Redesigning What is National: The Politics of Education and the New Moral Education Initiative in Globalizing Japan

ABSTRACT

In December 2006, the Japanese Diet passed a revision of the Fundamental Law of Education (FLE), which aimed at teaching a sense of community and patriotic feelings among school children. This move is a clear departure from the long-standing norm in Japan’s post-war education policy in which democratic control and egalitarianism were the two primary principles. As the new FLE emphasizes the importance of love of country, how could the principle be potentially embodied in the contents of teaching materials for moral education? This exploratory study questions how such principles might be embedded in the contents of teaching materials for moral education. There are two analytical foci of this study. First, through the analysis of a supplementary moral reader, Watashitachi no Dōtoku (Our Morals), directly written, commissioned, and distributed by the Ministry of Education (2014–2017/2018), this study reveals how the three underlying themes of the Revised FLE, including patriotism, public spirit, and international cooperation, are projected on the contents and narratives of Our Morals. Second, this intended image of Japan in Our Morals (concretized by the Ministry of Education) is also scrutinized against the backdrop of Japan’s contemporary multicultural challenges. This study attempts to encapsulate the manifestation of the government’s intentions observable in Our Morals and the findings of this study thus highlight the political (rather than educational/pedagogical) significance of Our Morals.

KEYWORDS:

• Politics of Education
• Moral Education
• The Revised Fundamental Law of Education (2006)
• Watashitachi no Dōtoku (Our Morals)
• Multicultural Japan

INTRODUCTION

Citizenship education is arguably one of the most effective means to inculcate the sense of nation among its citizens. Since the school is “an instrument of social discipline and moral education,” it provides the state with “a space for the spread of nationally relevant information to the masses” (Hroch, 2006, p. 28). For Eric Hobsbawm (1983, p. 264), this process serves to invent tradition whereby the “ … state [links] both formal and informal, official and unofficial, political and social invention of tradition.” Similarly, in Ernest Gellner’s terms (1983, p. 48), nationalism is by no means “the awakening of an old, dormant force”; it is rather “the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state.” The sense of nation is never given; it is taught, internalized, and banalized.

In December 2006, the Japanese Diet passed a revision of the Fundamental Law of Education (FLE) under the first administration of Prime Minister Abe (2006.9– 2007.9; 2012.12– 2020.9). Importantly, this move is a clear departure from the long-standing norm in Japan’s post-war education policy in which “democratic control” and “egalitarianism” were the two primary principles (Schoppa, 1991, p. 34; Kimura, 2015; Ichikawa, 2009). While the original FLE (1947) was meant to prevent a recurrence of the pre-war abuses of education, the new scheme intends to teach a sense of community and patriotic feelings among school children, with a sense of pride as Japanese at the center (Ichikawa 2009). More recently, in 2018, based on the underlying principles developed in the Revised FLE (2006), MEXT (the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), introduced the new moral education policy in elementary schools, and moral education (dōtoku) became a formal (as opposed to supplementary) subject in Japan, i.e. Tokubetsu no Kyōka – Dōtoku (Special Subject: Moral Education). MEXT expanded this to junior high schools nationwide in 2019. To be discussed in the next section, liberals strongly opposed the change, as it was reminiscent of pre-war education which stressed the importance of patriotism as well as sacrifice for the nation. In a nutshell, this move in moral education is a culmination of the recent conservative surge in Japanese politics (Anzai, 2015), and this study assesses it as a part of the securitization process (Wæver, 1995) of patriotic education in Japan. As epitomized in the 2006 FLE Revision and the recent (renewed) introduction of moral education in elementary and middle schools, conservative nationalist entrepreneurs (including politicians, bureaucrats and activists) are trying to instill a sense of urgency regarding the (alleged) lack of patriotic feeling in society through school education.

A question should be asked. As the new moral education initiative emphasizes the importance of love of country based on the Revised FLE (2006), how could the principle be potentially embodied in the contents of teaching materials for moral education? Also important in this conjunction is how does this projected (official) picture of Japan reflect the emerging multicultural challenges Japan has been facing in the new millennium? Studies of moral education in Japan have a long history. Given the negative legacy of the Japanese imperialistic education in the pre-war years, which emphasized patriotism based on loyalty to the emperor (as imperial subjects) and dedication to and sacrifice for the nation (Duus, 1998, Chapter 7), the field tends to focus on historical as well as normative aspects of moral education (Maruyama, 1946[1995]; Amano, 1956[2008]; Ienaga, 1957[2008]; Kosaka, 1966 [2009]; Oda, 1962[2009]; Eto, 1970[2009]; Kasuya, 1983 [2009]; Kato, 1997; Takahashi, 1999). More recently, there have been a series of critical assessments of the Revised FLE (Ichikawa, 2011, 2009; Ōuchi, 2017, 2007; Sugihara, 2017) along with studies on the emerging power of conservative NGOs, or, neo-nationalists (Nozaki, 2008; Fukuoka, 2018; Shibuichi, 2017; Tsutsui, 2009). However, regarding the question of the impact of the recent conservative swing on moral education teaching materials, empirical studies are still rare. As Anzai (2015) laments, “there is still insufficient empirical inquiry” when it comes to “the issues of whether such [a political] inclination is actually manifested in this moral education plan” (Anzai, 2015, p. 438).¹

One of the notable exceptions is Anzai’s (2015) study of 30 supplementary moral readers (for grades 1 to 6) by five publishers. She concludes that the impact of the FLE Revision in 2006 (including its emphasis on patriotism) was not necessarily observed in those supplementary readers (Anzai, 2015, p. 452). While certainly implicative, Anzai’s underlying findings need to be interpreted carefully. It should be noted that those readers, although based on the 2008 Education Guideline, were produced by private publishers and, more importantly, were not subject to the government’s screening process. It is thus unclear how the study’s samples reflect official positions and policies.²

In the present exploratory study, the analytical focus comprises two parts. First, the current study directly tackles the question of the impact of the conservative shift on moral education materials through the analysis of the contents of a supplementary reader (fukudokuhon), Watashitachi no Dōtoku (Our Morals), directly written, commissioned, and distributed by MEXT (2014–2017/2018). Through the analysis of Our Morals, this study reveals how the three underlying themes of the Revised FLE (i.e. patriotism, public spirit, and international cooperation) are projected on the contents and narratives of Our Morals. Here, what the study tries to encapsulate is the manifestation of the government’s intentions observable in Our Morals (not necessarily the classroom adoption and usage of Our Morals, including the question of how teachers teach). Second, this intended image of Japan in Our Morals is scrutinized against the backdrop of Japan’s contemporary multicultural challenges.

In what follows, I begin by briefly revisiting post-war patriotic education in Japan, which is followed by the introduction of Our Morals. The following section contextualizes the recent conservative swing of Japan’s education policy in terms of the theoretical backdrop of this study, securitization. Then, I analyze the observable discrepancies between the notion of Japaneseness exemplified in Our Morals and observable multicultural realities in contemporary Japan.

