Framing Glasnost and Perestroika, criticising the New Order: an analysis of Kompas’ news coverage

Abstract

This research examines how Kompas, an Indonesian press company, framed the issues of glasnost and perestroika in its daily publications from 1986 to 1991 to criticise the authoritarian New Order regime. This research found that Kompas attempted to negotiate with the New Order’s centralised authoritarian power through editorial articles on the issues of glasnost and perestroika. Compared to the Old Order Indonesia, the New Order government’s bilateral relations with Russia declined significantly. However, from 1986 to 1991, the frequency of news coverage about Russia (the Soviet Union) was massive. Such frequent coverage was inseparable from the implementation of glasnost and perestroika reform movements in the Soviet Union, which defined the zeitgeist at the time. This research found that Kompas implicitly criticised the New Order regime by articulating that change may occur in an authoritarian and military state, if the government had the determination. Applying a media framing analysis to examine Kompas editorial articles from 1986 to 1991, this research demonstrates that comprehensive media framing strategies are required in exploring issues related to authoritarian political regimes, as the strategies allow the press to express criticism while evading the risk of being banned. Negotiation with existing power holders is necessary so that the media may uphold its role as one of the primary pillars of democracy that is capable of criticising existing power holders.

Keywords:

• Indonesian press
• new order regime
• media framing analysis

REVIEW EDITOR:

• Lincoln Geraghty, School of Media and Performing Arts, University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom

SUBJECTS:

• Media Communication; Political Communication; Indonesian

1. Background

Followed by the 1917 October Revolution, the fall of the Russian Empire after World War I led to the establishment of the Soviet Union. Once an absolute monarchy in which the Tsar was dubbed the ‘defender of the faith’ of Russian Orthodox Christianity, the state transformed into a socialistic republic under one political party which embraced the sole communist ideology of Marxism-Leninism. This transformation distinguished the Soviet Union from other communist states which either adopted pure Marxism or embraced the interfusions between Marxism and other ideologies, such as Maoism.

Marxism began in Indonesia as Henk Sneevliet founded ISDV (Indische Sociaal Democartische Vereeniging), an association that would establish the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI/Partai Komunis Indonesia) in 1914. Nevertheless, the relationship between Russia and Indonesia only started developing significantly after PKI members joined Communist International (Comintern), a Soviet international organisation with a headquarter in Moskva (Moscow). Russia’s recognition of and support for Indonesian communism were evident when Comintern delegated Tan Malaka as the representative of Southeast Asian and Far Eastern Comintern. In addition, the Soviet Union also provided Marxism education in Moskva for Musso, Semaoen, and other PKI members. The Soviet Union’s further support for the independence of Indonesia was identifiable in Stalin’s support for Musso’s rebellion against the Dutch colonial government in 1926. Russia’s support for Indonesia’s struggle for independence continued over decades, from the end of World War II, Dutch colonialism, to Japan’s fascism.

During the early days of Indonesian independence, Russia supported Indonesia’s sovereignty as a new country in a move of contesting the US, the UK, and the allied forces’ plan to restore Indonesia’s former position as a Dutch colony. Russia’s support won the hearts of Indonesian people, as it resonated with ideas of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. However, Sukarno (the first President of Indonesia) decided to remain neutral, as the aftermath of World War II engendered an unstable political constellation of power between nations.

After World War II, the world’s politics entered a new phase, with the emergence of two superpower blocks with contending ideologies: (1) the United States, which holds on to capitalism and liberalism, and (2) the Soviet Union, which upheld communism and socialism. Competition between the two countries led to a worldwide political and military tension, otherwise known as the Cold War, which was enacted without full-fledged war. Instead, the Cold War was done through ideological influences, coalition of states, and foreign infrastructural, educational, and sports-related aid for states affected by World War II (i.e. Marshall Plan or Molotov Plan). One of the most tangible proofs of the Cold War was the establishment of military alliances, namely the America-led NATO (the western bloc) and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact (the eastern bloc).

Conflicted by the Cold War, Sukarno decided to form an alliance with NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), which remained neutral before the western and eastern bloc. The alliance with NAM, however, did not prevent the US and the Soviet Union from offering foreign aid, and Sukarno took the opportunity to stimulate Indonesia’s development instead. These supports came in the forms of not only scholarships (in the fields of education, arts, and culture) but also military weapons. After Sukarno’s visit to Moskva, Indonesian universities began offering Russian studies (particularly Slavic studies), Chinese Studies, and American Studies (Khrushchev, 2013). As for the military aid, American foreign aid went straight to the Army, while Russian aid went to the Navy, the Air Force, and the Police.

Regardless of the slight disturbance caused by PKI’s 1949 Madiun Affair, the relationship between Russia and Indonesia grew stronger during the 1950s and 1960s, especially after Sukarno proposed two ideas: the Nationalist-Religious-Communist Pancasila (Nasionalis-Agamis-Komunis/Nasakom) and the Political Manifesto in the Constitutional Law (Manipol-Usdek) as the country’s foundation. The latter allowed Indonesian socialism to become an ideology that was officially recognised by the state. With socialism becoming a part of the country’s foundation, state principles of both the USSR and Indonesia shared many similarities from the 1950s to the 1960s.

Bilateral relationship between the two countries significantly improved between the 1950s and mid-1960s, as signified by meetings between President Sukarno and President Nikita Khrushchev. After Sukarno visited Moskva, Khrushchev visited Jakarta and Bali in the following year. Such cordial relationship between the Soviet Union and Indonesia occurred as Russia began to notice the thriving existence of PKI, which was then the largest communist party in the world after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Acquiring more than six million votes, PKI took a substantial number of votes in the 1955 General Election and positioned themselves just below other major Indonesian political parties, such as PNI, Masyumi, and NU.

However, the bilateral relationship which had been nurtured in the 1950s and the 1960s could not survive the unanticipated coup in October 1965, otherwise known as the 30 September Movement. Scapegoating PKI, the coup subsequently destroyed the party’s massive influence as well as communism’s image before the public eyes. Communism was deemed as the source of the chaos which followed the coup, and the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR) specified that communism was a forbidden ideology for Indonesians through TAP MPRS 1966. The spread of communist ideology was completely banned, and stigmas were attached to activities related to communism. In a transition period from Sukarno’s Old Order to Soeharto’s New Order, Indonesia’s attitude toward Russia shifted. Once an ally, Russia’s image turned as it was portrayed as a state with a dangerous ideology. This subsequently influenced the relation between Indonesia and Russia, and how the bilateral relations changed are identifiable from the former press’ coverage about the latter.

During the Old Order era, countries with socialist or communist foundations received more positive coverage in comparison to news or reports on countries that embraced capitalism (Yatmaka, 2015). Nevertheless, the September 30th Movement shifted the foundation of news coverage in Indonesia and therefore allowed Soeharto to construct a different approach of dealing with the press. After Indonesian army generals were killed in the coup, as the leader of the Army, Soeharto put a halt to a majority of newspaper publications and radio station operations, with the exception of two Army-supervised newspapers, Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersenjata. During Soeharto’s New Order era, the press portrayed the Soviet Union and communism/socialism as hostile and dangerous, especially as the ideologies were scapegoated as the cause of the 1965 tragedy (Roosa & Hilmar, 2004).

Compared to the Old Order, the New Order’s news coverage on Russia was less frequent, as the Department of Information became the gatekeeper of discourse circulating within national publications. An exception was made when an Indonesian Naval officer leaked the map of Indonesian sea lanes to a Russian agent in 1984, as the case was massively broadcasted. The event was put under the spotlight of the national press as several Aeroflot (a Russian aviation company) and the Soviet Union embassy’s staff members were subsequently given the status persona non grata by the New Order Government. These coverages also emphasised the dangers of Russia and its communist ideology. Aside from this espionage case, almost no other issues related to Russia were frequently broadcasted.

