Can theosis deradicalize Christian fundamentalism?

Abstract

There has been a lot of concerns about the rise of fundamentalism in Christianity lately, especially since the January 6 Capitol Hill storming, that many see as the line in the sand as far as far-right is concerned. Consequently, the need to deradicalize that particular group within Christianity has been brought up to the fore. This study suggests that the doctrine of theosis can be utilized as Religious-Education-form of Deradicalization of Christian fundamentalism as has been done by Papanikolaou , whose work I view as an effort to deradicalize the Radical Orthodoxy in its rejection of liberal democracy. This study concludes that theosis combined with hermeneutics of charity has the potential to deradicalize five fundamentalism mindsets within Christianity and advocates it beyond Orthodoxy.

Keywords:

• Theosis
• deradicalization
• fundamentalism mindsets
• Pratt’s typology
• religious education

1. Introduction

Pope Francis once made a comment in an interview that “Fundamentalism is a sickness in all religions” and referring to it not as a religion but an idolatry (Arbuckle, 2016). Deradicalization for so long has been concentrated mostly in dealing with extremism in Islam. But lately, the FBI has diverted the focus from social activist and Antifa to far-right ideologies such as Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, the Three Percenters, and especially QaNon, whose prominent personalities incited Bible verses for their cause in social medias following the Capitol siege, and formally designated by FBI as “domestic terror threat” (Graves & Fraser-Rahim, 2021). From particular-biblical-eschatology-based vaccine rejection to the January 6 storming of Capitol Hill, all brings up the pressing need to deradicalize fundamentalism within Christianity. Davies (2009) defines religious extremism as “the complete rejection of ideas that appear to contradict or oppose a specific set of exclusive religious beliefs”. To define extremism in terms of what it is against has its utility, as Pratt (2010) says “In some respect ‘fundamentalism’ may be understood in terms of whatever it is against”. HM Government (2015) defines extremism (in general) as “vocal or active opposition to fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs, as well as calls for the death of United Kingdom armed forces at home or abroad”. It takes a long transitory way from religious fundamentalism to religious extremism and the final religious violence (terrorism), the latter usually being tainted with political and economic goals which are justified on moral grounds (Chan & Ghosh, 2018). Such moral justification arguably stems from the early fundamentalism stage and this morally justified violence is what makes a religious violence distinct from any other type of violence.

We thus can argue that to fight the doctrine of fundamentalism is to tackle the root of the problem and not the symptoms. Fighting intolerance must be given at least the same priority as fighting terrorism, as it is apt to view intolerance as soft terrorism. To dismantle a system of radical belief is no less important than law enforcement or military reaction.

Fundamentalist religion often overlaps with radical nationalism as in the case of “dominion theology” in Christianity (Brekke, 2012), and nationalism as such is an ideology (p. 108). Chan and Ghosh (2018) suggest that religious education is indispensible to the long-term impact of countering violent extremism (CVE), especially a religious education that has elements of critical thinking, ethical citizenship and respect for diversity. This parallels to the latest shift on emphasis from “War on Terror” to “Battle of Ideas” (Payne, 2019, p. 32). This is because extremists radicalized the youth by soft-power: ideas, ideology, narratives and propaganda which can’t just be countered by hard-power military response (Chan & Ghosh, 2018).

Chan and Ghosh (2018) further adds that “Extremist groups have used religious education very successfully to indoctrinate young minds (through a particular interpretation of their religious text)”. A particular interpretation of scripture has been weaponized to radicalized recruits, but the opposite also applies: another interpretation can be utilized for human flourishing that often requires deradicalization. The same Jesus’ words: “ … Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s” (Mat 22:21), can be interpreted by Robert Filmer’s Patriacha to justify the divine rights of the king, while some Christians see it as justification for the separation of church and state (Carter, 2005, p. 53). The same verse, yet two diametrically opposed interpretation.

Often enough, what we deem as absolute truth turns out to be a perversion of that very truth. Re-interpreting scripture that has been abused by extremists is nothing new in deradicalization effort, such was applied in radical Islam context. For example, Mustaqim (2017) constructs a “more humanist and tolerant understanding on Quranic verses in order to spread humanist and tolerant Islamic norms, rahmatan lil ‘alamin(blessings for all universe)”, that otherwise could be abused to endorse violence and terrorism. Mohammad Arkoun a reputable Islamic thinker in Algeria has published a lot of teaching material that have been used to counter radicalization by promoting “true” interpretation of the scripture (Rezan & Naupal, 2019), and also the groundbreaking book Akyol (2011) that has been banned in Malaysia for fear of undermining its religious police, as the book is arguing that Islam is compatible with classical liberalism and Enlightenment, and that the secular, liberal democracy is the form of government that is most desirable even in the light of Islamic teachings. Unfortunately, such efforts are rarer in Christian context.

In fact, the doctrine of theosis has been utilized in a work of Papanikolaou (2012) for such deradicalization effort within Orthodoxy. The title and subtitle of the book is very telling: “The Mystical as Political: Democracy and Non-Radical Orthodoxy”. That book arguably is an effort of applying the doctrine of theosis to interpret scriptures in such a way (such as “love your neighbour”) to opt for the best political system that is best suited for humanity (which is liberal democracy that is often rejected by radical Orthodox). Viewed in that light, this book is an effort to deradicalize radical Orthodox’s rejection of liberal democracy, a political system defined eloquently and practically by Papanikolaou (2012) as “nothing more than a political space shaped by a common good that embodies the principles of equality and freedom, with the former including social and economic equalities, and the latter including religious freedom facilitated by church-state separation”. We can agree with Gillespie (2017) when he writes “In fact, religion and politics have been entangled in almost every form of communal life we know of”, in an essay titled “The Inevitable Entanglement of Religion and Politics”, that such entanglement is indeed inevitable. As most of our environment is other people or social environment (Heinrich, 2016), every interpretation of scripture will have a social or political effect, it can be constructive or destructive, but never neutral. Such interpretation can give moral ground for violence or contribute to better future.

