An evolutionary theory of human knowledge progress: The new combinations of anthropology, archaeology and economics

Abstract

How have human knowledge, technology and living standards made progress? In this paper, we focus on the Palaeolithic Age when human knowledge started to progress greatly, and we examine whether the theory of knowledge progress in the modern economy can be applied to the Palaeolithic Age. If this theory can be applied to the earlier era, it means that there is a high possibility that we can explain the advances in human knowledge over about 3.3 million years (or more) by the theory.

Keywords:

• knowledge progress
• technological paradigm
• Palaeolithic Age
• innovations

JEL classification:

• B52
• O10
• O30

1. Introduction: reviews of previous studies and contributions of this paper

How have human knowledge, technology and living standards made progress? Many economists focus on the era after the Industrial Revolution around 1800 A.D. Although growth rates certainly increased after this, what was the situation in the era before it? For example, referring to “the great divergence” and “the proto-industrialisation”, there are many discussions about the economic level before the Industrial Revolution (e.g. Allen, 2009; Mendels, 1972; Pomeranz, 2000). However, they often focus on the era immediately before it. Nevertheless, what were the levels of knowledge, technology and living standards in the eras of the Roman Empire or the Palaeolithic Age?¹

The study of G. Clark (2007) is especially interesting among the studies discussing long-term economic growth.² He suggests that “the average person in the world of 1800 was no better off than the average person of 100,000 BC. Indeed in 1800 the bulk of the world’s population was poorer than their remote ancestors” (p. 1) and “in the long run births had to equal deaths. Since this same logic governs all animal species, until 1800 in this ‘natural’ economy the economic laws for humans were the same as for all animal species” (p. 19).

However, as he documents, the world population “grew from perhaps 0.1 million in 130,000 BC to 770 million by 1800” (p. 20). That is, although the growth rate of the population itself was low, the population expanded 7700 times in the period.³ He emphasises the Malthusian equilibrium—as technology advances and living standards increase, the population enlarges; however, the growth of the population continues until the living standard per capita falls to the minimum subsistence level.⁴ Nonetheless, more importantly, the level of knowledge and technology itself had improved significantly (even though per capita living standards had not changed, as he says).⁵ Of course, from the modern point of view, the level of knowledge and technology in 1800 AD was low, but compared to around 130,000 BC it was very advanced.⁶

How have archaeologists, anthropologists and economists tried to capture these advances in knowledge and technology? Table 1 summarizes the viewpoints and (some of) the representative theorists discussed in this section. Details will be discussed further in the next section, but this section considers perspectives of scientific understanding, long-term innovation theory, new combinations, imitation, diffusion, demand and social factors related to the advancement of knowledge and technology. Various archaeologists, anthropologists, and economists have discussed each topic, and although they have different academic backgrounds and emphases, they consider very similar perspectives and factors regarding the same phenomenon of human knowledge progress.

Table 1. Perspectives, factors, and (some) representative theorists on human knowledge progress

Perspectives; factors	Archaeologists; Anthropologists	Economists
Knowledge; science; technology	Strauss (1966); Dunbar (1995); Mithen (1996); Schiffer (2005); Mesoudi (2011)	Basalla (1988); Mokyr (2002); Arthur (2009)
Long-term innovation	Schiffer (2005); Mesoudi (2011); Henrich (2015)	Basalla (1988); Mokyr (2002); Arthur (2009); Jin (2016)
New combinations	Ambrose (2001, 2010); Hoffecker (2012); Tattersall (2012); Barham (2013)	Schumpeter (1934); Nelson and Winter (1982); Arthur (2009); Grebel (2013)
Imitation; diffusion	Tomasello (1999); Mesoudi (2011); Wilkins (2020)	Abramovitz (1989); Rogers (2003)
Demand	Straus (1995); Hoffecker (2005); Conard (2008)	Schmookler (1966); Ruttan (2001)
Social factors	Lemonnier (1990);Dunbar (1995, 2014); Shennan (2001); Adam et al. (2009); Seabright (2005); Kuhn (2012)	Smith (1776); Dosi (1982); Basalla (1988); Abramovitz (1989); North (1990)

In this section, we review the previous studies, first on knowledge, science and technology, second on the theory of knowledge progress in archaeology, anthropology and economics, and third on knowledge and competence, and discuss the contributions of this paper. In the second section, we consolidate into a theory of knowledge advances across the Palaeolithic Age and the modern era, based on a theory of Suenaga (2015b), which mainly focuses on ages after the Scientific Revolution during the early modern period. Suenaga (2015c, 2019, 2020, 2021b) examines whether or not the theory of Suenaga (2015b) can be applied to the advances in knowledge after the Scientific Revolution (e.g. heat engines; modern steelmaking technology; semiconductors), but can we apply the theory also to earlier eras such as the Palaeolithic Age? In section 3, we discuss the stone tools and projectile weapons that played significant roles in the advances in knowledge and especially in economic activities (hunting and gathering).

1.1. Knowledge, science and technology

First, in this section 1.1, I would like to discuss the views of economists, archaeologists and anthropologists on knowledge, science and technology. Understanding natural phenomena, and science (including early science), plays a very significant role in the advance of knowledge and technology. Arthur (2009) states that “technology is always based on some phenomenon or truism of nature” (p. 46) and that at “the very start of technological time, we directly picked up and used phenomena: the heat of fire, the sharpness of flaked obsidian, the momentum of stone in motion. All that we have achieved since comes from harnessing these and other phenomena, and combining the pieces that result” (p. 22). Arthur calls “the formal knowledge of phenomena” science (p. 60) and insists that “supporting any novel device or method is a pyramid of causality. … Particularly important in this pyramid of causality is knowledge—both of the scientific and technical type” (p. 124).

However, we need to be careful about the concept of “science”. Generally speaking, when we refer to “science”, “modern science”, which is expressed mathematically and requires examination with observation or experiment, is imagined (e.g. Weinberg, 2015); however, “science” in this paper includes not only “modern science” but also “early science” such as a simple understanding of natural phenomena. For example, imagine the situation in which when someone cracks nuts with a stone, the stone is broken and a sharp part is made. Understanding that the part can be used as a knife is included in early science.⁷

Mokyr (2002) states “useful knowledge … deals with natural phenomena that potentially lend themselves to manipulation, such as artifacts, materials, energy, and living beings” (p.3) and “useful knowledge … describes two types of knowledge” (p.4). And he describes knowledge of “what” about natural phenomena and regularities as “propositional knowledge” (or “Ω-knowledge”), and describes knowledge of “how” as “prescriptive knowledge” (or “λ-knowledge”).⁸ While he argues that we may call prescriptive knowledge techniques, he insists that the distinctions between propositional and prescriptive knowledge differ “in important respects from the standard distinctions between science and technology” (p. 4). Nevertheless, “propositional knowledge takes two forms: one is the observation, classification, measurement, and cataloging of natural phenomena. The other is the establishment of regularities, principles, and ‘natural laws’ that govern these phenomena and allow us to make sense of them” (p. 5). In addition, propositional knowledge includes “practical informal knowledge about nature such as the properties of materials, heat, motion, plants, and animals; an intuitive grasp of basic mechanics (including the six ‘basic machines’ of classical antiquity: the lever, pulley, screw, balance, wedge, and wheel); regularities of ocean currents and the weather; and folk wisdoms in the ‘an-apple-a-day-keeps-the-doctor-away’ tradition” (p. 5). Thus, the definition of propositional knowledge is almost the same as science (including both early and modern science) in this paper.⁹ And when we talk about “knowledge” in this paper, we focus on what Mokyr calls “useful knowledge”.

