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ABSTRACT
From 1965 to 1970, the United States Army executed a widespread program of surveillance of civilian political activity within the United States. The program’s originator was the US Army Intelligence Command, a geographically widespread counterintelligence organization built for the mission of protecting the army from foreign intelligence adversaries. Within Intelligence Command, this mission engendered an organizational culture that valued supporting the army above all else, including regulatory and legal restrictions. When the domestic disorders of the late 1960s necessitated repeated federal responses, Intelligence Command became the primary instrument for collecting information related to civil disturbances. Imbued with this culture, counterintelligence agents across the country conducted continuous surveillance of individuals, groups, and activities across the political spectrum. Yet, even when later exposed and under intense public scrutiny, Intelligence Command’s mission focus never wavered, thereby demonstrating the danger when the culture of an intelligence organization clashes with its legal limits.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Jenna McLaughlin, Zach Dorfman, and Sean D. Naylor, “Pentagon intelligence employees raise concerns about supporting domestic surveillance amid protests,’ Yahoo News, 4 June 2020.
2 “Press Release: Following Deployment of Military and Federal Law Enforcement by Trump on Streets, Schiff Requests Information from IC on Any Intelligence Support Requested or Provided,” U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 8 June 2020.
3 Ellen Nakashima, “Military spy agencies did not monitor protesters, Pentagon official says,” Washington Post¸ 12 June 2020.
4 Pyle, Christopher H. “CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics,” Washington Monthly, January 1970.
5 United States Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC), “Dossier # H1056226, PYLE, Christopher Howland,” undated, Folder 106,490 – 007 – 0610, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents, 1965–1972: Records of the US Army’s ACSI Task Force, National Archives and Records Administration, Bethesda, MD.
6 Pyle, “CONUS Intelligence.”
7 USAINTC, “General Comment on the Pyle Paper,” 17 February 1970, p. 2, Folder 106,490 – 007 – 0221, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
8 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert F. Froehlke, in US Congress, Senate, Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee of the Judiciary, 92d Congress, 1st session, 23, 24, and 25 February and 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, and 17 March 1971, Vol. 1, 422.
9 Robert E. Jordan, General Counsel for the Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Review of Civil Disturbance Intelligence History, in US Congress, Senate, Military Surveillance, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee of the Judiciary, 93d Congress, 2d Session, 9 and 10 April 1974, 287.
10 Senator Jam J. Ervin, Jr., Preface to US Congress, Senate, Army Surveillance of Civilians: A Documentary Analysis, Staff of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Congress, 2d Session, 1972, v.
11 John Patrick Finnegan, Army Lineage Series – Military Intelligence (Washington, DC: United States Army Center for Military History, 1998), 155.
12 Paul J. Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders 1945–1992 (Washington, DC: United States Army Center for Military History, 2012), 399.
13 Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 245–246.
14 Frank J. Donner, The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System (New York: Knopf, 1980), 289–290 and 317.
15 Christopher Pyle, Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics, 1967–1970 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986), 423–424.
16 Finnegan¸ Military Intelligence, 153.
17 Major General William Blakefield, “Briefing of Lieutenant General Ferdinand T. Unger, Director of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations, DA, Fort Holabird, Maryland,” 16 March 1969, Folder 016490–015-0268, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
18 The exact origins and first use of the term counterintelligence are unknown, though in the US Army the term first appeared formally during the Second World War era with the establishment of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps in 1942. Counterintelligence did not receive a formal definition until 1981, when Executive Order 12,333 defined it for the entire US intelligence community as ‘information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.’ For history of the practice of counterintelligence in the Army, as broadly defined above, see James L. Gilbert, et al, In the Shadow of the Sphinx: A History of Army Counterintelligence (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004).
19 Peter Mansoor and Williamson Murray, eds., The Culture of Military Organizations, 1.
20 Ibid., 2.
21 Ibid., 3.
22 Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, “Culture and Military Organizations,” in Ibid., 30.
23 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 381–130, Counterintelligence Investigations, Supervision and Control (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), 4.
24 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 30–7, Counterintelligence Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968), 3. This manual replaced a previous addition published in April 1965. There is no listing of the changes from previous version and a side-by-side is not possible due to the unavailability of the earlier edition. However, the 1968 included USAINTC organizational information, which only Intelligence Command could provide. Thus, draft versions likely circulated among USAINTC to spread awareness regarding upcoming changes. Even before its official February 1968 publication, Intelligence Command was more than likely working under the guidance of this new manual.
