A history of traitor of Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja, 1936–1941

Abstract

Firm patriotic opposition followed the Italian conquest of Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia, and other metropolitan centers in 1936. Even though Ethiopians had fought against the fascist army, some of them provided various forms of support to the opposing forces. The scholars did not write the brief history of the Italian collaborators, known as bandas. These bandas served as both combatant and non-combatant combatants for the Italian troops. On the other hand, some scholars had enumerated that Italian collaborators were later the patriots of their surrounding province, thus, led for the sovereignty of Ethiopia. Different sources, however, attested to the fact that Ethiopian bandas, despite their past in Qolla Dega Damot Awraja, which the scholars did not write and document, were essential to the Italians’ ability to hinder the nationalist resistance effort. Thus, between 1936 and 1941, the history of Ethiopia’s traitors in Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja was meticulously researched and documented in this work. For political and financial reasons, the Italian collaborators in Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja had served their masters, the fascist troops. Therefore, methodologically, the brief history of the bandas of Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja was documented using a variety of historical published and unpublished sources. Furthermore, oral sources from informants who witnessed the events firsthand and who were knowledgeable about the subject were also considered relevant sources. Once the sources are delivered, they are qualitatively analyzed to record the background information on the previously specified subjects.

Keywords:

• Qolla Dega Damot
• traitors
• banda
• fascists
• patriotic resistance movement

REVIEWING EDITOR:

• Samuel Adu-Gyamfi, History and Political Studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology College of Arts and Social Science, Ghana

SUBJECTS:

• History
• Modern History
• African History

1. Introduction

Ethiopia’s state formation dates back to ancient times; however, the Gondarine period (1636–1769) became the archetypal expression of Ethiopia’s strength, even though Solomonic monarchs were primarily responsible for establishing a strong state since 1270 AD (Mariam, 2012). Notwithstanding these, Zemene Mesafint (1769–1855), which was the time of enormous crisis in Ethiopian history, caused the country’s dominance to end in 1769. Kassa Hailu brought an end to this era in 1855. Later, Kassa was crowned Emperor Tewodros II, ushering in the era of the modern Ethiopian empire. A number of reforms were put in place by Emperor Tewodros (1855–1868) to lay the groundwork for the modern Ethiopian empire, but both internal and external factors quickly brought his vision to an end (Zewde, 1991; Sergew Hable Selassie, p. 164).

Later, under Emperor Menelik II (1889–1913), the modern Ethiopian empire was completed by means of territorial expansion. Menelik utilized both nonviolent and violent means to expand his territory (Sergew Hable Selassie, p. 194–201; Zewde, 1991, pp. 61–66). As a result, although the Italians had threatened Emperor Menelik because of their desire to rule Ethiopia, Menelik II carried out the unification and expansion process that began with Emperor Tewodros II and culminated in the creation of the modern Ethiopian empire at the start of the twentieth century. The Italians’ attempt to rule and colonize Ethiopia, however, was unsuccessful as Ethiopian soldiers under the command of Emperor Menelik II and Empress Taytu routed them; this will be covered in more detail under the heading Ethiopian response to foreign invasion.

Despite losing to Ethiopian forces in the Battle of Adwa, the Italians plotted for forty years to exact revenge on Ethiopia. Consequently, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 had its roots primarily in the battle of Adwa (Zewde, 1991, pp. 150–153). Thus, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia was launched from both the north and the south. Among other things, such as their advantage with regard to contemporary weaponry and their ability to bombard Ethiopian warriors from the air, the Italians were able to defeat Ethiopian troops during this historical incident by enlisting collaborators from Ethiopians who had fled their nation. In addition, Ethiopian traitors who joined forces with the enemy had given aid to the Italians. Researchers had looked into and recorded the nation’s history of traitors.

At various points in time, these traitors had left their nation and worked as Ethiopia’s enemy’s operatives. There have been disagreements on the brief history of the traitors, including whether or not they permanently abandoned their country or changed their focus to serve their home nation. Academics had sent in their arguments regarding this matter. Tilahun Tassew and Alula Yohannes claims that for a brief while, a few conspirators were the local patriots and were instrumental in the emancipation of both their woredas and the country as a whole. They therefore attested to the fact that Ras Hailu Tekle Haymanot was Gojjam’s inner patriot and Fitawurari Gebeyehu Woldemariam, collaborator of Italy but later served for the independence of one of the districts of the study area, Dembecha were distinguishable (Tassew, 2014, p. 142; Yohannes, 2011, p. 56). Haddis Alemayehu did, however, provide a brief explanation of the Italian collaborators’ general backing for their masters. Ras Hailu Tekel Haymanot and his associates had aided the fascist army because to their political animosity toward Emperor Haile Selassie and want to obtain Italian money called Lire, as had been proved by Haddis Alemayehu, Seletene Seyoum and other experts (Seyoum, 1999, pp. 86–88; Alemayehu, 1985; Garedew Demisie/tra/, 1995, pp. 149–150; Campbell, 2010, p. 51). From now on, at the awrajja level, this study examines and records the past of these social groups. Therefore, the researcher selected the topic to fill up the historiographical vacuum on the history of the traitors at the awraja level. Examining and documenting the short history of those traitors in Qola Dega Damot awraja between 1936 and 1941 is the primary objective of this work. Based on both published and unpublished historical sources, the article is thematically constructed to document the extraordinary history of the aforementioned issues. Oral accounts from relevant informants—primarily those who went on to fight the Italian armies in various regions of the study area—as well as informants who saw the events firsthand are also regarded as significant sources. Above all, a thorough examination of the materials was crucial in recording the brief history of traitors in the study area, Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja, from 1936 to 1941.