However, Mokyr (2002) focuses on the era before and after the Industrial Revolution and does not discuss the Palaeolithic Age. Arthur (2009) also focuses on modern technology, and less so on the Palaeolithic Age. Since the technology level of the Palaeolithic Age was very low compared to the modern era and the technological progress rate was extremely low, the technological progress at that time is not often emphasised. Nonetheless, from the point of view of the people who lived at that time, the new technologies such as the invention of the bow and arrow and barbed bone points were revolutionary technological advances that significantly changed lives in those days. Although Arthur (2009) states that “[e]ffects nearer the surface, say that wood rubbed together creates heat and thereby fire, are stumbled upon by accident or casual exploration” (p. 57), the shift in perception that we can manage and use fire that many animals fear would not have been easy and would have taken a great deal of time.

Humans knew that sometimes, when animals were killed and roasted by naturally occurring forest fires, they were found to be delicious, and then the fire’s utility was understood. Fire not only serves as a cooking tool, but also has various other uses such as protection and warming. Our ancestors who noticed such utility became able to manage fire and to make it at will. In these processes, (early) scientific understanding of fire’s utility, management and creation played an important role. In particular, in the process where fire could be generated at will, the act of rubbing pieces of wood together, or cracking stones and stones, which was done for other purposes, might happen to make fire. Then, the scientific recognition might lead to the acquirement of fire technology.¹⁰ It also influenced food and energy consumption, and thus it triggered a leap in physical and cultural evolution.¹¹

If we compare the case where the technology level increases from 1 to 2 with the case where it increases from 1000 to 2000, attention is often focused on the latter because that indicates a high level of technology and increase. However, the rate of increase is just the same. Disregarding past technological progress by focusing on the level of technology and increase at that time may overlook the essential mechanism of technological progress.¹²

Strauss (1966), having warned that we tend to look down on the past from the modern viewpoint, states the following: “Each of these techniques assumes centuries of active and methodical observation, of bold hypotheses tested by means of endlessly repeated experiments” (p. 14), and, for that purpose, “a genuinely scientific attitude” (p. 14) is necessary. He refers to this science as “science of the concrete” or “prior” science, and proposes that it was as academic as “modern science” and “it was no less scientific and its results no less genuine” (p. 16).

Moreover, the evolutionary psychologist Dunbar (1995) claims that science “is a method for finding out about the world” (p. 16) and that it “cover[s] the full range of empirical science from pure cookbook science to genuine attempts at explanation” (p. 43). Furthermore, Schiffer and Skibo (1987) assert that “every technology rests upon a suite of scientific principles” (p. 597) and that “changes in technology require growth in techno-science” (p. 595). Mesoudi et al. (2013) also state that “[t]echnological and scientific knowledge is accumulated over successive generations” (p. 194) and that “science and technology interrelate” (p. 194). Thus, the arguments of economists and palaeoanthropologists on science and technology are very similar, and it would be possible to combine the two arguments into a theory. New combinations of scientific knowledge, new combinations of technological knowledge, and new combinations of scientific and technological knowledge create advances in knowledge.

The discussion concerning the relationship between science and technology relates to the one of archaeologists for the relationship between perception and action (e.g., Stout, 2002). Although the latter concerns the relationship between perception and action in regard to tool-making, the focus is often on how to manufacture existing tools.¹³ On the other hand, in this paper, it is argued that new perception (scientific knowledge) and new action (technological knowledge) are combined in the emergence of new artifacts. Therefore, it may be possible to think that the discussion of perception-action is static and the one in this paper is dynamic.¹⁴ In this way, the discussions between economists and prehistoric anthropologists regarding scientific and technological progress have much in common, and it would be possible to combine both discussions as one theory.

1.2. The theories of knowledge progress: archaeology, anthropology and economics

How can we explain the advances in knowledge and technology in the Palaeolithic Age? Although the factors and mechanisms of advances in knowledge and technology might change, the same humans bring about these advances, so some common mechanisms may exist.

First, regarding the long-term innovation theory, some archaeologists and anthropologists have also tried to construct an innovation theory for the Palaeolithic Age.¹⁵ For example, Schiffer (2005) presents the “cascade” model for handling innovation processes relating to the “complex technological system” (CTS) and states “the hard work of invention takes place in a series of invention ‘cascades’” (p.485). In addition, he insists that “emergent performance problems—recognized by people as shortcomings in that technology’s constituent interactions—stimulate sequential spurts of invention” (p. 486).¹⁶ Furthermore, Mesoudi et al. (2013) insist that “innovation introduces new cultural variation into the population through copying error, novel invention, refinement, recombination, and exaptation” (p. 198). Moreover, presenting an innovation theory from the Palaeolithic Age to modern era, Henrich (2015) states that “the extent and sophistication of our technical repertoire—and of our ecological dominance—depends on the size and interconnectedness of our collective brains” (p. 318) and mentions that “in more complex societies, technological accumulations will depend heavily on the size and interconnectedness of the subpopulation at the knowledge frontier” (p. 325).

However, as Schiffer (2005) confesses honestly, “the cascade model does not explain how or why the development of a CTS is initiated” (p. 486). Moreover, Mesoudi et al. (2013) do not clarify why the variation is produced. Furthermore, Fitzhugh (2001) states the following: “A central issue in archaeology is the study of technological change, and yet we have relatively little theory to explain the origin of technological novelty” (p. 125).¹⁷ Moreover, Laurel et al. (2015) claim that “while there has been some success in describing how cultural traits spread in human and nonhuman populations, little theory has addressed the origins of these traits” (p.736).¹⁸ Kolodny et al. (Oren et al., 2015) insist the following: “Most models of cultural evolution focus on the dynamics of the transmission of cultural traits, often omitting the details of the creative processes underlying the origin of these traits. The source of cultural traits is represented as a random process occurring at a constant rate, analogous to a genetic mutation rate” (p. E6762). Thus, as many archaeologists and anthropologists have acknowledged, the theory of innovation in the Palaeolithic Age is far from established. As Hovers (2012) insists, “researchers of the Palaeolithic have reasonably abandoned attempts to pin down elusive cognitive inventions, i.e., material culture ‘firsts’ that express creative potential, in the records they study” (p.51).

On the other hand, how has economics considered such long-term innovation? Although the traditional theories of economic growth such as the Solow model regard technological progress as the most significant source of economic growth, technological progress is treated as an exogenous factor. In the theories of economic growth endogenising technological progress (e.g. Romer, 1990), although monopolies bring about new technology through R&D, the theories cannot be applied to the earlier eras such as the Palaeolithic Age. In addition, while most economists consider technological progress as the source of economic growth, technological progress before the Industrial Revolution is ignored in the theory of economic growth because there was little (or very slow) technological advancement. On the other hand, Galor (2011) also presented a macroscopic “unified growth theory” that population growth brings technological advances at an early stage, but the Paleolithic period and the initial population growth have not been analyzed. (We will revisit the model that connects this population with technological advances later). In addition, Lipsey et al. (2005) discuss various technological advances based on the concept of GPTs (General Purpose Technologies).¹⁹ Based on their discussion, most of the technology examined in this paper will be GPTs. In this paper, we clarify an essential aspect of this technology. Moreover, Dow and Reed (2011) built a model in which climate change affects the population, and changes in population density produce technological progress. While their model emphasizes the exogenous factor of climate change, we focus not only on exogenous factors but also on the actors who bring about the progress of knowledge and technology, and we perform a more detailed analysis on the progress of knowledge and technology. Basalla (1988) also refers to “our inability to account fully for the emergence of novel artifacts” (p. 210). Nevertheless, in innovation theory, how it is created is more important than how it is diffused and improved. Furthermore, evolution of human knowledge is intentionally performed by humans, unlike genetic evolution. Arthur (2009) insists the following: “What we should really be looking for is not how Darwin’s mechanism should work to produce radical novelty in technology, but how ‘heredity’ might work in technology” (p.18). However, what we should really be looking for is not “how ‘heredity’ might work in technology”, but how “humans” could produce “radical novelty in technology”.²⁰