POST-WAR PATRIOTIC EDUCATION IN JAPAN

Fundamental Law of Education (1947) and Hinomaru/Kimigayo Strife in the 1980s

The post-war era in Japan began with the U.S. occupation under the policy of de-militarization and democratization. National sovereignty was suspended by the General Headquarters (GHQ), and the occupation was sustained from 1945 to 1951. In 1947, the Fundamental Law of Education (FLE) was established, replacing the pre-war Imperial Rescript on Education. In accordance with the principle of the new constitution, “democratic control” and “egalitarianism” became the two primary themes in the post-war education reform, thus “[preventing] a recurrence of the pre-war abuses by limiting central government control” (Schoppa, 1991, p. 34; Nishi, 1982). Here, Nikkyōso (the Japan Teachers’ Union) instantaneously became the driving force for this new enterprise. Nikkyōso was formed in June 1947, three months after the establishment of the FLE, and the union ardently supported the FLE with “crusade-like zeal.” (Schoppa, 1991, p. 151). By democratic education, what the union meant was the “opposition to revision or even reinterpretation of the legal foundation of post-war education” (1991, p. 151).

However, the start of the Cold War in Asia drastically changed Japan’s reform line. This so-called reverse course is characterized by an anti-Communist orientation and the subsequent policies of re-reform by the conservative camp. Both the progressives and conservatives (led by the leading Liberal Democratic Party) were now trying to establish their version of a new Japan. Accordingly, the meanings of nation, state, and patriotism in the sphere of education became a great source of domestic contention, which reflected the ideological tug-of-war between progressive and conservative camps in post-war Japanese society (Oguma, 2002).

The mid-1980s witnessed another significant shift in education politics. Driven by the strong leadership of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, the Ministry of Education started calling for the mandatory raising of the national flag (Hinomaru) and the mandatory playing of the national anthem (Kimigayo) at entrance and graduation ceremonies in public schools. Nakasone’s reform initiative was “clearly motivated … by … a pining for a romanticized past,” or more specifically, certain “aspects of the pre-war 1945 educational system that exhibited what [conservative politicians and bureaucrats] regarded as desirable qualities” (Dierkes, 2005, p. 266). Nakasone established the Ad Hoc Council on Education (Rinkyōshin) in 1984 to hasten the process of change by attempting to circumvent the stagnation of existing bureaucratic structures.

Despite the fierce opposition from the liberal camp led by the Japan Socialist Party allied with Nikkyōso,³ by the end of the 1990s, the “battle over Hinomaru and Kimigayo [appeared] to be largely ending” (Hood, 2001, p. 72). It was an overwhelming victory for the conservative camp (and the Ministry of Education). It is clear that the percentage of schools flying the Hinomaru flag rose considerably as the millennium approached (Tanaka, 2000, pp. 242–243, Also see Table 4.2 in Hood, 2001, p. 73).⁴ It is also obvious that the ministry’s implementation of the Kimigayo national anthem at public schools became more and more successful over the years.⁵ To be noted, with the end of the Cold War, the progressive camp also started losing its public appeal and electoral power. The Kimigayo anthem and the Hinomaru flag eventually became Japan’s official national anthem and flag in 1999 .

The Revision of the Fundamental Law of Education (2006)

The renewed emphasis on patriotic education in the mid- to late 1980s initiated by Prime Minister Nakasone eventually led to the FLE Revision in 2006 under Prime Minister Abe’s first administration (2006.9–2007.9). Abe repeatedly promoted the revision of FLE during his political campaign.⁶ At the Upper House Special Committee on FLE, 30 November 2006, he explicitly asserted that the respect for Japanese cultures and traditions accompany love for the nation and local/regional community (Abe, 2006 [2009], pp. 611-612). As many point out, the emphasis on patriotism (aikokushin) in the Revised FLE (Article 2, Clause 5) is also connected to the other two underlying themes, i.e. public spirit (kōkyōshin) and international cooperation (kokusai kyōchō). The importance of international cooperation is emphasized in the same Clause 5 and those two concepts are coupled together. The Revised FLE places one of the objectives in terms of “ … fostering the value of respect for tradition and culture and love of the country and regions that have nurtured us, as well as the value of respect for other countries and the desire to contribute to world peace and the development of the international community (Revised FLE, Article 2, Clause 5). To be discussed later, public spirit is considered a foundational principle behind the FLE revision and it is also spelled out in the Preamble that emphasizes the importance of cultivating people who “ … honor the public spirit.” The Revised FLE also specifies one of the objectives as fostering… the value of actively participating in building our society and contributing to its development “in the public spirit” (Article 2, Clause 3).

Liberals vehemently opposed the move. Asahi newspaper is one of the largest and most influential daily newspapers in Japan, representing political liberals as opposed to the conservative Yomiuri newspaper. Accordingly, Asahi has been a close ally with Nikkyōso (along with other liberals) as both see the original FLE (1947) as the symbol of post-war education. According to Asahi’s editorials, while the love of nation is a natural feeling emanating from primordial attachments, which should not be denied, there should be diverse ways to nurture it.⁷ Thus, the proposed FLE revision that emphasized the importance of teaching patriotism in schools would promote and impose the “uniform (kakuitsutekina)” way to teach patriotic feeling in schools.⁸ Asahi also warned that the revision would create classroom competition over patriotic feelings among children.⁹ As the Diet finally passed the Revised FLE on 15 December 2006, Aashi (16 December 2006) stressed that the original 1947 FLE had been the major “brake (hadome)” against the state intervention in public education, quoting Article 10 of the original FLE, “Education shall not be subject to improper control, but shall be directly responsible to the whole people.”

In clear contrast to Asahi’s anti-FLE revision narratives, Yomiuri largely supported the government’s conservative swing in education reform. Yomiuri long had a position against the original 1947 FLE as, according to Yomiuri, it lacks respect for Japanese traditions / culture and patriotic spirit. Yomiuri criticized that the original FLE stressed individual freedom to the extent that the sense of nation and the respect for Japanese traditions/culture were utterly diluted.¹⁰ In this conjunction, Yomiuri’s editorial (11 January 2004) also pointed out the lack of “public spirit (ōyake no ishiki)” among Japanese children and youth, and it attributed this to “the misguided educational philosophy (machigatta kyōikukan)” based on the original FLE that overemphasized individual values. Yomiuri stressed that it is essential (fukaketsu) to establish and nurture a clear national identity as Japanese in order to survive in this complicated international society (Yomiuri, 3 August 2003). Yomiuri also maintained that Japan is the only country that has a negative view on patriotic education (Yomiuri, 13 April 2006) and it stressed that “coaching (shidō)” how to nurture patriotic feeling is totally different from “imposing (kyōsei)” it (Yomiuri, 26 May 2006).

Our Morals

Our Morals is a full-fledged revision of the controversial supplementary reader, Kokoro no Nōto (Notebooks for the Heart), which was produced by the Ministry of Education in 2002, and was distributed throughout the country (2002–2008).¹¹ Similarly, Our Morals was directly written and commissioned by the Ministry of Education in 2014 and was distributed until the end of the school year, 2017–2018.¹² There are four versions of Our Morals, with three books for elementary schools (each prepared for the 1^st/2^nd grades, the 3^rd/4^th grades, and the 5^th/6^th grades) and one for middle schools (the 7^th/ 8^th/9^th grades). This article specifically focuses on Our Morals for elementary schools since it is assumed that students in elementary schools are more vulnerable to the information provided by schools.