2. Ethiopian reactions to foreign invasion

There have been instances of desertion of the monarch and acting as an operative of foreign powers during the armed conflict against foreign invasion. For a variety of reasons, these military desertions led to accusations that they were national traitors. When it comes to fighting foreign invasions militarily, Ethiopia is not immune to treachery. From then on, for a variety of reasons, some Ethiopians left their nation and became allies of the enemy. The majority of Ethiopian conspirators against their country were those who rushed to political power, enjoyed economic prosperity, and had foreign help. Augustine Grant, a British traveler who spent time in Ethiopia’s north, wrote about the political conspiracy. He had attested that to be the emperor of Ethiopia local chiefs such as Kassa Mircha betrayed the monarch (Alemayehu, 2009, p. 70). That being said, Kassa Mircha did not represent Ethiopia as a banda; rather, he turned against the Emperor in order to gain power.

Several historical sources suggest that foreign invaders have attacked Ethiopia’s sovereignty. Even though they were vanquished by loyal Ethiopians on various battlefields, Britain, Egypt, Sudan, and primarily Italy turned into those nations that threatened Ethiopian independence at different points in time (Alemayehu, 2009, p. 70). Even though Ethiopians destroyed the aforementioned nations, they had recruited Ethiopian emperor traitors to further their political and commercial objectives. Disregarding Ethiopia’s prehistoric and medieval past, Emperor Tewodros II’s (r.1855–1868) newly established modern Ethiopian history was open to British colonization. As a result, General Robert Napier’s British army launched a military campaign against Ethiopia. In 1868, the hostile force enlisted the traitors of Emperor Tewodros II as close allies during this historical occurrence. Furthermore, two notable traitors who fervently supported the British army were Wagshum Gobeze Gebremedhin of Lasta and Dejjach Kassa Mircha of Tigray. They turned their backs on Ethiopia’s ruler and joined the enemy forces as spies because of their long wish of seizing power (Mariam, 2012, p. 143).

Ethiopia’s modern history saw the height of Egyptian hostility aimed at controlling the country. Ethiopia was primarily the target of Egyptian hostility when Emperor Yohannes IV (r.1872–1889) was in power. Thus, Egyptian forces under the command of Khedive Ismail Pasha launched a military campaign against Ethiopia and were ready to seize control of the nation; sadly, Egyptian hopes were dashed when Ethiopian forces outclassed them at the battles of Gundet (1875) and Gura (1876). Contrary to popular belief, some Ethiopians did, in fact, defect and join the enemy. Werner Munzinger’s Ethiopian wife, whose name was unmentioned by historians, had served the Egyptian armies. She was originally from Tigray and married to Werner Munzinger, the leader of a military operation against Ethiopia. Therefore Werner Munzinger was supported by his Ethiopian wife despite defeated by Ethiopian force (McGregor, 2006). The rulers of Hamassen, Dejjach Wolde Michael deserted his country and joined the Egyptian army in the devastating war at Gura in 1876 (Biniam Alemayehu/tra/, 2009, p. 91). Emperor Yohannes IV was also busy in defending the sovereignty of Ethiopia. Above all, Emperor Yohannes fought against Italians and Mahdist Sudan.