When discussing these long-term innovations, the concept of a “new combination” is often the focus. The importance of new combinations is often referred to by archaeologists and anthropologists (e.g. Ambrose, 2001, 2010; Barham, 2013; Hoffecker, 2012; Tattersall, 2012). They clearly distinguish between single component tools and multicomponent composite tools, and emphasise the significance of new combinations. For example, Ambrose (2010) insists that the “Lower Paleolithic and Early Stone Age (Oldowan and Acheulean) are reductive technologies that produce single component handheld stone tools. Conversely, the MP [Middle Palaeolithic] and the MSA [Middle Stone Age] are characterized by additive multicomponent composite-tool technologies” (p. S138).²¹ Furthermore, Barham (2013) calls the combinations of multiple components since five hundred thousand years ago “the hafting revolution” or “the first industrial revolution”.22

The importance of new combinations is also referred to by economists (e.g. Grebel, 2013; Suenaga, 2018). Schumpeter (1934) regards “new combinations” such as “production of new types of goods” and “introduction of new methods of production” as significant factors in economic development. Arthur (2009) discusses Schumpeter’s theory of new combinations in detail and suggests general propositions or principles that “all technologies are combinations of elements” (p. 203). In addition, he insists that “these elements themselves are technologies” (p. 203) and calls this mechanism “combinatorial evolution” (p. 22). Furthermore, Nelson and Winter 1982 state the following about new combinations: “innovation in the economic system—and indeed the creation of any sort of novelty in art, science, or practical life—consists to a substantial extent of a recombination of conceptual and physical materials that were previously in existence.” (p.130).

Demand also plays a very significant role in these innovation processes. The importance of demand has been actively discussed among archaeologists and anthropologists. In particular, changes in the natural environment associated with significant climate change prompted a variety of innovations. Ziegler et al. (2013) and Thomas et al. (2011) also argue that innovation during the Middle Stone Age in South Africa was closely related to rapid climate change. However, Mackay and Marwick (2011) consider technology selection from a cost-benefit perspective, and say that in some cases costly technologies will be pursued in the face of cold weather, while in other cases they will not. Jacobs et al. (2008) state that environmental factors alone cannot explain these innovative behavioral explosions. In addition, Hoffecker (2005) states “innovations, including some that would seem to have been essential at least during periods of cooler climate, such as artificial shelters and tailored clothing, apparently were developed several millennia after modern humans had arrived in Europe and Siberia” (p.190). According to J. Clark (2011), models for analyzing the process of producing “modern” behaviors include the assumption that “modern” human cognitive abilities were in place long before the appearance of “modern” behaviors, but that these abilities were only utilized under certain circumstances, such as environmental degradation or social stress.

The relative importance for innovation of supply factors, such as cognitive ability, and demand factors, such as the natural and social environments, has been widely discussed in economics in the form of the science push theory and the demand pull theory. For example, Dosi et al. (1988) states that environment-related factors (such as demand and relative prices) influence to shape: (a) the rate of technological progress; (b) the exact trajectory of progress within the combination given by a given “paradigm”; (c) selection criteria among new potential technological paradigms; On the other hand, however, he argues that each set of knowledge, expertise and specific physical and chemical principles (i.e., each paradigm) determines both an opportunity for technological progress and a boundary within which “induced effects” are exercised by the environment (p.228). This paper also constructs a theory using a paradigm similar to Dosi’s, while emphasizing the importance of demand. The dichotomy will be discussed again in section 1-3.²³

Many researchers also focus on the impact of society and groups on innovation. For example, according to anthropologist Dunbar (2014), there is “a general consensus that the prime mover in primate brain evolution (and perhaps even that of all mammals and birds) is the evolution of more complex forms of sociality” (p. 59).²⁴ Many scholars emphasise the impact of population growth on technological progress in these changing social environments. For example, Adam et al. (2009) and Kuhn (2012) argue that population growth and interconnectedness contributed to the advancement and diffusion of technological knowledge.²⁵ In addition, some researchers emphasise the importance of social learning (e.g. van Schaik et al. (2011); Dean et al. (2012)) and extended cognition (e.g. A. Clark, 2011; Malafouris, 2013). However, by emphasizing the importance of social factors, these studies often focus on learning and imitation rather than the emergence of new knowledge.²⁶ Moreover, in the research on the prehistoric era, the focus may not be on individuals but on society, because it is virtually impossible to identify people who create new knowledge. However, it goes without saying that social factors such as values and institutions (including informal ones) have a significant impact on the creation and diffusion of knowledge. As archaeologists Lombard and Parsons (2011) point out, “the adoption of inventions relate to a range of social, technical and psychological circumstances, whilst the spread of knowledge that support the use of such technologies depends on social, physical and organisational infrastructure” (p.1437).²⁷

In the field of economics, the relationship between social expansion and innovation has also been discussed for many years. Smith (1776), known as the father of economics, argued that the expansion of society promotes the division of labor, which increases the efficiency of each individual and creates new innovations. Suenaga (2015a) discusses the relationship between the increasing division of labor and innovation as society expands, and the cumulative development of “dividing” (division of labour) and “combining” (innovation). These arguments also apply to the Palaeolithic Age, although the scale of society is different.²⁸ As the population and society expanded, the division of labour increased the productivity of each individual and the potential for various new combinations. This progress was slow, but as the level of technology increased, the importance of factors such as organization, the division of labour, and society in regard to innovation also increased. Moreover, presenting an innovation theory from the Palaeolithic Age to modern era, Henrich (2015) insists the following: “It’s not the smartness of individuals or the formal incentives. … Innovation does not take a genius or a village” (p. 325). However, in reality, the higher the level of knowledge and the more paradigm-disruptive innovations, the more important the incentives and organizations.²⁹ Dosi (1982) also discusses the importance of social factors, such as social values and relationships with surrounding society, as factors in the selection of technological paradigms, which are critical concepts in this paper (see also Abramovitz (1989) and North (1990) in this regard).³⁰

However, society itself cannot create a knowledge progress (including innovation), and knowledge advancement is created by individual(s). The true theory of innovation has to be based on individual(s). As mentioned above, the traditional economic theory regards technological progress as an exogenous factor, and the endogenous theory of economic growth considers that firms receiving monopoly profits bring about innovation through R&D. In these theories, knowledge progress can be predictable and attained in equilibrium. Moreover, in some archaeological and anthropological models, innovations were represented by mutations or stochastic variables, or innovations occurred naturally with population growth (see e.g. Oren et al., 2015). However, real advances in knowledge cannot be expressed in “beautiful” mathematical models, and people facing various difficulties have produced these advancements through trial and error. A theory of knowledge progress has to be developed primarily based on micro viewpoints. If knowledge advances in historical eras (e.g. heat engines; modern steelmaking technology; semiconductors) are examined, scientists and technologists who instigated this progress can be identified to a certain extent (e.g. see Suenaga, 2015c, 2019, 2020, 2021b; Yamaguchi, 2006). Although it is virtually impossible to identify scientists and technologists in the prehistoric era and the analysis can only rely on speculation, an (or some) “anonymous” creator of knowledge achieved knowledge progress. In this paper, an evolutionary theory that can be applied in the long term is discussed based on individuals. Of course, various factors such as needs, values, rules and society affected the knowledge progress. This point will be discussed again in section 2.

However, what is important here is whether to endogenise scientific progress when discussing knowledge progress and economic development. Economists, in particular, often consider these scientific advances exogenously (e.g., Arthur, 2009; Dosi, 1982; Schumpeter, 1934). Nevertheless, (in particular, when considering long-term development) it is indispensable to endogenise not only technological progress but also scientific advancement. The model in this paper endogenises science (including early forms).³¹

1.3. The cognitive and cultural niche: capability and knowledge

In this section, we discuss the cognitive and cultural niche for human evolution in order to consider the relationship between knowledge and capabilities in the Palaeolithic Age.³² For economists have often discussed economic development without considering changes of human genetics, it is also necessary to take into account human genetic changes when discussing long-term processes, including the Palaeolithic Age.