To be noted, Our Morals is not a typical reader that went through the screening process required for all textbooks used in public schools. Just like Notebooks for the Heart, Our Morals was exempt from the screening process since it was designed to be used for a supplementary (as opposed to formal) subject, i.e. Dōtoku no Jikan (Moral Hour). Also important, Our Morals was never exposed to market competition and the reader was distributed to the public schools nationwide for free.¹³ Our Morals is thus widely believed to directly reflect the government’s intended moral values for moral education in Japan (Sugihara, 2017, p. 170), which makes the text a suitable sample for the purpose of this study. Again, the main purpose of the present study is to analyze the manifestation of the government’s intentions to be observed in Our Morals, or what Roesgaard (2017) calls the official bids for contents of moral education. Thus, this study aims to reveal the political (rather than educational/pedagogical) significance of Our Morals.¹⁴

There are two caveats to be noted. First, although the reported adoption rates of Our Morals were extremely high (99.5% for elementary schools and 98.4% for middle schools in 2014 (MEXT, 2014), some question the actual classroom usage of Our Morals (and Notebooks for the Heart) (Bolton, 2015; Bamkin, 2018; Roesgaard, 2017). As Bamkin (2018) points out, it is important to note that the schoolteachers he interviewed did not necessarily feel bound by textbooks in moral education. That is, “[t]eachers felt a significant degree of autonomy in using textbooks creatively to bypass content that conflicts with beliefs and purposes they feel are important” (Bamkin, 2018, p. 89).¹⁵ Also noted, as a supplementary reader, Our Morals was not necessarily compulsory like other textbooks. This article thus uses the term supplementary reader.

Secondly, as moral education became a formal subject for elementary schools in 2018 and middle schools in 2019, all the textbooks for moral education are now subject to the officially-sanctioned screening process and schools nationwide have adopted the newly approved textbooks. Accordingly, Our Morals is no longer the designated content for moral education materials, and the nationwide distribution of Our Morals ended at the end of the 2017-2018 school year. The reader is now only available online.¹⁶

SECURITTIZING PATRIOTIC EDUCATION IN JAPAN

Securitization is a process in which a valued object of reference is constructed as threatened to the degree that extraordinary measures are portrayed as necessary and legitimate. Since securitization is a speech act, the process is inherently intersubjective; the sense of urgency is constructed, reconstructed, and negotiated (Wæver, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998).¹⁷ As Pingel (2010) points out, while textbooks can be instruments for international understanding, it is often the case that “[t]extbook authors have not always been critical enough towards the society they live in” and school textbooks often “glorify their own nation and disparage others” (2010, pp. 7–8). In Japan, as culminated in the 2006 FLE Revision and the recent (renewed) introduction of moral education in elementary and middle schools, the conservative nationalist entrepreneurs (including politicians, bureaucrats and activists) try to inculcate a sense of urgency in society through school education (i.e., claiming that Japanese society utterly lacks a strong sense of nationalism). In this context, the emerging power of the conservative (or, neo-nationalist) NGOs in the late-1990s is noticeable, which advocated the renewed pride in nation and Japanese history (Nozaki, 2008). This is a part of the “systematic conservative movement” in which “conservative NGOs, media outlets, and politicians closely collaborated” (Ku, 2014, p. 264) and effectively changed the landscape of Japan’s rekishi mondai (history problem). Led by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Tsukurukai), they opposed the underlying general direction of history education in public schools in which official apologies were more acceptable and more self-reflection was encouraged in the mid-1990s (Tsutsui, 2009). In their terminology, post-war Japanese history education became “masochistic” (jigyakuteki) and Japanese people lost pride in their nation (Dierkes, 2010).¹⁸

While Tsukurukai initiated the conservative campaign in the early 2000s, it is Nippon Kaigi (the Japan Conference) that now leads this enterprise and has been the driving force behind the recent conservative reform of the moral education curriculum.¹⁹ For Nippon Kaigi, its underlying emphasis on youth education (and patriotic education) is a necessary step toward the constitutional revision of Article 9 (or, Peace Clause) so as to make Japan a “normal” country with normal military capability (Fujiu, 2017, Chapter 4). In this context, the dedication to the state (and nation) based on a strong sense of patriotism and national pride is thus posited as one of the underlying principles for Japan’s national polity and a prerequisite for Japan to become a normal country. To be noted, former Prime Minister Abe has been a “special advisor” since the inception of the organization in 1997 (Fujiu, 2017, pp. 13–14). Its platform emphasizes the importance to “[n]urture young people to cultivate patriotic spirit, respect for the national anthem, flag, and history, and cherish quintessential Japaneseness” (Mizohata, 2016). In this context, Nippon Kaigi also tries to revive the pre-war idea of Japan as a sacred nation based on emperor worship (Fujiu, 2017, pp. 77–80). By securitizing patriotic education, in other words, the conservative camp is trying to legitimize (and solidify) its power positions, articulate the perceived urgency of the issue, and promote its agendas (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995).

CONTEXT: JAPANESE SOCIETY AT CROSSROADS?

Japanese society is rapidly changing in this new millennium. Despite the once celebrated myth of Japan as an ethnically-homogeneous nation, Japanese society is now accepting more foreign residents on its soil. Although the total number of foreign residents is still relatively low and constitutes only around 2% of the total population, the pace of change is noteworthy. While the number of foreign residents reached one million for the first time in 1990, the figure is 2.82 million in 2019. In terms of the entire workforce in Japan, foreign workers constitute approximately 2% (Nikkei, 2018). In Tokyo, one in 18 workers was a foreign worker (5.5%) in 2018; that figure had grown threefold in a decade (Nikkei, 2019a). As Japan is already an emerging ageing society (those over 65 accounted for 27.7% of the total population in 2017) with the fertility rate a mere 1.42 in 2018 (Nikkei, 2019b), Japanese society is pressured to accept more foreign workers (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2018).

Over the years, the number of foreign residents with permanent residency status also increased. Although it was about 72,000 in 1996, it reached 720,000 by 2016 (Mainichi, 2017). It is also noted that about 20% of foreign residents live in/around the Tokyo area (Japan Times, 2019). Furthermore, according to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW), one out of 50 newborns (2.1%) were half-Japanese in 2018.²⁰ The number of foreign visitors has also increased to an unprecedented degree. While the number of overseas tourists to Japan was less than 5 million at the beginning of the millennium (4.76 million in 2000), the number reached more than 31 million in 2018 (NHK, 2019). As the Japanese population is about 126 million, this large number of foreign visitors is not insignificant. In a nutshell, Japanese society has been exposed to a new multicultural reality in the globalizing world.

ANALYSIS

Data and Method

This exploratory study problematizes the curriculum design of the newly implemented moral education in Japanese elementary schools in 2018. Specifically, this study aims to explain the manifestation of the government’s intentions observable in a supplementary moral reader, Our Morals (2014–2017/2018), or what Roesgaard (2017) calls the official bids for contents of moral education (not necessarily the classroom usage of it). There are three versions of Our Morals for elementary schools (each prepared for the 1^st/2^nd grades, the 3^rd/4^th grades, and the 5^th/6^th grades). First, through the analysis of Our Morals, this study reveals how the three underlying themes of the Revised FLE (i.e. patriotism, public spirit, and international cooperation) are supported in the contents and narratives of Our Morals, which also reveals the intended (official) image of the Japanese nation behind the introduction of new moral education. The study also refers to other primary sources, including the 2008 Education Guideline for Moral Education and ministerial reports, along with secondary scholarly works. Second, this intended image of Japan is scrutinized against the backdrop of Japan’s contemporary multicultural reality.