A friendship contract was formed in 1887 between King Menelik of Shewa and the Italians under Antonelli. Menelik’s allegiance was sought after, and the pact attempted to persuade him to rebel against Emperor Yohannes IV (Biniam Alemayehu/tra/, 2009, p. 207). From that point on, Menelik had assured the Italians that he would rise up and battle the Ethiopian emperor using the Italian government’s military might (Biniam Alemayehu/tra/, 2009, p. 214). Emperor Yohannes IV had to deal with political intrigues in the interim. Yohannes faced challenges from his fellow Ethiopians, particularly King Menelik of Shewa and King Tekle Haymanot of Gojjam, during this historical event. At the battle of Mettema in 1889, Emperor Yohannes IV was fighting Sudan, and both Menelik and Tekle Haymanot had plotted against him (Mariam, 2012, p. 179). Historical accounts attest that the Hewett Treaty, which was signed in 1884 at Adwa by Ethiopia’s Emperor Yohannes IV and Britain’s Rear Admiral Sir William Hewett on behalf of Egypt, followed the conclusion of the Gura battle, which took place between Ethiopia and Egypt in 1876. The treaty’s goals were to bring peace to Ethiopia and Egypt and protect Egyptian armies from attacks by Mahdist Sudan. This treaty contained several articles, including the safe evacuation of Egyptian troops via Massawa, the return of Egypt-controlled Bogos to Ethiopia, and the unrestricted flow of goods—including weapons—to and from Ethiopia via the port of Massawa, and Egyptian authority over the appointment of Ethiopia’s bishops. However, Italy and Mahdist Sudan became Ethiopia’s foes as a result of this deal. Because Ethiopia was seen by Mahdists as an ally of Egypt and an opponent of Sudan, Ethiopia and Sudan fought each other in the Battle of Mettema in 1889, which resulted in Emperor Yohannes IV’s death and the demolition of churches by Mahdist forces (Zewde, 1991, pp. 55–56. Binaim Alemayehu/tra/, 2009, p. 165, 227).

Italy’s goal was Ethiopia’s protracted struggle since the Italians made every effort to establish complete control over Ethiopia using various means. The Battle of Adwa in 1896 destroyed Italy’s overwhelming interest in gaining control of Ethiopia. The Italian ambition to conquer Ethiopia was defeated by Ethiopians under the leadership of Emperor Menelik II (r.1889–1913). Due to Italy’s subversions’ agenda, there were traitors and Italian operatives among the loyal Ethiopians fighting in the Battle of Adwa. The Italian subversion strategy, spearheaded by Eritrea’s governor Antonio Baldissera, initially succeeded in enlisting Ras Mengesha Yohannes (Zewde, 1991, pp. 55–56. Binaim Alemayehu/tra/, 2009, p. 165, 227, 299), Ras Sibhat Aregawi and Dejjach Hagos Teferi as their collaborator. The main obstacle to Emperor Menelik II was, above all, the defection of Ras Sibhat Aregawi and Dejjach Hagos Teferi, who, along with 1,500 local soldiers, deserted the emperor and gave intelligence to the enemy force (Gulilat, 2013, pp. 319–320). These Tigrean local rulers had defected against Emperor Menelik II and served for the enemy force (Zewde, 1991, pp. 79; Mariam, 2012, p. 243). In addition, Emperor Menelik II faced challenges from political power conspiracies in his conflict with the Italians. In 1896, however, at the battle of Adwa, an Ethiopian force under the command of Emperor Menelik II defeated the Italians (Zewde, 1991, pp. 75–76; Mariam, 2012, p. 243). Due to the cohesiveness and well-coordinated efforts of Ethiopian soldiers under the capable leadership of Emperor Menelik II (1889–1913), the Adwa battle was ultimately won by Ethiopian forces over Italians. Ethiopians were unified by Emperor Menelik II’s general mobilization order to fight Italy, the country’s opponent who was determined to destroy Ethiopia’s national identity. Ethiopians around the nation were thus inspired to fight against the Ethiopian invaders and rally for their nation. Ethiopian forces emerged victorious thanks to the enormous contributions of Emperor Menelik II, Empress Taytu, and well-known military commanders (Metaferia & Milkias, 2005, pp. 28–29).

Emperor Menelik II had not only brought his armies together, but also tricked Italians by means of his supporters. Ras Mekonnen, Ras Michael, Nigus Tekle Haymanot, and other local leaders had been told by him to warn the Italians of the Emperor of Ethiopia’s departure. That being said, these men had spoken with Italians, received intelligence from them, and relayed it to Menelik II. Ethiopians triumphed at the battle of Adwa in 1896 as a consequence of Emperor Menelik II’s skillful leadership. Ethiopians would actively participate in defending their country’s sovereignty alongside their leaders, thanks to the Adwa triumph. Moreover, the ambition of Italians to defeat Ethiopian forces through creating political difference among Ethiopians was not confirmed realized. A Tigrean local chief’s conviction that Emperor Yohannes IV had transferred power to Ras Mengesha was the basis for the political plot against Menelik. Ras Mengesha and Ras Alula therefore carried out a plot, even though their goal was ultimately ineffective, in order to vehemently oppose Menelik’s coronation as Ethiopia’s monarch (Mekonnen, 2010, p. 42). The Tigrean chiefs held the view that Emperor Yohannes IV had passed the mantle of sovereignty to Ras Mengesha Yohannes following the battle of Mettema in 1889.

