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ABSTRACT
For Eckhart, God is indistinct to creation; that is, supremely immanent or present to it. What, then, is left to be said about the creature’s union with God? Surely all the work is already done? Eckhart answers: yes and no. This paper traces the philosophical meaning of difference and sameness, distinction and indistinction, and finally transcendence and immanence in Eckhart’s thought. This does not yield the idea that we should straightforwardly turn from our composite nature in order to achieve union with God (a position long attributed to Eckhart). Instead, it shows that through an asymmetrical relation we become indistinct to God in virtue of our distinction; we are to discover union through our composite nature. Necessarily this means union with God is simultaneously and perpetually complete and incomplete. This follows from the fact that God is beyond the oppositional structure between distinction and indistinction, transcendence and immanence.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 On the matter of an ‘ontological interpretation’ of ‘divine indwelling’, which would be the closest point of contact to our concerns here, see Kieckhefer, ‘Meister Eckhart’s Concept of Union’, 208–9.
2 Meister Eckhart, Prolog. in Opus propositionum n. 11, LW I/2 45, 22-4. All citations of Eckhart’s works are taken from the critical edition: Eckhart, Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke. The abbreviation style follows ‘Lateinischen Werke’ (LW) or ‘Deutschen Werke’ (DW), followed by the volume, page, and line number(s). Abbreviated titles of works are used: Prologus in Opus propositionum [Prolog. in Opus propositionum]; Predigt [Pr.]; Expositio libri Genesis [In Gen. I]; Expositio libri Sapientiae [In Sap.]; Quaestiones Parisienses [Quaest. Par.]; Expositio libri Exodi [In Ex.]; Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Iohannem [In Ioh.].
3 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 144, LW II 482, 4–9.
4 Meister Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I n. 12, LW V 47, 14–48, 4. For a very fine introduction to the themes of this question, as well as an overview of the different ontological and henological approaches to it, see Keenan OP, ‘Theological Epistemology’.
5 Meister Eckhart, Prolog. in Opus propositionum n. 6, LW I/2 43, 16-20.
6 Meister Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I n. 7, LW V 43, 13–44, 2.
7 Meister Eckhart, Quaest. Par. I n. 9, LW V 45, 6–15.
8 Meister Eckhart, Prolog. in Opus propositionum n. 25, LW I/2 55, 13–15.
9 Turner, Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, 101.
10 Ibid., 101–2.
11 Ibid., 102.
12 See also O'Regan, ‘Theological Epistemology and Apophasis’, 379–80. O’Regan seems to offer a similar analysis to that of Turner in this regard. However, ‘excess’, we may note, suggests either something inappropriate, or else (as we would expect in the context of any discussion of transcendence) the only appropriate description of what apophasis is attempting to do.
13 Turner, Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, 105.
14 Ibid., 101.
15 Ibid., 189. I am applying Turner’s point here to distinction and indistinction; his original point is about rational and non-rational animality.
16 Meister Eckhart, In Ex. n. 74, LW II 77, 9–78, 4.
17 Turner, Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, 189.
18 See Wojtulewicz, ‘Deconstructing Sophisms in Meister Eckhart’, 121–44.
19 Turner, Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, 189.
20 It is worth noting the difference between Aertsen’s and Mojsisch’s interpretations regarding the transcendentals and being here. Mojsisch thinks Eckhart’s concept of God as One ‘breaks through’ the ‘transcendental level’ with his negatio negationis (and this, Mojsisch thinks, ‘advances the theory of univocity’, Mojsisch, p. 100). Aertsen, on the other hand, thinks the transcendental ‘is not surpassable’ because the convertible transcendentals (which includes ‘one’ and ‘being’) ‘are identified with the Transcendent’ (Aertsen, p. 139). This is the ground on which Aertsen argues against Etienne Gilson’s conclusion that Eckhart’s Quaest. Par. I dissociates God from being. It is not clear why Mojsisch’s theory advances the case for univocity rather than equivocity here; but certainly his concept of analogy is etiolated (‘it sets the absolute in relation to the limited’, Mojsisch, p. 68). Oddly, Aertsen’s reading seems more in line with Mojsisch’s description of univocity than his own. I therefore see Mojsisch’s position as more equivocal in practice, and Aertsen’s as properly univocal. But for reasons I set out here, I think it makes greater sense of Eckhart’s position to read it analogically (especially where he leans on Aquinas’ understanding of infinity), which is why I think Turner’s analysis of the mutual exclusion of disjunction between opposite terms is correct. Mojsisch, Analogy, Univocity and Unity, especially 67–8 and 100–1; Aertsen, ‘Ontology and Henology in Medieval Philosophy’, especially 139.
21 Turner, Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, 189.
22 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 154, LW II 490, 4–5.
23 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 154, LW II 489, 9-10; English translation taken from McGinn, Tobin, and Borgstädt, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher, 169.
24 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 154, LW II 489, 10–11; English translation taken from ibid.
25 Turner, Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, 163.
26 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 154, LW II 490, 7–9; English translation taken from McGinn, Tobin, and Borgstädt, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher, 169.