Regarding the data analysis, I conducted “detailed documentary analysis” (Cave, 2013, pp. 546–548). The study focuses on the three underlying themes of Revised FLE (2006) discussed earlier, i.e. patriotism (aikokushin), public spirit (kōkyōshin), and international cooperation (kokusai kyōchō). All three versions of Our Morals cover these three themes to a greater or lesser extent. Based on the table of contents of each of the three versions of Our Morals, the Curriculum Guideline for Moral Education (2008),²¹ and the Curriculum Guideline for Moral Education Expository Text (2008),²² the specific coverages of those three themes in all three versions of Our Morals are identified (See Table 1). To ensure both validity and reliability, I read all three versions of Our Morals twice. There are observable affinities across the three themes (and others) and the narratives are often interconnected.

Table 1. Coverages of Three Themes (Patriotism, Public Spirit, and International Cooperation) in Our Morals.

	Patriotism
Grades 1^st/2^nd	• “Nurturing Affinity to your Hometown” (pp. 150–157)
Grades 3^rd/4^th	• “To Love Your Hometown” (pp. 158–163). • “To Cherish Traditions and Cultures” (pp. 164–169)
Grades 5^th/6^th	• “To Love Your Hometown (Kyōdo) and Nation” (pp. 164–175)
	Public Spirit
Grades 1^st/2^nd	• “Keeping Promises and Rules” (pp. 118–129) • “Feeling Good about Working” (pp. 130–137) • “To Enjoy School Life” (pp. 140–149)
Grades 3^rd/4^th	• “Helping Each Other” (pp. 80–81) • “To Follow the Rules in Society” (pp. 118–129) • “To Know the Importance of Work” (pp. 130–135) • “Cooperation in Classrooms and School” (pp. 148–157).
Grades 5^th/6^th	• “Autonomy and Responsibility” (pp. 28–33) • “To Know Your Roles” (pp. 140–149) • “To Contribute to Public Interests” (pp. 152–155)
	International Cooperation
Grades 1^st/2^nd	• “Let’s Learn about Other Countries” (pp. 170–173).
Grades 3^rd/4^th	• “Foreign Cultures” (p. 167)
Grades 5^th/6^th	• “Connecting to the People in the World” (pp. 174–183)

Reading Watashitachi no Dōtoku (Our Morals): Three Problematiques

Patriotism

One of the most significant changes in the Revised FLE (2006) lies in its emphasis on “the importance of developing patriotic citizens with a profound knowledge of traditions and the culture of Japan” (Anzai, 2015, p. 437). Accordingly, the Revised FLE defines one of the objectives of education in terms of “ … fostering the value of respect for tradition and culture and love of the country and regions that have nurtured us” (Revised FLE, Article 2, Clause 5).²³ The Curriculum Guideline for Moral Education (2008) was produced so as to follow the spirit of the Revised FLE. This underlying principle of the Revised FLE is also observed in Our Morals.

To be noted, the above logic dovetails with revisionist historiography. According to the revisionists (notably, Nippon Kaigi), post-war Japanese history education became “masochistic” (jigyakuteki) and Japanese people lost pride in their nation. For them, the revision of FLE was a necessary step to inculcate patriotism based on the attachment to the local community (kyōdo) and nurture a sense of pride in the Japanese nation. In this context, the evocation of national pride based on shared traditions and cultures also reminds us of the pre-war notion of Japaneseness, which, similar to the German Volk, stressed “‘traditions’ based on natural environment [fūdo], history, and culture” that were also assumed as “eternal” and “fixed” (Kawai, 2015, p. 31). The 2015 Curriculum Guideline for Moral Education Expository Text similarly defines the concept of country (kuni) as “a historical and cultural community” based on “historically developed nation, land, traditions and cultures” (2015, p. 58).²⁴

It is important to note that, as was the case with Notebooks for the Heart, the way Our Morals tries to convey the importance of patriotic feeling is very subtle (yet, seemingly also very effective) (Baba, 2004[2009]). For the 1^st/2^nd graders, the notion of hometown is introduced in the last part of the text with a slogan, “Nurturing Affinity to your Hometown” (Our Morals: 1^st/2^nd Grades, 2014, pp. 150–153). Through the story about a summer festival in Kyoto, the text hints that pupils should think about the continuity of local traditions and cultures (pp. 154–157). For the 3^rd/4^th graders (Our Morals: 3^rd/4^th Grades, 2014), the sense of local identity is posed as an important part of everyday life with references to local sceneries, folktales, and festivals (“To Love Your Hometown,” pp. 158–163). Then, in the next section (“To Cherish Traditions and Cultures,” pp. 164–169), the respect for tradition and culture (and historical continuity) is more explicitly discussed in terms of Japan’s peculiarities, including Japanese clothes (wafuku) such as kimono, Japanese cuisine (washoku), Japanese-style rooms, and local and national seasonal events throughout Japan (pp. 164–166). As Roesgaard (2017) also points out in her analysis of Notebooks for the Heart and Our Morals, it is important to note that “history and being a part of something bigger … are linked to doing things together and preserving local traditions” (p. 102). The section also introduces a famous British writer, Lafcadio Hearn (also known as Koizumi Yakumo in Japan), who initially visited Japan as a news correspondent at the time of Japan’s rapid modernization in the 1890s. He is portrayed as a foreigner who truly appreciated Japan’s natural beauty and arts; he married a Japanese woman and eventually became a naturalized Japanese citizen (pp. 168–169).²⁵

The concept of patriotic feeling (kuni wo aisuru kokoro) is more directly introduced for Our Morals: 5^th/6^th Grades.²⁶ Our Morals: 5^th/6^th Grades (2014) starts its narrative on patriotism with the love of family (pp. 156–159). It then moves to the love of community (with a special emphasis on schools; pp. 160–163), which was further extended to the love of hometown, local region, and, finally, country (kuni) in the next section titled “With the Love of Local Community and Country (Kyōdo ya Kuni wo Aisuru Kokorowo)” (pp. 164–175). Here, emphasizing the importance of Japanese traditions and cultures (deeply embedded in one’s love for local community and region) as a source of pride, the love of the nation (patriotism) is presented as the natural feeling emanating from “a respect for Japanese traditions and cultures” (p. 164), which is closely aligned with the spirit of the Revised FLE (2006). This way, the love for one’s hometown (and region) is captured as a pretext for the love of one’s nation (and the state).

Critics problematize this logical structure behind the introduction of patriotism in moral education. By pointing out that Prime Minister Abe’s notion of patriotism is deemed as the extension of the love for the local community (or, hometown), for example, Kan Sanjun (Kan, 2006 [2009], p. 422), a liberal critic, questions the very logical continuity between hometown love and patriotism. For him, patriotism is something generated through state-sponsored education (and the pre-war education system successfully materialized it); it is never a natural feeling emanating from something ordinary (and thus more universal), i.e. one’s love for his/her hometown. By posing one’s love of nation as a natural feeling, in other words, Our Morals: 5^th/6^th Grades certainly masks this process of constructing patriotism.