2.1. Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1936–1941)

The Italians invaded Ethiopia from two directions: first, they crossed the Mereb River and attacked Ethiopia from the north (Eritrea), under the command of Marshal Emilo De Bono. Rudolfo Graziani’s Italian forces had also spearheaded the invasion of the country from the south, in what is now known as Somalia but formerly Italian Somaliland. A short while later, Italian forces conquered the northern regions of Ethiopia, including Adwa, Adigrat, and Entincho (Yohannes, 2011, p. 36).

Furthermore, nine divisions of 250,000 white armed combatants and 150,000 Africans from their colonies in Libya, Italian Somaliland, and Eritrea—collectively known as askaris—came to attack Ethiopia under the direction of Marshal Emilo De Bono, the chief commander of the northern front with 300 airplanes and these numerically superior forces led De Bono to penetrated into Ethiopia’s interior. Using one division force and one hundred aircraft, Rudolfo Graziani also invaded and took control of Ethiopia on the southern front (Berhe, 2003). De Bono and Graziani were given orders by Mussolini to seize Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, with ease (Berhe, 2003). Thus, Italy’s superior armament—both in terms of quality and quantity—and its use of poison gas, which the League of Nations forbade, greatly increased the Italians’ effectiveness (Zewde, 1991, p.159). With tanks, artillery, and aviation forces at their disposal, the Italians stationed about 350,000 metropolitan troops in Eritrea. Similarly, Mussolini triumphed over his enemies thanks to 70,000 native men (Mallett, 2015, p. 219).

The Ethiopian army, on the other hand, was composed of no more than 300,000 soldiers and was led by local Rases or rulers with unclear horizontal ties to one another. The national army’s commander in chief, Emperor Haile Selassie, was unable to deploy his soldiers and defend the Italians in the hilly regions mostly due to a lack of contemporary communication methods. The opponent could better organize their forces with this tactical advantage (Berhe, 2003, p. 89).

Ethiopians were adamant about taking on the opposing force in spite of the aforementioned issues. Ethiopians have always been instilled with a sense of pride in their country, patriotism, freedom, and human decency. Ethiopians were hence committed to upholding their nation’s independence (Berhe, 2003, p. 90). Emperor Haile Selassie issued the general mobilization order, or Yektet awaj, on October 3, 1935 (Engdawork, 2000, pp.15–16; Seyoum, 1999, p. 207). In January 1936, the Ethiopian counteroffensive began in response to the emperor’s command for a nationwide mobilization. Renowned war leaders rallied Ethiopian forces to fight back against Italian incursions from the north and south. Leading the Ethiopian forces in the northern front was Ras Kassa Hailu, who was resolved to battle the enemy force from three angles: the war minister at the time, Ras Mulugeta Yegezu, headed the eastern direction, while Ras Kassa Hailu and Ras Seyoum Mengesha commanded the central direction. The Ethiopian army was headed by Ras Imiru Haile Selassie to the west. In addition, Ras Desta Damtew, Dejjazmach Mekonnen Endalkachew, Nessibu Zeamaunuel, and Grazmach Afework Wolde Semayat were given the task of repelling the Italian forces by Emperor Haile Selassie (Sbachi, 1979, p. 25).

Gondar was the route taken by Ras Imiru Haile Selassie, the governor of Gojjam at the time, to defend the enemy troops on October 28, 1936, per an order from Emperor Haile Selassie. So, from Debre Marqos, Ras Imiru gathered his army and set up camp at Dembecha. Most importantly, Ras Imiru organized his army and issued an order for widespread mobilization. Rising from Gojjam, Ras Imiru’s Neftegna army was thought to number in the 40,000s. It marched toward the Shire front (Sellassie, 2002).

At Endabaguna, Ethiopian forces surrounded the Italian colonial soldiers, known as askaris. As a result, on December 15, 1935, Ethiopian forces attacked Italians (Zewde, 1991, p. 155). Despite facing military defection from their comrades, Fitawurari Kinfe Manyahelehal, the war commander under the overall leadership of Ras Imiru Hailesilassie, and his associates had dared to challenge the Italians at Endabaguna and Shire. On February 29, 1936, the horrific fighting that had been going on in the Shire region also spread to the Selekleka regions. But since the Italians used poison gas and airstrikes on Ethiopians, and because their comrades abandoned them, Ras Imiru’s armies were unable to hold off the enemy forces and withdrew back into the Tekeze Gorges. This historical incident signaled the end of the Shire region’s protracted and fierce struggle on the western front (Zewde, 1991, p. 155). Thus, Ras Imiru made his way back to the western and southwestern regions of the nation, where he joined the Black Lion group and fiercely battled the enemy army until the Italians captured him (Ayele, 2010, p. 18).