As mentioned above, the definition of extremisms in terms of “what they are up against” has its utility. What kind of ideas do extremisms generally up against? Another definition of general extremism states:

“Extremism can be used to refer to political ideologies that oppose a society’s core values and principles. In the context of liberal democracies this could be applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and universal human rights. The term can also be used to describe the methods through which political actors attempt to realise their aims, that is, by using means that ‘show disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others” (Borum, 2011).

Radical Orthodoxy in their rejection of liberal democracy can be seen as being in the domain of extremism according to the aforementioned definition of it. Hedges (2014) applies Douglas Pratt’s typology of religious fundamentalism to John Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy and concludes that it employs style of rhetoric that have clear affinities with such ideologies, though also clarifying that he is not a fundamentalist in the way the term normally employed. Thus, it is apt to see, Papanikolaou (2012)’s work as an effort of deradicalization of Radical Orthodoxy by utilising the doctrine of theosis.

This study argues that the doctrine of theosis fills a theological blind spot that can reduce the risk of radicalization in Christianity, and further asks: How this doctrine can tackle some of the most dangerous presupposition of Christian fundamentalism? To get ahold of the idea of fundamentalism we first look at Pratt’s typology Paradigm of Fundamentalism and combine it with Strozier et al (2011)’s fundamentalist mindsets. Second, we will see how theosis can be used as a mean of deradicalization, such as in the work of Papanikolaou (2012) to neutralize such mindsets within Radical Orthodoxy. Thus, we will first familiar ourselves with some of Christian fundamentalist mindsets and then elaborates several elements of theosis that can neutralize such mindsets.

2. The doctrine of theosis

Although mostly associated with Orthodoxy, there are a lot of studies that show the primacy of it in Protestantism (Karkkainen, 2006), Catholicism (Hudson, 2007), even Pentacostalism (Rybarcyk, 2002). Pope John Paul II once said that Catholics should be familiar with “the venerable and ancient tradition of the Eastern Churches” which is divinization or theosis (II, 1995).

Theosis as a doctrine of deification has as its purpose to be united with God, brought about by catharsis and theoria, sometimes referred to as three stages of faith (Engelhardt, 2018). Theosis is the mystical union with God, especially popularized in Vladimir Lossky’s The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, that made Orthodox theology has since been identified with mystical theology.

In this study, we use the less literal definition of theosis, as in Papanikolaou (2012) which is “divine-human communion”.

3. Pratt’s Typology paradigm of fundamentalism

Douglas Pratt invents trichotomous typology of fundamentalist groups that can describe the spectrum of radicalization process (though not definitive and in some cases not mutually exclusive), which are passive, assertive and impositional (Pratt, 2010). This typology is a paradigm that can be used to see fundamentalism in phases, thus exploring its dynamics of sequential development. Each phase constitutes several features, with each feature comprises of paired factors. This typology has ten features within it, thus make up 20 factors that can represent fundamentalism as a story.

The passive phase comprises of three features: “principal presuppositions”, “authority derivation”, and “implicit verification”. The feature of “principal presupposition” has two factors: “perspectival absolutism” and “immediate inerrancy”. The feature of “authority derivation” has two features: “apodicity assumption” and “narrow narrative indwelling”. The feature of “implicit verification” has two factors: “narrative correlation” and “rhetorical corroboration”. Referring to this particular first phase, Pratt (2007) explains “these features, I suggest, denote the essence of fundamentalism per se, whether religious or non-religious”.

The assertive phase comprises of four features: “epistemological construction”, “identity structure”, “contextual scope”, and “condemnatory stance”. The paired factors of “epistemological construction” are “hard factualism” and “applied necessity”. “Identity structure” feature contains “communitarian intent” and “individual constraint”. “Contextual scope” feature has paired factors of “ideological exclusivism” and “polity inclusion”. The feature of “condemnatory stance” contains paired factors of “judgmental values” and “pietistic tyranny”.

The impositional phase comprises of three features: “discriminatory value application”, “explicit justification” and “enacted extremism”. The feature of “discriminatory value application” has two factors of “otherness negated” and “self-superiority asserted”. The feature of “explicit justification” has two factors of “sanctioned imposition” and “legitimated violence”. The feature of “enacted extremism” has two factors of “manifest contempt” and “terrorist events”.

Pratt (2007) acknowledges that “this analysis emerges from an exercise of a priori critique and reflection” and Baker (2018) referring to Pratt’s typology explains that “the types outlined are not true or false, but rather should be judged by their utility”. Pratt claims that his typology “exposes the ideological structure of fundamentalism more precisely” by exploring the dynamics of the sequential development that is inherent to the fundamentalism (Pratt, 2010)”.

Casual scrutiny to Christian Fundamentalism five basic tenets show no sign of rejection of any principles of liberal democracy. Those five tenets are: Biblical inerrancy, virgin birth of Christ, the substitutionary atonement, the bodily resurrection of Christ, the historicity of miracles (Morris, 2008). If fundamentalism is to be defined in terms of what they are “against”, is it possible to believe in those five tenets without rejection of liberal democracy principles? Is it possible that actually those very beliefs endorse principles of liberal democracy? Gierycz (2020) asks a very good question in the title of her paper. “Religion: A Source of Fundamentalism or A Safeguard Against It? This paper suggests that it is possible for religion to be a safeguard against fundamentalism, echoing Gierycz.

