Taiwan’s security: Civilian control and external threat

Abstract

Since the early 1990s, Taiwan has successfully transformed civilian control over its military with its democratisation. Despite some constraints, the elected administrations and congress have influenced on defence affairs, and each of the four elected administrations has demonstrated distinct characteristics. In parallel, the external threat from China has been risen with its military expansion. This paper analyses how civilian leadership in Taipei has addressed the external threats and incorporated non-military factors in defence policies. Distinct national identities between administrations have led to different and inconsistent strategies and disruption of military modernisation. The popularity of various national measures, such as reducing conscription and shifting energy policies, has also eroded Taiwan’s deterrence. With its expanding military inferiority to China, Taiwan has an increasingly narrow margin for making mistakes in its defence policy.

Keywords:

• Civilian control
• external threats
• Taiwan
• China
• defence strategy
• conscription

1. Introduction

The paired concepts of civilian control and external threats offer pathways for fresh insights into Taiwan’s security. In the face of increasingly serious threats from China in recent decades, Taiwan should have been cautiously developing its defence, but the reality is somewhat different. In the mid-2000s, Taipei slowed its pace of defence build-ups, including a failure to acquire submarines, leading to Beijing’s superiority due to its massive military modernisation. In the 2000s and 2010s, both ruling parties in Taiwan constantly marginalised conscription by adopting an all-volunteer forces (AVF) policy, which also reduced Taiwan’s deterrence against China. These two issues had significant impacts on Taiwan’s security, and while they differed with regard to reasons, execution, and alternatives, both were initiated by civilian sectors. Furthermore, different elected administrations undertook their respective defence strategies based on varying considerations. Overall, civilian control over the military in Taiwan has been remarkable, despite some constraints. The phenomenon of elected political elites shaping Taiwan’s security against its predominant external threat, China, presents a democratic perspective on understanding the evolving security outlook of this international hotspot.

Civilian control and external threats are fundamental aspects of civil-military relations (CMRs). External threats usually form the basis of a country’s rationale for establishing and maintaining armed forces, which need to be strong enough to provide defence against potential enemies. However, a formidable military could be detrimental to domestic society. The main purpose of civilian control is to prevent the military from applying its coercive power domestically. As civilian political leadership is accountable to the people under a democratic mechanism, it has greater legitimacy than its military counterpart in decision-making on security-related issues, despite the latter’s greater knowledge on defence. Therefore, civilian leaders have the right to be wrong (Feaver, 1996).

Taiwan’s civilian leadership faces a severe external threat. Unlike other territorial disputes over a few islands and bodies of water, China’s territorial claim covers all of Taiwan. The latter consequently faces the highest level of external threat, one that targets its very survival. The two regimes across the Taiwan Strait—the Republic of China (ROC) in Taipei and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing—have not formally settled their relations since the ROC lost the Chinese civil war and fled to the island in 1949. The PRC sees Taiwan and the ROC as a legacy from the civil war and asserts its legitimate claim to the island, with the use of force as a policy option (Taiwan Affairs Office and The Information Office of the State Council, 2000). This external threat was not serious prior to the 1990s, when China lacked adequate air and naval power and potential American intervention served as a deterrent. The strait serves as an obstacle to stop the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from invading Taiwan. The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis that the PLA held large military exercises, including launching short-ranged ballistic missiles close to the island, confirmed the geostrategic landscape around Taiwan and inspired China to endeavour to find solutions. Thereafter, Beijing’s rising military power, both to project forces across the strait and to deny Washington’s intervention, has favourably reshaped its military balance with Taipei (Huang & Ding, 2011). Without the United States, whether Taiwan can stand alone if China attacks and how long it can resist have become substantial questions (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2021).

Against this backdrop, this paper raises three questions: (1) What are the dynamics between external threats and civilian control in Taiwan, and how do they play out? (2) What are the major non-military factors shaping civilian leaderships’ responses to external threats? (3) How have these factors affected Taiwan’s defence? To answer these questions, a case study is conducted in three parts. This paper firstly reviews the relations between civilian control and external threats as a research approach to studying Taiwan’s security. Then, it will examine how civilian control of the four respective administrations have responded to external threats. Finally, it analyses the two categories of non-military factors and their impacts on the civilian administrations’ defence policies and estimates the potential development of the next civilian leadership’s response to the external threat.

2. Civilian control and external threats in Taiwan: a literature review

The literature on civilian control and external threats in Taiwan can be divided into two categories: general discussion and case studies. General discussion within CMR research establishes the rationale for civilian control in the context of external threats. Feaver (1996) provides a comprehensive perspective on the relations among external threats, the military, and civilian leadership. In this triangular dynamic, civilian control is important in preserving liberty and preventing the military from having domestic impacts through coercive force. Owing to the legitimacy of elections, civilian leaders representing their society have the final say on threats estimated by the military, including having the right to be wrong, because they “set the level of acceptable risk for society” (p. 154).

Nielsen (2002) discusses how civilian control contributes towards defence performance, offering both positive and negative examples. Without civilian involvement, military organisations will stagnate and become ill-suited for strategic requirements. Blend (2001) clarifies how civilian control helps coordinate comprehensive responses to external threats through consensus building. Using the cases of India and Pakistan, Staniland (2008) elaborates on two patterns of the relations between external threats and civilian control: de-politicisation and praetorianism. The former pattern is illustrated in India, where civilian control has been enhanced to manage external threats; meanwhile, external threats have led to the latter in Pakistan, where the military has become involved in politics. Pion-Berlin and Dudley (2020) also observe that external threats may not only strengthen civilian control over the military but also deepen civilian dependence on the military

Based on these concepts, several researchers have studied civilian control in Taiwan. Fravel (2002) and Kuehn (2008) focus on the transition of civilian control along with democratisation. While elaborating on common points such as the legal reforms, lack of civilian involvement in the Ministry of National Defence (MND), and the critical influence of President Lee Ting-Hui, the researchers express different views on the function of the political warfare system for civilian control and the role of the Lee administration in structural change. China, the primary external threat, is seen as a positive factor contributing to civilian control (Fravel, 2002; Kuehn, 2008). Pion-Berlin et al. (2019) examine the limited civilian control in Taiwan in comparison with four other countries, finding that the need to prepare for external threats from China is the main reason for the Taiwanese civilian leadership to depend on the military, owing to the narrow margin for error in decision-making.

