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Research Symposium on Challenges for the 21st Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff

Irregular warfare in strategic competition

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Pages 148-158 | Received 04 Aug 2023, Accepted 01 Nov 2023, Published online: 21 Nov 2023
 

ABSTRACT

After two decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has shifted to preparing for large-scale combat operations. However, it would be a mistake to discard hard-earned lessons from these conflicts. Despite contemporary advances in technology and important differences between current US competitors and the Soviet Union, irregular warfare will play a prominent role in the new era of strategic competition. It was a prominent form of US-Soviet competition during the Cold War, is already used extensively by the United States and its competitors and remains attractive given concerns about escalation between nuclear-armed powers. Given the continued relevance of irregular warfare, we focus on two main lessons from the US experience. First, since irregular warfare is about influencing populations and achieving political goals without large-scale combat operations, influencing and working alongside the partner is the primary mission. The second lesson follows directly from the first; if irregular warfare is ultimately about achieving policy goals with an economy of military force, IW is a team sport requiring joint and interagency collaboration to be effectively implemented.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. This paper was drafted following a workshop at the United States Military Academy at West Point in February 2023.

2. It is important, however, not to oversell Russian accomplishments in irregular warfare. Russia failed in 2014 to fully mobilize Russian-speaking populations in the Donbas, and had to send in conventional troops when its proxies were nearly defeated by Kyiv in August 2014 (Chinchilla and Driscoll Citation2021; Kofman Citation2016). And of course, in 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine with the bulk of its conventional combat power.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Alexandra Chinchilla

Alexandra Chinchilla (corresponding author) is an Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service.

Kyle Atwell

Kyle Atwell is a US Army Officer, Co-founder and Chair of the Board at the Irregular Warfare Initiative, and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Practice within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Alexis Bradstreet

Alexis Bradstreet is a Cadet at the United States Military at West Point, majoring in Cyber Science in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Catherine Crombe

Katie Crombe is a US Army Officer and Strategist, currently serving in the Joint Staff.

Luther Leblanc

Luther LeBlanc is a Cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point, majoring in American Politics.

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