are opponents of “gender” and “gender ideology” and, on the other, there are advocates of liberal and feminist norms. In Bulgaria, members of the anti-gender coalition declared that they supported Bulgarian laws but were against externally imposed norms introducing “gender.” In Poland, the PiS’s electoral victory in 2015 contributed to the intensification of the “culture wars” and new anti-gender initiatives. However, the “culture wars” argument goes beyond the IC, and describes a sense of conflict between two opposing visions of the nation and the future, and perceived threats to what is considered the “right” way of life.

Second, the article has illustrated that the strength of a coalition – in terms of its size and access to resources – matters. We argue that resources are hierarchically arranged as primary and secondary resources, depending on their impact, which supplements the ACF. In Bulgaria, a Constitutional Court majority shared the beliefs of the anti-gender coalition. Their formal legal power to declare the constitutionality of international conventions became the primary resource, which blocked ratification. While both advocacy coalitions relied on secondary resources (such as signing petitions, participating in public discussions, and providing information) to influence parliamentary debate, and subsequently proceedings at the Constitutional Court, the anti-gender coalition in Bulgaria was larger in size and more vocal, and claimed a larger share of public opinion. In Poland, the feminist coalition was strong; it had a partisan majority in parliament, the support of the president, and access to formal power to approve the ratification bill. Moreover, societal actors provided information to raise awareness and mobilize supporters, lobbied the prime minister, and organized petitions, demonstrations, and a Facebook information campaign. The skillful leadership of two prime ministers also proved helpful. By contrast, the anti-gender advocacy coalition was weak because it was small in size and lacked primary resources. However, it had some significant secondary resources – in particular, skillful leadership, as the PiS leadership used the Catholic Church to help to mobilize supporters.

Third, the article has demonstrated that a legal actor, if asked to adjudicate, can play a decisive role in advocacy coalitions. Yet, the ACF literature has not thus far afforded sufficient attention to the courts. The comparative analysis has shown that ratification is possible through either the primary resources held by partisan actors (Poland) or those held by legal actors (Bulgaria). By declaring the IC unconstitutional, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court became the veto player. The analysis has suggested that judges have their own deep core beliefs, which may result in competing interpretations of the question at hand. Here, the majority’s decision was underpinned by conservative beliefs and engaged with the question of the broader social and moral impact of the IC. By contrast, the dissenting opinions were founded on a minimalistic vision of the court’s mandate and a liberal approach to human rights. The Bulgarian case supports the proposition that legal interpretations, while following the rules specific to the juridical arena, are also grounded in a social context (Bourdieu 1987).

Fourth, the article has shown that gendered advocacy coalitions are likely to last in some form because they are based on deep core beliefs that do not change easily even though policy beliefs, in some contexts, might be less enduring. In Bulgaria, the Constitutional Court ruling decisively ended the policy-specific debate concerning the ratification of the IC, and the two rival advocacy coalitions that had formed around that issue demobilized. However, the deep core beliefs that motivated those coalitions are still present in Bulgarian society and motivate political action in different settings. For instance, feminist organizations have continued to work on the development of a more robust legal system for protection against domestic violence. Conservative sentiments have also been apparent, including in public demonstrations and hate speech. Conversely, in Poland, both deep core and policy beliefs seem more permanent. Since the 2015 election, the anti-gender coalition, led by the PiS, has campaigned for the country’s withdrawal from the IC,³ submitted reservations to the IC, and deprived women of reproductive rights as well as made persistent attacks on LGBTQ+ people. In response, the feminist coalition has become increasingly active, with mass mobilization on an unprecedented scale in the form of the “Black Protests” and the All-Poland Women’s Strike.

Finally, the article has demonstrated that democratic backsliding has negative consequences for gender equality and social justice. The rise of right-wing populism, illiberalism, and anti-gender movements is associated with opposition to gender equality and anti-gender politics (Graff and Korolczuk 2022; Gwiazda 2021; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). James Dawson (2018) suggests that despite Bulgaria’s democratization and subsequent accession to the EU, liberalism has yet to be consolidated in civil society there. The illiberal rhetoric (anti-LGBTQ+, anti-migrant, and deeply suspicious of liberal NGOs) around the IC substantiates that argument. At the time of ratification, Poland was considered a stable democracy. Opposition to feminist change was present but still a minority. When the PiS came to power in 2015, illiberal and anti-gender agendas came to the fore, resulting in gendered democratic backsliding. Not only were the fundamentals of liberal democracy dismantled, but anti-gender ideas were also more pronounced and several anti-gender policy initiatives were proposed.

In conclusion, this article has explored the relationship between gendered advocacy coalitions and the IC’s ratification. It has also identified the cultural cleavage stemming from deep core beliefs, pitting the traditional worldview against the feminist one. Further research could test the article’s main hypothesis in other contexts, investigate whether coalitions change over time, and assess policy effectiveness. Overall, the IC, with its important goal of combating violence against women and domestic violence, remains a contested issue in Central and Eastern Europe.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and the editors for their assistance with this publication. Anna Gwiazda acknowledges the receipt of a small grant to conduct this research from the Faculty of Social Science and Public Policy at King’s College London.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Anna Gwiazda

Anna Gwiazda is a Reader in Comparative Politics in the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London, UK. Her current research focuses on women’s political representation and gender equality. She has published extensively in this field, including guest editing two special issues: “Politics and Gender in Eastern Europe” in Politics & Gender in 2019 and “Women’s Political Representation in Central and Eastern Europe” in East European Politics in 2021. She has also researched the quality of democracy and published Democracy in Poland with Routledge in 2016.

Liana Minkova

Liana Minkova holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Cambridge, UK, and a Junior Research Fellowship at Newnham College, University of Cambridge. She conducts interdisciplinary studies in international organization and international law, and has published in Politics & Gender, the Leiden Journal of International Law, and the Journal of Genocide Research.

Notes

1 Though Turkey ratified the IC, it withdrew in 2021. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic had not ratified the IC as of May 1, 2023. Conversely, three non-member states acceded to the treaty: Israel, Kazakhstan, and Tunisia (Council of Europe 2022).

2 These organizations included Feminist Daily, the Federation for Women and Family Planning, Trans-Fusion, Voices against Violence, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, “Blue Line,” the Polish Professional Women’s Network, and the Women’s Agreement of March 8.

3 In July 2020, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki submitted an application to the Constitutional Tribunal to adjudicate on the IC. As of May 1, 2023, no decision had been made.