The current literature indeed addresses various facets of civilian control and external threats in Taiwan, but the research lacks sufficient depth with regard to the intricate security situation across the strait. First, the external threat has not been elaborated. In addition to facilitating civilian control, the ultimate level of external threat from Beijing plays a significant role in civilian leadership in Taipei, but this aspect is generally unexplored. Second, despite constraints such as the lack of civilian involvement in the MND, including the position of the minister, the civilian administration and legislation have determined defence policies, including strategies and related affairs. The civilian sector indeed looks to the military for the execution of defence-related affairs, but the former’s policy making has been prominent, including some policies with negative impacts on security. In short, how Taiwan’s civilian control manages external threats is worthy of further exploration.

These CMR studies generally describe a model of how civilian leadership moderates military countermeasures to external threats. With a lack of specific knowledge, civilian leadership would adopt some strategies or concepts from its military, but non-military factors can be prominent or even eclipse military considerations in a civilian administration’s defence policy. Non-military factors can be categorised as foundational principles and election or popularity consideration. Foundational principles of major political parties can be ideologies, national identities, and other fundamental values which are essential for the overall national strategy. As such, they naturally guide defence policies. Since elections are essential for most civilian administrations, voters’ preferences other than foundational principles also affect civilian leadership’s policy making and execution. Usually, the public chooses its own immediate well-being which often conflicts with defence considerations. Therefore, civilian leadership’s defence policy is usually planned and conducted with a broader perspective, but security could be the value being sacrificed.

In the case of Taiwan, the two categories of non-military factors are observable. The most salient foundational principle among major parties in Taiwan, namely the ROC regime, is the future of the island; specifically, whether it will be independent or unified with China. Under external pressure, particularly China’s threat of using force, many political elites choose a safe term—status quo—to maintain maximal support. Nevertheless, their respective political positions still indicate their distinct approaches, between maintaining de facto independence and moving towards more cross-strait integration. With vivid or even volatile elections and other democratic mechanisms reflecting and forming public opinions, voters’ preferences other than national identities also influence civilian decision makers. As Beijing represents a great level of external threat, Taipei’s responses would indicate how non-military factors have been considered along with military ones.

The four elected civilian leaderships following democratisation, with their respective ruling parties and defence policies, present a convenient setting to examine the relations between civilian control and external threats in Taiwan with regard to the effects of the two categories of non-military factors.

3. Lee Teng-Hui (1988–2000): the transition period

Although President Lee was popularly elected in 1996, the impact of his administration on the dynamics between civilian control and external threats can be traced back to 1988, when he succeeded the presidency after Chiang Ching-kuo. Civilian control within the ROC regime was transformed from the authoritarian model that relied on the networks of the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party, also known as Kuomintang (KMT), and the political warfare department to a democratic model based on legal frameworks and administrative arrangements. This transition may not be considered complete, because most defence ministers were former officers and transparency was limited in the military (Fravel, 2002). However, the legal structure and other mechanisms did undergo reforms.

External threats were prominent. Unlike China’s previous military exercises, the ones in 1995 and 1996, before the first presidential election in March 1996, involved short-range ballistic missiles aimed at the two sea areas outside the Keelung and Kaohsiung ports. They were unprecedented in that China’s military threats moved massively from the offshore islands of the Cold War, such as Kinmen and Matsu, to Taiwan (Tucker, 2009). After approximately three decades of general peace in the strait, the crisis demonstrated an explicit external threat.

The civilian leadership’s response to external threats did not stand out vis-à-vis clear policy change during this period, while the military pursued a strategic transition. Prior to the crisis, structural reforms had already progressed to the point of fitting the geostrategic realities of Taiwan from 1993. Before the reforms, the ROC armed forces were formed for the political goal of “retaking the mainland” with large land troops that were not optimal for island defence. Although a few adjustments, such as enhancing sea denial and anti-landing capabilities, had been made since the 1970s, the overall structural change remained in place until the 10-Year Force Build-up Program followed by the Jing-Shi Program, in the 1990s, which reduced the size of land forces and increased investments in the navy and air force (Ministry of National Defense, 2017c). Military reforms and the rising external threat were positive for developing civilian control, as the armed forces were occupied with the internal balance of power among services and addressing solutions for potential scenarios. Some sources suggest that the military took the initiative in the Jing-Shi Program, while others point towards the Lee administration’s inspiring role (Fravel, 2002; Kuehn, 2008).

Despite the structural change, Taiwan’s defence strategy continued to rely on a layered defence approach, following the principle of “solid defence, effective deterrence” (防衛固守, 有效嚇阻) that was dominated by the military. As pre-emptive strikes can be politically inappropriate, this strategy was aimed at defending the island passively, focusing on defeating an amphibious invasion by the PLA, which would be indispensable for conquering Taiwan. Since this strategy was promoted by General Hau Pei-tsun, who was the chief of general staff, the role of the civilian leadership was limited (Huang & Ding, 2011). The military focused on three key missions, “counter air, sea denial and anti-landing” (Ministry of National Defense, 2021b). In the 1990s, this strategy was implemented by modernising related capabilities such as fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), major surface combatants, and attack helicopters. The crisis resulted in greater procurements that made Taiwan one of the top customers of sophisticated weapon systems (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022b). Since the ruling KMT controlled most seats in the Legislative Yuan, the civilian leadership, both administrative and legislative, had no issue regarding defence procurement (Legislative Yuan, n.d..).

The moderate strategic change and the lack of civilian initiation may be related to various factors, such as a limited level of threat and domestic CMR dynamics. Despite the eye-catching exercises of shooting ballistic missiles and quantitative superiority, China’s military capability may have been insufficient to project its forces across the strait in the 1990s. Beijing’s efforts towards modernising the PLA were in their initial stages, and a number of new assets—particularly fourth-generation fighters and new major surface combatants—were similar or even fewer than those of their ROC counterparts (Tables 1 and 2) (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000, 2016, 2023). Internally, respect for military autonomy, shortage of military talent in civilian leadership, and insufficient time to develop an alternative strategy may have been other reasons that the Lee administration did not pursue a dramatic change in defence strategy (Kuehn, 2008).