Others question the very reference to patriotism in moral education. For liberals, this is problematic as the public school could become a (potential) machine to teach/inculcate nationalistic sentiments among school children (as was the case with the pre-war moral education). As discussed earlier, Asahi newspaper already warned in 2006 that the proposed FLE revision would impose the “uniform” (kakuitsutekina) way to teach patriotic feeling in schools (Asahi, 14 April 2006; Sugihara, 2017). That is, as Baba (2004[2009]) stresses, the purpose of moral education should lie in letting school children think how to live better as “independent individuals” (jiritsushita kojin) and live together with others in the communities and society in which one lives (p. 342). He asserts, “patriotism has nothing to do with moral education” (ibid.). To the contrary, the Ministry of Education (and conservative politicians) deem patriotism as an exemplary theme of civic education, and as discussed in this section, the promotion of patriotic sentiment is one of the core messages observable in Our Morals.²⁷

Public Spirit

In this conjunction, Our Morals also incorporates the notion of public spirit into this formula. As discussed, the renewed emphasis on the importance of “the public” (kōkyō) (and the public good) is one of the most critical shifts observed in the Revised FLE in 2006 (Narushima, 2009[2009]). While the original FLE (1947) stresses universal moral standards (such as “truth and peace”) and maintains that education is to “[aim] at the creation of culture, general and rich in individuality” (fuhenteki nishite shikamo kosei-yutakana bunka no sōzō) (Preamble), the Revised FLE (2006) now holds that Japanese people need to “honor the public spirit … while promoting an education which transmits tradition and aims at the creation of a new culture” (Preamble; emphasis added).²⁸ Article 2 of the Revised FLE now poses educational “objectives” (mokuhyō), as opposed to “principles” (hōshin) in the original FLE in 1947. Among the newly added five clauses, as discussed earlier, the third clause now stipulates that education “ … actively contribute, in the public spirit (kōkyō no seishin ni motozuki), to the building and development of society” (Article 2, Clause 3; emphasis added).

For liberal critics, the revision was utterly unacceptable. The imposition of “objectives” is deemed as the state’s intervention, and the autonomy of school education (as the hallmark of the original FLE) is now threatened (Ōuchi, 2017, pp. 160–161). As discussed, Asahi newspaper problematizes this by maintaining that this is a clear deviation from the spirit of the post-war education that started by condemning the excessive devotion to the state in the pre-war and wartime education. For conservative Yomiuri, however, this is certainly a necessary revision as the newspaper long criticized the original FLE as it (and post-war education in general) largely ignored the importance of the public spirit while emphasizing individual freedom. According to The 2015 Curriculum Guideline for Moral Education Expository Text (2015, pp. 48–57), it is designed so that school children will learn the importance of public spirit through the underlying themes such as the respect for rules (and the importance of social justice), the importance of work (and the sense of social responsibility), and the contribution to school/community.²⁹

Again, the way the underlying narratives are conveyed in Our Morals is subtle (and incremental). Our Morals: 1^st/2^nd Grades (2014) introduces the importance of rules and work in everyday life (including family, school, and society) for the sake of everyone’s welfare. Under the section titled “Together with Others” (min’na to tomoni), they are prompted to think about the importance of caring for others and appreciating others working for them. Our Morals: 3^rd/4^th Grades (2014) starts its narratives on the importance of public spirit with a discussion on the value of cooperation among friends in schools (pp. 70–79). By referring to the Japanese Olympic Swimming Team (and its entry in the 400m relay), the importance of helping each other (sasaeai/tasukeai) is underlined (pp. 80–81). It also posits “cooperation” (kyōryoku) as a key to building respectable classrooms and schools (pp. 148–152).³⁰ Just like Our Morals: 3^rd/4^th Grades, Chapter 4 of Our Morals: 5^th/6^th Grades (2014) first underlines the significance of individual roles in the groups to which one belongs (such as family, school, and local community) (pp. 140–151). The text then moves smoothly to the discussion of the importance of public spirit (and one’s devotion to society) (pp. 152–155). At this point, the sense of patriotic feeling is equated to the devotion to the national community (and the state) (Narushima, 2009[2009]; Sugihara, 2017).

This moral framework fits very well with Japan’s well-known cultural norm of cooperation (and teamwork), which may make one feel that it is rather non-problematic. Emphasizing the significance of the public gaze, Japan’s success story in post-war economic development and prosperity is often explained by referring to this cultural norm.³¹ In this conjunction, one of the recurrent themes, “Do not be selfish,” can be observed throughout the text. Earlier in the text (pp. 28–33), the 5^th/6^th graders are encouraged to think about the meaning of freedom (jiyū) to be differentiated from the notion of autonomy (jiritsu), which also accompanies the sense of self-discipline and responsibility. While each individual in society is entitled to freedom, the use of it must be carefully monitored by oneself: one needs to behave responsibly for the sake of “others” and “oneself” (p. 32). Although the text does not necessarily deny the importance of self-fulfillment, this notion does not come first, either. Under the section, “To Realize One’s Roles” (pp. 140–151), the word, “shūdan (group)” appears 12 times in the first four pages of the section (pp. 140–143). As the text discusses one’s role and responsibility in a group, it stresses that one strives to be the best for the good of all (min’na no nakade kagayaku), emphasizing the importance of “to work for others” (min’na no tameni hataraku) (pp. 150–151). In this conjunction, what is emphasized under the subtitle, “That which is ‘To Work’” (“Hataraku” to iukoto), is the significance of one’s work that contributes to the public good (pp. 152–153). As the text’s underlying narrative lies in the importance of the group (and individual contribution to the collective good), Our Morals maintains that one’s individuality needs to be carefully (self-) controlled.³²

It is important to note that by stressing the individual dedication to collective goods (and the state as a logical extension), Our Morals (and the 2008 Curriculum Guideline) evidently lacks an important critical gaze on Japanese society itself. According to Staub (1997), there are two types of in-group identification: while blind patriotism is “a rigid and inflexible attachment to country” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 153), constructive patriotism is “critical loyalty” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 153). More concretely, what the latter stresses is “a support for a questioning and criticism of [one’s country] that is intended to bring about positive change” (Schatz & Staub, 1997, p. 231). Similarly, Martha Nussbaum (2008, p. 86) stresses the importance of fostering “a critical political culture”; that is, “[teach] children that the ability to think critically is one of the most essential abilities of the democratic citizen.” It is important to note that blind faith is to freeze one’s thinking and learning, (potentially) falling into “an unwillingness both to criticize and to accept criticism of [one’s country]” (Schatz & Staub, 1997, p. 231). Although Our Morals does not necessarily impose total conformity, its moral teaching is at least unilateral as it stresses each individual member’s dedication to the interests of the whole society (not vice versa) (Ichikawa, 2009, pp. 151–152).³³

International Cooperation

Thirdly, throughout the three versions of Our Morals, the importance of international understanding and international cooperation are underscored. This is one of the important themes specified in the 2006 Revised FLE and the 2008 Curriculum Guideline for Moral Education. Along with the emphasis on patriotic feeling, the last part of Clause 5 of Article 2 in the Revised FLE also underlines the importance of “ … fostering … the value of respect for other countries and the desire to contribute to world peace and the development of the international community” (Revised FLE, Article 2, Clause 5). The underlying narratives found in Our Morals are rather straightforward. For the 1^st/2^nd graders (Our Morals: 1^st/2^nd Grades, 2014), foreign countries are introduced by referring to the Olympic/Paralympic Games and the appreciation of cultural differences are also discussed (pp. 170–173). In Our Morals for the 3^rd/4^th grades, traditions and cultures in foreign countries are also discussed along with those in Japan (Our Morals: 3^rd/4^th Grades, 2014, p. 167).³⁴ In this vein, the notion of international society is more explicitly discussed for the 5^th/6^th graders (“Connecting to the People in the World,” Our Morals: 5^th/6^th Grades, 2014, pp. 176–183). By referring to historical figures such as Sakamoto Ryoma (1836–1867) who helped set the stage for the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and Nitobe Inazo (1862–1933) who worked for the League of Nations, for example, the text encourages readers to go abroad and communicate with people from all over the world.³⁵