The “niche” is sometimes defined as “the role an organism occupies in an ecosystem” (Pinker, 2010, 8993). According to the cognitive niche, an increase of cognitive capability (by mutation) made it possible for the genus Homo to enter into a specific niche and to greatly evolve (Barrett et al., 2007; Pinker, 1994, 1997, 2010; Tomasello, 1999; Tooby & DeVore, 1987).³³ On the other hand, advocates of the cultural niche assert that the change of natural environment rather than mutation caused cultural evolution (Henrich, 2015; Richerson et al., 2010; Richerson, 2011; Robert et al., 2011).³⁴

Naturally, there is an interaction between this genetic change and cultural accumulation, resulting in “gene-culture coevolution” (Laland & Brown, 2002). Although both cognitive and cultural niche theories recognise the co-evolution of gene and culture, there is a difference as to which factor is more important. Morgan (2016) insists that the “cognitive niche is a co-evolutionary theory, arguing that the genetic change underlying increases in certain mental capacities generated selection for increases in others … However, advocates of the cognitive niche downplay the importance of gene-culture interactions” (p.2). In addition, “according to the cultural niche, cultural and genetic evolution are engaged in a single co-evolutionary process, with the products of cultural evolution altering or generating selection on genes” (Morgan, 2016, p. 2).³⁵

The controversy as to which of the two factors is more important has long been taking place in economics as well (e.g. science or technology (Suenaga, 2015b); science-push or demand-pull (Dosi et al., 1988). Nevertheless, this paper does not view them as being in binary opposition, but proposes that they form a linked evolutionary system while affecting each other (see also Suenaga (2015b) for the linked evolutionary system). In addition, it may be possible to think that, at the initial stage of each development, cognition rather than culture, mutation rather than knowledge, science rather than technology and science-push rather than demand-pull are relatively important, and after the initial phase, their importance becomes relatively low.³⁶

Basically, we need to discuss human intellectual capability separately from the knowledge generated by the capability. In addition, cognitive niche theory corresponds to capability, cultural niche theory corresponds to knowledge, and it is important to clearly grasp the difference between the two dimensions.³⁷ Large-scale or important genetic evolution might promote considerable advances in scientific and technological knowledge through the improvement of scientific and technological capability (including physical change). On the other hand, when each developmental stage was in a stable phase, a change in the natural environment that happened by chance might trigger a leap of cultural and genetic co-evolution to a higher developmental stage.³⁸ Furthermore, this relatively discontinuous evolution might bring about new developmental stages such as Acheulean and Mousterian culture, however it might accompany time-lag.³⁹

Rather than contributing to the controversy about whether the cognitive niche or the cultural niche is adequate for the explanation of human evolution, this paper discusses a theory that can comprehensively explain the history of human evolution from the Palaeolithic Age to the modern era while referring to both views and sublating them. As Morgan (2016, p. 3) points out, “the role of gene-culture co-evolution in the wholesale evolution of human intelligence is far from established”,⁴⁰ but the capabilities and knowledge have influenced each other to form a linked evolution system (co-evolution). Therefore, in the following, the advance in knowledge also includes the improvement of the capability associated with the genetic evolution.⁴¹

2. A theory of knowledge progress from the Palaeolithic Age to the modern era

As mentioned above, although a variety of theories about knowledge progress have been considered, at the core of knowledge progress are new combinations of knowledge such as scientific and technological knowledge. Therefore, in this paper, we will consolidate the various arguments, which are discussed in the previous section, into a theory of knowledge progress (or technological progress) from the Palaeolithic Age to the modern era.’ The theory in this paper is based on scientific and technological knowledge. Although it is easy to explain complex history in a complicated way, it is more important to describe the essence via a simple theory. Unlike many historians, I focus on the simplicity of the theory. The effectiveness of the theory depends on how much it can explain the essential part of a complex history.

Science aims to provide an elucidation of natural phenomena, while the purpose of technology is to create artifacts. In this paper, scientific knowledge is useful knowledge about natural phenomena, and technological knowledge is useful knowledge about creating artefacts.⁴² In addition, science in this paper includes not only modern science but also early science. Combinations of technological knowledge and combinations of scientific and technological knowledge will bring about advances in knowledge and technology.

With regard to Dosi’s (1982) definitions, this paper defines “technological paradigms” as “a ‘model’ and a ‘pattern’ of a solution to selected technological problems, based on selected scientific knowledge”, and defines “technological trajectories” as “the progress process of technological knowledge, based on a technological paradigm”. Whether these advances are improvements along a technological trajectory or a paradigm shift causing new technological trajectories to emerge depends on whether or not the “selected scientific knowledge” as the basis of the technological trajectory is new (regardless of whether scientific knowledge precedes technological knowledge or vice versa). Improvement along a technological trajectory can be called “paradigm-sustaining technological progress”, and a shift in paradigm, with new technological trajectories emerging, can be called “paradigm-disruptive technological progress”.⁴³

In addition, in his diagram, advance in scientific knowledge is located in “soil”, because it is not economically valued.⁴⁴ Furthermore, although Suenaga (2015c, 2015b) also discusses the soil layers in detail, phenomena hidden in deeper layers may have greater potential for economic development.⁴⁵

How is the advance in knowledge produced? Although Arthur (2009) rhetorically asserts that technology “builds itself organically from itself” (p. 24), the reality is, of course, not so, and humans produce knowledge. People specialising in science or those who are excellent at scientific thinking seek to contribute to advances in scientific knowledge in order to understand natural phenomena or to gain a reputation. In addition, people who do technological work are willing to contribute to the advance in technology for the purpose of creating better technological devices, obtaining financial benefits, or saving labour.⁴⁶ And the advancement of knowledge enabled humans to hunt prey more efficiently and acquire previously difficult prey.

While almost all progress in knowledge involves new combinations of existing knowledge (new combinations of scientific knowledge, new combinations of technological knowledge, or new combinations of scientific and technological knowledge), the capability and means of communication connecting knowledge and the “ba” (place) that create the new combinations of knowledge also play a significant role. In addition, the new combinations of knowledge may be carried out in one’s brain or among multiple humans. Moreover, even when thinking alone, if various forms of knowledge are clearly conceptualised as words, it is easier to create new combinations with other knowledge. Furthermore, combinations among multiple people would be promoted, if knowledge was transmitted as words or phrases (even in primitive expressions). Although there is much debate as to when a human-specific language became possible,⁴⁷ the conceptualisation and the development of language skills have enormously influenced advances in knowledge. In addition, as the size of the group as a “ba” (place) becomes larger, or as communication with other distant groups becomes possible, the possibility of new combinations also increases.⁴⁸ In particular, interaction with different ideas or groups and expansion of the possibilities for division of labour can greatly influence the emergence of new knowledge.⁴⁹ Moreover, if knowledge is written on external devices outside the brain in the form of symbols, communication beyond time and distance can also be enabled.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the speed and efficiency of the communication are improved by the progress of information storage technologies such as symbols, letters, paper, printing and information storage devices, while the development of communication technologies such as vocalisation ability, language systems, translation systems and communication methods will further promote new combinations of knowledge.

In addition, regarding the combinations of scientific and technological knowledge (or communication between scientists and technologists), the values of both (e.g. factors such as the eagerness to acquire new knowledge and the degree of obedience and submission to the educator of knowledge) also have a significant impact. If the relationship between science and technology is weak, such as when scientists look down on the status of technologists or when there is little tendency to try to understand the natural environment scientifically, the combinations of scientific and technological knowledge might be restrained.⁵¹ On the other hand, as in the “Industrial Enlightenment”, the greater the intention to apply science to technology, the easier it is to create combinations of scientific and technological knowledge.⁵²

Furthermore, as a matter of course, the role of necessity or demand cannot be understated when considering the advances in knowledge. For example, changes in the natural environment might increase the need for new knowledge, and the possibility for contacting or trading with other new groups might create a demand for new knowledge. Nevertheless, such demand does not necessarily produce new knowledge. Freeman and Perez (1988) point to the modern economy as saying that “It is only when productivity along the old trajectories shows persistent limits to growth and future profits are seriously threatened that the high risks and costs of trying the new technologies appear as clearly justified” (p.49), which is true to some extent in the Stone Age. Changing existing behaviours is not easy, and new challenges are unlikely to succeed. However, rather than focusing on whether demand or supply is more important, it may be more appropriate to think that these factors evolve while affecting each other.

