Mechanism of the green supply chain profit of building materials considering the duopoly competition model and consumer green preference

Abstract

The environmental pollution problem caused by building materials enterprises has been paid attention to by scholars. However, the existing research on supply chain management cannot explain the influence mechanism of green building materials supply chain profit under duopoly competition. This paper aims to reveal the influence mechanism of green supply chain profit of building materials, according to the duopoly competition model and Stackelberg game. There are four main conclusions in this paper. (1) The profit of the supply chain under centralised decision is higher than that under decentralised decision and cost-sharing decision; cost cost-sharing decision is the best decision for building materials manufacturers and retailers. (2) Consumer green preference has a positive impact on the profits of building materials manufacturers, retailers and green supply chain of building materials. (3) Under different scenarios, the competition intensity coefficient between building materials manufacturers has different influences on the profit of the green supply chain of building materials. (4) Different ordinary building materials manufacturers’ markets have different impacts on the profit of the green supply chain of building materials. This paper not only provides a decision-making basis for the production and operation of green building materials but also offers a theoretical basis for green supply chain management.

KEYWORDS:

• Green supply chain
• Stackelberg game
• cost sharing
• duopoly competition model
• consumer green preference

Data availability statement

The authors declare that the data are not available and can be presented upon the requested of the readers.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [grant number 72204178], Sichuan Science and Technology Program, and Natural Science Foundation of Sichuan, China [grant number 2023NSFSC1053].