A paradigm such as Chan and Ghosh (2018) that¹ sees progression from fundamentalism to extremism and the final violent terrorism has wide acceptance and its utility. But it is helpful to know that there is no clear-cut boundaries between the concepts. What is helpful as far as deradicalization is concerned is to echoing what; Pratt (2007) says, “Religious terrorism, I contend, derives substantially if not solely from an ideology of religious fundamentalism”. The word “substantially” and “solely” need to be taken seriously, if we believe that prevention is better than cure. So, identifying exactly in which phase a religious extremist is in (whether early fundamentalism or middle extremist) is not very important, for as far as s/he rejects the principles of liberal democracy, s/he need to be deradicalized.

4. Five fundamentalism mindset

If a person rejects liberal democracy principle, then regardless of the phase he is in in Pratt’s typology of fundamentalism, he needs to be deradicalized. I propose that what is important is to find the basic axioms of fundamentalism or even better, identifying mindsets behind such ideology.

Strozier et al. (2011) introduced the term “fundamentalist mindset” that describes the mental mode of fundamentalism, that transcends its particularities in contemporary religion. They list them as: dualistic thinking; paranoia and rage in group context; an apocalyptic orientation that incorporates distinct perspective on time, death and violence; a relationship to charismatic leader; and a totalized conversion experience. One can readily see that these mindsets are present in models of radicalization and especially in Pratt’s typology, regardless of phases. For example, one can argue that all the five mindsets are present even in the most early passive phase, within all features of “principal presuppositions”, “authority derivation”, and “implicit verification”. Our goal is to see how a doctrine such as theosis can serve as a mean of deradicalization (by way of religious education) in Christian context as exemplified in the work of Papanikolaou (2012).

4.1. Dualistic thinking mindset

The first fundamentalist mindset is “dualistic thinking”, described as “a conflicted or opposing nature inherent in absolutist ideology”. This mindset is equated to Manichaeanism, which is a worldview that depicts “the tendency to view the world as a battleground between pure good and pure evil” (Strozier et al., 2011, p. 12) . Each distinct mindsets are useful for heuristic purposes, but as the authors have warned, “one must be aware of the enormous overlap between these categories (p. 11). We can see how “dualistic thinking” is connected to the other characteristics. As identical to “binary opposition”, opposing views may create paranoia in the fundamentalist mindset “because each opposing point is experienced as a threat (Barbre, 2011). Paranoia is a “specific cognitive orientation that stimulates dualistic thinking”, while the apocalyptic organizes such thinking around the view that “locating evil also presumes the possibility of salvation or an escape from evil” (Barbre, 2011). The charismatic leader embolden these trait of dualistic thinking by galvanizing the individuals into a group self (total conversion).

Dualistic mindset which can be seen as us-versus-them mentality, is identical to certain features and factors in Pratt’s typology (irrespective of phases) such as “condemnatory stance”, “ideological exclusivism”, “polity inclusion”, “judgmental values”, and “discriminatory value application”.

In chapter two, Papanikolaou (2012) addresses theologians’ (William T. Cavanaugh and Vigen Guroian, each respectively of Catholic and Orthodox tradition), opposition to the secular, who claim that behind the mask of social impartiality of the secular there lies a violent nature. This serves as the ground to view that the secular is incompatible with the church as manifestation of the kingdom of God. Papanikolaou argues against such paradigm that equates the church as the kingdom of God, since the presence of the kingdom of God in the church is not the same as equating the two. Such paradigm allows justifying the demonization of the secular, and everyone within it. Such is the very kind of dualistic thinking that theosis is against. Papanikolaou suggests to view the secular more of a desert than a battlefield, where the former is a place we renew with the reality of God’s presence via theosis, as theosis “does not allow for a spatialized mutual exclusivity within the created order, even at the level of thought (Papanikolaou, 2012, p. 145) ”.

Viewing the secular as the battlefield is what makes Radical Orthodoxy rejects liberal democracy and human rights. Dunn (2013) concludes that the fundamental claim or thesis of Papanikolaou (2012) is “theosis requires non-dualistic approach to politics”. Hedges (2014) uses Pratt’s typology of fundamentalism to conclude that John Milbank’s discourse employs “styles of rhetoric and representation of the religious Other that have clear affinities with such ideologies”. The logic of theosis is antithetical to dualism mindset:

“The logic of the realism of divine-human communion, or a meta- physics of participation, then, does not lead to Milbank’s ironically Gnostic-like dualism between the Christian mythos and the liberal mythos” (Papanikolaou, 2012).

Papanikolaou (2017) accuses Radical Orthodoxy’s rejection of liberal democracy as guilty of “political Nestorianism” though they claim that their political theology was based on Chalcedonian Christology. Nestorianism did not deny union of creation with God, but such union is mediated by a third party whose status (divine or human) is unclear. Papanikolaou claims that Chalcedonian theology attempts to overcome dualism or binary mode of thought, such that “this dualistic and binary mode of thought is most evident in the rhetoric of mutual exclusivity”, and concludes “The critique of political democratic liberalism betrays Chalcedon and mimics Nestorian logic insofar as it reinforces the dualisms that Chalcedon attempts to overcome”. Thus, Papanikolaou advocates a political theology that is more Chalcedonian which he calls “a politics of non-dualism that is not realized at the level of the rhetoric of demonization or mutual incompatibility, but in the practices in which one learns how to love, even the stranger and the enemy”.