27 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia, q. 7, a. 1, obj. 3; English translation taken from Aquinas, The Treatise on the Divine Nature, 61, 9–13.
28 Clarke, ‘The Limitation of Act by Potency’, 185.
29 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 7, a. 1, co.; English translation taken from Aquinas, Treatise on the Divine Nature, 62, 33–5.
30 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 7, a. 1, co.; English translation taken from ibid., 62, 25–8.
31 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 7, a. 1, co.; English translation taken from ibid., 62, 36–8.
32 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 7, a. 1, ad. 3; English translation taken from ibid., 62, 46–8.
33 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 144, LW II 482, 5–7.
34 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 154, LW II 490, 7–8.
35 Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, 17–18.
36 Ibid., 18.
37 See for example In Ex. n. 106, LW II 106, 14–107, 3.
38 Przywara, Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm.
39 Wojtulewicz, Meister Eckhart on the Principle, 246–51.
40 Davies, Mystical Theologian, 99ff. Davies distinguishes between the ‘theology of union’ and the ‘imagery of union’ which more or less maps onto the distinction I am making here between the question of analogy and the question of union, or, a philosophical and theological analysis.
41 Wendlinder, Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart gives a very good overview of this aspect of Eckhart’s thought, and the points of connection that exist with Thomas Aquinas. Guerizoli gives insightful analysis on the immanent and transcendent aspects of the ‘Gottesgeburtszyklus’ ('birth-of-God cycle’), see Guerizoli, Die Verinnerlichung des Göttlichen, 18–25.
42 Meister Eckhart, Sermo XXIX n. 296, LW IV 263, 13–264, 3; English translation taken from McGinn, Tobin, and Borgstädt, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher, 223–4.
43 For an in-depth study of this concept in Eckhart’s Latin and German works, see Wojtulewicz, Meister Eckhart on the Principle. Different expositions of the term principium in Eckhart’s work can be found in Waldschütz, Denken und Erfahren des Grundes; Goris, Einheit Als Prinzip Und Ziel. Despite due caution from both authors, I am myself more sceptical about any association between principium, as principally found in the Latin works, and grunt, as found in the German works. Any equivalence between Latin and German terms has been a thorny issue at least since the time of Martin Grabmann, and it is worth noting that Eckhart does sometimes deploy the term ‘principium’ in his German works, which is suggestive of his own frustration at finding equivalences. I find myself more in agreement with McGinn’s analysis of principium, especially given his comment on what I have been calling the asymmetrical relation between God and the creature; principium being, McGinn thinks, something which belongs ‘to the divine side, but not the human’. See McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart, 42–3.
44 Meister Eckhart, In Gen. I n. 2, LW I/2 61, 4–5.
45 Wojtulewicz, Meister Eckhart on the Principle, 55–22.
46 For an excellent account of this theme in the pre-Socratics, see Miller, ‘The Reception of Hesiod by the Early Pre-Socratics’.
47 Wojtulewicz, Meister Eckhart on the Principle, 132.
48 See for example Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 161, LW II 497, 7–11 and In Ioh. n. 582, LW III 510, 1-2.
49 See Wojtulewicz, Meister Eckhart on the Principle, 9. Note here the patristic theme of layering the re-creation accomplished by Christ’s resurrection on top of the Genesis account of creation.
50 Grotz gives a sophisticated analysis of language-use in Eckhart, especially with respect to modistic use, and considers the negation of negation as important in explaining the exegetical technique Eckhart deploys in order to ‘weniger sagt und dabei mehr meint’. This gives rise to what Grotz calls ‘Mehr-Deutigkeit’. For my own part, I am describing something similar by referring to ‘condensation’. See Grotz, ‘Zwei Sprachen und das Eine Wort’, 52–7.
51 Meister Eckhart, In Ioh. n. 216, LW III 181, 7–182, 6.
52 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 201, LW II 536, 6. Eckhart even compares Pythagoras with John the Baptist; to be taken on the strength of his word, just as John was believed and admired though he did not perform miracles: In Ioh. n. 520, LW III 449, 1–10.
53 Riedweg, His Life, Teaching, and Influence, 81.
54 Ibid., 44.
55 Clarke, ‘The Limitation of Act by Potency’, 174.
56 Ibid., 184.
57 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 144, LW II 482, 4–5; English translation taken from McGinn, Tobin, and Borgstädt, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher, 166.
58 Wojtulewicz, Meister Eckhart on the Principle, 133–4.
59 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 154, LW II 489, 7–8 and 490, 1–3; English translation taken from McGinn, Tobin, and Borgstädt, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher, 169.
60 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 282, LW II 614, 13–615, 1; English translation taken from ibid., 172.
61 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 155, LW II 491, 7–9; English translation taken from ibid., 170.
62 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 155, LW II 491, 3–4; English translation taken from ibid.
63 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 156, LW II 492, 4–5; English translation taken from ibid.
64 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 156, LW II 492, 8–12; English translation taken from ibid. Square brackets are original to the translation.
65 See Aertsen, ‘Ontology and Henology in Medieval Philosophy’, 137–9.
66 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 146, LW II 484, 6; English translation taken from McGinn, Tobin, and Borgstädt, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher, 167.