However, when a significant change occurred in Eastern Europe (particularly in Russia and all members of the Warsaw Pact) as Mikhail Gorbachev introduced glasnost (literal: openness) and perestroika (literal: restructuring) movements in the 27^th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1986, the Indonesian press started to increase its coverage on Russia. Once the Soviet Union carried out these movements, other members of the Warsaw Pact also started implementing glasnost and perestroika. Gorbachev proposed these two movements in the attempt at forming a peaceful and safe ‘Common European Home’ that would be free from the shadows of confrontation (Gorbachev, 1998).

Glasnost and Perestroika led to several ramifications unforeseen by Gorbachev. A notable result of these movements was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disestablishment of the Warsaw Pact. The most significant impact of the two movements was the fall of the Soviet Union in 25 December 1991, as capitalism and liberalism penetrated Eastern Europe. As the Soviet Union fell, Russia ceased to adopt communism as its official ideology. Many interpreted the historic event as a display of communism’s defeat against American liberalism and capitalism. In the book The End of History, Francis Fukuyama further mentioned that the fall of the Soviet Union was the end of the Cold War.

As significant changes in Eastern Europe led to new dynamics of global power relations, the Indonesian press enthusiastically published news related to how glasnost and perestroika unfolded in the region. As the two movements began, the Indonesian press’ coverage on Russia changed. The Indonesian press companies, especially Kompas and Tempo, portrayed that glasnost and perestroika as positive changes in Russia. The amount of coverage on Russia and Eastern Europe also increased significantly. Tempo specifically published a special edition on Eastern Europe’s glasnost in its 7 February 1987 edition. Meanwhile, Kompas placed glasnost and perestroika in not only its foreign news section, but also its editorial, columns, and entertainment sections.

Kompas is a daily newspaper that was considered prestigious as it gave a significant amount of space for foreign issues (3–4 printed pages) during the New Order era (Shah, 1996). According to Shah and Ette, while newspaper publications tend to feature news covering crimes, politics, and sports, Kompas was the only publication at the time which featured topics of international news in a separate section.

During the 1978 two-week ban which affected national publications such as Sinar Harapan and Indonesia Raya, Kompas managed to remain in circulation despite the fact that it subtly criticised the government. They successfully avoided the ban due to Kompas’ underlying ideology, where the publication strategically positioned itself in the New Order context, particularly by accepting (the government’s) imperfections while highlighting the room for improvements in the future. In practising this ideology, Kompas emphasises that a journalist does not only a technical job, but also an intellectual one. Therefore, Kompas’ news coverage is not merely a mechanical reproduction of an event, but the result of an intense struggle and dialectics between the event and Kompas’ ideological perception and the journalist’s consciousness.

At the same time, Kompas resembled other publications which emerged during the New Order era, in the sense that they could not be free from values. Kompas emphasises that in enacting its role of controlling and giving social criticisms, the news company upholds the freedom of press while upholding particular values, due to specific needs which arise in specific situations (Oetama, 2007). In other words, Jakob Oetama argued that Kompas took various measures to avoid ban; however, its news coverages were not necessarily controlled by the government.

Kompas needed to take various measures since the press, especially daily publications, was facing a very tangible risk of an editorial article which would backfire during the New Order (Oetama, 1999). If during the Old Order, the press had belonged to the editors where chief editors held the most important roles, the New Order press had to operate on two principles: the development press (the state’s instruction) and advocacy press. The latter’s operation depends on the reflective capabilities of a daily publication in assessing any existing sociopolitical contexts (Oetama, 2000). In the case of Kompas, the news company informed the public about the government’s program of development, yet they also interpreted the information according to its editorial ideology. Here, Kompas remained a partner of the government while subtly maintaining its function of social control. In Oetama’s words, this was a way of ‘communicating in an insincere society.’

In taking its role of informing the public about development programs, Kompas focused on issues such as foreign affairs (Oetama, 2007). According to Oetama, international news was useful to inspire and enlighten the public on issues related to Indonesia’s development. Consequently, Kompas carefully selected international news according to Indonesia’s sociopolitical context at the time. In the late 1980s, Kompas was a daily publication which massively reported glasnost and perestroika. In a period of 6 years (1985–1991), a total of 425 articles on glasnost and perestroika (220 and 285, respectively) were published, signifying how Kompas viewed these movements as important topics to cover. When Oetama’s statement about Kompas’ editorial principles was taken into account in relation to such massive coverage, this would mean that glasnost and perestroika bore resemblances with Indonesia’s sociopolitical contexts at the time.

It is arguable that such high amount of exposure for issues related to glasnost and perestroika was driven by several underlying motives. As Kompas’ editor in chief at the time, Jakob Oetama once stated that Kompas did not only provide information on foreign affairs in relation to the Indonesian government’s programs of development, but also interpret these sets of information in relevance with existing sociopolitical circumstances. It is hypothesised that Kompas intended to indirectly criticise Soeharto’s government, and this factor also contributed to how Kompas avoided the ban through subtle and structured critiques. Due to such hypothesis, it is necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis to understand Kompas’ adeptness in conveying news, particularly in how the media framed specific issues. This research applies the method and the theory of framing to 425 Kompas articles published from 1986 to 1991.

The study found 425 published articles consisting of various segments, such as editorials, hard news, features (soft news), advertising placements (‘klasika’/klasifikasi iklan), word of the day (istilah), and ‘origins’ (asal-usul). Kompas’ frequency of coverage on glasnost-perestroika was in line with the global zeitgeist related to these movements, which started to gain global recognition in 1986 and reached their peak in 1991. There were merely 14 articles on glasnost and perestroika from 1986 to 1987. From 1988 to 1989, however, 108 articles were published on the topic. Next, in the period of 1990–1991, the number increased to 303. Such high amount of coverage in the later years was closely related to a zeitgeist which began in 1986 and reached its peak in 1991 when Gorbachev disestablished the Soviet Union. In 1991 alone, Kompas’ published 173 coverages on glasnost and perestroika.

In terms of monthly number of publications, the highest quantitative increase of coverages on the issue was found in January, February, and March 1990 when the topic of the independence of Baltic States (Estonia SSR, Latvia SSR, and Lithuania SSR) was reaching its peak. Similarly, in August 1991, a spike of Kompas’ coverage on related topics was found as the issue of a coup against Gorbachev’s government in the Soviet Union began to circulate. While the increasing amount of Kompas’ coverage was in line with the changing zeitgeist related to the movements from 1986—1991, Kompas also had its own agenda in pushing the number of publications related to these issues. Further elaboration on this proposition will be provided in the analysis section of this research.

The increasing coverage on glasnost-perestroika was followed by the increasing number of editorial articles which further discussed these movements in more details. Editorial articles signify the ideological positioning of a media/publication. Consequently, the increasing number of editorial articles related to glasnost-perestroika indirectly signifies how important the issue was for Kompas, and how the media wished to subtly convey particular messages for its readers. Yearly quantitative increase of articles and editorials on the issue of glasnost and perestroika is detailed in the following Figure 1:

Figure 1. The increasing number of Kompas’ published articles and editorials on Glasnost and Perestroika between 1986 and 1991, retrieved from the National Archives.

The graph reveals that the number of Kompas’ published articles on glasnost-perestroika significantly rose from 1 to 173 in the respective years of 1986 and 1991, and such spike was parallel with the incremental publication of editorials. If merely 2 editorials on the pertaining issue were published in 1986—1987, the number surged by 1200% to 24 editorials in 1988—1989. Subsequently, in 1990–1991, 43 Kompas’ editorials on glasnost-perestroika were published (79% increase in terms of quantity). Considering that an editorial shows a publication’s ideological positioning, these constant incremental trends in the number of editorial articles proved how the issue of glasnost-perestroika became gradually more important for Kompas. It is important to note that the analysis section of this research also distinguished editorial articles which focused on glasnost-perestroika as international news and those which utilised the issue to criticise the New Order government.

An editorial conveys a media’s ideological positioning in relation to the interest of its stakeholders, which consist of its editorial team, journalists, and even shareholders of the publication (van Dijk, 1996). Since an editorial article holds such an important ideological positioning in a daily publication, Kompas’ critique of the New Order can be understood from how they write their editorials, including the specifics in which they frame the issues of glasnost and perestroika.