4.2. Paranoia mindset

The second fundamentalist mindset is “paranoia and rage in group context”. It is described as “a specific cognitive orientation that stimulates dualistic thinking”, and “suggests the malevolence in the fundamentalist mindset better than mere suspicion and incorporates the psychological dimension that may be a way of organizing the world”. Paranoia is deeply rooted in dualistic Manichaeanism mindset that is worse than anxious vigilance. Strozier et al. (2011) stress “the centrality of psychological tendency toward dualism and paranoia so central to the fundamentalist mindset”. If dualistic thinking reflects conflict between two ideas, the way fundamentalist mindset view opposing view as a threat is explained as paranoia. Thus we can readily see how interconnected paranoia mindset with the rest of the mindsets as explained:

“Dualistic thinking is inherently related to paranoia and the apocalyptic. Paranoia is a specific cognitive orientation that stimulates dualistic thinking. The apocalyptic serves to organize such thinking. Dualistic thinking becomes apocalyptic because “locating evil also presumes the possibility of salvation, or an escape from evil” (Strozier et al., 2011) .

How can theosis counter such paranoia? As theosis rejects dualistic thinking that demonizes religious/secular others, it cannot but neutralizes such paranoia itself. Papanikolaou (2012, p. 3) defines theosis as divine-human communion which is “to love God with all of one’s heart, soul, strength, and mind, that is, singularly, and to love neighbor as self”. He further argues for the practice of ascetism, a tradition of thinking on how to fulfill the commandment to love. He argues that one cannot will to love, since it needs practice. An ascetics of theosis is “the performances of practices aimed at moving one toward the acquisition of the virtue of love” (p. 4).

Hedges (2014) concludes that Milbank’ religious Other “has resonances with fundamentalist and extremist ideologies which may arguably contribute to discourses which can be seen to privilege prejudice in theology”. The affinity between “prejudice” and “paranoia” can be seen in Renshaw’s “Prejudice and Paranoia”, a comparative study of antisemitism and Sinophobia in early twentieth-century Britain when ethnic Other is the villain in a kind of conspiracy theory such as “Jewish takeover” or “Asiatic takeover” that often ended in ethnic violence (Renshaw, 2016). Hedges (2014) accuses Milbank of employing a “monolithic metanarrative about true and false religion” and claims that “Radical Orthodoxy has been criticized for its simplistic employment of dichotomies, of dividing the world between those who expound true religion and those who expound false religion”. Furthermore, Milbank insists that Christians can learn nothing from other religion but should instead approach them as objects for conversion, where dialogue is replaced with “mutual suspicion” (Hedges, 2014, p. 27).

The hypostatic union of divinity and humanity in Jesus Christ is the foundation of justification and theosis. Rakerstraw (1997) states that “The Greek Fathers and St. Gregory Palamas incorporate a strongly physical view of theosis, which derives the deification of human nature from its hypostatic union with the incarnate Logos of God”. Kariatlis (2022) explains that the “Church fathers speak of the original destiny of human nature as one leading to a hypostatic union with the divine Logos in Christ”, that is our theosis. From this Logos, the word “dialogue” is derived, where Logos means “word” but can also mean “speech” and dia means “through”. “Dia-logos” is explained as “the word that moves” or a “multidirectional exchange of speech” (Heller, 2016).

In countering theology that privileges prejudice, such as Milbank’s, Hedges (2014) proposes a kind of theology that: 1) Genuinely respectful of Other, 2) Not dismissive of dialogue with other, 3) Redefine the possibilities within Christian tradition for engaging with Other, and 4) Overcome entrenched and reinforcing theologies of alterity. I suggest that Papanikolaou’s “Mystical of Political” manages to do just these in countering the Radical Orthodoxy rejection of liberal democracy, by formulating a political theology that is based on theosis and combine it with hermeneutics of charity, instead of suspicion.

Noting the central place of hermeneutics of charity in Papanikolaou (2012) it is worth exploring deeper. Sosler (2020) defines it as “A humble, relational, and attentional posture toward a person, text, or topic that seeks to understand and so exhibit love to the person, text, or topic in front of one in order to edify the proper and of life, which is to love God”. I Corinthians 13 characteristic of charity is the set of rules or guidelines in this particular hermeneutic. Sosler argues that those characteristics are not only moral virtues, but also educational virtues for learning: “Charity informs how one knows; it is a posture the Christian takes in learning”.

While agreeing with some political theologians that without some referent to the transcendent that liberal democracy will implode, Papanikolaou (2012) argues that the referent need not be divine but can take the form of common good that is grounded in the realism of theosis. I argue that this striving for common good could trump paranoia mindset. Papanikolaou stated that common good is contained in the Orthodox faith, and its notion does not “follow from natural law principles but one that emerges through civic-engagement-as-diaologue”, and adds that such engagement is in itself, common good, “which means that the common good entails the unequivocal equality among all citizens as co-participants in the dialogue or the “community of dispute.” (Papanikolaou, 2012, p. 158). More about the common good and theosis:

“As I argued above, however, the Christian affirmation of a political community with a good internal to itself, and which is distinct from though not separate from ecclesia, emerges from the logic of divine-human communion. Such a good must be labeled the common good insofar as it is the good of the political community” (Papanikolaou, 2011, p. 157).