The Ethiopian armies were attempting to repel the Italian force under Marshal Badoglio, who had taken De Bono’s post. In addition to the Shire conflict with great enthusiasm, the Ethiopians faced the enemy troops. Ethiopians attempted to attack the Italian force, which was outnumbered and better-equipped, during the Temben combat, which took place on February 27 and 29, 1936 (Zewde, 1991, p. 155). Ras Mulugeta Yegezu, the war minister at the time, led the Ethiopians stationed at the bastion of Ambaradom when the Italians began a full-scale offensive against them. Ras Mulugeta was slain in an airborne strike against Ethiopians. Finally, the disheartened remnants of Ethiopian soldiers that had battled at Temben and Ambaradom joined the Imperial Body Guard, Emperor Haile Selassie’s trusty army that had fought the Italians at Maichew (Bimrew, 2018, p. 18).

Ethiopia and Italy fought each other in the Maichew battle on March 31, 1936. Ethiopians were devoted to protecting their adversary in the fight, but they were unable to hold off the Italian army (Zeyohannes, 1934, p. 60). Bombs, poison gas, and an Italian air bombardment proved too much for the emperor’s Imperial Body Guard to withstand. Thus, the Italian forces’ victory against Ethiopia brings an end to the thirteen-hour-long combat of Maichew (Zeyohannes, 1934, p. 60). During this historic fight, an Ethiopian soldier showed his sorrow in the following way since he did not think that the Italian troops had won and Ethiopians were defeated by the enemy force:

በማይጨስ ቢሆን መች ይገባ ነበር፤

በጋዴን ቢሆን መች ይገባ ነበር፤

በሰማይ ላይ ገባ ባላወቅነው አገር፡፡(Zeyohannes, 1934, p. 394)

The enemy (Italians) could not possibly invade via Maichew and Ogaden.

Instead, the sky—an unidentified nation—was how they reached Ethiopia.

Italian superiority in air power, which was a key component of their success on various fronts, was embodied in this poetic statement.

During the battle of Maichew the roles of peasants of Qola Dega Damot awrajja was very significant. Grazzmach Gebre Kidan who was the prominent war leader has organized peasants of the study area and marched to defend the independence of Ethiopia from the enemy force. Hence he worked hard in organizing peasants of Qola Dega Damot with strong moral encouragement. Though they fought courageously, the victory went to the Italians (HAACDMU. Folder No.0052).¹

The Ethiopian soldiers were clearly making an effort to halt the enemy’s advance on the southeastern and southern fronts. While Nesibu Zeamanuel led Ethiopian troops in the southeast, Ras Desta Damtew led Ethiopian forces in the southern front. Nesibu Zeamanuel’s troops opposed the Italians and briefly halted Graziani’s advance. Ethiopian forces on the southern fronts, from Negele to Dolo, were commanded by Ras Desta Damtew. Likewise, fierce combat had started at Qorahe in the southeast. Despite the Italians’ success, the Ethiopian troops under the command of Dejjazmach Afework Wolde Semayat fought with a strong sense of national pride against the enemy forces in the Qorahe front (Harde, 1974, p. 219).

It was not until Tuesday, May 5, 1936, that the Italian army under Badoglio gained possession of Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa (Engdawork, 2000, p. 107) and on 9 May 1936 Mussolini announced the Ethiopian Italian Empire before an enthusiastic throng in Rome (ay 2, 1936, Emperor Haile Selassie and members of his royal family—including delegates—travelled to Europe to plead for justice for Ethiopia (Zewde, 1991, p. 168).

On April 1, 1936, the historic town of Gondar was taken over by the Italian force under the command of General Achili Starace, who had advanced from Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, to the southern regions of Ethiopia (Bimrew, 2018, p. 21). Following their conquest of Gondar, the Italians advanced further into Gojjam, seizing other areas surrounding Lake Tana (Hamilton, 1936, p. 112); and General Achili Starace’s men were in charge of Bahir Dar and the surrounding areas (Hamilton, 1936, p. 112). The Italian force under General Achili Starace finally took possession of the study region, Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja, in May and June 1936 (Yohannes, 2011, pp. 41–44).²

In reaction to their foray into Ethiopia, on June 1, 1936, the Italians united Ethiopia with their conquests in Eritrea and Somaliland, announcing the establishment of the Africana Orientale Italiana (AOI), or Italian East African Empire (Zewde, 1991, p. 160–162). Eritrea and Tigray, Amhara, Galla and Sidama, Shewa, Harar, and Somalia were the six governorates or administrative zones that comprised the Italian East African Empire. A residential and a sub-residence commissariat were present in every governorate. Fascist forces brought Gojjam under the control of a single commissar, and Debre Markos became the seat of the commissariat. Benito Mussolini appointed General Alesandro Pirzio Biroli as the governor of both Gojjam and all of Amhara. He was instructed to carry out heinous crimes with the goal of annihilating the nationalist resistance movement (Henok Geletwa/tra/, 2002, p. 146, 266). Therefore, under strict orders from his master, Benito Mussolini, to destroy any and all patriots who opposed the Italian army, General Alesandro Pirzio Biroli was working to stop the patriotic resistance movement in the province of Gojjam.