Table 1. The evolving balance of airpower across the strait between 2000 and 2023

	China (PLAAF and PLAN)	Taiwan (ROCAF)
2000	4^th Generation Fighters: PLAAF 65 J-11 (Su-27), 40+ Su-30MKK. AWACS^1: 3 Y-8 (PLANAF) Aerial Refuelling (AR): 6 HY-6 (PLAAF)	4^th Generation Fighters: 128 F-CK-1, 58 Mirage-2000–5, 126 F-16A/B AWACS: 4 E-2T
2016	4^th Generation Fighters: PLAAF: 95 J-11, 75 Su-27, 73 Su-30MKK, 323 J-10A/B/S, 110 J-11B. PLANAF: 24 J-10A/S, 72 J-11B, 14 J-15 (Su-33), 24 Su-30MK2 AWACS^1: PLAAF: 10; PLANAF: 14. AR: PLAAF: 11, PLANAF: 3.	4^th Generation Fighters: 128 F-CK-1, 56 Mirage 2000–5, 145 F-16 A/B. AWACS: 6 E-2T
2023	5^th and 4^th Generation Fighters: PLAAF: 220 J-10A, 55 J-10B, 220 J-10C, 70 J-10S, 130 J-11B, 250 J-16, 140+ J-20A, 73 Su-30MKK, 24 SU-35, 12 J-16D PLANAF: 16 J-10A, 7 J-10S, 72 J-11B, 60 J-15, 24 Su-30MK2, AWACS^1: PLAAF: 4 KJ-200, 20 KJ-500, 4 KJ-2000; PLANAF: 6 KJ-200, 14+ KJ-500, 4 Y-8J. AR^2: PLAAF: 10 H-6 U, 3 Il-78, 3 Y-20 U; PLANAF: 5 H-6DU.	4th Generation Fighters: 77 F-16A/B, 54 Mirage 2000–5, 63 F-16 V, 127 F-CK-1C/D, AWACS: 6 E-2T^1^2

1.Aerial Warning and Command System

2.Aerial refuelling aircraft

Table 2. the evolving balance of naval power across the strait between 1996 and 2022

	China (PLAN)	Taiwan (ROCN)
2000	Submarines: Armed with ASCM & torpedo: 1 type-039, 1 type 35 G. Armed with torpedo: 2 Project 877, 3 Project 636, 17 type 035, 34 type-033. Major Surface Combatants: With Layered Air Defence^2: 1 project 956, Amphibious Ships: 18 LST; 42 LSM.	Submarines: Armed with torpedo: 2 Guppy II class, 2 Zwaardvis class Major Surface Combatants: With Layered Air Defence: 7 upgraded Gearing class, 7 Perry class. Amphibious Ships: LSD: 1 LSM: 4 LST: 12
2016	Submarines: Armed with ASCM & torpedo: 8 Project 636N, 27 type 039A/B/G, 3 type 091, 2 type 093 Armed with torpedo: 2 Project 877, 2 Project 636, 12 type 035. Major Surface Combatants: CV^3: With Layered Air Defence: 4 project 956 class, 2 type 052, 2 type 052B, 6 type 052C, 2 type 052D, 2 type 051C, 2 type 054, 20 type 054A Amphibious Ships: 3 LPD; 16 LST; 31 LSM.	Submarines: Armed with ASCM & torpedo: 2 Zwaardvis class Armed with torpedo: 2 Guppy II class Major Surface Combatants With Layered Air Defence: 4 Kidd class, 8 Perry class, 6 Knox class Amphibious Ships: 1 LSD; 12 LST.
2023	Submarines: Armed with ASCM and Torpedo: 6 type 093/A/B, 2 project 636, 8 project 636 M, 12 type 039 G, 4 type 039A, 16+ type 039B, Armed with Torpedo: 2 project 636, 4 Type 035B, Major Surface Combatants: CV: 1 type 001, 1 type 002 With Layered Air Defence: 7 type 055, 4 project 956, 1 type 051B, 2 type 052, 2 type 052A, 6 type 052B, 25 type 052D/DM, 2 type 051C, 2 type 054, 31 type 054A, Amphibious Ships: 3 LHD, 8 LPD, 28 LST, 21 LSM,	Submarines: Armed with ASCM & torpedo: 2 Zwaardvis class Armed with torpedo: 2 Guppy II class Major Surface Combatants: With Layered Air Defence: 4 Kidd class, 10 Perry class, 5 Knox class, Amphibious Ships: 1 LSD, 1 LPD, 6 LST.

Owing to the transitional nature, the two categories of non-military factors were not dominant factors. Despite their unclear influence on the military, the Lee administration’s cross-strait policies sometimes directly affected external threats. The most prominent example is Lee’s special state-to-state relationship in 1999, an unprecedented challenge to China’s redlines around Taiwan’s move towards independence (Faison, 1999). The situation in the strait was intensified by Beijing’s increasing military actions (Cabestan, 2014). This risk-taking policy may have reflected Lee’s confidence in civilian control, and his political approach of making Taiwan’s de facto independence might have been another motive (Fravel, 2002). Regarding factors of popularity, the KMT administration shortened the conscription term from two years to 22 months before the 2000 presidential election to attract voters (Su, 2007). Although this reduction was not significant, it started the trend of shortening conscription in the following decades.

4. Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008): the minority administration

Over eight years, the relationship between civilian control and external threats in Taiwan was significantly reshaped under the minority administration of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led by President Chen Shui-bian. The civilian administration began to implement its defence policies, which included a more offensive strategy and a shorter period of compulsory military service, but the divided civilian sector significantly delayed military modernisation.