An editorial is given the highest position among newspaper segments, as its degree of importance transcends that of coverage (hard news) and features (soft news) (Entman, 1991; Gamson, 1992; Asher, 1995; Fairclough, 1995). Typically, the initials of a journalist are not attached to a Kompas editorial, with the exception of editorials of several editions where the initial JO (Jakob Oetama, the editor in chief and the person in charge) is visible. In comparison, features and hard news are usually accompanied by the initials of their writer(s) and editor(s).

Similar to the New York Times and Washington Post, Kompas places its editorial as its primary daily political stance (Asher, 1995). According to Oetama (2002), the writing of a Kompas editorial is the most important writing phase of the publication and the most important responsibility of the chief editor. This statement was also confirmed by Redana (2021). Since Kompas’ editorial articles are the voice of their ideological stance, they become invaluable research corpora. Kompas’ ways of negotiating with the power of the New Order Government can be identified through examining how its editorials were written.

Kompas’ editorials’ framing of glasnost-perestroika shows that it is possible to classify the media’s editorial articles on the pertaining issue into two types: (1) editorials with a dominant tendency to criticise the New Order Government and (2) editorials with a dominant tendency of reporting an issue through the frame of international news, albeit with slight criticisms for the government. In the preliminary analysis, it was found that in terms of the quantity of a published editorial, the latter type (editorials which focused on the issue of glasnost-perestroika) exceeded the former (editorials with social criticisms for the New Order government). Nevertheless, editorials on international news/foreign affairs also contain criticisms for the New Order. Though these editorials were few, their number increased in the period of 1986–1991. From 1986 to 1987, only 1 editorial article expressed bold criticisms for the New Order. The number of such editorials increased to 5 articles in the period of 1988–1989. Meanwhile, between 1990 and 1991, there were 9 editorials which criticised the New Order. Notably, blunt editorials which utilised the framing of glasnost-perestroika to criticise the New Order government were accompanied with the editor-in-chief’s initials (JO/Jakob Oetama).

Arguably, the gradual increase of the number of editorials was one of Kompas’ strategies in negotiating with existing power holders at the time. Had Kompas’ editorials been dominated by criticisms for the New Order government, it would not have remained a neutral/centrist publication (harian tengah). A centrist publication positions itself on two sides. More specifically, the publication would serve as the voice for the government’s program and, at the same time, examine recent issues related to the government through critical points of view. In this context, Kompas’ critiques were conveyed through strategic and subtle ways that allowed the publication to avoid the ban issued by the Department of Information. In brief, Kompas was able to criticise the New Order’s authoritarian regime while keeping itself secure through hiding its critical remarks in its editorials’ framing of glasnost-perestroika. Kompas’ criticism increased as more coverages on glasnost-perestroika were made and bilateral relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union under Gorbachev’s government improved.

Considering that Kompas is a national daily publication with a prestigious status, its massive and intensive coverage on the movements implies a hidden message. When examined in the context of the repressive and totalitarian New Order government, the shift in Kompas’ portrayal of Russia can be understood as the beginning of a covert resistance. Additionally, such change can also be understood as the media’s strategy and attempt to criticise the New Order regime without the fear of having its publication license revoked by the government. This research analyses how Kompas utilises the issues of glasnost and perestroika as an entry point for discussing political changes in Indonesia during the New Order era, particularly from 1986—1991. In analysing this issue, this research will focus on two research questions: (1) How did Kompas frame the issues of glasnost and perestroika in Russia in the period of 1986–1991? And (2) What were Kompas’ strategies in utilising media framing for conveying its criticisms for the New Order government?

The objective of this paper is to show how Kompas’ editorials made use of the news of the political development in the Soviet Union to push its agenda for a political change in Indonesia without being suspected or accused of criticizing the New Order. Kompas’ strategies to escape state censorship of the media while still being able to bring critical awareness to the reading public regarding the need to democratize Indonesia are important to be studied in light of the art of negotiation between the media as the ‘beacon of freedom’ on the one hand and the state that tries to curb such freedom in the struggle for democratization.

2. Literature review

Existing works of research with similar topics and corpora could be classified into three categories: (1) Research on the politics of Kompas’ editorials; (2) Research on media framing, and; (3) Research on the press’ role as an agent of change. Existing research on Kompas and the press’ condition during the New Order Era include that of Wijayanto (2019), Shah and Gayatri (1994), Yani (2002), Kleden and Oetama (2007), Imtihani (2014), Herman and Nurdiasa (2010), Agustin (2018), Situmorang (2016), Suwirta (2017), Ardianto (2012), and Putri (2015).

Analysing Kompas’ image as a mainstream publication, both Wijayanto (2019) and Shah and Gayatri (1994) provided details on how Kompas sustained its position as an elite newspaper in Indonesia. Shah and Gayatri analysed news coverages, particularly those on foreign affairs, economy, and education, in addition to the publication’s editorials. They found that as these coverages were embedded with the opinions of academics and intellectuals, Kompas managed to establish its image as an elite publication during the New Order era. Their research also suggested that during the New Order period, Kompas was the only daily publication which provided an exclusive space for international issues. Meanwhile, Wijayanto (2019) focused on the politics of the editorials and found that Kompas emphasised emotive elements (‘rasa’) in its coverages to sustain its ‘elite’ status. As an emotive type of journalism (jurnalisme ‘rasa’), Kompas ensured its survival throughout the Old Order, the New Order, and the Reformation period. Due to Kompas’ ability to survive over the three periods and each of their characteristics, Kompas has been known as a mainstream media in Indonesia. Both Wijayanto (2019) and Shah and Gayatri’s (1994) research have focused on the politics of Kompas’ editorials, but their research has not analysed Kompas’ strategy in utilising news as a tool to criticise a regime.

Referring to Yani (2002), Kleden and Oetama (2007), and Imtihani (2014), it is inferred that the politics of Kompas’ editorial does not always highlight its emotive elements or elite status, particularly in coverages on issues that are considered sensitive by the public. The three abovementioned works mentioned that in making a coverage on an issue (particularly politics), Kompas always took into account the convenience of two parties: the readers and the news subject. Through news framing analysis, Yani (2002) assessed Kompas’ adept navigation in reporting sectarian conflicts in Maluku. According to Yani, Kompas managed to remain neutral in reporting the conflict from both the Christian and the Muslim points of view. Therefore, the convenience of its readers (88% of whom are Muslims) remained undisturbed. Kleden further emphasised Kompas’ distinct editorial quality by stating that Kompas’ journalism was closely linked to the New Order’s repressive regulations on Indonesian press. The three research shared a common idea that Kompas’ success lies in its ability to avoid licence revocation without compromising its journalistic integrity (by becoming the government’s mouthpiece).

Imtihani’s research (2014), however, is distinguished from the two aforementioned works as it shows how Kompas does not only sustain its emotive journalism when discussing sensitive issues, but also takes a side during certain contexts, particularly in finding a convenient position before government regulations. When stating the abovementioned jargon ‘journalism for communicating in an insincere society’, Oetama was referring to the politics of Kompas’ editorial. If Kompas had used direct framing in creating news coverages without internal censorship, Kompas would not have survived the New Order. Such repetitive internal censorship allowed Kompas to become familiar with delivering news which put its readers at ease while remaining critical towards its coverage objects. Imtihani reaffirms Yani, Oetama, and Kleden’s arguments by examining Kompas’ coverage on a conflict in Aceh and finding that Kompas was capable of framing its reportage adeptly, as evidenced by how it remained in circulation for readers in Aceh while maintaining the Indonesian government’s trust during the times of conflict.