As mentioned above, during the progress of human knowledge (and capability), advances in scientific and technological knowledge and their new combinations play significant roles. Moreover, the emergence of a technological paradigm based on new scientific knowledge plays a huge role in raising the level of human technology and living standards.⁵³ Furthermore, in these processes, the evolution of communication technology and changes in values and demand also have significant impacts. In the next section, based on the above theoretical framework, we consider knowledge progress in the Palaeolithic Age.

3. Knowledge progress in the Palaeolithic Age

Although animals that use stones as tools exist, humans intentionally processed stones about 3.3 million years ago and used them as tools.⁵⁴ The stone tools found at the Lomekwi site in Kenya (Harmand et al., 2015; Lewis & Harmand, 2016) may not be culturally continuous with later Ordovician stone tools (Toth & Schick, 2018), but they are beyond the level that modern nonhuman primates can produce (Braun et al., 2019; Marlize et al., 2019). After about 2.6 million years ago, the so-called Oldowan stone tools began to be produced. The action of breaking a stone to create sharp or pointed parts needed, even though very crude, early scientific knowledge (and cognitive capability) concerning the stone. Mithen (1996) calls it “the fracture dynamics of stone” and the combination of the scientific and technological knowledge became a major point of distinction between humans and other animals. These technologies were also influenced by climate change and increased social behaviour.⁵⁵ However, such new combinations often arise “discontinuously” in the face of the limitations of existing paradigms, rather than being easily created.⁵⁶

While scientific knowledge concerning stones advanced with knowledge concerning the kind of stone and how to choose a hit point, the forms of stone tools were more sophisticated from around 1.76 million years ago (the so-called Acheulean stone tools).⁵⁷ Even though the progress required a higher degree of planning abilities and spatial cognition (e.g. Stout et al., 2015; Torre, 2016; Wynn & Coolidge, 2016),⁵⁸ it was a technological trajectory that evolved under a technological paradigm based on scientific knowledge about the fracture dynamics of stone. Ambrose (2001) views these technological advances as single techno-units made by “reduction”, and Wynn and Gowlett (2018) see these advances as a set of ergonomic design principles linked to the production of sturdy, hand-held cutting tools. Humans could process the stone intentionally after acquiring scientific knowledge about stone or “the fracture dynamics of stone”, and gradually raised their level of technological knowledge. In a sense, this development could also be called the emergence of a new technological paradigm that made use of new scientific knowledge.

Although the processing technology of stones progressed to a more sophisticated one, the combinations of knowledge regarding stone and wood led to the creation of composite tools such as the wooden spear with a stone point approximately 500,000 years ago.⁵⁹ Unlike stone, wood is less likely to remain as an artefact, so there is little archaeological evidence of the wooden parts of such tools. “A fundamental irony of Paleolithic (or ‘Old Stone’ Age) archaeology is that it concerns a period of human history when most artifacts probably were made from wood” (Hoffecker, 2018, 1959). Among them, the wooden spears from Schöningen in Germany (Schoch et al., 2015; Thieme, 1997) are among the most valuable discoveries when considering the progress of human knowledge and are said to have been made about 400,000 ~ 300,000 years ago and to have been used with stone points. Although the technological knowledge concerning wooden spears progressed with the scientific knowledge concerning matters such as the characteristics of wood, combining this with the scientific and technological knowledge about stone created a new technological paradigm of the spear with a stone point. And with the advent of these new technological paradigms, Acheulean stone tools such as the hand axe were no longer made.⁶⁰

The scientific and technological knowledge concerning the spear with a stone point progressed not only due to the knowledge of stone and wood, but also with knowledge about string (such as twine and sinew) and glue to tightly connect the stone point to the wood. For example, from 200,000 years ago onward, European Neandertals used fire to synthesise pitch from bark (Roebroeks & Villa, 2011; Villa et al., 2014). Wadley et al. (2009) point out that compound adhesive was produced in South Africa at least 70,000 years ago. A mixture of plant gum, beeswax and powdered ochre was used and the adhesive had to be carefully dried by fire. In order to create compound glue, a product—ochre powder—that has no glue-like attributes, was used. According to Wadley (2010b), the type of thought process required to make successful adhesives is not much different from that required for technologies such as alloying metals and firing ceramics. After that, the spear with a stone evolved into more efficient and effective weapon using microlith blades and obsidian.

Furthermore, the human demand to further enhance the power of the spear with a stone point and the change in the natural environment that led to the demand created a new innovation of the spear-thrower (or “atlatl”) around 100,000 years ago.⁶¹ A trigger of this innovation might have been that the part of the stone tool with the handle became detached and flew away vigorously when swung down. Although people at that time might not have understood the scientific principles regarding the spear-thrower, the technology was invented empirically. It was a new technological paradigm that exploited (implicit) scientific knowledge with regard to the principle of leverage, even though there was no clear scientific understanding of such principle.

Although the advances in scientific and technological knowledge, along with other advances in knowledge, changed human life, the emergence of a new technological paradigm, especially the bow and arrow, enormously influenced human life in various areas, from hunting technology to life style and globalisation (Crosby, 2002; Sisk & Shea, 2009). It is said that bows and arrows were used in South Africa from about 71,000 ~ 64,000 years ago (Brown et al., 2012; Lombard & Phillipson, 2010), and mechanical projectile weaponry had a major impact on the spread of humans to late Pleistocene Eurasia from approximately 50,000 years ago (Lombard & Noël Haidle, 2012; Shea & Sisk, 2010).⁶²

The emergence of the new technology, the bow and arrow, probably occurred because humans could understand and utilise the energy stored in bent branches. The bent branches might have been used as a trap for catching small animals (Lombard & Phillipson, 2010). However, in order to use this externally stored energy more effectively as a projectile weapon, it was necessary to combine various other forms of knowledge such as in-depth knowledge in regard to the wood, strings (or chords) and arrows.⁶³ At the same time, there might have been a growing need to target smaller animals instead of larger ones. Climate and population changes have a great influence on this background.⁶⁴ Until then, thrown spears might have been used to hunt prey from far away, but these might not have been suitable for quietly hunting distant prey with less power. In the evolution and change on the supply and demand side, the creation of projectile weaponry utilising external energy saw the emergence of a new technological paradigm in that scientific knowledge was required concerning external energy which was completely different from before.⁶⁵ The technology of bow and arrow had evolved further with the improvement of wood, strings and flint arrowhead.

In addition, the bow and arrow using poison, which is said to have been used from approximately 43,000 ~ 24,000 years ago, was also a new technological paradigm since it involved using new and chemical knowledge about poison.⁶⁶ While humans who were victims of the poison of animals and plants gradually acquired (early) chemical knowledge with regard to poison, the hunting capability of bows and arrows, which were ineffective as a technology for killing large animals with a single shot, saw considerable progress with the application of chemical knowledge. And, as the chemical knowledge about poison increased, it became possible to use poison more efficiently and effectively, but it was found better for the poisons to enter the bloodstream of the prey rather than for the arrow to penetrate the prey deeply, so changes were seen in the cut end of the flint arrowhead.⁶⁷

Although each form of technological knowledge leads to progress through advances such as the refinement of processing technology, a new technological paradigm is created by combining technological knowledge with new scientific knowledge. Needless to say, the technological paradigms may co-evolve, some of them may not be used at all and the level of technology may regress. However, the creation of new technological paradigms gives rise to a higher level of technological knowledge and the hunting effectiveness of tools is also gradually increased.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the scientific knowledge, from the point of view of modern science, was primitive and superficial, and the hierarchical and systematic characteristics of scientific knowledge found in heat engines (Suenaga, 2019), modern steelmaking technology (Suenaga, 2020, 2021b) and semiconductors (Suenaga, 2015c, b), which are more recent technologies, could not be seen.