Perhaps in any good literature on the topic of deradicalization one will find the suggestion for a dialogue. Even the word “dialogue” is one of the many words deemed synonymous with “deradicalization” along with “rehabilitation”, “reform”, “deprogramming”, and others (Koehler, 2017). For instance, Koehler (2016, p. 226) endorses Theological/Ideological Dialogue and Victim-Perpetrator Dialogue. Chan and Ghosh (2018) list some exemplary model and pedagogical approach that can be used by Religious Education to counter religious extremism, or in other words, to deradicalize or counter-radicalize. One of them is Robert Jackson’s Interpretive Approach and Dialogue, a pedagogy that promotes “an analysis representation, interpretation, and self-reflection of religious beliefs among students and teachers”. Dialogical approach is used to compare and contrast “the overlapping similarities and differences among insiders and outsiders of a tradition” and this approach is pivotal in Jackson’s pivotal interpretive approach. The approach emphasizes reflexivity and action through the values of democracy, social justice and human rights. Jackson’s varying-representations-through-dialogue informs the process of interpretation and by understanding such varying interpretation makes one understands religious Other in different way and overcome any unjustified biases, and hopefully paranoia mindset.

Papanikolaou (2012) accuses Hauerwas of posing a “hermeneutics of suspicion” to philosophical liberalism, in his fear that liberalism will marginalize religion in public life, and instead proposing “hermeneutics of charity” (p. 136). There are two main objections of Hauerwas to liberalism: its anthropology deemed antithetical to Christian; and marginalization of religion in public life. Papanikolaou argues that such objections does not rule out hermeneutical retrievability of “hermeneutics of charity” that would: retrieve elements of philosophical liberalism in relation to Christian theological claims, and see strands of philosophical liberalism’s antireligious rhetoric as entailing a genuine concern for human being.

Hence we see, that Papanikolaou’s hermeneutics of charity deradicalizes the view of secular/religious Other by acknowledging that our limit and weakness needs those Others, as he explains that “Christendom’s complacency needed a dose of godless liberalism”, and gives example of Athanasius asking Arius to clarify incarnation and Trinity. As Papanikolaou (2012) emphasizes, “the single greatest challenge to Christians, especially Orthodox Christians, is to discern their own limits within a political community”. Knowing our limit should make us more appreciative of religious Other, thus debiasing any prejudice or paranoia towards them.

Papanikolaou (2012, p. 145) asserts that the realism of theosis demands a stance of hermeneutical charity, especially when dealing with any trajectory of antireligious liberalism, as explained: “First, like any good heresy, modern liberalism awakened Christian thought to its inner contradiction; put more positively, it compelled Christian thought to coherence with its core principles”. Perhaps, when Jesus tells us to love our enemy (Mat 5:44), it is because we really need them for our betterment.

4.3. Apocalyptic mindset

The third fundamentalist mindset is “an apocalyptic orientation that incorporates distinct perspective on time, death and violence”. Apocalyptic itself connotes the end of the world, and as a mindset it “represents a psychological orientation that is more profound than … eschatological theology”. An interpretation of an eschatological scripture is not a trivial matter since it can produce a would-be-terrorist or good-citizen Christian. Papanikolaou (2012) deems Milbank’s view of eschatology as all-or-nothing apocalypticism, and he compares it to Graham Ward’s eschatological remainder, which “means that the Christian participates in the future kingdom of God because the kingdom is operative in the present (Studebaker, 2012)” . It indicates that the Christian life is an ongoing process of participating in the kingdom of God (M. S. Studebaker, 2021), and it is “the already and not yet” (Studebaker, 2016). Eschatological remainder is a combination of Metz’s and Agamben’s thought, it “realizes (but not fully) the future today, specifically recognizing its messianic character” (Horstkoetter, 2011). It is a kingdom, as “Christ embodiment in the world establishes an alternative kingdom, the Kingdom of the eschatological remainder” (McClain, 2011).

Eschatological remainder is contrasted to eschatological reserve in that the latter means that “the fullness of God’s reign is reserved for a future event, the end of the world, in which individual and cosmic eschatology will be completed” (contributors, N. W, 2022). Whereas the former “emphasizes a certain continuity between the kingdom that is already among us and the kingdom that is to come”. This “continuity” means “we are already living within the future messianic return. Eshatological remainder alerts to a messianism operative now.” (Ward, 2009). Papanikolaou commends Ward’s eschatological remainder as more charitable compared to that of Milbank’s, and that it “requires we recognize our own limits within a political community- limits like those we find in a liberal democracy (Dunn, 2013).

As theosis is viewed as “participatory metaphysics” or “the power of the kingdom in the visible church” (Dunn, 2013), then eschatological remainder in its emphasis on believers’ participation and continuity, arguably has the potential to make an apocalyptic orientation that consent to the principles of liberal democracy, and incorporates distinct perspective on time, death and violence that is non-radical.

Papanikolaou (2012)’s discussion on two types of eschatology, which is all-or-nothing apocalypticism vs eschatological remainder is a discussion of John Milbank’s vs Graham Ward’s political theology. Milbank insists on political order that is identical to ecclesia, while Ward allows one that is distinct from it and “is not necessarily grunded in a particular theological perspective”.

4.4. Charismatic leader mindset

The fourth fundamentalist mindset is “a relationship to charismatic leader” and suggests the relationship between leader and followers. Charismatic leader often an essential ingredient in a fundamentalist mindset that exists in a paranoid and apocalyptic mass movements, and formulate an ideology that exploits his paranoid and apocalyptic tenets. Such leader plays important role in determining the degree to which the fundamentalist mindset may actualize its potential for violence (Strozier et al., 2011, p. 39), and its legitimacy derived from the totalism of conversion. As a mindset this can be linked to cult of personality or cult of the leader that creates heroic image of a leader.