The Chen administration proposed an offensive strategy supported by the military. During the presidential campaign in 2000, Chen proposed a defence strategy called “Decisive Campaign Outside the Territory” (決戰境外), which sought to avoid or reduce combat in Taiwan during wartime. The Chen administration was the first elected civilian administration to initiate a military strategy, but it encountered several restrictions. Geographically, keeping warfare away from the island was unlikely because of the narrow strategic depth vis-à-vis China’s standoff munitions with extended ranges. Taipei had no effective means of countering Beijing’s increasing number of ballistic missiles. American PAC-2 SAMs were introduced in Taiwan in the late 1990s, and the subsequent version, PAC-3, later became available; however, these missiles came at a high cost and had an uncertain interception rate, particularly under saturated attacks (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). Developing offensive capability against China thus became a feasible approach for the Chen administration because the indigenous defence industry was able to develop a related capability given the existing missile technology. Based on its Hsiung Feng (HF) anti-ship cruise missiles, the MND’s Chong-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) developed a model cruise missile with an estimated range of 600 to 1000 km, the HF II-E, which it first tested in 2007 (Lague, 2007; Y. W. Chen, 2009). This offensive approach was also relevant to the DPP’s foundational principle of pro-independence that made the Chen administration less concerned about provoking China. Regardless of whether the Chen administration or the military conceptualised the missile project, it was a clear step towards the civil-military collaboration in the defence policy.

The divided nature of the Taiwan civilian sector had significant security impacts; the diverse national identities corresponding to the KMT and DPP as their foundational principles, along with their respective political allies, had distinct views on China as an external threat. The KMT preferred cross-strait integration with China for economic interests and perhaps eventual unification. Therefore, defence was intended to passively deter China’s military adventurism while avoiding provocation. In contrast, the DPP saw Beijing as the primary threat to Taipei’s de facto independence. Thus, civilian control was bifurcated and discordant in addressing external threats. The DPP’s minority in congress between 2000 and 2008 endowed the KMT and its political allies with the power to take countermeasures in legislation and budgeting, including defence (Rigger, 2010).

The divide in the civilian sector between the administration and legislation compromised the development of Taiwan’s naval capability. With respect to defending the island, denying external invasion via the sea is preferable because it lowers damage onshore. Owing to their stealth nature, submarines have been a key component in sea denial, but acquiring submarines has been a challenge for Taipei. It only managed to obtain four diesel-electric submarines from the United States and the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022a). Under heavy pressure from Beijing, most countries with submarine-building capability do not dare to sell any boat to Taipei. In 2000, the Bush administration made an unusual move of adding diesel-electric submarines to the list of arms sales to Taiwan, giving the ROC navy a rare opportunity to strengthen its deterrence capability. When the MND proposed a special budget for the purchase of eight submarines, Patriot PAC-3 SAMs and 12 P-3C anti-submarine aircraft from the United States in 2004, opposition members in congress repeatedly rejected funding on several grounds, such as over-expenditure and potential corruption (Chase, 2008). The latter concern stemmed from some known corruption cases from the 1990s, which resulted in public distrust of the military, despite rising threats from China (BBC News, 2000). Although the MND launched a series of public campaigns to highlight the importance of such procurements, the victories of the KMT and its political allies in the congressional elections of 2004 and 2008 highlighted their power over the minority administration (Jacobs, 2012). The PAC-3 missiles and P-3C aircraft deals were passed after the KMT returned to power in 2008, but the submarine deal was never realised, and the Obama administration eventually cancelled the offer (Ashby & Abramson, 2010). Further, other major procurements, such as 66 F-16C/D fighters, were delayed (Wolf, 2009). The political dispute demonstrated the powerful role of the congress in civilian control. Thereafter, as opposition parties never formed a majority in the Legislative Yuan, a similar form of civilian control did not occur again.

A considerably downgraded conscription system was another Chen administration’s defence policy with security impacts, and it was related more to concerns about voters’ preference. Strategically, when “retaking the mainland” was no longer a goal, the Jing-Shi Program and subsequent reforms reduced the size of ground troops, which represented the highest demand for conscripts. Sophisticated weapon systems in the air and maritime domains, such as fighters, SAMs, and vessels, are generally unsuitable for conscript crews because their service is usually too short for proper training. The high numbers of conscript deaths (hundreds annually) and the delay in establishing careers and other life paths, in comparison with non-conscripted people, such as women, led to a preference for shortening the duration of conscription, if not abandoning it altogether (Fravel, 2002). Between 2004 and 2007, the Chen administration slashed the required service term, reducing it from 22 months to 14 months. The administration thus created momentum for increasingly shorter periods of service, with the goal of eventually terminating conscription altogether (Speck, 2008; Su, 2007). In line with its civil counterparts, the military embraced the concept of AVF, as the shortened service period for conscripts was incompatible with their training schedules. Qualified soldiers should ideally receive training and experience extensive training, such as major exercises, but conscripts with short periods of service are unlikely to meet these requirements. Furthermore, as unmotivated conscripts usually have reluctant attitudes, eager voluntary soldiers are preferable (Cole, 2006). In the mid-2000s, the MND sought to increase its recruitment of voluntary soldiers, but experienced little success due to a lack of talents recruited (C. M. Chang, 2015).

5. Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016): harmony across the strait

Based on pro-unification as a foundational principle, the KMT administration under Ma Ying-jeou saw China as an external threat in a different manner than its predecessor, leading to a shift in defence strategy even as the military’s cooperation endured. The Ma administration’s general guidance was to utilise China’s rising economy to rejuvenate Taiwan’s prosperity, a reason of maintaining popularity. Therefore, a non-provocative military posture was indispensable for harmonious cross-strait relations (Liu, 2014). Under this directive, the official Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 2009 only cited a policy of deterrence through means of consolidation and denial—better known as the “hard ROC” strategy—to replace offensive deterrence Ministry of National Defense (2009a). The 2013 version of the QDR repeated this approach. Taiwan did not focus on strikes on China to keep battles away from the island, as the Chen administration had proposed, but instead focused on a hardened defence to absorb attacks from the PLA as a means to thwart any invasion (Ministry of National Defense, 2013; Y. W. Chen, 2009). This defensive strategy was observed in at least two dimensions: military procurement and increasing the weight for humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) missions.