The politics of Kompas’ editorial is identifiable from its coverages on not only national, but also international issues, as stated in Herman and Nurdiasa (2010) and Agustin (2018)’s research on Kompas’ framing strategies. If the abovementioned works of research highlighted Kompas’ success in creating a ‘convenient’ journalism, Herman and Nurdiasa (2010) examined 49 Kompas’ coverages on Palestine from 2008—2009 and found that Kompas mostly portrayed the nation in a negative light. For instance, in covering the Palestine-Israel conflict, Kompas consistently framed Palestine as a state with poor moral judgment due to its constant refusal of ceasefire and its constant missile attacks on the citizens of Israel.

Herman and Nurdiasa (2010)’s argument on how Kompas does not always opt for ‘emotive’ and ‘convenient’ journalism is supported by Agustin (2018). Analysing Kompas’ coverages on Rizieq Shihab from 2016 to 2017, Agustin (2018) found that in both its editorials and columns, Kompas frequently framed Rizieq Shihab as an orator who slandered Pancasila (Indonesia’s state philosophy) and Sukarno (the First President of Indonesia). Kompas constantly highlighted Rizieq’s status as a citizen with no special privileges before the law, encouraging the police to take action without being afraid of the civil organization that Rizieq leads. Agustin (2018) argued that though Kompas utilised the law for its framing, Kompas no longer applied its ‘emotive’ and ‘convenient’ journalism in providing coverages on Rizieq Shihab in its editorials and columns. The two works of research argued that the politics of Kompas’ editorials aligned the publication more closely to the government’s side.

Focusing on Kompas’ coverages on important political figures (especially an incumbent), two other research also supported the idea that Kompas is a press company which makes alliance with the government. Both Ardianto (2012) and Putri (2015) applied Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis to examine how Kompas framed an incumbent president under a positive light. Ardianto (2012) even suggested that Kompas played a more active role in being President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s PR (public relations) compared to the Ministry of Communication and Informatics. The research further found that Kompas, though largely independent from any political parties during the era of Yudhoyono’s Cabinet, prominently constructed positive images of Yudhoyono through its text production, particularly in covering 3 sectors: economy-politics, organisation, and culture. Meanwhile, Putri (2015) found that Kompas constructed Joko Widodo’s positive images through particular dictions and editorials which benefited the incumbent in relation to the 2014 General Election. Through Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, Putri found that Kompas’ positive image construction for Yudhoyono persisted in the moments when the publication constructed Joko Widodo’s images. In contrast, Kompas’ editorials utilised neutral tonality and negative vocabularies in its headlines for coverages on Prabowo Subianto (Joko Widodo’s rival during the election).

In doing its politics of editorial, Kompas took another measure by using convenient language. If Wijayanto (2019) emphasised the emotive elements (rasa) Kompas’ editorials, Situmorang (2016) used the term ‘convenience’ (kenyamanan) to describing these articles. Different from Shah and Gayatri (1994), who argued that as an elite publication, Kompas’ headlines used academic dictions for its headlines, Situmorang (2016) stated that Kompas’ front page used proper sentences although the news covered issues considered taboo or sensitive by the public. The publication avoids using sensational headlines in order to remain consistent with its language guidelines. The research utilised linguistic guidelines to examine Kompas’ strategies to sustain its status as a primary point of reference for newspapers in a digital era.

Suwirta (2017) and Suprianta (2018)’s analysis showed that in utilising a rather safe way of framing its news coverages for government consumption, Kompas was conducting a journalism with pacifying qualities. Suwirta (2017) argued that in a relationship between the press and social criticism, Kompas would position itself as a press company in alliance with the government, as evident in the New Order government’s assistance for the publication. The New Order government supported Kompas as a Catholic-owned media company which operated in a prominently Muslim society. Despite its alliance with the New Order government, Kompas retained its critical remarks. Meanwhile, Supriatna stated that through forming an alliance with the government, Kompas deliberately articulated its identity as a daily publication which emphasised a ‘convenient’ model of journalism. Suwirta and Supriatna’s research shows that Kompas editorials uses specific framing that is in agreement with government regulations. In fact, Kompas arguably takes sides at times in writing about certain important figures.

In abovementioned works of research on Kompas, there has not been sufficient discussions on criticisms for the government through the framing of international news. Due to this research gap, it is necessary to review academic works on various press companies’ framing strategies. Existing research on (foreign) newspapers and media show that how a news frames political issues through its strategies of editorial politics depends on (1) the context in which the media company operates, and (2) the media’s determination to become the society’s agent of change. (Ette, 2000; Brewer et al., 2003; Kakiailatu, 2007; Keller, 2009; Sen & Hill, 2001, Sen & Hill, 2011; Petia & Daniela, 2012; Tapsell, 2012; Ancheschi, 2015; Kroon et al., 2016; Steel, 2016; Basuki et al., 2017; Fenton & Fuchs, 2018; Laksono, 2018).

Ette (2000) and Petia and Daniela (2012) argued that the framing of international news is related to the domestic affairs of a state in which a media company operates. Applying news content framing analysis, both works of research and found that the press maintained a society’s stability when covering sensitive issues. Ette (2000) found that during a transition from an authoritarian government to democracy, the press mostly acted as an agent which stabilised the public. Meanwhile, Petia and Daniela (2012) found that the press utilised the element of human interest in introducing a new ideology for a society which transitioned from an authoritarian regime to democracy. Both works of research emphasised the press’ effort of being an agent of change, albeit with different approaches (as either a stabiliser of the public or a party which introduces a new ideology to the public).

Meanwhile, Brewer et al. (2003) and Kroon et al. (2016) found that in being an agent of change, the press did not necessarily emphasise the element of human interest or the public stability. Brewer et al. (2003) analysed the global influence of a national-scale press in the case of The New York Times, which, through negative framing and stigmatisation on a particular country, possesses enough power to change a society’s dynamics. Although the element of human interest was emphasised in their reportage, The New York Times’ framing was laden with negative outlook on another country. Here, a press company still plays the role as an agent of change, but this role manifests differently. To put it bluntly, the press can become an agent of changes driven by biased interests, considering that it is capable of attaching stigmas to specific foreign states. This argument is supported by Kroon et al. (2016), who examined Western European major news companies’ coverage on Gypsies in Europe. Although reporting the issue within a humanistic frame, Western European news companies further stigmatised the Gypsies as a backward community. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the press’ influence in establishing the public’s unwelcome attitude for the Gypsies was evident. Both works of research explained that although on the surface, the press apparently guarded a society’s stability, certain press framings may also influence the public opinion with discrimination and stigmatisation at the same time.

Ancheschi (2015), Fenton and Fuchs (2018) and Kakiailatu (2007) argued that instead of changing the stigmatisation of a society under the approach of human interests, the transition to authoritarianism could be initiated by changes brought forth by the press. Studying Kazakhstan, Trump, and a New Order Indonesia respectively, the three works of research show that the relationship between the press, the government, the editorial team, the public, and new platforms (such as the social media) can be manipulated to adjust the framing of specific news coverages according to the interests of power holders, and this would result in false news. Ancheschi (2015) found that while Kazakhstan was experiencing a euphoria for democracy after gaining its independence from the Soviet Union, the power holders utilised the press and the media to initiate a public desire to return to a totalitarian government. Meanwhile, Fenton and Fuchs (2018) examined the press which divided the American society into two extremes which supported either CNN or Fox. Similarly, Kakiailatu (2007) examined how the press’ romanticised framing of the New Order government hindered the development of democracy in Indonesia.

In terms of the press’ framing and effort as an agent of change, research on Indonesian press editorials other than that of Kompas needs to be examined. Laksono (2018), Basuki et al. (2017), Steele (2018), and Keller (2009) explored the issue of media’s independence since the New Order era, especially major national media companies with loyal subscribers such as Kompas, Tempo, Media Indonesia, and Republika. Laksono (2018) focused on the changing role of the press’ interferer. Once held by the government, the role of news inventors shifted to capital holders and the chief editors. This was evident in the case of Tempo, which included euphemisms in their coverage on capital owners. Meanwhile, Keller (2015) found that euphemism in media framing was first prompted by the trauma caused by the authoritarian New Order government, but the root cause later shifted to threats from the power of capital holders. On the other hand, Steele found that the pressure for certain framing methods was applied by neither the government nor capital holders, but by an Islamic civil organisation which overtly used physical violence against media companies which opposed their ideologies.