The advances in scientific and technological knowledge as described above and the emergence of new technological paradigms may seem very slow and unimportant to modern people. However, they led to very important and ground-breaking progress for humans, who had often been preyed upon by animals, enabling them to acquire higher status in the ecosystem and expand their population and occupation area.

How do new technological paradigms emerge? Basically, there are limits to progress under the existing technological paradigms and there are also changes in the natural environment. Under these circumstances, the emergence of new technological paradigms may be demanded and new technological paradigms may be created by accident (for example, through playing). Combinations of scientific and technological knowledge may be created by a genius inventor or by collaboration among a few humans.⁶⁹ In order to capture the progress of knowledge, it is necessary to discuss on the basis of these individuals (although it is virtually impossible to identify the innovator of the Stone Age). Moreover, progress in communication technology and the existence of “ba” (field) where people gather may be important in these processes. However, while being influenced by these factors, scientific and technological knowledge (with co-evolution of scientific and technological capabilities) has grown, new technological paradigms have emerged, and human life has gradually developed to higher stages, although it is difficult to verify empirically how much these factors contribute.

4. Conclusions and implications

This paper examines whether the theory of knowledge progress applicable to the modern economy can be applied to older eras, especially the Palaeolithic Age. As discussed in Section 1, what archaeologists and economists argue is very similar, and the arguments can be summarised in the theory presented in Section 2. In addition, Section 3 examined whether the theory could apply to the Palaeolithic Age. After all, advances in knowledge, technology and living standards are realised by advances in scientific and technological knowledge and their new combinations. In particular, the emergence of technological paradigms based on new scientific knowledge (regardless of whether scientific knowledge precedes technological knowledge or vice versa) makes human knowledge, technology and living standards take one step further. In this paper, due to restrictions on paper width and evidence, the focus was on verification of stone tools and projectile weapons, but these tools were extremely important in Palaeolithic life, and the theory discussed in Section 2 is considered to be extremely useful for understanding these important advances in knowledge. Although it is easy to explain complex history in a complicated way, it is more important to describe the essence via a simple theory. The term “knowledge economy” has attracted attention in recent decades, but knowledge has played the most important role in economic development since the Palaeolithic Age.

In the process, there have also been influences of the so-called demand side such as the natural and social environment, but the advances in knowledge were realised by scientists (although early) and technologists; however, a same person might play both roles. Their efforts made these advances possible and should not be disregarded. It is also important that their knowledge and capabilities co-evolved (this is also the co-evolution of gene and culture). The linked evolution of demand and supply and the linked evolution of knowledge and capability, have led to modern development. It may be said that the level of human capability and knowledge in the Palaeolithic Age was low, but the linked evolution as described above is similar to that of modern times and can be understood using the same theory.

However, advances in technological knowledge (progress on technological trajectories) without advances in scientific knowledge may have limits, for example, due to the law of diminishing returns. The extinction of humans apart from Homo sapiens may be related to the inability to create new scientific knowledge-based technological paradigms. In addition, there were times, such as that of the Acheulian culture, when little progress was made over a long period. This might be due to the fact that few new technological paradigms were created, but it might also be because the progress of existing knowledge faced limits, and there was no improvement in the ability and means of communication, or in the ability to co-evolve with existing knowledge. Moreover, the level of knowledge has not always increased. The advanced technology may cease for some reason, and the level of knowledge and technology may decline. Moreover, there were knowledge gaps between regions, like the modern era. However, despite repeated advances and declines, the level of human knowledge and technology has gradually progressed, leading to the modern economy. Although different theories are often applied to before and after the Industrial Revolution, or prehistoric and historical eras, the history of human knowledge progress is continuous and can be captured by the same theory. In that sense, evolutionary economics should have a closer relationship with evolutionary anthropology and psychology.⁷⁰ This paper is one of these attempts.⁷¹

In addition, although not discussed in detail in this paper, the theory in this paper may be applicable to the Neolithic Age. The deepening of scientific knowledge concerning animals and plants made it possible to domesticate these animals and plants. Then, “genetic manipulations” (Watson & with Andrew Berry, 2003, p. 6) were performed by selecting only the species suitable for cultivation and animal husbandry. This was also the emergence of a new technological paradigm based on new scientific knowledge.⁷² Then, advances in scientific and technological knowledge concerning fire gave rise to bronze and iron tools.⁷³

However, we should pay more attention to the fact that the Palaeolithic advances began in Africa, and that the Neolithic advances started in the Middle East, because, in the region where progress was made earlier, the rise in the level of technology has been delayed in the modern era, and countries that developed later are now called developed countries. This means that the regions that lagged behind may have made more intellectual efforts to overcome a variety of constraints. This hypothesis may be called the “richness curse”.⁷⁴ Needless to say, this hypothesis requires complex arguments. Nevertheless, it at least suggests that it is worthwhile to rethink the knowledge progress (and globalisation) by taking a long-term view, as discussed in this paper. Of course, this is also essential in considering future sustainable economic development.

In addition, at the end of the consideration of these long-term knowledge advances, I also want to discuss AI (Artificial Intelligence) which has become a hot topic recently. The combinations of scientific and technological knowledge by scientists and technologists have created new technological paradigms and long-term development of knowledge. Although there are various definitions of AI (e.g. Russell & Norvig, 2010), at least for a while, AI will not be able to replicate the human creativity that started to develop after the Palaeolithic Age. Researchers who think about advances need to consider these advances in the long-term.

Declarations

I comply with ethical standard.

Acknowledgments

Work on this paper was funded by the Institute of Social Sciences, Meiji University. In addition, I wish to thank Yoshinori Shiozawa and some anonymous reviewers for having provided much kind and valuable advice. Furthermore, the author is grateful for the comments received at the 73rd Annual Meeting of the Anthropological Society of Nippon. All remaining errors are my own.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

Institute of Social Sciences, Meiji University

Notes

1. The relationship between the economic levels of the Stone Age and modern era have also been discussed recently in major journals of economics (e.g. Ashraf & Galor, 2013; Olsson & Paik, 2016; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013).

2. See also Basalla (1988), Geselowitz (1993) and Cameron and Neal (2003).

3. However, some palaeoanthropologists estimate that the population around 130,000 B.C. was more than one hundred thousand (e.g. Ambrose, 1998; Barham, 2013; Shennan, 2001).

4. See G. Clark (2007: Ch. 2).

5. Ashraf and Galor (2011) empirically substantiate this central hypothesis of Malthus’s theory.

6. Of course, Clark also proposes that the “technology of England in 1800 … was hugely advanced compared to the technology of hunter-gatherers in the Paleolithic, before the development of settled agriculture” (p. 29) and that a “growing world population was a powerful and direct testament to these changes, as much as the written and archaeological remains of machines and devices” (p. 144).

7. See also Beaune (2009) for analogy and invention.

8. See also Ryle (1949), Shiozawa (2019) and Suenaga (2015b).

9. However, if “useful knowledge”, such as where the village exists, is also included in propositional knowledge, it differs slightly from the science in this paper.

10. Although there is much debate about when it became possible to manage fire freely, it is said that at least about 790,000 years ago, fire could be used freely (Alperson-Afil et al., 2017; Alperson-Afil, 2008; Goren-Inbar et al., 2004). In addition, see also Wrangham (2009), Roebroeks and Villa (2011), Berna et al. (2012), Dunbar (2014), Sorensen et al. (2014) and Gowlett (2016). Moreover, Suenaga (2019) analyses evolutionary processes of science and technology for heat.

11. On this point, see e.g. Henrich (2015).

12. See also McBrearty and Brooks (2000); Hoffecker (2005); Hovers et al. (2006); Coolidge and Wynn (2009); Sawyer (2012); Aoki and Mesoudi (2015) for gradual transition.

13. In addition, see also the discussion of cognigram in Lombard and Haidle 2002.

14. What is progress in this context? Progress in scientific knowledge is to be able to understand natural phenomena more deeply and to understand other natural phenomena. Progress in technological knowledge is to be able to manufacture artifacts more efficiently or to create more effective ones.

