Redefining NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships: cooperative security meets collective defence and deterrence

ABSTRACT

When the 2010 Strategic Concept first established NATO’s partnerships as essential in the core task of cooperative security, global partnerships were primarily intended to support non-Article 5 contingencies. However, given the structural changes in the international system, NATO’s partnerships outside the Euro-Atlantic area are adapting to respond to the new security challenges. This article examines the evolution of NATO’s partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and offers insights into future developments. There is a clear alignment between the Alliance and the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) in the way they diagnose the interconnectedness of security developments of their respective regions. Both sides increasingly see these partnerships as significant for their own defence and deterrence, rather than as instruments in pooling resources in the provision of security for third parties.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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Notes on contributors

Gorana Grgić

Dr. Gorana Grgić is a Senior Researcher with the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security team at the ETH Zürich’s Center for Security Studies. Gorana is also a non-resident Senior Lecturer in US Foreign Policy at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and an Expert Associate with the National Security College at the Australian National University. Her research interests include US and EU foreign policy, NATO, and the nexus between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security.