The whole ordeal is closely related to the position of the Indonesian press, as it operates in grey areas (Tapsell, 2012; Hill, 2001; Sen, 2011). These three works of research argue that although an editorial’s ideological or political framing has been carefully constructed, there are other parties involved in the coverage of a topic. The government has the Ministry of Communication and Informatics, the press has The Press Council, and capital owners hold more than 50% of a media’s shares. According to Tapsell (2012), while the role of journalism should provide detailed coverage on a specific topic, the coverage of Indonesian journalism is limited by the influence of several external parties. Indonesian journalism was once confined by the authoritarian regime of the New Order and, afterwards, by the influence of a news company’s stakeholders. Due to these external influences, it is necessary to conduct a deeper analysis on the idea of news framing as a medium of criticism.

Upon the examination of existing research on related topics, it is concluded that Kompas is a publication company which forms an alliance with the government in an attempt at avoiding the government’s ban. Kompas’ process of forming alliance includes various dimensions, one of which is the politics of its editorial, where its criticism is conveyed in a rather covert manner, and its tonality is based on the principle of an ‘emotive’ journalism. The works of research mentioned above have not included an editorial’s politics and strategies of utilising international news, particularly the issues of glasnost and perestroika, in attempting to criticise an authoritarian government. Another research gap that was found is the lack of analysis on Kompas’ attempt at maintaining its alliance with the government. Through the framing of news related to glasnost and perestroika, Kompas attempted to remain critical particularly of the changes which would potentially occur in an authoritarian, militaristic government. In addition, this research also fills a research gap in which the relationship between glasnost, perestroika, and Kompas during the New Order period is understudied.

3. Research aim & scope

This research was conducted to identify the Indonesian media’s effort to resist against the New Order totalitarian regime and its repressive regulations against the press. Another purpose of this research is to show Kompas’ strategy in utilising coverages on Russia’s glasnost-perestroika as a space to criticise a repressive government. In the context of academic studies on the relations between Indonesia, Russia, and the Indonesian press, this research can serve as a beneficial steppingstone for further analyses on the New Order’s repressive regime and for the transnational relationships attributed by the press through news coverage and publications.

The scope of this research is limited to 15 Kompas editorial articles published from 1 January 1986 to the 31 December 1991 editions, particularly those which utilise glasnost-perestroika as a space to criticise the New Order regulations. Kompas was selected as the research corpus for its ability to remain in operation for decades, over different governments, particularly throughout the Old Order, the New Order, Reformation, and Post-Reformation periods. Next, in the period of 1986—1991, Kompas managed to navigate around the repressive control of the Department of Information, which conducted a massive ban of press companies. Additionally, Kompas is a daily national publication which is perceived to be the frontrunner of Indonesian newspapers. Several works of research mentioned that Kompas managed to obtain this position through its unique editorial style. As Kompas produced various articles related to the issues of glasnost-perestroika, this research focuses on editorials which utilised the issues to criticise the New Order government regulations. Editorials were chosen due to its important position in a newspaper, as it is placed above coverages/hard news and features/soft news (Entman, 1991; Gamson, 1992; Asher, 1995; Fairclough, 1995).

Editorials published between 1986 and 1991 were selected as this research’s corpora since this research focuses on how the editorials utilise issues related to glasnost and perestroika, which were legalised and implemented by the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the aforementioned time period. Automatically, the two movements also influenced all Eastern bloc states which belonged to the Warsaw Pact. As the Soviet Union fell on 25 December 1991, Kompas editorials published thereafter were not included to the research corpora.

During the data selection process, it was found that 15 Kompas articles framed issues of glasnost-perestroika to criticise the Indonesian government in the New Order period. The 15 articles were then analysed and classified into 15 editorials under 3 distinct models of framing: (1) contrast; (2) conflicting rhetoric; (3) Reacting to changes with caution.

4. Method

This research applies Robert Entman’s theory of media framing. The theoretical framework was used to analyse Kompas’ editorial due to its suitability and proximity, in terms of both context and corpus. Examining the relation between specific issues and the element of politics, Entman’s works of research have analysed the content of printed media which represent their countries of origin due to its massive circulation and nation-wide scale. Applying the theory of media framing, his research examined American media such as The New York Times and Washington Post as well as weekly newspapers such as Time and Newsweek, all of which constantly cover political topics recently developed in the US. Entman’s research on framing predominantly assesses political issues such as the Gulf War, the Serbian War, and the US General Elections (2008 & 2012) covered by national newspapers with massive circulation. Considering the focus on political issues and framing by printed media, Entman’s theory has a close contextual proximity with (and hence, the relevance to analyse) the relation between Kompas’ editorials, glasnost-perestroika, and the New Order.

The foundation of framing theory is that the media highlights a particular event and applies this focus in the level of interpretation (Entman, 1994; McCombs, 2006). In framing, the media offers certain news or occurrences to their interlocutors in a specific ‘frame’ (commonly referred to as ‘the frame’), which influences readers’/audiences’ process of receiving information. Complementing Entman’s framing theory, which is dominantly used in various research to analyse political issues in newspapers and other forms of media, Weaver and McCombs (2006) argued that the most common media framing for analysis is the utilisation of frame in terms of news framing, which includes how a media frames information in its news.

For Entman (1994), framing is a process of selection of facts and reality where certain parts of occurrences and news are highlighted more than the others. These highlighted parts of events will lead to a circumstance in which certain information is not only presented under a larger, more specific, or particular context, but also receives a bigger portion of coverage. In the context of politics, particularly news about politics, framing plays a bigger role if the power of language is involved in the process (Entman, 1993). Entman also argued that the reality resulting from information as portrayed by a media depends on the way it is framed and interpreted.

Entman argues that there are two dimensions in media framing. The first dimension is the selection of issues. Meanwhile, the second dimension is the highlight of particular aspects of reality. Therefore, media framing is conducted by selecting an issue that is considered important before highlighting certain parts of the event through significant portion of coverage while neglecting the others. Both dimensions (selections and highlights) constitute the framing process of an event.

There has not been any research which applied the theory and methodology of media framing to analyse Kompas editorials which covered the Soviet Union-Russia’s glasnost and perestroika during the New Order totalitarian era from 1986 to 1991, particularly how these editorials utilised the space of international news as a space for criticising the New Order’s authoritarian regime. This article focuses on examining the strategies of contrast, rhetoric of conflict, and caution that are employed by Kompas to express its editorial opinions about the slow and almost stagnant process of democratization in Indonesia. Through this research, it is expected that this research contributes to the repository of analyses of Indonesian media’s framing of texts in criticising the New Order’s repressive and authoritarian regime.

5. Contrasting terms

There are four editorials which can be classified to this model, namely ‘Mereka Menyebutnya ‘Perestroika’, Kita Menamakan Deregulasi’ (They Call It ‘Perestroika’, We Call It Deregulation, 7 November 1987), ‘Hubungan Pembangunan Ekonomi Dan Pembangunan Politik’ (The Relationship between Economic and Political Development, 13 June 1989), ‘Drama Gorbachev Drama Dunia, Tragedi Gorbachev Tragedi Dunia!’ (Gorbachev’s Drama is The World’s Drama, Gorbachev’s Tragedy is The World’s Tragedy!, 21 August 1991), and ‘Memperkuat Jiwa Untuk Membangun Masyarakat Moderen’ (Reinforcing the Mind, Developing the Modern Society, 28 August 1991).

In analysing Kompas’ editorial’s act of contrasting terms, the first step is to examine vocabularies consisting of specific terms narrated uniquely and specifically by Kompas. In the article ‘Mereka Menyebutnya Perestroika, Kita Menamakan Deregulasi’ (They Call It ‘Perestroika’, We Call It Deregulation), Kompas contrasted the Soviet Union’s perestroika with the New Order’s deregulation. Kompas’ framing of contrasting terms is evident from the article title, which contrasted perestroika and the New Order’s deregulation. Further evidence of contrast was found in the quote, ‘…arti kata Rusia perestroika ialah restrukturisasi. Sedangkan makna deregulasi, kiranya jelas bagi kita sekalian…’ (‘the meaning of the Russian word perestroika is restructuring. Meanwhile, the meaning of ‘deregulation’ is rather obvious for us all…’). For Kompas, restructuring (restrukturisasi) is the Indonesian counterpart for the Russian word perestroika.