During Ma’s terms, military acquisition was predominantly defensive. All sophisticated weapon systems from external sources, including AH-64E attack helicopters, PAC-3 SAMs, P-3C anti-submarine aircraft, and UH-60 M utility helicopters, were obviously defensive in Taiwan’s strategic context, as none of them were likely to launch a significant attack across the strait. Although the UGM-84 L submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles from Washington had a certain potential for offence, the arrangement of 32 missiles on only two capable Dutch platforms significantly constrained their strategic impact (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012). As for the assets supplied by the indigenous defence industry, the armoured personnel carriers (APCs), a naval supply ship, missile boats, and corvettes were strategically defensive as well (Recognition, 2015; Thim & Liao, 2016). Indigenous projects with offensive potential, namely the HF- II-E cruise missile and Wan Chien (WC) standoff missiles, were retained, but production numbers were reduced (C. Y. Lin, 2014; Threat, 2017). In general, Taiwan’s defensive procurements benefited China’s military build-ups (Tables 1 and 2).

The level of HADR was promoted as one of the Ma administration’s core missions for the armed forces, especially after Typhoon Morakot in 2009 (Today, 2009a, 2009b). The disaster caused by the typhoon emphasised the value of the military in rescue and recovery. Subsequently, some newly procured UH-60 helicopters were shifted from the army aviation brigade to the civilian rescue department, and the Marine Corps’ AAV7 amphibious vehicles also played a major role in HADR, particularly when flooding occurred (C. Y. Lin, 2014; Defense Industry Daily, 2017; Li, 2014). The QDR and whitepaper highlighted HADR as a priority during peacetime, with training and exercises being modified accordingly (Ministry of National Defense, 2009b, 2015). The emphasis on the military’s HADR role—even higher than combat preparation—was compatible with the Ma administration’s strategy, as military confrontation across the strait was meant to be downplayed (McCauley, 2018). HADR also helped the administration to manage popularity during disasters, which often occur in Taiwan.

As the Ma administration reduced cross-strait tensions, it used the military for other external security issues, as seen in a fishing incident between Taipei and Manila. When a Taiwanese fisherman was killed by the Philippine Coast Guard during a law enforcement activity on 9 May 2013, Taipei quickly escalated its response to Manila, moving from diplomatic and economic measures to military actions. Fighter jets, destroyers, frigates, and other military assets were deployed to a location close to the Philippines’ exclusive economic zones (L. Chung, 2013). Taiwan’s response was considered an overreaction and interpreted in a range of ways from domestic politics to a sign of nationalism, which were factors of popularity (Banlaoi, 2013; Bowring, 2013; Turton, 2013). Regardless of the real motive behind the escalation, the civilian leadership would be the main decision-maker. Whether the military played a key role in preventing conflict was uncertain, as Manila did not send any aircraft or vessels to the site of the exercise, which was likely owing to its weak aerial and naval capacity (Inquirer, 2013).

Conscription was a rare common ground for defence policy between the Chen and Ma administrations. Following in the previous administration’s steps, the Ma administration reduced service to one year in 2008 and announced the transition to AVF in 2013 (J. Chen, 2015; Taiwan News, 2008). The AVF policy, a major campaign proposal by Ma, sought to minimise the defence burden on young male citizens so they could more readily pursue education and employment, a popular and welcomed idea. All conscripts had to undergo only four months of training and were then classified as reserves, and all regular units were manned by voluntary personnel (Easton et al., 2017). The MND made two attempts to switch entirely to AVF from conscription in 2013 and 2015, but had to postpone this because of the failure to recruit enough voluntary soldiers (Chow, 2016). The poor level of recruitment was attributed to military salaries being less attractive than alternatives in the job market (C. Y. Lin, 2014; Cole, 2006).

Although the external threats did not have a direct impact, the death of a conscripted corporal during a disciplinary action in 2013 served as a reminder of the root of unpopular conscription. After the news of the death emerged in the media, both the corporal’s unit and the MND claimed that critical evidence, such as security camera recordings, had been lost (Taiwan News, 2013). The public was not satisfied with these explanations. The incident sparked anger, especially among male citizens who had negative experience with conscription. The issue was taken up by activists and became a social movement with a large demonstration attended by tens of thousands of people to demand more transparency and other reforms in the military (BBC News, 2013). The Ma administration introduced organisational reforms to meet these demands, such as widening the application of civil law to military affairs, and the military accepted these changes (Yeh, 2014). However, the civilian administration was unable to secure evidence related to the case from the military, a mark of the lack of efficiency of civilian control. The civilian administration’s inability to ensure conscription contributed to the mindset of adopting AVF among civilian leaderships.

Another issue between civilian control and external threats centres on counter-intelligence—namely, retired officers visiting China and espionage among personnel in service. A number of retired high-ranking officers publicly visited China owing to their Chinese identity, cultural attraction, and financial interests. These visits raised questions about the risk of disclosure of Taiwan’s classified information. Using guidelines established to manage harmonious cross-strait relations, a factor in its foundational principle, the Ma administration did not take effective action in this case (Cabestan, 2016; Lo, 2014). There was also a series of cases in which espionage was exposed; the suspects went as far up as officers with the rank of general in the services. Despite official claims that countermeasures and improvements were being undertaken, the espionage problem was not managed effectively, as evident from a case involving a former vice defence minister (Bristow, 2017; C. Wang & Hou, 2021). This inability to control the problem could be attributed to a political decision by the civilian administration regarding cross-strait relations, its lack of influence on affairs within the military, or both. Regardless, the civilian administration’s inadequate efforts for coping with intelligence issues more or less worsened Taiwan’s security, particularly when China achieved military superiority.

6. Tsai Ing-wen (2016-present): holding the status quo

With Tsai Ing-wen’s victory in the 2016 presidential election, the DPP return to power initiated a new set of dynamics between external threats and civilian control. Despite the political guidelines around preserving the status quo, the Tsai administration has not fully accepted the 1992 consensus that Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to China, a key feature distinguishing it from its predecessor and a foundational principle for its political campaigning against the KMT. Thus, Beijing has increased military activities around the island, in addition to other policies such as diplomatic measures, to put pressure on Taipei (Ministry of National Defense, 2021b; Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2021). Compared with the crisis in the 1990s, the PLA currently has greater capabilities and capacity against Taiwan, as evidenced by the two major exercises surrounding the island in 2022 and 2023 (B. Lin et al., 2023). Regarding the enhanced external threat, the Tsai administration’s defence strategy has become more offensive and substantial than the strategies of its predecessors.