3. Ethiopian traitors

Italians had been waiting since the 1920s to invade Ethiopia in order to get revenge for their devastating defeat at Adwa. As was previously mentioned in brief, there were two directions of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia; north and south. The subversive strategy of enlisting Ethiopian traitors and using them as their servants was employed by the Italians during their military preparation. The Italian policy of recruiting collaborators for their ambition of administering Ethiopia had been carried out from their invasion of the country till evacuation through different mechanisms. One of their mechanisms was enthroning local chiefs to power. Accordingly, Italians restored Ras Hailu as governor of Gojjam, Dejjazmach Haile Selassie Gugsa as the ruler of the whole Tigray and they promoted Dejjazmach Ayalew Birru to Ras (Zewde, 1991, p. 167). Consequently, these Ethiopian local chiefs had served the enemy force.

Though their motivations varied, the primary one for those Ethiopians who had allied with Italy was a desire for political dominance. Political opponents of Emperor Haile Selassie were thus considered traitors to their nation and accomplices of the hostile army. To put this into action, the Italians had pledged to supply the required supplies if Ethiopian regional leaders turned against the emperor. Other reasons for the provincial lords’ decision to support Italian soldiers and reject the emperor included their desire to receive money from the Italians. So as to prevent a nationalist opposition movement, Italians were dedicated to meeting the monetary demands of the regional heads and other opponents of the Emperor (Garedew Demssie/tra/, 1995, pp. 49–51). Additionally, there were factions within society harboring grudges against Emperor Haileselassie who turned their backs on their nation and joined the fascist forces. The great taxes levied by the government and the resentment of the Raya Azebo and Yejju Oromo people toward the Emperor led to their treachery (Garedew Demssie/tra/, 1995, pp. 47).

Above all, recruiting Ethiopian collaborators was motivated by Italy’s divide and rule strategy. In order to govern the populace, the fascist leaders incited hostility among Ethiopians through the divide and conquer strategy. Consequently, by designating Ras Imiru Haile Selassie as the governor of Gojjam, they had incited animosity between Shewa and Gojjam by stoking the notion that the governing family in charge of Gojjam originated in Shewa. It was important for the Italians to gain support through these divide and conquer tactics. In addition, the Italians’ tendency to be friendly with the local chiefs and the oppressed groups under Emperor Haile Selassie’s autocratic rule had a role in their turning into traitors in Ethiopia.³

Dejjazmach Haileselassie Gugsa had underground consultation with the Italians in May 1934 and had hosted and served the Italian agent and spy called Virgilio Scotti (Erlich, 1986, p. 148). Dejjazmach Haile Sellassie Gugsa left Ethiopia five months before the Italian offensive war broke out in 1935, joining the Italian forces as an ally. Marshal Emilo De Bono verified that Dejjazmach Haile Sellassie Gugsa, along with an approximate contingent of 10,000 troops, absconded from Ethiopia; thus, he assumed a pivotal part in the Italian seizure of Meqelle on November 8, 1935. In addition, he had stopped communicating with Addis Ababa and was working with the Italians. As a result of Hailesellasie Gugsa’s enormous achievements to Italy, Benito Mussolini and King Victor Emmanuel III anointed him Ras of Tigray; Italians replaced the Ethiopian flag and he battled Ethiopians in Italian uniforms. Above all, Dejjzmach Haile Selassie Gugsa had opened Ethiopian door to the enemy force and paved the way for the occupation of Ethiopia by Italy (Zewde, 2012, pp.179–180; Gnogno, 2009, p. 52; Tessema, 1962, p. 126). Ironically, nonetheless, the recruiting of conspirators from Ethiopia by the Italians has been the primary cause of their possession of Ethiopian territories. As a result, Dejjazmach Nigussie Zana and Teklu left Ethiopia and became devoted allies and counselors to the Italian military leaders, helping them to rule Ethiopia (Sellassie, 2002, pp. 266–267).

At last, Ras Imiru Haile Silassie’s army reached Dabat, where they encountered Dejjazmach Ayalew Biru. Ras Imiru encountered a great deal of difficulties during this historical event as a result of the soldiers Dejjazmach Gessesse Belew, Lij Dagnachew Tessema, and Fitawurari Tamirat deserting him and retreating (Alemayehu, 2008, pp.48–49; Sellassie, 2002, p. 271; Tessema, 1962, p. 116). Ras Imiru and the Gojjam army that remained had been devastated by these military desertions. Dejjazmach Ayalew Biru and Ras Imiru Haile Selassie’s men marched to the front lines of battle. Remarkably, though, Dejjazmach Ayalew Birru, one of Ras Imiru Hailesillasie’s companions, also abandoned him. Dejjazmach Ayalew Birru did not fight the fascist forces with all of his heart. His animosity at the emperor led him to plot (Tessema, 1963, p. 135).