Meanwhile, in exploring the concept of ‘deregulation’ (which is a term introduced by the New Order government) Kompas provided neither definitions nor explanations; in fact, not even a word counterpart was listed. The writer of the article merely stated that the meaning of the word had been known by the readers, rendering any explanations unnecessary. Using the pronoun ‘us’ in the sentence ‘kiranya jelas bagi kita sekalian’ (‘…rather obvious for us all…’), the writer implicitly assumed a similar understanding with the readers. Here, it is safe to interpret that the sentence conveys the writer’s reluctance of defining the word ‘deregulation’, and it was assumed that readers had already had the same level of comprehension of the term.

At the same time, the statement can be interpreted as the writer’s attempt at establishing a common ground with the readers, especially in terms of understanding the New Order’s deregulation and how the term is implemented. The use of the word ‘us’ is a strategy of establishing a mutual understanding between the editor and the readers on the issue of perestroika, particularly in the sense of insinuating how the public knew a ‘secret’ related to Indonesia’s political context at the time. It was assumed that readers had already been familiar such narrative, although Kompas could not overtly express such secret. While the word perestroika was associated with political and economic restructuring, the word deregulation was merely explained with a vague statement ‘rather obvious for us all’. Such differing method of explanation suggests that for Kompas, the two words are not on par with each other. Political reformation and restructuring were non-existent in the context of the New Order’s deregulation. Additionally, it is arguably Kompas’ way of stating that the New Order’s deregulation should also be accompanied with political openness and restructuring, as the case with the Soviet Union’s perestroika.

6. Contrasting leadership narratives

In addition to contrasting terms, Kompas editorials also contrasted the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev (the Soviet Union) and that of Soeharto (Indonesia’s New Order regime). In Kompas’ narrative, the Soviet Union’s perestroika was understood as a reform that inspired the nation and moved it forward, as stated directly by Gorbachev. The statement was found in the article ‘Mereka Menyebutnya Perestroika, Kita Menamakan Deregulasi’, paragraph 4–9. The following quotation was analysed to understand Kompas’ strategy in contrasting leadership narratives:

…Perlunya kemauan dan efektivitas politik untuk deregulasi menjadi lebih benderang, apabila dibandingkan dengan bagaimana Mikhail Gorbachev bersikeras melaksanakan perestroika-nya.

…There needs to be willingness and political efficacy for a clearer deregulation, especially when we take a look at how Mikhail Gorbachev is determined to implement his perestroika.

The article itself did not provide a definitive explanation for Kompas’ interpretation of the New Order’s deregulation. In the article’s contrast of leadership, however, it was found that Kompas directly correlated perestroika and Mikhail Gorbachev, who was both the President and the Secretary General of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party. Campaigning for openness and restructuring of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was the initiator and the person in charge for activities related to glasnost-perestroika movements. Meanwhile, on the other side, the narrative about the New Order’s ‘deregulation’ was almost non-existent, and information on whether the term was proposed by Soeharto (the president), Golkar political party (the power holder of the parliament at the time), or a certain minister during the New Order era was vague. The implementation process of the New Order’s deregulation was not elaborated in the article either. Such lack of explanation can be interpreted as Kompas’ act of proceeding with caution in conveying its criticism, particularly about how the New Order’s deregulation was not led by a person who took full responsibility over the regulation, different from the narrative of primary leadership about the Soviet Union’s perestroika.

Kompas frames the Soviet Union’s perestroika as a regulation which was successfully implemented due to its high political efficacy and Mikhail Gorbachev’s determination. In the narrative, this was compared and contrasted with the case of Indonesia, where Soeharto led both the country and Golkar political party. Both Gorbachev and Soeharto held the highest power for each country’s executive and legislative position, yet Kompas contrasted their willingness to implement each country’s regulation. Gorbachev was depicted as someone who assumed complete responsibility for both the term and the political connotation of perestroika. Meanwhile, Soeharto was not linked to the term deregulation, especially how the term operated in a political context. Here, Kompas’ critique of the New Order’s deregulation was that it operated merely in the narrative level. In other words, Soeharto’s deregulation was framed as non-mandatory, which was highly in contrast with Gorbachev’s perestroika. Additionally, Kompas’ framing depicted that in terms of implementation, Soeharto’s deregulation was politically ineffective.

7. Contrasting the Soviet Union and the Indonesian government’s narratives

Another use of contrasting strategy in Kompas’ media framing was evident in the imbalance of narratives between those of deregulation and those of glasnost-perestroika. In the editorial article ‘Mereka Menyebutnya Perestroika, Kita Menamakan Deregulasi’, the term ‘deregulation’ was more prominently mentioned (14 times), while glasnost and perestroika were mentioned 4 times and 8 times, respectively. Nonetheless, in its narrative framing, Kompas provided more discussions on glasnost and perestroika compared to deregulation. In the aforementioned editorial, for instance, Kompas provided more in-depth explanation about perestroika, as evidenced by the editorial’s detailed recollection of factors supporting perestroika, perestroika-related obstacles emerging in the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev’s determination on implementing perestroika, the Soviet society’s control over the movement, the relationship between narratives related to perestroika and those of the nation’s politics, and perestroika as a program which was designed to support the democratisation of the Soviet Union and develop the Soviet Union’s economy. According to this article, perestroika was closely related to glasnost (openness) in the political and economic sectors.

On the other hand, when Kompas provided narratives on deregulation, the media’s framing tended to state how obvious the term was for ‘us all’. Kompas did not provide details on deregulation as it did when covering the topic of perestroika. This contrast in the amount of explanation is closely related to Indonesia’s political condition at that moment, which necessitated Kompas to criticise the New Order government with relatively safer methods, such as utilising the framing of glasnost-perestroika. Through the framing of glasnost-perestroika, Kompas was attempting to make the best use of its editorial, which was a space for negotiations with the power holder of the New Order government. Kompas seemed to insinuate that the power of the New Order bound its narratives, so that in its narratives, certain issues are depicted with careful dictions, deliberate ignorance, or special emphasis in the attempt of negotiating with power holders. By this means, Kompas retained its ability to convey and send across its criticism while avoiding possible negative consequences of a critique (such as being banned).

Meanwhile, another case of imbalance narrative was also identified in the article ‘Mereka Menyebutnya Perestroika, Kita Menamakan Deregulasi’. In terms of coverage portion in the article, narratives on the New Order exceeded those of glasnost. Details on perestroika and deregulation were found from the first to the tenth paragraph, yet there were more discussions on the New Order’s economic and political conditions compared to those of the Soviet Union. In the editorial article, Kompas narrated and framed glasnost-perestroika as regulations successfully implemented in the Soviet Union. Kompas also wrote that the zeitgeist at that time supported the implementation of the movement throughout Eastern Europe/the Eastern bloc. Meanwhile, narratives on how deregulation should be implemented along with political changes, society openness, and economic development was linked to the New Order. The difference in coverage portion proved that Kompas’ narrative criticised the New Order regime through the framing of glasnost-perestroika.

8. Conflicting rhetoric

During the observation, it was found that Kompas editorials utilised conflicting rhetoric to criticise the New Order regime. In particular, rhetoric of glasnost and perestroika was used as a cloak which guaranteed the security of the media company when conveying critique of the New Order and its derivatives, such as criticism of the rhetoric of Pancasila, deregulation, or empty ballot boxes during the General Election. Published on 3 April 1989, the article ‘Makna Kemenangan Zavlavsky, Yeltsin, dll. dalam Pemilu Uni Soviet’ (What does Zavlavsky, Yeltsin, etc.’s victory in the Soviet Union General Election mean?) was written with this type of framing, particularly as the article insinuatingly criticised the rhetoric of empty ballot box through the use of rhetoric of democracy.