The Tsai administration’s defence strategy can be seen as a civil-military synergy based on existing conditions. The official layered defence strategy aims to “resist the enemy on the other shore, attack the enemy on the sea, destroy the enemy in the littoral area, and annihilate the enemy on the beachhead” (Ministry of National Defense, 2017a; MND, 2021a). This stance is similar to the previous narrative, but offensive capabilities are amplified. Despite being downplayed by the Ma administration, Taiwan has developed its offensive capabilities, such as the CSIST’s HF-IIE cruise missiles, WC ASMs, and HF-III supersonic anti-ship missiles, along with the ongoing project of the Yun-Feng supersonic cruise missile (Threat, 2021). All of these serve as the means to project a standoff and/or sea denial firepower (Yu & Wang,). In contrast to China’s sophisticated platforms, these missiles present an asymmetrical countermeasure, as Taiwan is inferior in naval and aerial capabilities (Tables 1 and 2). Taiwan’s accidental firing of the HF-III anti-ship missile in the strait in 2016 appeared to strengthen the narrative of the denial strategy (Lewis, 2016). From 2019 onwards, Washington’s offer of AGM-84 H land attack cruise missiles, Army Tactical Missile Systems, AGM-154C standoff munitions, and other arms also boosted Taipei’s offensive capability (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, n.d..). Although the Tsai administration was not able to design the entire strategy, the civilian leadership’s green light was crucial for the MND to secure funding for both indigenous and American arms. It took considerable diplomatic effort for Taipei to deal with Washington for arms sales, and the role of the civilian leadership was indispensable.

The indigenous defence industry has been another feature that the Tsai administration has promoted vis-à-vis external threats. During the election campaign in 2015, Tsai’s team emphasised the economic and defence value of investing in the indigenous defence industry (J. Chung, 2015). After Tsai’s inauguration, the nomination of Feng Shih-kuan, a retired Air Force general, was interpreted as a sign of his rich experience in the defence industry, such as developing the indigenous defence fighter (IDF) (Taipei Times, 2017). Subsequently, the three services of the armed forces respectively made proposals. The Navy has been the main stakeholder in indigenous projects, including submarines, additional stealth corvettes, landing platforms, high-speed minelayers, transport ships, frigates, and minehunters with construction periods of more than two decades (Ministry of National Defense, 2017c). Washington’s agreement to sell submarine technology to Taipei was a positive sign for the more difficult indigenous submarine project (NHK World, 2018). The Air Force requires T-5 advanced jet trainers, developed from the IDF (Giovanzanti, 2021). The Army has not been assigned many additional projects, but its CM-32 APCs have been developed into several versions of armed vehicles (Taipei Times, 2021). The indigenous missile models mentioned above have been a part of Taipei’s investments. With continuous support during both terms of the Tsai administration, several projects have progressed considerably, and the submarine project may also proceed rapidly (Ministry of National Defense, 2021b). Both a more offensive strategy and the development of defence industries reflect the DPP’s pro-independence foundational principle that allows more confrontation in the strait.

The defence industry represented a major solution for Taiwan’s civilian leadership to deal with external threats, but it faces financial challenge under the Tsai administration. The costs of developing indigenous models of sophisticated weapon systems are usually higher than those of purchasing models with similar performance from abroad, especially those that are already in production (Taylor, 1990). Owing to the international isolation and clear threats to its survival, it is crucial for Taiwan to develop its military assets, even at an extra cost, but the civilian leadership’s financial support may be uncertain. Despite official claims, the defence budgets of the Tsai administration did not reach 3%, or even 2.2%, of the gross domestic product between 2016 and 2022 (Bandow, 2021; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022b). Less than 30% of these budgets are allocated for defence investment, with the rest spent on training and human costs (MND, 2021b). Thus, indigenous projects rely on special budgets, which means there is a lack of structural reform to support the defence industries (Madjar, 2022).

Being less concerned about harmonious cross-strait relations, the Tsai administration focused more on intelligence issues. From 2017 onward, retired generals’ visits to China have been restricted and, in 2019, new laws were passed to strip the pensions of officers who are sentenced for espionage (Bristow, 2017; Strong, 2019). These efforts should reduce Taiwan’s vulnerability, but the actual effect is not certain, as espionage cases continue to appear and there is likely a high number of Chinese spies on the island (Chin & Chung, 2017; Lee & Lague, 2021; Y. Chang, 2020). It is too early to determine whether such cases signify the efficiency of counter-espionage mechanisms or only address the tip of the iceberg (Lu et al., 2023).

Unlike other policies that show high concern for external threats, the AVF policy works differently by reducing the size of the armed forces. Before the 2016 election, some DPP legislators used polls to argue for an extension of conscription, but the AVF policy was put into effect by the MND under the Tsai administration in 2019 (Molter, 2019). During the transition, recruitment did not go well, and the manpower shortage became increasingly serious. The gap was estimated at 14,000 troops, a significant number of armed forces with a planned size of 175,000 during peacetime (Tu & Chin, 2018). Apart from soldiers, the shortage of officers also became relevant to the extent that the MND had to take measures such as improving the living environment to maintain numbers (Ministry of National Defense, 2017b). Regardless of various difficulties, both the Tsai administration and the MND implemented the AVF policy (Ministry of National Defense, 2018). Later, the MND claimed to reach 90% of its recruitment goal, but it did not reveal additional details such as the gaps in human resources and the shortage of officers (C. P. Wang, 2021; Ministry of National Defense, 2021b). The reduction in a few combat units was viewed as a means of improving the recruitment rate (Gu, 2021).

The insufficient quantity, and perhaps also quality, of human resources undermines the effectiveness of Taiwan’s armed forces. Although land troops, where the manpower shortage seems most prevalent, are less relevant to island defence owing to their lack of function in the maritime domain, their strategic value has significantly increased in the context of military inferiority to China. Within decades of confrontation, the PLA would be able to develop various means such as ballistic and cruise missiles to defeat Taiwan’s air and naval assets, and the lack of strategic depth across the strait indicates that the latter would be highly exposed to the former’s firepower. Given the disadvantageous exchange, Taipei may initially lose a great deal of major platforms and other arms and may fail to stop Beijing’s landing. The existence of conscription signifies the likelihood of further resistance. Conscription enlarges the armed forces for more operational flexibility and allows for a greater margin to bear losses. As most male citizens with military training can extend resistance beyond conventional warfare, a prolonged war with rising costs would contribute to Taiwan’s general deterrence against China. Even before China could build any beachhead, conscription would provide relatively sufficient capacity to protect key facilities and respond to sabotages and other attacks by the PLA special forces and other troops that might penetrate into the island in advance (Ministry of National Defense, 2021b).