Pratt categorize Radical Orthodoxy within assertive phase, though in latest Milbank’s writings there are signs of toning down, but some of the older tenor remains (Hedges, 2014). This leads Hedges to conclude that Milbank’s theology as “at best unhelpful and at worst potentially dangerous”. Though I will not predicate charismatic leader to a theologian/academician like Milbank as such phrase is depicted in Strozier et al. (2011), but Milbank’s adoption of all-or-nothing apocalypticism is not untroubling, as “apocalyptic provides the narration for leaders to exploit” and some violent charismatic leader in medieval times often intellectuals and “most commonly former priests who had a history of interests in mysticism” (Strozier et al., 2011, p. 39).

I am of the opinion that theosis as a doctrine of deification of each and every individual believer serves as a natural antidote to any forms of personality cult. For a charismatic leader to succeed, especially in his violent quest, the group must be totally converted, that is “one must recognize “ … the state of the guru’s self. A totalistic group process develops, but it is the guru who takes the group inti the Armageddon-like seris of events” (p. 39). Theosis as union with God should prevent one from psychological union with the violent collective as they are represented by the charismatic leader.

Koehler (2016) differentiates between the “push” and “pull” factors of deradicalization, where push factors are defined as “the negative social incidents and circumstances that make it uncomfortable and unappealing to remain in the group”, and pull factors are the opposite of them (positive) in the external world outside the group. One of the important push factors listed is “frustration with the group’s hypocrisy and behaviour”. I argue that this specific “push factor” is an important element to free a fundamentalist from the trap of the charm of charismatic leader. If a fundamentalist has any degree of open-mindedness, he will notice the gap between a charismatic leader’s claim and his own life, as another important pull factors listed is “unmet expectation”, where the propaganda made by a charismatic leader is in contrast with reality.

4.5. Total conversion mindset

The fifth fundamentalist mindset is “totalized conversion experience”, and applies to those changing faiths, but also changing in degree of faith”. It underscored a dramatic change in religious belief or orientation. This mindset is related with “charismatic leader” for it is the latter that leads “the individuals come to identify with, adhere to, and compose the group self (p. 39)”.

One has the impression of the overlap or connection between “charismatic leader mindset” and “total conversion mindset”. A charismatic leader could be seen as the face of the group, with members’ self identity totally immersed in a group. I would argue that Christianity in general and theosis in particular, serve as an antidote to such collective mentality.

Strozier et al. (2011) begin the discussion of total conversion in light of psychological theories that view it as positive and curative (James and Jung) and negative (Freud). Interesting reference is made to Erik Erikson that expounding on the notion of conversion in terms of benign “wholeness” and destructive “totalism”, that “evokes a Gestalt in which an absolute boundary is emphasized … ”, and concludes that “the fundamentalist mindset is grounded in the psychology of totalism and is based on a paranoid psychology.

Galen (2011) suggests that what lacks in Strozier et al. (2011) is emphasis on textual literalism and inerrancy as presents in Bob Altemeyer. But I would argue that actually the psychology of textual literalism and inerrancy was discussed in in the notion of totalism, expressed as “Nothing that belongs inside must be left outside, nothing that must be outside can be tolerated inside”. This totalism is identical with absolutism and very important for a fundamentalist mindset since “An absolutist conversion process grounds the fundamentalist mindset”.

Absolutism presents in many features and factors in Pratt’s typology, such in all three features of the passive phase: “principal presuppositions”, “authority derivation”, and “implicit verification”. And absolutism can be seen identical in factors of: “perspectival absolutism”, “immediate inerrancy, “apodicity assumption”, “narrow narrative indwelling”.

Papanikolaou (2012)’s “Mystical as Political” is viewed in this paper as a deradicalization attempt of Radical Orthodoxy. As mentioned above under the heading “Apocalyptic Mindset”, John Milbank’s apocalyptic mindset can be described as what Papanikolaou terms as “all-or-nothing apocalypticism”. It is in a way an absolute apocalyptic and totalistic in its Weltanschauung.

Jordan Peterson is a man Tyler Cowen called as “the most influential public intellectual in the Western world right now” (Brooks, 2018) and known to have close affinity to Orthodoxy.² He did a psychological reading on Lucifer in the Bible and in John Milton’s Paradise Lost and concludes that in Milton’s eyes, Lucifer is the spirit of reason, and “Lucifer is therefore, the spirit of totalitarianism” (Peterson, 2018, pp. 362–363).

I argue that a successful effort of deradicalization or counter-radicalization must address the indoctrination of absolutism. Wallace (2016) claims that religious absolutism is not the original, ancient Christian but a recent phenomenon of 1870s when for the first time the doctrines of infallibility and inerrancy were introduced. She defines religion as a system of symbols intended to help us to try to articulate and stabilize important inward elements of human experience of meaning, value, and identity, such an experience that we can’t articulate directly without metaphor. This definition of religion is contrasted to an absolute authority structure that prevails in totalism. Viewed in this light, absolutism is a distortion of Christianity and an aberration.

Instead of fundamental absolutism which is essentially theologically corrupt and irrational, Wallace (2016) offers “moral imagination” a term she derived from Hobbes’-1640 “creative imagination”, that she explains as “the ability to recognize and to create the patterns that most deeply reveal what it means to be human and how it is we ought to live in the midst of life’s complexities and difficulties”. This moral imagination is the true truth-claim of Christianity instead of literal absolutism.

Wallace (2016) argues that the major church fathers of classical antiquity explicitly warned that the creation story in Genesis are not to be taken as literal accounts of historical events. She argues that historically secular humanism derived from Christian humanism, a movement based on the recognition of human rights and the seeking of truth and wisdom, and one that was instrumental in setting off Renaissance, Reformation and the Enlightenment. Christian humanists worked out a new synthesis of important strands in European culture thus laid out a robust and deeply theological foundation for what would become the modern, rational, scientific, democratic West. The face of Western culture couldn’t be changed without such robust theological foundation as Christianity had been the state religion of the West since 1390. The successes that Christian humanism has achieved from 1400 to 1700 is threatened by Christian fundamentalism which took shaped in 1870, specifically including democracy, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and biblical scholarship. Christian fundamentalism doctrines are reactionary Victorian inventions and not ancient teachings and beliefs. Wallace claims straightforwardly and unabashedly that Christian fundamentalism is simply a totalitarian ideology.