25 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 10–17, Organizations and Functions United States Army Intelligence Command (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,1965) p. 1 in Folder 016590 – 004 – 0287, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
26 Wong and Gerras, “Culture and Military Organizations,” 27.
27 MG Blakefield commanded USAINTC from 5 June 1967 to 22 February 1970. For a complete list of all USAINTC’s commanding officers from 1965 to 1970, see USAINTC Memorandum, Re: Statistical Data – Senator Ervin Requirement, April 1971, in Folder 016490 – 004 – 0287, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
28 See Blakefield, Speech to US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 November 1968, 1 or Blakefield, Speech to US Army Chaplain School, 11 February 1969, 2 in Folder 016490–015-0268, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
29 USAINTC Organization Chart, 1 January 1965, in Folder 0164900 – 004 – 0287, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
30 USAINTC Map – Area of Jurisdiction, CONUS Military Intelligence Groups, in Folder 0164900 – 004 – 0287, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
31 Army Regulation 10–17, 1.
32 Field Manual 30–17, 37.
33 Ibid., 52–60.
34 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 169–170.
35 USAINTC Command and Staff Briefing, “The Role of Army Intelligence in Civil Disturbances,” February 1971, in Folder 016490 – 017 – 0426, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
36 Finnegan, Military Intelligence, 153.
37 Ibid. and in USAINTC, “Reference Material for CG, Civil Disturbance Planning,” in Folder 016490–016-0332, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
38 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 8, 143.
39 Ibid., 223.
40 Headquarters, Department of the Army. “The Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan – GARDEN PLOT,” 1 February 1968, US Declassified Documents Online, accessed 8 September 2019, 2.
41 Ibid., 5.
42 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, “Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Information Collection Plan,” 2 May 1968, US Declassified Documents Online, accessed 8 September 2019, 1.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., B-1 and B-12.
45 Ibid., B-8.
46 Ibid., B-2.
47 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 171–172.
48 Headquarters, US Army Intelligence Command, “Special Report, USAINTC Support During Civil Disturbances,” unpublished report to the Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, 30 August 1967, in Folder 016490–016-0410, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
49 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 185–186.
50 Headquarters, 113th Military Intelligence Group, “After Action Report – Garden Plot, Detroit, 24 July – 5 August 1967,” in Folder 016490–014-0379, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents, 4, 9–10.
51 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 185.
52 Pyle, Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics, 42.
53 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 214.
54 113th Military Intelligence Group, “After Action Report,” 10–11.
55 Cyrus R. Vance, “Final Report of Cyrus R. Vance, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Concerning The Detroit Riots, July 23 through 2 August 1967,” 12 September 1967, 50.
56 Ibid., 60.
57 Colonel Robert W. McCartney, Headquarters, US Army Intelligence Command, Memorandum, “CONUS Intelligence Operations,” 9 January 1968, in Folder 016489–013-0038, US Surveillance of Dissidents, 2.
58 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 247–248.
59 “History, US Army Intelligence Role in Civil Disturbances,” undated, in Federal Data Banks, vol. 2, 1292.
60 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Operations Report – Lessons Learned, Civil Disorders 1967: A Summary of Lessons Learned,” 1 April 1968, in Folder 016490–17-0205, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents, 5.
61 See Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, p. 228 and Pyle, 47. Both agree on this assessment of MG Yarborough, though the primary evidence of his view comes from a quote used by Pyle attributed to “notes of one who was present at this briefing.”
62 Quote from Milton R. Hyman, Memorandum for Record, “Subject: Army Civil Disturbance Intelligence Activities,” 23 January 1971, in Military Surveillance, 300.
63 Blakefield, quoted in “Commander’s Conference Notes,” 17 April 1968, in Folder 016490–006-0367, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents, 2.
64 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 371.
65 Testimony of Froehlke, Federal Data Banks, vol. 1, 390.
66 The precise scale of the information collection activities by non-Intelligence Command personnel is impossible to ascertain, given the destruction of the voluminous reports in 1970–71. The testimony of former counterintelligence agents L. Lane and O. Pierce, both former members of the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, CO, to the Ervin committee provide valuable insight into the non-USAINTC activities. The activities were predominately local but conformed to the information requirements outlined in the Civil Disturbance Information Collection Plan. See Federal Data Banks, vol. 1, 305–312.