It was found that several other articles used the framing model of conflicting rhetoric. Another article utilising this framing model is an editorial published on 5 July 1989 titled ‘Keterbukaan Itu Sekadar Keterbukaan atau Bertalian Dengan Fungsi’ (Is It Genuine Openness or Is It A Functional One?). The article subtly criticised the New Order’s rhetoric of openness, specifically ‘limited openness’ (keterbukaan terbatas), ‘unobtrusive openness’ (keterbukaan yang tidak mengganggu), and ‘openness, with restrictions’ (keterbukaan tetapi pelarangan). The article ‘Koreksi Terhadap Kapitalisme dan Surutnya Komunisme, Peluang Bagi Kita’ (Corrections on Capitalism, the Downfall of Communism, and Opportunities for Us), which was published on 19 February 1990, utilised rhetoric related to the position of Pancasila, communism, and liberalism within global geopolitical developments. Next, the editorial ‘Kup Ditaklukkan Oleh Demokrasi dan Kebebasan Rakyat Soviet’ (A Coup Conquered by Democracy and the Liberation of the Soviet people), published on 23 August 1991, discussed the rhetoric ‘the Devil’s Kingdom’ (‘Kerajaan Setan’), ‘democracy-autocracy’, and other jargons of democracy. Last but not least, the article ‘Perihal Strategi Pembangunan Nasional Di Bidang Sosial Budaya’ (About the Strategies of National Development in the Field of Humanities, 27 September 1991) discussed the rhetoric of local wisdom (kearifan lokal) and its relation to glasnost-perestroika’s elements of democratisation, which emerged along with the existing zeitgeist.

8.1. Rhetoric of international issues as a space for critiques of the New Order regime

Kompas used the terms glasnost and perestroika as a rhetoric for criticising the New Order. The editorial ‘Keterbukaan Itu Sekadar Keterbukaan atau Bertalian Dengan Fungsi’ (Is It Genuine Openness or Is It a Functional One?) contains multiple statements with the framing of rhetoric, particularly for criticising the New Order. For instance, the quotation below

… kita ingin menjelaskan fungsi keterbukaan yang juga banyak dibicarakan di negeri kita. Kita membuat perbandingan dengan konsep glasnost dan perestroika…

…we also wish to explain the function of openness, which is frequently talked about in our own country. Let’s make a comparison with the concept of glasnost and perestroika…

is arguably Kompas’ rhetoric for subtly criticising the New Order, as it is conveyed under the narrative of international news that was frequently discussed about at the time. The statement contains an assumption that both readers and the editorial team understood that it was impossible for the New Order government to remain oblivious about the concept of glasnost-perestroika, which had become a global topic and a zeitgeist at that time. Kompas seemed to offer a rhetoric in which readers were asked to interpret the popular concept of openness at the time and link their understanding to conditions related to the idea of openness in Indonesia. In Indonesia, the concept of ‘openness’ merely existed on the level of rhetoric, which was in contrast with the concept of glasnost-perestroika. Additionally, Kompas seemed to convey a critique that such openness had not occurred in Indonesia.

In terms of rhetoric, Kompas also conducted acts of negotiation with the New Order Government, particularly in withholding its critiques in the attempt of avoiding the ban from the Department of Information. This restraint was evident in the following quotation:

…janganlah bahan perbandingan itu serta merta dipojokkan dengan argumen: oh kita lain, itu konsep Uni Soviet, konsep Gorbachev. Kita, Indonesia, lain. Memang lain, akan tetapi senantiasa ada persamaan-persamaan, karena itu bahan perbandingan memberikan relevansi….

…lest we downplay this comparison with arguments such as: ‘oh, we’re different. That’s the Soviet’s concept, Gorbachev’s concept. Indonesia is different.’ Our situations are indeed different, but there are also similarities. Therefore, this comparison provides relevance…

The quotation seems to portray the dual position of Kompas’ editorial. On one hand, it utilises discourses to criticise the Indonesian government’s rhetoric of openness. At the same time, it also affirms the contextual gap between a foreign concept called glasnost-perestroika and existing situations in Indonesia. Kompas’ editorial seems to highlight that the comparison could be made in a space where the discourse of openness was becoming a topic frequently discussed by both countries. Additionally, the quotation can be understood as a statement which asserted the idea that comparing the Indonesian government’s rhetoric of openness with that of the Soviet Union government would lead to relevance, which would benefit both countries. Kompas emphasised that the Soviet Union’s concept of openness and Indonesia’s rhetoric of openness should not be interpreted differently. The quote also insinuates an idea that since the Soviet Union’s concept of openness allowed its people to become more open, Indonesia should also learn from the case so that such idea could be implemented.

9. Caution against changes

When using a frame in which Kompas cautioned readers against changes, its editorials’ narratives are imbued with undertones of anxiety and carefulness. These undertones were identified in Kompas’ attempts at criticising the New Order through several statements about certain figures, the glasnost-perestroika idealism, or the New Order idealism. Here, Kompas did not only highlight the positive impacts resulted by the massive change occurring in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Indonesia, and all over the world, but also criticised the change by detailing the negative impacts brought forth by such change. In detailing the media company’s views on glasnost-perestroika, Kompas’ editorials also alluded to changes that may occur because of massive changes.

Several editorial articles which utilised this framing model (caution against changes) are ‘Sikap Kritis Kaum Muda Soviet Terhadap Komsomol’ (The Younger Generation’s Critical Attitude Toward Komsomol, published on 19 February 1988), ‘Menteri Moerdiono Menempatkan Deregulasi Pada Konteks yang Mencakup’ (Minister Moerdiono Positioned Deregulation in an Overarching Context, published on 13 July 1998), ‘Hasil Referendum Menentukan Masa Depan Uni Soviet’ (The Verdict of the Soviet Union’s Referendum, published on 13 March 1991), ‘Mungkinkah Gorbachev Akan Menjadi Korban Gagasannya Sendiri?’ (Will Gorbachev be A Victim of His Own Ideas?, published on 2 April 1991), and ‘Zaman Sekarang dan Yang Akan Datang Adalah Zaman Keterbukaan’ (The Present and The Future are the Age of Openness, published on 22 October 1991). All of these editorial articles are accompanied with the initial JO (Jakob Oetama). In addition, the article ‘Citra Presiden Mikhail Gorbachev Hadapi Dilema’ (President Mikhail Gorbachev’s Image in the Face of Dilemma, published on 13 November 1991).

9.1. Caution against changes as a space for critiques of the New Order

To understand Kompas’ method of criticising the New Order through messages of caution against changes (particularly in addressing issues of deregulation, de-bureaucratisation, and openness in relation to the glasnost-perestroika zeitgeist), it is necessary to analyse several quotes from the editorial titled ‘Menteri Moerdiono Menempatkan Deregulasi Pada Konteks yang Mencakup’ (Minister Moerdiono Positioned Deregulation in an Overarching Context). For instance, through the following statement,

…di Uni Soviet, ungkapan yang kini menjadi populer di seluruh dunia adalah glasnost dan perestroika. Di Republik Rakyat Cina, kata-kata yang dipakai adalah kaitang dan gaige. Di Indonesia ungkapannya berbunyi deregulasi dan debirokratisasi…

…in the Soviet Union, the terms that have now achieved a global popularity are glasnost and perestroika. In the People’s Republic of China, they used the words kaitang and gaige. In Indonesia, these are known as ‘deregulation’ and ‘de-bureaucratisation’…

Kompas was arguably stating that changing conditions had occurred in great countries, particularly those with totalitarian-centralistic ideologies, which shared a similar context with Indonesia at the time. It is also possible that Kompas was positioning Indonesia in comparison with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. According to Kompas, Indonesia had the potential of exceeding the progress of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China as Indonesia is not a totalitarian communist state. There were also implicit remarks about movements of change had emerged from glasnost-perestroika, while their Indonesian counterparts (‘deregulation’ and ‘de-bureaucratisation’) were deemed less popular and less applicable. Kompas’ statement can be interpreted as a criticism of how the New Order government’s glasnost-perestroika counterparts were nonsense, compared to what the Soviet Union government had done. Furthermore, the statement may imply that totalitarian-communist states had changed; however, in Indonesia, ideas of change, openness, and deregulation were mere dreams and discourses of the New Order government.