Papanikolaou (2012) can be seen as an effort of deradicalization by adopting a different kind of hermeneutics, which he coins as “hermeneutics of charity”. It is in a way deradicalization effort using religious education. We can argue that indoctrination is identical to brainwashing. Chan and Ghosh (2018) distinguishes between education and indoctrination as the share common traits, both deal with information and knowledge, such difference is in how and what is taught:

“However, indoctrination occurs when there is no opportunity to question, discuss and analyse, but information is handed down as exclusive content and students learn by rote. Education, on the other hand, refers to the development of both the cognitive and the affective domains. Knowledge is constructed by the student from the variety of sources that are consulted, and teaching is dialogical and critical and focuses on the relational aspect of human identity, since identity is formed through relationships. When knowledge learnt in schools is relevant to the student’s experience it becomes meaningful. Thus, the content and method of education is very important in determining whether it aims to force and indoctrinate students with a particular ideology or whether it aims for personal and social development. Similarly, RE (Religious Education) can also be used both to indoctrinate individuals and to promote individual development”.

As RE can be used to promote fundamentalism, more serious efforts such as Papanikolaou (2012) should be appreciated and cultivated not only to deradicalize but also to counter-radicalize. Besides Robert Jackson’s Interpretive Approach, Chan and Ghosh (2018) also refers Quebec’s Ethics and Religious Culture (ERC) program, that they recommend as a role model to combat extremism. Besides including dialogue, respect for others, and citizenship education as their methods, they also emphasizes critical thinking, that requires analysis and critique of ideas on evaluative criteria. Koehler (2016) quoting Lilienfeld et al (2009) referring to specific psychological techniques to deradicalize such as “perspective taking”, “consider the opposite”, “delayed decision-making”, “critical thinking”, and “open-mindedness”. Streib (2010) advocates eloquently that “RE should be a process dealing with perplexity and astonishment, rather than providing a flood of answers to which the students do not know the question”.

Wallace (2016) explains how for the early-Renaissance Christian humanist, man as an image of God means to be blessed by three crucial traits: compassion, critical intelligence, and creativity. Those three interact in a dynamic process of mutual constraint and interplay. This dynamic mutuality is grounded in Christian understanding of the divine for a Christian humanist, and understood theologically, though one can also take a secular route to this understanding. This understanding, “made it possible to begin to locate cultural authority within human critical thinking, not simply within institution like monarchy or papacy” (Wallace, 2016, p. 23). In this line of reasoning, we can argue that Christian fundamentalism in its emphasis on indoctrinating absolutism is corrupting the image of God in a human being.

We can see that true religion educates, while absolutist ideology indoctrinates. Dr. Norman Doidge writes the foreword in Peterson (2018), “Ideologies are substitutes for true knowledge, and ideologues are always dangerous when they come to power, because a simple-minded I-know-it-all approach is no match for the complexity of existence”. Peterson (2018) says it best:

“Truth will not come in the guise of opinions shared by others, as the truth is neither a collection of slogans nor an ideology. It will instead be personal. Your truth is something only you can tell, based as it is on the unique circumstances of your life”.

Koehler (2016) gives a simple yet sharp conceptualization of radicalization as “de-pluralization” whereas the opposite deradicalization as re-pluralization. He views it as impossible to discuss deradicalization without exploring the role of ideology. The core elements of ideology are: problem definition, solution and future vision. We can readily see John Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy in its ideological elements with problem definition as: liberal democracy is not compatible and mutually exclusive with Christianity. The solution as: rejection of liberal democracy, and the future vision of a Christian democracy where a Christian values are enforced upon society.

Papanikolaou (2012) argues that the logic of theosis has implication about the structure of creation itself. Creation has the capacity to presencing the divine: “This capacity to embody the divine is what contemporary Orthodox theologians refer to as the sacramentality of creation”. The word “sacrament” is derived from the Greek New Testament word “mysterion”. I suggest that by viewing this mystical union as a mystery places a limit to our epistemology of the absolute divine, and thus logically makes absolute knowledge an automatic impossibility. As Paul says it “For we know in part.” (I Cor 13:9). The method of argument in Papanikolaou (2012) is seen as apophasis (Dunn, 2013), and as its title suggests the idea of mysticism, apophatic mysticism is “the way of unknowing” or “nothingness”- belongs to the essence of the spiritual path (Kourie, 2008)”. More generally, mysticism is describes as “passionate return to the source”, “realization that everything in interconnected”, “awareness of God’s presence”, “consciousness of union with the Divine” and “Ultimate Reality” (Kourie, 2008).

Papanikolaou refers to Schillebeeckx’s theology to display an example of politics of non-dualism and expound on his notions of mysticism (Papanikolaou, 2017). Though a Roman Catholic theologian, Papanikolaou assesses Schillebeeckx’s work is non-dualistic and a Chalcedonian at heart. Schillebeeckx rejects the notion of the political as an autonomous sphere, and for him:

“… the mystical and political are in a dialectical relationship, meaning, as I understand it, that they designate distinct realities but which mutually implicate and impact each other. The mystical is not something private that one engages in separation from the political and the prophetic; indeed, the mystical is realized in the midst of the political and prophetic, especially when the mystical is understood in terms of love of God and love of neighbor. In Schillebeeckx’s own words, ‘In such mysticism, love for all men and women and an all-embracing love for fellow creatures as an expression of love of God can come fully into its own. Within this mysticism there is plenty of room for the struggle for justice and love, and for making the creation whole, for all that lives in this finite world’ ”.