It is important to note, however, that when Our Morals encourages school children to connect to the world and contribute to the international community, the book asks them to do so only as a Japanese citizen (“with a clear sense of being Japanese [nihonjin toshite no jikaku wo motte]”) (Our Morals: 5^th/6^th Grades, 2014, p. 176). In other words, while Japan is depicted as a part of an international community, it is not necessarily a global community based on shared cosmopolitan values. The image of the international community is rather the aggregate of individual countries.³⁶ This evokes a controversial 1966 report by Chūōkyōiku Shingikai (Central Education Council), “the Image of the Ideal Japanese (Kitai Sareru Ningenzō),” which maintains that only those who have a good sense of being Japanese can be true cosmopolitans (sekaijin) (Nakamura, 2009[2009], p. 74; Duke, 1967; Kosaka, 1966 [2009]). For that purpose, the report stresses that Japanese citizens are supposed to possess “correct patriotism” (tadashii aikokushin) and attitudes (Ichikawa, 2011, Chapter 5).³⁷ This is an underlying spirit embedded in the conservative narratives, which was incorporated into Nakasone’s 1984 Ad Hoc Council on Education discussed earlier (and eventually led to the FLE Revision in 2006). The 2008 Curriculum Guideline for Moral Education Expository Text is also explicit about the connection between the love of nation and international cooperation, presupposing the sense of pride as a Japanese and the understanding of Japanese traditions and cultures as the basis for international goodwill (pp. 59–60).

Furthermore, Our Morals fails to reflect Japan’s emerging multicultural reality. One example in Our Morals: 5^th/6^th Grades (2014) is a story about a Japanese school girl, Ai, whose classmate, Rya’n, is from Vietnam. Ai’s father is half-Japanese; his mother is Japanese and his father is American (a member of the U.S. military). One day, Ai’s dad talks to Ai about his hardship in the early years of his life and the discriminatory treatments he has gone through all these years (due to his obviously non-Japanese looks). He also encourages Ai to be kind to Rya’n. The moral here is very clear and the book’s tone is evidently anti-discriminatory. Yet, this type of family structure is also presented (although implicitly) as an exceptional case. When the text discusses happiness within family (pp. 156–159), those family pictures in the section depict a stereotypical Japanese household with two parents, grandparents, and siblings (pp. 156–157). Although more Japanese households are now led by single-parents and more married couples now choose not to have children, Our Morals does not address these realities.³⁸

Moreover, while Our Morals contains many pictures throughout the text for all three versions, those people pictured (in schools, parks, offices, festivals, etc.) all portray the (stereotypical) ethnic Japanese in appearance. What this entails is never trivial. That is, those hyphenated Japanese children and adults (like Rya’n and Ai’s father) are not depicted as a part of Japanese society, not to mention all other foreign nationals residing/working in Japan. This dovetails with Tsuneyoshi’s (2007, p. 39) observation of Japanese elementary social studies textbooks, in which Japanese society is depicted as “a relatively mono-ethnic nation-state.” Although readers can actually find (many) foreigners (i.e. individuals who do not appear to be stereotypically “ethnic Japanese”) in Our Morals, they can be found only in sections that pertain to foreign countries and communities. While it is not explicit, the implied message here seems rather apparent. As has been the case with Japanese education policies for a long time, “[The] Japanese school system has forced the children belonging to ethnic or language minorities to assimilate into Japanese mainstream culture, denying their own languages and cultures” (Nomoto, 2009, p. 57; Moorehead, 2013).

Unlike the scholarly consensus about the constitutive nature of nation-formation in Japan,³⁹ it is true that many Japanese do not doubt that the Japanese nation is ethnically homogeneous (Sugimoto, 2006, pp. 477–481; Tanabe, 2021; cf. Doak, 1996, 2012). This is largely based on the myth that “the Japanese state … was formed only by the Japanese ethnos (nihon minzoku) which has the same language and culture” and “only the Japanese ethnos, which has a ‘single and pure blood line’ has lived on the Japanese archipelago” (McVeigh, 2004, p. 206). The image of the Japanese as “a distinct ‘ethnic group’” is also reinforced by the image of Japanese “race” and “culture,” which are also popularly believed to be historically distinct (Morris-Suzuki, 1998, p. 78). Our Morals evidently endorses this myth and its underlying narratives amplify it further.

CONCLUSION

Again, education can be a weapon for those in power who securitize education, conveying the elite’s notion of what is national through the politics of education. As discussed in the section on postwar education reform and the Hinomaru/Kimigayo strife in the 1980s, behind this study is the cultural war in post-war Japan in which those powerful in politics exercise their (hegemonic) power to pursue their political agenda. The Japanese education policy in the early post-war years is exemplified as the tug of war between liberals and conservatives and each competed for its cultural supremacy. With the relative decline of the political left, the more recent case of education reform epitomizes the political (or, securitizing) process in which the conservative camp has been trying to legitimize (and solidify) its power positions, articulate the perceived urgency of the issue, and promote its agendas (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995). Our Morals reveals the Ministry of Education’s (and the former Abe administration’s) attempts to securitize education and instill a new national design, and moral education is deemed as a very effective tool to build a new banal national psyche among children. As observed in Our Morals, this national psyche is designed to embody patriotic moral values as exemplified by such concepts as unified national identity, communal contributions, and a homogenous and traditional Japanese population and family structure.

As this study problematizes, however, while the Ministry of Education certainly has the power to control the newly implemented moral education curriculum, its cultural products (i.e. Our Morals) do not necessarily reflect the changing reality of Japanese society. In this regard, this study thus echoes those (more normative and critical) arguments about this process and the warnings against the new direction leaning toward more nationalistic education (Ichikawa, 2009; Ōuchi, 2007; Sugihara, 2017). While Our Morals emphasizes international cooperation, the texts certainly lack the perspective on “intercultural education” (Lee, 2017). As discussed, although the reader presents its (ideal) Japanese family (i.e. an ethnically homogenous Japanese family with two parents), the growing number of children with single parents are certainly left out, as are the growing number of half-Japanese children. Simply put, this “silence[s]” many minority students and “erase[s]” their voices (Minor, 2019, p. 106). Tsuneyoshi (2018a) is thus probably right when she depicts Japanese education with the phrase “‘International’ without the ‘Multicultural.’”⁴⁰ More broadly, this defies the premise of what Curren and Dorn (2018) call “virtuous patriotism” in which pursuance of “just communities” is deemed essential and “children are accepted as equals and experience growth and progress in their lives and as contributing members” (2018, pp. 97–98). Thus, it is a “public responsibility … to provide civic education that resists the marginalization and persecution of racial, religious, and ethnic minorities” (Curren & Dorn, 2018, p. 18, emphasis in original).