Another statement also explored the New Order government’s ambiguous ideas of deregulation and de-bureaucratisation.

…tentang ungkapan deregulasi dan debirokratisasi yang menunjukan keputusan dan kemauan politik pemerintah, kita pernah mencoba menemukan suatu titik perkaitan…

…about ‘deregulation’ and ‘de-bureaucratisation’, which suggested the government’s political decision and willingness, we have attempted to find a connection…

In the statement, Kompas was conveying a narrative of caution against changes, albeit with subtlety, as evident in the use of the phrase ‘a connection’ (titik perkaitan). Kompas narrated that both deregulation and de-bureaucratisation were the New Order’s government initiatives in response to changes of the time. However, the application of deregulation and de-bureaucratisation in the Indonesian society was not elaborated. Instead, by emphasising the aforementioned ‘connection’, Kompas entrusted the task of interpretation to its readers. The quotation also may imply that Kompas provided a space for its readers to critically read the situation, in which changes and openness remained in the realm of discourse and did not tangibly manifest in the New Order era. In the end, it seemed that the New Order government was the party who faced changes with extraordinary caution. The New Order government’s excessive caution was interpreted as Kompas as unexplained reluctance, as stated by the expression ‘we have attempted to change’. Nonetheless, Kompas did not provide any details on whether the change occurred in the discursive or the applicative level and, once again, let its readers read between the lines.

10. From deregulation to political changes

From the abovementioned framing analysis, it was found that Kompas took the opportunity to criticise the New Order through the utilisation of a specific strategy. With the emergence of glasnost-perestroika, Kompas gained a space of negotiation to criticise the New Order’s politics through subtle expressions. Kompas’ strategy of conveying its messages through non-confrontational narratives of criticism and ambiguous sentences shows how Kompas utilises the space of negotiation as a space of critique amid the repressive New Order regime.

A media company adopts different strategies in playing its role in an authoritarian regime. Halpern (1994), Becker (2014), Stockmann and Gallagher (2011), and Hale (2018) revealed that each media company needed to find a way to speak its voice and be a bridge between the government and the people while maintaining their integrity so that they remain unaffected by the messages they broadcast. Halpern (1994) referred to the case of Chile during the authoritarian regime of Pinochet, where the far-right was in power. At the time, the local media was still capable of criticising the government through presenting or omitting information about a regime, especially in news about politics. Becker (2014) also studied the case of a Russian media during the communist era, which had to navigate through Putin’s regime and avoid the ban from the Department of Information by framing coverages on politics with narrative elements that were seemingly unoffensive. Becker (2014) also found how Russia provided a space for private-owned media to publish their works, though they were generally in opposition with other media which supported the government. The strategies adopted by the private-owned media were the determining factor of both resistance and consumer retention. Meanwhile, Stockmann and Gallagher (2011) analysed how Chinese media had more space for negotiation after the liberalisation of the press. Despite their attempts at criticising the government, the non-government media was incapable of causing destabilisation. These non-government media remained on the lane of revealing specific cases overlooked by government-owned media, although eventually the latter co-opted the coverage of these cases, even in a more intense manner. Hale’s (2018) research affirmed how Russian media tended to share a unifying narrative in defending the Russian identity, especially in their coverages of the issue of Crimea. Whether the media covering the Crimean conflict was government-owned or private-owned, their narrative structure was not filled with criticism. Instead, these media showed their support for the crisis in Crimea.

Arguably, Kompas’ unique strategy in negotiating its position is identifiable from its ways of presenting its narratives in the domain of a totalitarian regime. Kompas utilised its coverage on Russia as a space for conveying its criticism toward existing conditions of Indonesian politics at the time, in which critique had to be expressed neither directly nor openly. In adopting this strategy, Kompas primarily utilised the international news coverage on Russia, before criticising the situation in Indonesia. Through editorial articles, which convey the chief editor’s ideological stance and hold the highest importance in a newspaper, Kompas gradually increased its intensity of criticism along with the gradual development of glasnost-perestroika. More specifically, the media company’s utilisation of editorial articles as a space for criticism through the coverage on glasnost-perestroika began in 1986, where the movement was at its infancy stage of development. The coverages became more remarkably massive in 1991, when the popularity of glasnost-perestroika’s openness had reached every corner of all Eastern Europe.

11. Conclusion

As a national publication with a prestigious status which has operated since the New Order era, Kompas successfully utilised a space created by the international popularity of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) from 1986—1991 to criticise the New Order government while evading the risk of ban. In doing so, Kompas framed the issues of glasnost and perestroika to convey subtle criticisms on Indonesian politics and economy in its editorials, which are representative of the chief editor’s ideology. Kompas’ success was evident as its critique under such framing did not engender negative consequences (such as persecution or sanctions) from the regime at the time.

This research found that Kompas used several models of framing their criticism. The first is the framing of contrasts, which include the contrasting of terms and leadership narratives (particularly between the Soviet Union government and the Indonesian government). Next, there is a framing of contesting rhetoric related to international issues of political and economic changes, which allowed the newspaper to explore this issue while upholding its position as a pillar of democracy. As Kompas’ subtle narratives of criticism in its editorial articles were conveyed through the topics of glasnost and perestroika, the media company maintained a safe position which allowed them to evade the New Order’s press ban. By utilising international issues and editorial articles, Kompas paved a way for the press (especially newspapers), to assume its duty as the pillar of democracy, especially in providing criticisms.

It is possible that the framing of articles similar to that of Kompas is adopted by media companies in other countries with repressive government. Large-scale national publications may take advantage of hard news, soft news, features, or editorial features to state its ideological position while negotiating with power holders. The framing of information allows a media company to bridge the gap between an authoritarian government and its people, so that bold statements may be expressed with subtleties.

Although repressed, Indonesian media at the time was capable of taking advantage of a space newly created by glasnost-perestroika to not only express their criticism toward the government, but also trigger the consciousness of its readers and the general public on international issues and existing zeitgeist. Consciousness, critique, and media strategies of conveying its voice within limitations persist, even in an era where glasnost and perestroika are no longer popularised. This research’s finding related to Kompas, glasnost, perestroika, and the strategic position of editorial articles may provide insights for other research with similar topics, particularly those focusing on states under repressive regimes in which the local media had to adeptly negotiate in expressing their criticisms.

Author note

This paper examines the framing strategies employed by a leading national daily, Kompas, in using its editorials regarding the democratization process that was happening in the former Soviet Union to articulate its critique to the Indonesia’s New Order authoritarian regime as well as to initiate a public discourse on political change in Indonesia. Such a strategic framing of news is crucial for avoiding the New Order’s media censorship, especially since Kompas is the most-read newspaper amongst the middle class, politicians, and government officials, while maintaining a cordial relationship with the ruling power. This paper contributes to the theorizing of media framing in a repressive socio-political context where media control is exceptionally strong.

Disclosure statement

The authors declare there is no Complete of Interest at this study.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mochamad Aviandy

Mochamad Aviandy, Assistant Professor at Department of Literature, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia. Received his doctoral degree from Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia. His main research subjects are Indonesian media and cultural studies.

Manneke Budiman

Manneke Budiman, Professor of Literature and Cultural Studies, Faculty of Humanities Universitas Indonesia. Received his Ph.D. in Asian Studies from the University of British Columbia, Canada. Currently he is Head of the Literature Department.

Dhita Hapsarani

Dhita Hapsarani is a lecturer of Literature in the Faculty of Humanities Universitas Indonesia with research interest in the area of English literature, children’s literature, women’s studies, and adaptation studies.