15. While economists often call inventions with commercial value “innovations”, inventions and innovations are often used interchangeably in archaeology and anthropology. It may be adequate for definition of invention and innovation in the prehistoric era that O’brien and Alexander Bentley (2011) refer to widely diffused inventions as innovations.

16. Moreover, see also Arthur’s concept of “structural deepening” (Arthur, 2009).

17. See also Schiffer (2005). Fitzhugh (2001) discusses the role of risk sensitivity in technological invention.

18. See Laurel et al. (2015) for a survey of creativity in some academic fields.

19. A GPT is defined as “a technology that initially has much scope for improvement and eventually comes to be widely uses, and to have many spillover effects” (Lipsey et al., 2005: 133).

20. Haidle et al. (2015) present a model of cultural performance with three dimensions (evolutionary-biological, historical-social and ontogenetic-individual development); however, in this paper, it is considered that the co-evolution of individual knowledge and biological capabilities is centered on a model, and that the advances in knowledge (including capabilities) are influenced by social-historical environments. Although Haidle et al. (2015) present an eight-grade model for evolution of cultural capacities, the model is not about the mechanism of the evolution. In addition, they establish the model based on animal and archaeological data; however, this paper builds an evolutionary model of cultural traits covering from the Palaeolithic Age to the modern era. Moreover, Lombard (2016) describes evolutionary processes as “mountaineering”. Although the “innovation diagram” in this paper resembles “mountaineering”, this paper explicitly clarifies the factors and hierarchy of the evolutionary processes. See also Suenaga (2015c, 2019) for “mountaineering” and the factors behind the evolution of heat engines and semiconductors. See also the concept of “local optimisation” in economics.

21. See also Ambrose (2001) for the discussion in detail.

22. See also Hoffecker (2012) for a detailed discussion. In addition, many researchers focus on continuity and discontinuity of innovation. For example, Basalla (1988) insists that the emergences of major artifacts such as stone tools, steam engines and transistors were not discontinuous but continuous. However, as Nelson and Winter 1982 insist below, if the creation of any sort of novelty consists of a recombination of concepts and materials that were previously in existence, everything is connected to the past. Then, it is meaningless to emphasise continuity based on the connection to the past, as in Basalla. (Although Basalla (1988) analyses steam engines and semiconductors for case studies of continuity and discontinuity, these industries are analysed by Suenaga (2015c, 2015b, 2019)). Although what is important here is how to distinguish between continuous and discontinuous, this paper distinguishes based on whether new scientific knowledge is used and then whether a new technology paradigm emerges (see Section 2 for a discussion in detail). See also Dosi’s (1982); Yamaguchi (2006); Arthur (2009); Roux (2010) for a detailed discussion.

23. There have been various discussions in archaeology about push and pull theories, e.g., with regard to the emergence of agriculture (see, for example, Barker, 2006; Bogucki, 1999; Stark, 1986). However, following the taxonomy of economics, I will refer to supply-side factors as push theories and demand-side factors as pull theories (see also Schmookler (1966), Dosi et al. (1988), and Ruttan (2001) for details).

24. See also Dunbar (1995) and Gamble et al. (2011) for the “social brain” hypothesis.

25. However, Collard et al. (2016) criticize the hypothesis that explains increases in cultural complexity in terms of population size.

26. For studies focusing on learning and imitation, see Tomasello (1999) and Wilkins (2020). See also Rogers (2003) and Abramovitz (1989) for studies of imitation and diffusion in economics.

27. See also Beaune (2004); Hovers et al. (2006) on this point. Moreover, the importance of social factors is also emphasized in the theory of chaîne opératoire (see, for example, Lemonnier (1990); Stiegler (1998); Audouze (2002)).

28. On the role of division of labour in the Stone Age, see also Kuhn and Stiner (2006) and Seabright (2005).

29. Suenaga (2015c, 2019, 2020, 2021b) discusses the importance of incentive and organization in innovation of heat engines and semiconductors. See also Chesbrough (2003); Suenaga (2012) for more recent industries.

30. The relationship between technology and society is frequently discussed in journals such as Technology in Society; see also Suenaga (2019, 2020) in this journal.

31. See also Suenaga (2015c, 2015b) for a detail discussion.

32. See also Morgan (2016) for the comparison of both advocates. Moreover, see also Haidle et al. (2015) for differences of capability and knowledge.

33. Pinker, who supports the theory of the cognitive niche, argues that the “cognitive niche embraces many of the zoologically unusual features of our species. Tool manufacture and use is the application of knowledge about causes and effects among objects in the effort to bring about goals” (1997: 190). In addition, he suggests that “it seeks to explain how evolution caused the emergence of a brain, which causes psychological processes like knowing and learning, which cause the acquisition of the values and knowledge that make up a person’s culture” (1994: 425). Moreover, according to Tomasello (1999), “human beings evolved a new form of social cognition, which enabled some new forms of cultural learning, … and … a variety of historical and ontogenetic processes … are set into motion by the one uniquely human, biologically inherited, cognitive capacity” (p. 7, 15). See also Gabrić et al. (2018) for a recent survey of the relationship between stone tools and cognition (in particular, language). It is also important to note that these cognitive abilities are similar in concept to the ability to generate scientific knowledge, or scientific competence, discussed in the previous section.

34. In contrast, Richerson et al. (2010) who support the theory of the cultural niche insist that “the process of cultural evolution has played an active, leading role in the evolution of genes” (p. 8985). Richerson (2011) suggests that Pleistocene embryonic cultures resulted in new environments in which more complex innate psychological traits were favoured, thereby allowing the formation of complex languages, religions and social systems, and emphasises that cultural evolution played a leading role in genetic evolution. In addition, Henrich (2015) also states that culture drives “much of our species genetic evolution” (p. 7).

35. There are various definitions of “culture” (e.g. Haidle et al., 2015; Kuper, 1999; Tylor, 1871; White, 1959). Boyd and Richerson (2005, p. 6) define “culture” as “information capable of affecting individuals” behavior’ and “information” as “idea, knowledge, belief, value, skill, and attitude”. Their terms such as “idea”, “knowledge” and “skill” are almost synonymous with “scientific knowledge” and “technological knowledge” in this paper. Because the concepts of “belief”, “value” and “attitude” can be said to be somewhat vague and unimportant, we include their concepts in the general concept of “scientific and technological knowledge” in this paper. Mesoudi et al. (2013) also state the following: “Both technology and science are prime examples of cumulative cultural evolution” (p. 194).Thus, the “cognitive niche theory” led by mutation of genes may be called a “mutation-driven theory”, and the “cultural niche theory” led by the progress of knowledge may be called a “knowledge-driven theory”. In addition, although this paper may seem to neglect cultural aspects such as cave paintings and music that are not directly related to economic activities (hunting and collecting), such aspects are very important for improving social bonds and motivation.

36. See Dosi’s (1982, 1984), Nelson (2008) and Coccia (2015) for changes in the relative importance of technology and science, or demand-pull and science-push, in the developmental stage.

In the process of evolution of intellectual ability and knowledge, various species came into existence and went extinct. Although new cultures were not created with the birth of new species, as the environment changed drastically and competition between species intensified, species selection took place, and groups with higher intellectual abilities and knowledge were able to survive and thrive. However, this evolutionary process did not necessarily proceed in a single direction, and it was possible that species and populations with higher capabilities and knowledge disappeared (this is called “path dependence” in economics (e.g., Arthur, 2009)).

37. See also Cartwright (2001: ch.8) for a review of the intelligence origins of primates. According to him, if “there ever will be a consensus on what were the definitive causes of brain enlargement for our ancestors we are still a long way from that goal” (p. 144). In addition, “the final answer will be that it was a complex combination of many factors—ecological, sexual, social, linguistic and technological—that were at work” (p. 149).

38. In addition, many researchers emphasise change in the natural environment as a factor that advances culture (especially technology). For example, Conard (2008) presents “the model for Mosaic Polycentric Modernity” and argues that humans spread across different areas produced the technology necessary in that area. Straus (1995) and Hoffecker (2005) also discuss a variety of ways that climate changes have affected technology and ideology.