67 Christopher Pyle’s monograph, Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics, 1967–70 is the best work at describing in detail the breadth and depth of USAINTC and other Army organization’s collection activities, drawing on “more than 100 former intelligence agents, analysts, and coordinators,” as sources. However, most of these sources are cited anonymously, making their information exceeding difficult to verify.
68 US Army Intelligence Command, “General Summary of GARDEN PLOT/LANTERN SPIKE, 4 April through 17 April 1968,” 25 April 1968, in Folder 016490–017-0205, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents, 1.
69 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 353.
70 Headquarters, Region I, 113th Military Intelligence Group, “Operation Plan DENATCON 68,” 1 August 1968, in Folder 016490–007-0544, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents, 1–2.
71 For a detailed description of the different disguises and other efforts USAINTC personnel adopted during the Democratic National Convention, see Pyle, Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics, 172–179.
72 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 359.
73 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Observations of Disturbances During the Democratic National Convention,” October 1968, in Folder 016490–008-0363, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents, 1.
74 Ibid., 7.
75 Blakefield, Command Presentation to Headquarters, USAINTC, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 16 October 1968, in Folder 01640–015-0268, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents, 4–5.
76 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 370–372.
77 Colonel Maurice L. Young, USAINTC Director of Investigations, “Lessons Learned, Inaugural 1969,” 18 April 1969, in Folder 061490–009-0050, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
78 David E. McGiffert, Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Staff, Subject: Army Intelligence Mission and Requirements to Civil Disturbances, 5 February 1969, in Federal Data Banks, vol. 2, 1139–1141.
79 Thaddeus R. Beal, Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Staff, Subject: Army Intelligence Mission Requirements Related to Civil Disturbances, 24 April 1969, in Federal Data Banks, vol. 2, 1141–1142.
80 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 389.
81 Testimony of Froehlke, in Federal Data Banks, vol. 1, 394.
82 Colonel Robert E. Lynch, Department of the Army Office of the Adjutant General, “Directive, Subject: Collection, Reporting, Processing, and Storage of Civil Disturbance Information,” in Folder 016490–017-088, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents, 3.
83 Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 410–411.
84 Major General Roland M. Gleszer, Headquarters, Military District of Washington, “After Action Report, Washington Protest Activities, 7–10 May 1970,” 26 May 1970, in Folder 016490–012-0884, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents, 5.
85 Finnegan, Military Intelligence, 157.
86 Ibid, 162–163.
87 USAINTC Command and Staff Briefing, “The Role of Army Intelligence in Civil Disturbances,” February 1971, in Folder 016490 – 017 – 0426, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents.
88 Federal Data Banks, vol. 1, iv–v and Federal Data Banks, vol. 2, 1457–1499.
89 USAINTC’s assigned strength fluctuated from a low of 2,782 personnel in 1966 to a high of 4,427 in 1970. USAINTC, “Statistical Data & History to Answer Senator Ervin Requirement,” April 1971, in Folder 016490 – 006 – 0002, US Army Surveillance of Dissidents, 1–2.
90 Statement of Ralph Stein to the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 24 February 1971, in Federal Data Banks, vol. 1, 244–262.
91 Testimony of Joseph Levin to the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 24 February 1971, in ibid., 292.
92 Agent Letter No. 18, 15 February 1971, in ibid., 1483.
93 Agent Letter No. 12, 13 February 1971, in ibid., 1473.
94 Agent Letter No. 13, 20 December 1970, in ibid., 1474.
95 James F. Martin to Senator Sam Ervin, Agent Letter No. 17, in ibid., 1479–1480.
96 Gilbert, et al., In the Shadow of the Sphinx, 138.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Benjamin J. Lyman
Benjamin J. Lyman is an instructor at the United States Military Academy, a US Army Military Intelligence officer, and a PhD candidate at The Ohio State University. He holds a BA from Dickinson College and an MA from The Ohio State University. He has served the US Army in numerous positions within the United States and abroad. His dissertation will focus on the practice and experience of military intelligence in the American Civil War.