Britain on the Eve of the Six Day War: The British Effort to End the Egyptian Blockade on the Straits of Tiran

Abstract

After the Suez Campaign, Britain sought to preserve a measure of stability in the Middle East. Britain believed that only if the Middle East enjoyed a modicum of stability could it safeguard its own political and economic interests in the Arab world, as well as block any further Soviet penetration of the region. But in May 1967, following Nasser's decision to close the Straits to Israeli shipping, Britain recognized that unless something was done soon about the Straits, a war could erupt with catastrophic effects on British interests. To this end, it made strenuous efforts to promote the idea of an international naval task force, which, by lifting the blockade, would end the crisis. Unfortunately, Britain, hamstrung by its fear of undermining its interests in the Arab world, was unwilling to assume the lead in establishing the task force. It certainly did not want to risk the possibility of finding itself in a headlong military confrontation with the Arab states. The British venture came to nothing and despite its best efforts, Britain failed to forestall the Six Day War with its disastrous effects on Britain's interests in the Middle East.