While many Ethiopians valiantly resisted the Italian invaders in various ways, there were also those who plotted the monarch’s downfall. Such a political move against Emperor Haile Selassie also amounted to the nation’s military abandonment and enemy service. As a result of Lij Eyasu’s removal from office by the emperor, there were traitors from Wollo. Ras Gugsa Wolle’s death in the battle of Anchim in 1930 incited intense hatred toward the monarch, and few Gondar residents declined to actively take part in the struggle against the Italians. Gojjam was particularly incensed about Ras Hailu Tekle Haymanot’s life imprisonment. Similarly, a small number of distant people had defied the monarch and never taken part in the war. Few people from Afar were also defied the monarch because of the detention of Lij Eyassu, thus they did not engage in the anti-fascist struggle (Selassie, 1997, p. 184; p. 114). From that point on, Ethiopia has a history of military plotting and desertions, mostly during the second Italian invasion.

The aforementioned causes made the Italian occupation of Ethiopia’s capital city, Addis Ababa, on May 5, 1936, apparent. The Battle of Maichew, Emperor Haile Selassie’s last battle, ended with an Italian triumph. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian soldiers turned their backs on the emperor as he marched north. As a result, Dejjazmach Belay Kebede and Dejjazmach Aba Wuqaw (Sellassie, 2002, p. 293) have turned against Emperor Haile Selassie and are now working for the opposing army. Following Ethiopia’s loss by Italy in the 1936 Battle of Maichew, Emperor Haile Selassie withdrew via Wollo and returned to Addis Ababa. The emperor encountered more formidable opposition from Ethiopians than from Italians during this retreat. From that point on, the Raya Azebo people murdered Ethiopian forces and threatened the throne. The people of Raya Azebo were the active agents of the fascist force, hence they had killed patriots. The famous patriot, Lij Yinesu Shenkut was killed by these bandas of Ethiopia (Garedew Demisie/tra/, 1995, pp. 47–48; Abebe, 2008, p.13).

Quite properly, Peitro Badoglio’s Italian force had arrived in Addis Ababa, and the Ethiopians greeted him warmly. In addition, some Ethiopians left their nation and sided with the fascist leaders. Thus, having sworn loyalty to the Italians, Ras Hailu Tekle Haymanot, Ras Gebre Hiwot Woldemichael, Dejjazmach Amede Ali, Ayalew Birru, Habte Michael, Mengesha Wube, Ras Kebede Mengesha, Aba Jobir, and Fitawurari Kinfe had left Ethiopia (Garedew Demisie/tra/, 1995, pp. 47–48; Abebe, 2008, p.13). Liqe Mekuas Mengistu Wube and Tesfaye Tegegn also followed the footsteps of Ras Hailu Tekle Haymanot, the arch-collaborator of Italy, and aided the fascist (Campbell, 2010, p. 51). The war chiefs of Ethiopia withdrew back to the center when the Italians defeated them. Ras Mulugeta Yegezu, Ethiopia’s war minister at the time, returned during this Italian military loss. Ras Mulugeta was slain during his retreat by the Raya Azebo people, who also threatened Ethiopian armies in this historic episode. Ethiopian population mainly Raya Azebo and Oromo therefore posed a serious threat to Ethiopian armies (Tessema, 1962, p. 141; Garedew Demisse/tra/, 1995, p. 47).

Emperor Haile Selassie fled Ethiopia for London via Djibouti shortly after the Italians occupied Addis Ababa and other cities in order to demand justice (Campbell, 2010, p. 43). The emperor gave the resistance fighters orders to battle the fascist forces at Gore during this episode. Furthermore, after being defeated by the enemy force, Ras Imiru Haile Selassie, who had fought against the Italians on the western front, withdrew and took up arms against the fascist forces in Gore. Ironically, though, Ras Imiru was beset by internal issues as a result of Dejjazmach Habte Mariam, the governor of Neqemte, abandoning Ethiopians and taking an oath of allegiance with the Italians. Above all, Ras Imiru Haile Selassie’s Ethiopian patriots were the enemy that Dejjazmach Habte Mariam had assembled his army to combat (Selassie, 2002, pp. 290–291). Similar to this, Tekle Mariam, the Italian collaborators at the time also posed a threat to the patriotic resistance warriors under the leadership of Ras Imiru Halie Selassie. The fascist force was served by Tekle Mariam, the governor of Guma, who plotted against his fellow Ethiopian nationalists (Selassie, 2002, p. 293).