Despite its significant effort on promoting AVF, the Tsai administration has adjusted the policy due to external threats. After the AVF, the MND has extended service terms for officers, while also adding specific training for conscripts in field units and prolonged mobilisation exercises for reserves (Ministry of National Defense, 2022a; Reuters, 2021; Taiwan, 2021). It is difficult to predict whether the civilian leadership or the military will take the lead in modifying the AVF, but there was no major change until the Russo-Ukraine War. In March 2022, the defence minister mentioned the possibility of extending conscription (Blanchard & Lee, 2022). At the end of 2022, Taipei extended the conscription back to one year for male citizens born in 2006 and later, after Beijing’s extensive exercises, especially those in August (Feng, 2022). Despite a lack of direct evidence, Washington’s attitude may suggest its influence on the extension of service (Nakamura, 2022).

7. Non-military factors in Taiwan’s civilian control in the context of external threats

Two categories of non-military factors, namely national identities and election considerations, have shaped civilian control in Taiwan, including their responses to external threats. Taipei’s civilian control has certainly prevented the military from applying coercive means in the civil domain, and it has allowed different civilian leaderships to pursue their respective defence strategies. Although all administrations and legislators have obtained legitimate political power from the democratic mechanism, both “blue” and “green” camps have generally failed to develop a consensus on China due to their diverse national identities with their respective views on China as the primary external threat. Overall, bifurcated civilian control has resulted in inconsistent defence strategies.

The pan-blue, including the KMT, does not deny China as an external threat, but it sees the possibility of unification across the strait. In contrast to para bellum, they highlight dialogue and integration to maintain peace. As peace has often been a predominant reason for Taiwanese people to support the status quo, the pursuit of harmonic relations across the strait has been popular in Taiwan (Kassam, 2021). Since Beijing is Taipei’s largest trade partner, peace further involves the economy (World Trade Organization, 2020). Since peace is not a unilateral effort, the need to somehow satisfy China’s conditions such as a lack of challenge against the one-China policy is unavoidable for harmonious relations across the strait. Undeniably, cross-strait integration, especially under the 1992 consensus, could lead to unification, which would eventually terminate the ROC regime, including other features of the status quo such as the current democracy. Yet, the unification is acceptable, if not preferable, for political elites and people with the Chinese identity, and the ROC Constitution stands for this possibility (Constitution of the Republic of China [Taiwan]). Consequently, a strong defence would at best be temporarily useful to deter Beijing from taking an adventurist alternative to negotiations, whereas offensive capabilities should be downplayed to avoid provocation. It must be noted that the KMT under the Lee administration in the 1990s differed with regard to the narrative and saw China being a clear and present threat. The difference could be attributed to the civilian leadership’s relatively lower influence on defence policy at the time, and Lee’s political approach plus the crisis also highlighted threats from China.

The pursuit of independence, at least at a de facto level, is a foundational principle of the DPP along with other pan-green or pro-independence parties. As de jure independence would be the ultimate goal, preparing for a potential war with Beijing should be imperative for Taipei. From the less ambitious perspective of preserving the status quo, preventing Taiwan from being captured by China is vital. From the mid-2010s, there has been “third force” appearing in Taiwan’s domestic politics, but its views on China lie between the two approaches mentioned above, rather than being completely different.

The two DPP administrations were keen on developing offensive capabilities to enable more strategic flexibility through denial by disrupting China’s invasion and perhaps inflict punishment by attacking some economic targets. During Chen’s terms, the ambitious strategy of striking remote targets, including Shanghai or even the Three Gorges (Sanxia) Dam, was intended to have a psychological impact on China through deterrence by punishment (Chuang, 2007). In contrast, the Tsai administration plans to attack the opposite shore of the strait to disrupt invasion as deterrence by denial. The counter-value of Chen’s offensive strategy might be attributed to its initial stage of developing the strategy and related capabilities. After a period of development, substantial capabilities make the Tsai administration’s strategy rather practical and moderate. The offensive strategy was not exclusively initiated by the DPP administration, as the Chiang Ching-kuo administration attempted to develop nuclear weapons more than once in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the DPP administrations have moderately realised the offensive strategy instead of being set back (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2015). The indigenous defence industry also serves this purpose while enriching industrial and technological capacities as well.

The two approaches towards the external threat based on distinct foundational principles resulted in inconsistent defence strategies that put Taiwan in a more inferior position vis-à-vis China. When Beijing accelerated its military build-up during the Chen administration, Taipei did not maintain its original pace of modernisation as it experienced delays and failures in major projects, particularly submarines. The Ma administration’s passive defence strategy with limited and defensive procurements amplified the unfavourable balance of forces across the strait. When the Tsai administration resumed Taiwan’s military build-ups in 2016, the asymmetric approach reflected its inferiority vis-à-vis China (Tables 1 and 2). The gap of military capability across the strait is wide enough for China to attain certain superiority with its East Theatre Command alone (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023). Consequently, how Taiwan’s asymmetrical capabilities could deter the PLA may not be certain. Although Beijing had a rising economic and political trajectory and was eventually set to become militarily superior to Taipei, the gap could have been narrower, and the balance could have been less disadvantageous to the latter had it responded better with a consensus among the civilian political elites.

Nevertheless, consensus within civilian leaderships based on the same concern about popularity could be detrimental to defence as well, as demonstrated by the AVF policy. The KMT and DPP administrations shared a mostly negative view of conscription, thus promoting the AVF. For the reasons mentioned above, conscription has not been popular in Taiwan. Hence, the two major political parties shortened compulsory service to attract votes. With the obvious anti-unification position, the DPP needs a stronger defence capability than the KMT, but the former has been even more willing to reduce conscription. During Chen’s terms, the AVF was set as a policy goal, inherited by its successors. In contrast to its KMT predecessor, which postponed the AVF twice, the Tsai administration made great effort towards the AVF despite some drawbacks. Although the policy U-turn in 2022 has reversed the AVF/conscription policy, it demonstrates the extent to which a popularity factor can override security concern.