39. Oren et al. (2015) also propose a simple model illustrating both exponential and punctuated patterns of cultural traits. In addition, this is similar to the argument that the paradigm-disruptive innovation brings new and long-term waves. See also Suenaga (2015b, 2018) for further discussion.

40. See also Lotem et al. (2017).

41. However, with the advent of new medical technology that can change human genetics (or the technology to evolve human intelligence), it is interesting (and horrible) that economics, trying to understand the modern economy without considering changes of human genetics, will have to consider the relationship between the evolution of human genetics and economic development.

42. See Section 1.2 in this paper and Mokyr (2002) for useful knowledge. Furthermore, Suenaga (2015b) discusses the definitions, relationships, mechanisms and structures of science and technology in detail. Moreover, in Suenaga (2015b), the relationship between science and technology is discussed in terms of a number of models, based on Yamaguchi’s innovation diagram. The models are the Price model, which pays attention to the autonomy of science and technology; the Bush (linear) model, which focuses on science-driven technological progress; the Rosenberg model, which is based on technology-driven scientific progress; and the Dosi model, which considers the relationship between science and technology from the viewpoint of technological paradigms and trajectories.

43. For clarification of “paradigm-sustaining technological progress” and ’paradigm-disruptive technological progress’, see Yamaguchi (2006).

44. Arthur (2009) also mentions the discussion about the soil. “I like to think of phenomena as hidden underground … . Effects nearer the surface, say that wood rubbed together creates heat and thereby fire, are stumbled upon by accident or casual exploration and are harnessed in the earliest times. … The discovery of the most deeply hidden phenomena … require modern methods of discovery and recovery” (p.57). “One effect leads to another, then to another, until eventually a whole vein of related phenomena has been mined into. A family of effects forms a set of chambers connected by seams and passageways, one leading to another … . Phenomena form a connected system of excavated chambers and passageways. The whole system underground is connected” (pp. 58–59).

45. Sakai et al. (2012) call the technological paradigm a wall, and discuss the difficulties of and countermeasures to converting the paradigm so that it is not captured by the existing paradigm. Jin (2016) also discusses the importance of knowledge transcendence and artificial skepticism. However, predicting the emergence and direction of paradigm-disruptive innovation will be even more difficult (perhaps impossible) than paradigm-sustaining innovation.

46. Of course, there are cases where the same person carries out both scientific and technological actions. Furthermore, the advances in knowledge also relate to social values and institutions, such as whether social and economic benefits can be guaranteed. See also Mokyr (2005); North (2005).

47. For example, see Diamond (1992), Klein and Edgar (2002) and Hoffecker (2012).

48. See also Adam et al. (2009) and Kuhn (2012) for the relationship between knowledge progress and population. Being able to manage fire also led to more time for activities, which had a great impact on communication.

49. Then, the expansion of the social exchange network through the improvement of communication capability expanded the production of composite goods. See also Ambrose (2002) for a detailed discussion.

50. See also d’Errico et al. (2018) and von Petzinger (2016) for symbols and communications.

51. See also Mokyr (1990, p. 200).

52. See also Mokyr (2002).

53. However, in the era when communication and information storage technologies were underdeveloped, even existing knowledge was not sufficiently transferred, and knowledge often degenerated, and regional disparities tended to be relatively large (see also d’Errico & Stringer, 2011; Hovers et al., 2006; Kuhn, 2006; Lombard & Parsons, 2011; Lombard, 2016). Although there are also regional differences in the modern era, the factors are not only insufficiency of information and communication technology but also education (see also Abramovitz, 1989; Suenaga, 2018). In both the Palaeolithic Age and the modern era, if children’s capabilities and knowledge were not increased by adults, the knowledge level in the area might regress and become lower than in other areas. Moreover, Suenaga (2015b) argues the following: “Technological paradigms which are not suited to the economic environment in the short term might be disregarded, even if they have long-term potential” (p. 225). On the maladaptiveness of culture, see also Richerson and Boyd (2005). In terms of economics, especially when there is imperfect information or limited rationality, the diffusion of information is delayed and the optimum path is not selected; in addition, path-dependency, the lock-in effect and organizational/institutional inflexibility also occur (e.g. see Arthur, 2009; North, 1990).

54. Although it is said that Homo habilis made the Oldowan stone tools, there are also reports that the stone tools were already being used about 3.3 million years ago, a period from which no Homo genus fossil has been found (e.g. Harmand et al., 2015; Lewis & Harmand, 2016). See also McPherron et al. (2010) for bones with stone inflicted marks approximately 3.4 million year ago. See also Backwell and d’Errico (2005) for bone tools.

55. See also Harmand et al. (2015); Lewis and Harmand (2016) for the climate change. In addition, see also Toth and Schick (2018); Morgan et al. (2015); Gabrić et al. (2018) for the increased social behavior.

56. See also note 22 of this paper on “discontinuity”. Also, see Yamaguchi (2006) and Suenaga (2015c, 2019, 2020, 2021b) for the difficulty of emerging a more modern technological paradigm.

57. Acheulean stone tools are associated with Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis. See also Lepre et al. (2011) for Acheulean tools.

58. Moreover, Morgan et al. (2015) mention that teaching or proto-language may have been pre-requisites for the emergence of Acheulean tools.

59. The spear with a stone point was used for hunting by Homo heidelbergensis and Homo neanderthalensis. See Hoffecker (2009) and Wilkins et al. (2012).

60. See also Klein and Edgar (2002) in this regard.

61. Hunting with a spear-thrower can be linked to Homo sapiens and perhaps Homo neanderthalensis. See Gärdenfors and Lombard (2018) on this point.

62. Bows and arrows are said to have been used only by Homo sapiens (e.g. Shea & Sisk, 2010). See also Lombard and Parsons (2011); Lombard (2016) on regression of the bow and arrow technology in South Africa. Using concepts of “rugged fitness landscape” and “mountaineering”, they try to explain the regression.

63. See Lombard and Noël Haidle (2012) for reverse engineering of various technologies.

64. See also Pei-Lin (2006) for relationships between the bow and arrow technology and climate changes.

65. Although Carignani (2016) emphasises the “Horizontal Transfer” (the recombination of functional modules across diverse lineages) with respect to the invention of the bow and arrow, this paper regards new combinations of scientific and technological knowledge as more important. See also Suenaga (2022) for bows and arrows.

66. See Gärdenfors and Lombard (2018) for the era. Lombard (2020) insists that the origin dates back about 60,000 years.

67. See also Lombard (2020) for the use of these poisons.

68. See also Tomasello (1999), Lombard (2016) and Vaesen and Houkes (2018) for the nature of cumulative culture and the ratchet effect of culture change.

69. Nevertheless, in order to analyse the progress, one can only rely on imagination, because it is difficult to know the details of people who enabled knowledge progress in the prehistoric era, unlike recent cases. However, in the relatively recent cases of heat engines, steel and semiconductors, scientists and engineers have often collaborated in the process of emerging new technological paradigms (e.g. Suenaga, 2015c, 2019, 2020, 2021b; Yamaguchi, 2006).

70. See Mesoudi (2011) for an attempt at integrating ideas on evolution and culture from various academic fields.

71. However, in order to complete this attempt, I need to write a massive book that covers the period from prehistory to the present. This book will be completed in the next few years. See also Suenaga (2021a).

72. The processes and factors concerned with domestication varied from region to region. In some cases, settlement came first, while in others it was the other way around. It was also influenced by various conditions such as the vegetation, climate, and history of the region. Agriculture arose independently in several regions but developed under various influences as human cognitive and scientific knowledge increased. For more details, see also, for example, Bellwood (2005), Fuller et al. (2014), and Osamu et al. (2016).

73. See also Suenaga (2020, 2021b) on the evolution of steel.

74. This concept is broader than the “resource curse”. See Wick and Bulte (2009) and Ross (2015) on the “resource course”.