Finally, several considerations for further research deserve attention. First, as the formalization of moral education was introduced in elementary schools in 2018 and in middle schools in 2019, the newly approved textbooks have also been introduced and adopted to schools. As discussed earlier in this article, Our Morals are no longer the main designated contents for moral education materials. In this context, one viable path for future research will be the examination of contents of the newly approved textbooks, including the adoption process for this cycle. As the three volumes of Our Morals are one of the most explicit embodiments of the Ministry of Education’s underlying policy on moral education, the findings of this study should serve as an important reference point. Secondly, in this conjunction, it is important to note that the study does not necessarily claim that the coursebook contents determine what is taught in class in a direct way. As Bamkin (2019, p. 250) aptly points out, it is important to note “[k]nowledge of curriculum content or textbook content is not … knowledge of how moral education is implemented in practice.” Another potential research query would be the question of how teachers teach these new moral education courses and how they perceive the new directions and reflect upon their teaching.⁴¹ Thirdly, focusing on the production side of the story, this study admittedly does not engage with the reception of moral education (cf. Fukuoka, 2011). When someone creates new school curriculum with a particular intention, it does not necessarily mean that it will be received as intended (Griswold, 1994). Therefore, further study needs to look into this analytical gap and explore the perceptions of students who studied under this new curriculum.

The question of patriotic education in Japan provides a good case to help us think through the issue of national belonging in the global era.⁴² Why are we still attracted, swayed, and bothered by what is national? To be noted, however, school education is never a panacea in cultural wars. School textbooks would not automatically produce patriotic children overnight. Yet, at the same time, it seems undeniable that by emphasizing the importance of individual dedication for the sake of community as an important moral virtue (without reference to the importance of individuality), the new curriculum may bolster one’s blind dedication to the state (and condemn those who do not). In other words, school education is significant as it can provide an institutionalized, banal framework of the nation. Or, put simply, a national framework serves as “a common [point] of reference” (Klatch in Fukuoka, 2017, p. 338). Despite the charge of deep-rooted methodological nationalism along with the global surge of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism over the years, the concept of a nation still poses “an unescapable framework of solidarity” and “citizens have no choice but to think and feel about the (their) nation” (Duchesne, 2018, p. 868). As Calhoun (2017, p. 19) asserts, “ … nationalist politics depends on the seemingly apolitical deployment of the rhetoric of nation” and “hot nationalism depends on banal nationalism.” Patriotic education facilitates this process (or, at least, this is what those in power try to achieve) and the recent Japanese case examined here exemplifies this.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kazuya Fukuoka

Kazuya Fukuoka is Professor of Political Science at Saint Joseph’s University.  His research interests include collective memory, nation and nationalism, and the IR of East Asia.  His articles have appeared in Nations and Nationalism, National Identities, East Asia, Asian Politics & Policy, and International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, among others.  He is also a contributor to edited volumes such as Routledge Handbook of Memory and Reconciliation in East Asia (Routledge) and Northeast Asia’s Difficult Past (Palgrave Memory Studies), among others.  He also writes and publishes in Japanese.

Notes

¹ In contrast, the production of history textbooks has been a major theme in memory studies in Japan for years and the contents of the textbooks (and their political implications) have been scrutinized by experts (Cave, 2013; Dierkes, 2005, 2010; Hagstrom & Isaksson, 2019; A. Hashimoto, 2015).

² To be noted, Anzai (2015, p. 452) herself admits this potential design problem by stating that “[e]xemption from the authorization process may give publishers the leeway to place less emphasis on exactly the same moral values as those stressed in the revised FLE.”

³ To them, Hinomaru and Kimigayo still symbolized Japanese imperialism and Japan’s aggression in Asia in the pre-war and wartime years (Fukuoka, 2017).

⁴ Already in 1985 when the ministerial notification strongly “recommended” that the Hinomaru flag be flown at school ceremonies, 92.5% of primary schools and 91.2% of junior high schools nationwide followed the recommendation. When the 1989 announcement “obligated” the practice, the rate further rose to 98.0% in 1992 and 99.0% in 1999 for primary schools and 97.6% in 1992 and 98.6% in 1999 for junior high schools. See Tanaka (2000) and Hood (2001).

⁵ Political pressures from local boards of education had been immense and those teachers rejecting the governmental orders were punished. See, for example, Aspinall and Cave (2001).

⁶ This is also Abe’s long-standing political agenda. See his book, Toward a Beautiful Country (Abe, 2006). This also corresponds to Nippon Kaigi’s underlying emphasis on Japaneseness based on Japan’s distinct traditions and cultures. See, for example, Mizohata (2016) and Shibuichi (2017).

⁷ Over the 2006 revision of FLE, Asahi published editorials opposed to the proposed revision seven times in 2006.

⁸ This underlying narrative was repeated five times in 2006 alone. Asahi, April 14; April 29; May 25; October 28; 13 December 2006.

⁹ This point was reiterated four times in 2006. Asahi, May 25; October 28; November 16; 13 December 2006.

¹⁰ Yomiuri, 15 November 2002; 14 January 2003; 11 January 2004.

¹¹ For a critical analysis of Notebooks for the Heart, see, for example, Miyake (2003[2009) and Baba (2009[2009]). As the book does not reveal its authors (it simply says “Published by the Ministry of Education”), Baba (2009 [2009]) maintains that the book is just “given from the above” (p. 340) and condemns it as the equivalent of government-designated moral readers in the pre-war years (p. 341). For the similarity and differences between Notebooks for the Heart (Kokoro no Nōto) and Our Morals, see Roesgaard (2017, Chapter 5).

¹² In Japan, the school year starts in April and ends in March. Our Morals was distributed until the end of the 2017-2018 school year, i.e., the end of March 2018.

¹³ For the textbook screening process and market competition in Japan, see, Cave (2013) and Fukuoka (2017).

¹⁴ Roesgaard’s (2017) in-depth analysis of the similarities/differences between Notebooks for the Heart and Our Morals provides important reference points for this research.

¹⁵ According to Bolton (2015), among 35 moral education classes he attended, only six used Our Morals (2015, p. 55). Although this is the observation from just one school, the finding seems implicative. Roesgaard (2017) makes a similar report on the classroom usage of both readers; while the four teachers she observed all followed “the scope of the MEXT guideline,” none used Our Morals or Notebooks for the Heart (2017, p. 151). At the same time, she also speculates that those four teachers were “those most engaged in teaching, and hence are prone to go the extra mile and produce their own material or make choices that are not the most obvious” (2017, p. 151).

¹⁶ All three versions of Our Morals are available through the Ministry of Education’s website. See http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shotou/doutoku/index.htm.

¹⁷ In the field of politics of memory (especially for scholars in international relations and political science), securitization has recently become a primary reference point (and a viable theoretical framework) that articulates the intentions of mnemonic/nationalist entrepreneurs who try to advance their political interests in specific issue/policy areas. See, for example, the recent special issue of Global Change, Peace & Security on the politics of education (“School Textbooks, Peace and Conflict” eds. Guest Editors Denise Bentrovato, Tobias Ide and Jakob Kirchheimer) <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cpar20/30/3>. See also Ide, et al. (2019) and Mälksoo (2015). For the Japanese context, see Fukuoka (2018).