The issue of conscription ought to be more sophisticated than simply extending the service term. To resume the previous conscription system by extending the length of service back to one year is an administrative decision, but improving training is a sheer challenge to the civilian control in Taiwan. An extension from four months would indeed provide more time for training, but the efficient use of this extra time for improving individual conscripts’ combat skills could not rely on the military alone. Since democratisation, the MND and armed forces have maintained their autonomy from civilian control, and their training for conscripts has often been criticised for low relevance to warfare and the conscripts’ poor readiness for combat (Chen, 2021; Cheung, 2023; Huang, 2020). If the civilian administration hopes to avoid repeating the previous flaws of conscription, greater monitoring and other involvement would be necessary; however, the lack of civilian talents in defence affairs and the need to reduce military autonomy would be notable challenges. If the civilian leadership is not fully aware of the value of conscription or does not have enough political will to pursue substantial reforms of conscription, an extension of conscription would be more ceremonial than a substantial boost to defence.

Despite not being a defence policy, Taiwan’s energy policy in recent years is another example of a non-military factor related to popularity that affects national security. Since the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011, anti-nuclear sentiment has been dominant, and both the KMT and DPP administrations have accommodated the demand to remove nuclear power. The Ma administration stopped the fourth nuclear power plant from being commissioned and instead built natural gas-powered power stations (Hung, 2014). The Tsai administration has followed this trend and enlarged the portion of green energy (Taiwan Power Company, 2023a). As a result, natural gas reached 43% of power generation in 2023. However, the amount of natural gas in storage would only last 11 days, despite an official goal of 24 days (Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2022; Kuo & Kao, 2023; Taiwan Power Company, 2023b). This vulnerability in energy could allow China to achieve heavy pressure in a short period of time, even without kinetic attack, through the use of blockades.

As all civilian leaderships can sacrifice security for non-military considerations, they matter more in Taiwan than anywhere else due to its dual vulnerable position: legal and geographic. The unsettled cross-strait relationship makes Taiwan not a sovereign state, and thus its survival faces greater risks than that of any of small or weak countries neighbouring China, such as Laos. The island’s location adjacent to the rising superpower results in its increasing military vulnerability to the progressing PLA. In other words, Taiwan’s narrow for error margin makes flaws in its defence policies more influential and observable. As a result, the island’s security is increasingly subject to external environment, particularly the Sino-US balance.

Taiwan’s civilian leadership could remain in its central role in responding to the external threat. According to the political context, a polity other than democracy, such as a junta, is unlikely. The lack of ambitious and charismatic officers makes a junta unimaginable, and a high dependence on international trade exposes Taiwan to international sanction, especially by the West. Although a soft authoritarian polity under the guise of democracy is not impossible, the civilian control would not be structurally changed, and thus civilian leaderships’ attention to non-military factors in both categories remain.

In the near future, both categories of non-military factors for Taiwan’s civilian leadership may be considerably merged and intertwined with military affairs due to the evolving geostrategic climate. The DPP’s victory in the presidential and congressional elections of 2020, along with the KMT’s poor performance and popularity, seemed to suggest greater public acceptance of the pro-independence or anti-unification political approach in Taiwan (L. Chung, 2022; Wu & Madjar, 2021). However, China’s continuously strengthening military capability, marked with the island-surrounding exercises, and doubts about the United States’ security commitment to the strait could cause the external threat to rise to an unprecedented level, thus affecting Taiwanese voters more than before. Strengthening defence is a natural response to external threat, but appeasement is an alternative. Non-DPP parties and presidential candidates may highlight peace instead of the current approach, including the extended length of conscription, and the DPP’s amendment of its pro-independence position cannot be excluded either. In short, the upcoming presidential and congressional elections in 2024 are likely to reset Taiwan’s response to the external threat.

Whether a pro-independence/anti-unification or a pro-unification/China-friendly stance will be taken by Taiwan’s next administration, it could be facing a more formidable external threat. If the new leadership continues the current asymmetrical defence, developing a strategy to be really capable of meeting the threat would be the main challenge, especially with regard to allocating enough resources. Given that Taipei shifts towards appeasement, the military’s inability to respond to Beijing would be the persistent outcome. Both possible routes suggest that Taiwan’s civilian leadership has an even narrower margin to make mistakes in its defence policy.

8. Conclusion

Democracy has been the primary difference between Taiwan and China, but it has not benefitted the former much in its defence against the latter. Democracy, including civilian control, is simply a form of polity rather than a solution to the diverse national identities of the unique statehood or popularism in Taiwan. Civilian control with the democratic mechanism has exposed some fundamental defects which were covered in the previous authoritarian era when political freedom was restricted. Although a harmony-oriented defence strategy may not reappear, the opportunity to achieve a better balance of forces has been missed. As for conscription, the current extension would not be sufficient and sufficient civilian leadership effort is needed to make it militarily meaningful.

From another perspective, with such a high level of external threat, the Taiwanese civilian leadership still has the right to be wrong and the island still retains its way of life instead of being captured by China. This phenomenon has nevertheless been based on the Sino-US balance, especially Beijing’s caution and Washington’s superiority. These factors may be reshaped along with various evolving forces in the foreseeable future, such as the United States’ financial difficulties and China’s strengthening of conventional and nuclear capabilities. In other words, civilian leadership in Taiwan may face a more formidable external threat than before, given the lack of a sound foundation from its predecessors to stand upon.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Shang-Su Wu

Shang-Su Wu is an Assistant Professor at Rabdan Academy, United Arab Emirates. PhD. in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Australia. Main research areas include defence policies, military modernisation, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, railways of international relations. Main publications: the Defence Capabilities of Small States: Singapore and Taiwan’s Response to Strategic Desperation (London: Palgrave, 2016); “China’s Railway Diplomacy under the Belt and Road Initiative” in Research Handbook of the Belt and Road Initiative (London: Edward Elgar, 2021); “Military Modernisation in Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific Context” (2021) etc.