Sabotaging Paradiplomacy: A Typological Analysis of Counter-Paradiplomacy

Abstract

While Paradiplomacy has received substantial scholarly attention in recent decades, less attention has been given to its antithetical dynamic: counter-paradiplomacy (CPD). This paper fills this gap by providing a comprehensive scrutiny of states’ reactive policies against subnational diplomatic engagement. We use a typological analysis to differentiate between various forms of CPD, which is impacted by both the nature of the actors involved and the power asymmetries between them. Each typology is illustrated with contemporary cases that highlight these different forms of frictional interactions between states and subnational actors.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Duchacek applied the label ‘protodiplomacy’ (1986) to this particular form of secessionist-motivated paradiplomacy.

2 Although as we shall see at the end of the section, the British government used soft CPD, some years after the referendum, in the context of Post-Brexit Scottish paradiplomacy.

3 The Iraqi Constitution’s vagueness (see art. 111 and art. 112, Iraq’s Constitution, 2005), regarding natural resource’ ownership arguably creates a fertile ground for disputes between the central government and the KRG.

4 In October 2019, nine Catalan policymakers, including the Vice-president and Parliament Speaker, and civil society leaders were sentenced to 9–13 years in prison for crimes including ‘sedition’ for their participation in the organisation of the 2017 referendum. In June 2021, after spending three-and-a-half years behind bars, they were eventually pardoned by the Spanish government. Other members of the Catalan government, including the President at the time, Carles Puigdemont, fled into exile in Brussels in November 2017.

5 The Spanish foreign ministry was particularly concerned about a future recognition of a potential Catalan independent state by Latvia. This fear was cemented, among other factors, by declarations of Latvia’s PM in 2013, Valdis Dombrovskis, who expressed support towards Catalonia’s self-determination.

6 For a comprehensive list of de facto states, see Florea, 2017 and Rossi & Castan Pinos, 2020.

7 As of October 2022, these negotiations are ongoing (see Gibraltar Government, 2022).

8 Until 2018 it was known as the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. The entity is also known as ‘Rojava’.

9 The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, used the ‘tragic events’ in the two self-declared republics as a pretext to launch an invasion (officially a ‘special military operation’) in Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (Kremlin, 2022). In September 2022, these two territories, together with parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhia provinces, were officially annexed/incorporated to Russia. As a result, both the LPR and the DNR have ceased to exist as de facto states.