¹⁸ This so-called neo-nationalist viewpoint has been most eloquently articulated by the founder of Tsukurukai, Fujioka Nobukatsu, and the co-founder and influential cartoonist, Kobayashi Yoshinori. Kobayashi’s best-selling comic Sensōron (Theory on War) (1998) appealed to a wide range of generations, with young adults reportedly constituting the majority of the readership of this “right-flavored” material. Their discourse became more popular in the latter part of the 1990s in which a renewed sense of national pride was explored by re-visiting and re-interpreting Japan’s war behaviors, including the causes of Japan’s military expansion in Asia. Their discussion also includes the revival of the notion of Japan as an Asian emancipator, approval and justification of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits, and skepticism toward Chinese and Korean historiography on issues such as Nanjing and comfort women. They also criticized the neighboring countries for their political usage of history issues as diplomatic cards. See also Schneider (2008) and Saaler (2005).

¹⁹ Nippon Kaigi is “arguably …[the] most powerful nationalist lobby group” in Japan (Japan Times, 2015) and this “grass-roots conservative” organization has approximately 40,000 dues-paying members; its local branches count about 250 nationwide. It has generated strong support from legislators at national and regional levels (Fujiu, 2017). The organization claims its successful campaigns for the Act of National Flag and Anthem (1999) and the FLE revision (2006). See Nippon Kaigi’s homepage, http://www.nipponkaigi.org. Shibuichi (2017) is rather skeptical about the assertion that Nippon Kaigi is “an untouchable, powerful organization” that influences Japanese politics.

²⁰ In 1987, when the ministry started collecting data, it was 0.07%. The data only include those half-Japanese who were born in Japan and does not include those born abroad. See the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare website, https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/suii06/brth8.html.

²¹ For the summary discussion of the contents each age cohort (the 1^st/2^nd grades, the 3^rd/4^th grades, and the 5^th/6^th grades) is supposed to learn, see The 2008 Curriculum Guideline for Moral Education (Elementary School), https://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shotou/new-cs/youryou/syo/dou.htm.

²² See The 2008 Curriculum Guideline for Moral Education Expository Text (Elementary School), https://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/education/micro_detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2009/06/16/1234931_011.pdf. For the contents for each age cohort to learn, see the summary discussion (pp. 33–37) followed by the sections on the 1^st/2^nd grades (pp. 38–46), the 3^rd/4^th grades (pp. 47–52), and the 5^th/6^th grades (pp. 52–60).

²³ See MEXT website, Basic Act on Education (2006), http://www.mext.go.jp/en/policy/education/lawandplan/title01/detail01/1373798.htm

²⁴ See The 2015 Curriculum Guideline for Moral Education Expository Text (Elementary School), https://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/education/micro_detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2016/01/08/1356257_4.pdf.

²⁵ For a similar (yet more detailed) analysis of Lafcadio Hearn in Our Morals, see Roesgaard (2017, pp. 82–83).

²⁶ There are no explicit references to patriotism in Our Morals for the 1^st/2^nd and 3^rd/4^th graders.

²⁷ Focusing on the “mediating” (Bamkin, 2018, p. 92) function of schoolteachers, Bamkin’s (2018) ethnographic study demonstrates that almost all of his interviewees did not consider “love of nation as a value important for moral education in Japan” (2018, p. 85), which also shows that “personal and institutional beliefs create barriers to the implementation” of the nationalist agenda in moral education (2018, p. 86). However, at the same time, “aspects of tradition and love of region (localism) continue as strong institutional practices in schools in Japan” (2018, p. 93).

²⁸ For the English translation of original (1947) and revised (2006) FLE, see the MEXT homepage: https://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/kihon/data/07080117.htm.

²⁹ See The 2015 Curriculum Guideline for Moral Education Expository Text (Elementary School).

³⁰ The coverage in Our Morals: 3^rd/4^th Grades never goes beyond the immediate social relations and communities (such as friends and schools).

³¹ See, for example, Johnson (1982); Vogel (1979).

³² One may question the logical flow here since the importance of one’s role in a group and one’s contribution to the public good does not necessarily imply that one needs to control one’s own individuality. A potential (normative) concern here is that these (supposedly) universal norms are re-interpreted so that the notion of public spirit is connected to Japanese traditions and norms, and furthermore, the importance of public spirit is used as a pretext for the importance of patriotic feeling (as observed in both the FLE revision along with other official documents, and Our Morals). This has been a long-standing conservative agenda (and one of the underlying concerns expressed by liberals), which also became contentious in the FLE revision in 2006. This study’s reference to the editorial debate between Asahi and Yomiuri earlier also exemplifies this. In this sense, this paper is aligned with an underlying liberal concern about the education policy that could produce “sub-servient” (tsugōnoii) people (Sugihara, 2017).

³³ According to Narushima (2009[2009]), through the creation of a national community with a strong sense of patriotism and respect for public spirit, the Japanese government could possibly circumvent the public frustration over, for example, Japan’s stagnant economy since the 1990s (and the subsequent emergence of a “new poor” class in Japan). For the analysis of Japan’s “new poor” class, see Hashimoto (2018).

³⁴ The text briefly introduces foreign cuisines (such as couscous in North Africa and borsch in Ukraine and Russia), foreign clothes (sari in India and kilt in Scotland), and foreign housing (ger in Mongolia and trulli in Italy).

³⁵ In this section, the Olympic Games is also discussed with its underlying principle, peace through sports (p. 179), through the story about Japanese volleyball coach, Kato Akira, who helped develop the Peru women’s national volleyball team in the 1960s (pp. 180–183).

³⁶ Tsuneyoshi (2018b, p. 189) depicts this “Olympic type of image” of international community as “the UNESCO Model” in which “Japan and other nations [coexist] peacefully. …Within the borders, there was an assumption of homogeneity.” Therefore, as Roesgaard, 2017, p. 103) notes, “[t]he fact …that other nations have specific cultural traits by extension justifies and normalizes the specificities of the Japanese.”

³⁷ By “correct patriotism,” what is suggested are: (1) the attachment to the local community based on shared culture, history and tradition and (2) the respect and love for the emperor (as the symbol of the state as defined in Article 1 of the Japanese Constitution) (Ichikawa, 2011, pp. 298, 300–303).

³⁸ Recently, Japan’s family structure has also been changing rapidly. While single-parent households with children under 18 accounted for 6.0% in 1990, the figure increased to 10.5% in 2015 (see Maita, 2018). For the poverty of single-parent households, see Maita (2017).

³⁹ For the constitutive nature of the Japanese nation, see, for example, Oguma’s (2002) widely-read text in which he deconstructs the myth of Japan’s ethnic homogeneity nurtured in the post-war years.

⁴⁰ The phrase is the subtitle of her article (Tsuneyoshi, 2018a).

⁴¹ For the exception, see Bamkin’s (2018) in-depth analysis of teachers’ contributions to what is actually taught in schools. What Bamkin explores is the autonomy of schoolteachers in moral education. See also Bamkin (2019, 2020).

⁴² History wars in Asia still revolve around Japan. Among the recent political skirmishes between Japan and China / South Korea over how to commemorate Japan’s past wrongs and atone for physical as well as psychological wounds it caused in Asia, the so-called kyōkasho mondai (history textbook controversies) has continuously shown that difficult pasts will not disappear easily. For the recent development of the Japanese history textbook controversy, see, for example, Fukuoka (2018).