Papanikolaou (2017) considers such a view as an application of Chalcedonian-like logic that sees Christian existence as an attempt to realize the love of God, and that the mystical is indeed the political. Though commending Schillebeeckx’s political theology, Papanikolaou also corrects his view that the mystical and political as in a dialectical relationship, and sees it more as iconilectic instead.

5. Conclusion

According to Clarke (2017) there are three theological themes in any fundamentalism: 1) world-vision, a conviction that God’s will in revealed in Scripture as literally interpreted, 2) world-ways, which is mandated individual and collective behaviour, and 3) global-order, which is the urgency to dominate the world with one’s religion. As Clarke is a Christian theologian and pastor, he argues to counter fundamentalism within it, one has to find its center-ground-seeking tenet. We can argue that behind these theological themes lies a set of fundamental mindsets that behooves deradicalization, and the work of Papanikolaou (2012) can be seen as an effort to find that center ground.

The prospect of theosis to deradicalize fundamentalism in Christianity is not as simple as it seems. As we have shown in Papanikolaou (2012), theosis can also be used as a theological ground to reject liberal democracy notions of equality and liberty as seen in John Milbank’s discourse with its rejection of nature-grace distinction and its ensuing particular understanding of church (rejection of the autonomous status of the secular apart from the eucharistic church). Milbank also shows a combination of theosis with his version of eschatology, all-or-nothing apocalypticism. Graham Ward makes a step forward in allowing a political order that is distinct from the church, grounded on a distinct eschatology which he coined “eschatological remainder”. However, Ward is seen by Papanikolaou as “slide back toward Milbank” when he insists on the transcendent as a foundation of democratic aspirations.

Papanikolaous (2011) takes another step forward from Ward in arguing for politics grounded in “common good” instead of the transcendental theocratic language, and whether such common good is transcendent or immanentist, “depends on the perspective from which one assesses the common good”. As for Papanikolaou (2012), this common good “by definition is a form of transcendence, even if affirmed on the ground of immanentist convictions, such as secular humanism”.

What makes Papanikolaou (2012) arrives at a theosis-based political theology that accepts liberal democracy? I would argue that it is hermeneutics of charity as opposed to hermeneutics of suspicion that Papanikolaou accuses Hauerwas guilty of. In this light we can also see that Ward’s eschatological remainder as a work of hermeneutics of charity, as it is commended by Papanikolaou as charitable. I would argue that theosis combined with hermeneutics of love has a prospect of deradicalizing Christian fundamentalist mindsets, as the latter being elaborated by Strozier et al. (2011).

Papanikolaou (2012) can be seen as hermeneutics of charity in action, but more work needs to be done on expounding such hermeneutics deeper, as method of interpretation is instrumental to make someone a fundamentalist or true Christian. As debatable the notion of true Christian is, at least in Papanikolaou’s version it is a Christian who is striving for a common good based on realization of belief in divine-human communion, who struggle in his ascetical practices to love. In chapter four of “Divine-Human Communion and the Common Good”, there’s a heading titled “The Turn to Practices” discussing the work of Ward, Gregory and Mathewes on relation between Christian practices and political theology in light of theosis. This move to “practices” is applauded by Papanikolaou, though he argues that “insufficient attention is given to the fact that Christians are engaged in an ascetical struggle to learn to love” (Papanikolaou, 2012). I would argue that the right kind of hermeneutics is the kind that bear the fruits of love, as Jesus says “ … by their fruits ye shall know them” (Mat 7:20). Though the aforementioned chapter heading seemingly indicative, it is inspiring to imagine it as imperative. Whenever we are in doubt about certain hermeneutics, in the same breath with Mat 7:20, let us “Turn to Practices”, and of course these practices are the practices of love.

If we are to believe that prevention is better than cure, than counter-radicalization is more important than deradicalization (Braddock, 2020). I argue that somehow there is a theological blind spot in Christianity that should be filled with theosis, as it can be used not just to deradicalize but also to counter-radicalize. Chow (2013) explains how the doctrine of theosis has the best chance for producing an original Chinese theology since its ancient tradition insisted upon synergism, that humans must have a role in salvation history. Theosis as an Orthodox doctrine that emphasizes synergy rather than monergy, is related to the “Chinese religious ethos that searches for a unity between Heaven and humanity (Tian ren heyi)”. Theosis as a doctrine of participation in divine nature, can be seen as a participation of bringing heaven on earth. Theosis concerns with the heaven that is here and now, not just the heaven of the afterlife. An act of religious terrorism such as suicide bomber whom believes s/he will get to afterlife heaven after the act, yet bringing “hell on earth” to his/her neighbors is anathema to theosis. As the doctrine is respected in almost every traditions in Christianity, even beyond Orthodoxy, perhaps it is useful for every traditions to find its own version of theosis.

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Notes

1. They quote Lam et al. (2015). This progression also implicit in Pratt’s typology in its “dynamics of the sequential development” (Pratt, 2010, p. 442). This progression also visible in numerous theories of radicalization such as NYPD model, Marc Sageman’s four-step process, Taarnby’s eight-stage recruitment model, and more others (Koehler, 2016, pp. 70–73).

2. See https://www.trinityorthodox.ca/event/resurrection-logos-panel-discussion-divine-individual-and-finding-our-bearings-postmodern.