67 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 147, LW II 485, 5–6; English translation taken from ibid.
68 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 147, LW II 485, 5–7; English translation taken from ibid.
69 See Wojtulewicz, ‘Late Medieval Mysticism’, 2 and 15.
70 Przywara puts this well when he says, following De Pot. q.7, a. 5, corp., ‘To be sure, there is such a thing as a positive statement concerning God, but it is merely the basis of a negative statement concerning his absolute otherness’. Betz and Hart give the translation of De Pot. q. 7, a. 5, corp. in n. 211 as ‘The perception of negation is always founded upon a certain affirmation … : hence, unless the human mind possessed some positive knowledge of God, it would be impossible for it to deny anything of God’. Przywara, Analogia Entis, 231 and 231n.211.
71 Wojtulewicz, ‘Late Medieval Mysticism’, 15.
72 Key to this determination of self-abandonment is the idea that immanence does not become a matter of possession for the creature, but of dispossession. But we may add that the question of possession itself presupposes a distinction which treats God as a ‘thing’, which for reasons we have explored, is false. See Dubilet, ‘Meister Eckhart’s Kenotic Lexicon and the Critique of Finitude’, in The Self-Emptying Subject, 51–5.
73 This is to say that the negation of what is creaturely is already to negate the negation, for the distinction that characterizes the creature is itself already a negation. In this sense, I agree with Williams, ‘Two Masters Negating the Negation’, 49–53.
74 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 156, LW II 492, 6–7.
75 Przywara affirms this point about Eckhart’s thought in that it is not a flight from creatureliness, but also adds why he thinks Eckhart’s position ultimately to be wrong, see Przywara, Ringen der Gegenwart, 488: ‘Wenn also Meister Eckhart von den Stufen des Entwerdens spricht, so ist das, im Lichte dieser Zusammenhänge, letztlich weniger Geschöpfflucht oder Geschöpfverachtung, sondern Eindringen in die mystische Tiefe der Schöpfung in Gott, Eindringen in ihr geistiges Urwesen. Es handelt sich letztlich nicht um Entwerdung im strengen Sinn, sondern um Geistwerdung oder Verinnerung. Aber auch diese Ausdrücke sind noch falsch. Denn die Schöpfung ist bereits Geist in Gott, ist bereits ein “Innen” in Gott, und die Menschenseele trägt bereits als Geistseele das All geistig in sich und das Außen als ihr Innen und trägt als Christenseele auch das Geistsein und Innensein dieser Schöpfung in Gott in sich, da nicht mehr sie lebt, sondern Christus, Gott in ihr’.
76 Ibid., 52: ‘[…] cognitio matutina, das “Erkennen der Dinge in Gott”, im Gegensatz zur cognitio vespertina, dem “Erkennen Gottes in den Dingen” […]’. Przywara is making a point about mysticism in reference to Jan van Ruusbroec and not Meister Eckhart here, but its application to Eckhart seems appropriate.
77 Wojtulewicz, Meister Eckhart on the Principle, 174.
78 Ibid., 174–6.
79 Ibid., 175.
80 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 146, LW II 484, 2 and 6; English translation taken from McGinn, Tobin, and Borgstädt, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher, 167.
81 Meister Eckhart, In Sap. n. 145, LW II 483, 8–10; English translation taken from ibid., 166.
82 Between these possibilities is found the tension in how Eckhart relates to questions of hierarchy (Neoplatonic or ecclesial). See Dubilet, ‘Conceptual Experimentation with the Divine: Expression, Univocity, and Immanence in Meister Eckhart’, in The Self-Emptying Subject, 61–2. I contrast Eckhart’s and Ruusbroec’s spiritual and metaphysical commitments with respect to this question of ecclesial hierarchy in Wojtulewicz, ‘Late Medieval Mysticism’.
83 Meister Eckhart, Pr. 39, DW II 265, 1–266, 2; English translation taken from McGinn, Tobin, and Borgstädt, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher, 298.
84 On the subject of epektasis and where it sits in relation to the broad history of Christian thought on the beatific vision, see Boersma, Seeing God, 76–96 and 129–62. See also Petcu, ‘The Doctrine of Epektasis’. Particularly interesting in the context of immanence are the topological questions raised by Conway-Jones, ‘The Greatest Paradox of All’.
85 On this point see also McGinn, ‘Mystical Union’, 414–15.
86 Tobin, Meister Eckhart, Thought and Language, 114.
87 Ibid.
88 Meister Eckhart, Prolog. in Opus propositionum n. 25, LW I/2 55, 13–15. On the point of the changing emphases of Eckhart’s language in the specific context of the Commentary on the Book of Wisdom, see Duclow, ‘Meister Eckhart on the Book of Wisdom’, 232–5.
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Christopher M. Wojtulewicz
Dr Christopher M. Wojtulewicz is a Lecturer in Philosophy at St Mary’s College Oscott, a Research Fellow at Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford, and an Associate of the Cambridge Centre for the Study of Platonism.