Ethiopians were engaged in combat by Italian soldiers under the command of General Navarini in the southern regions of the nation, including Arbegona and Agere Mariam. Among other objectives in this war was to capture Ras Desta Damtew, the leader of the Ethiopian nationalists. As a result, despite fierce resistance from the Ethiopian patriots, Italian soldiers were unable to seize Ras Desta. Ironically, though, it was because to the involvement of their collaborators that Colonel Tuki’s Italian soldiers were able to finally capture Ras Desta Damtew. Ras Desta was thereafter punished by the Italians after he was seized by the Ethiopian banda Dejjazmach Teklu Meshesha in 1937 (Garedew Demisse/tra/, 1995, p. 208–209).

Even though the patriotic resistance movement in Ethiopia was intensifying in many regions, Ethiopians working with Italians attempted to sabotage the effort. Thus, traitors like Grazzmach Wolde Michael, Qegnazmach Tadesse Banje, Qegnazmach Kumbi Kemsi, and others challenged the strong patriotic resistance movement of Lij Hailemariam Mamo, Shaleqa Mesfin Sileshi, and Ras Abebe Aregay. These Italian collaborators, known to their country as the Bandas, had left Ethiopia and engaged in fierce combat with other Ethiopian patriots on other battlefields, so posing a threat to the movement of patriotic resistance (Zewolde, 1960, pp. 28–36, 52). The Italians stepped up their efforts to recruit accomplices throughout Ethiopia. Dejjazmach Hosaena Jote and Yohannes Jote, the brothers who oversaw Benishangul, were therefore considered to be traitors to their nation and fervently backed the Italian endeavor to annex Ethiopia. Along with his numerous Muslim forces, Aba Jifar, the ruler of Jimma, also abandoned Ethiopia and sided with the Italians (Garedew Demissie/tra/, 1995, pp.149–150). These agents of Italian armies whose name has mentioned earlier highly supported the fascist governments but tried to hamper the resistance movement in Ethiopia despite their desire became futile.

4. Traitors of Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja

A strong patriotic resistance movement emerged in the wake of the Italian conquest of Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia, and other metropolitan centers; however, the Italians had governed these areas through divide and conquer totalitarian, racist, and corrupt institutions (Zewde, 1991, pp. 162–163). These harsh Italian laws did not exempt Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja. Because of the responsibilities that their collaborators played, the fascist rule was implemented in the many urban centers of Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja, including Bure, Dembecha, Dabi, Feres Bet, and others. Moreover, the Italian collaborators known as the bandas of the awrajja had rendered excellent service to their masters under various conditions. Furthermore, for a variety of reasons, the bandas of the study area had left their nation and provided significant support to the opposing force. As a result, the traitors of Qolla Dega Damot awrajja aided Italian fighters, both in battle and in non-combat.

4.1. Combatants

Ras Imiru Haile Selassie, the governor of Gojjam, carried out Emperor Haile Selassie’s general mobilization order (Yektet awaj). Ras Imiru organized his forces to combat the Italian invasion of Ethiopia after informing his people of the Italian assault. Under the general command of Ras Imiru Haile Selassie, the soldiers of Gojjam in general and Qolla Dega Damot in particular, under the leadership of Fitawurari Kinfe Manyahelehal, marched to confront the opposing force. Ras Imiru and Fitawurari Kinfe had significant difficulties during their military march to the Shire front as a result of the desertion and retreat of Dejjazmach Gessese Belew and other soldiers (Alemayehu, 1985, p. 58).⁴ As a result, before reaching the front lines of battle, the soldiers of Gojjam and the study area in particular had to contend with internal conflicts. Dejjazmach Gessesse Belew, who recruited numerous collaborators and helped the Italians, was the pioneer of the bandas due to his desertion and collaboration with the Italians.

Leader of the Gojjam bandas in general and Qolla Dega Damot in particular, Dejjazmach Gessesse Belew, drew supporters to join him in working with Italy. Moreover, Fitawurari Tamirat, Fitawurari Gessesse Nigusie, Fitawurari Zeleke Kassa, Fitawurari Zeleke Wole, Qegnazmach Ayele Hailu, Qegnazmach Merid Wassie, Fitawurari Zeleke Assege, and Fitawurari Ayele Hailu had deserted from Ras Imiru Haile Selassie’s armies, forcing others who were actively opposing the fascist forces to retreat. From then on, the aforementioned bandas of Gojjam in general and Qolla Dega Damot in particular broke Emperor Haile Selassie’s heart. In a letter to the Gojjam people, the emperor expressed his genuine opinion that a large portion of Ras Imiru Haile Selassie’s army had escaped (Engdawork, 2000, pp. 25–26). Both Fitawurari Tirfe Kassa and Qegnazmach Nigatu Seifu were traitors and collaborators with Italy. As a result, they had helped the Italians in their efforts to stop the movement of national resistance. The bandas stated earlier orchestrated the deaths of Dejjazmach Sibhatu Yigzaw, Lij Bezabih, and Qegnazmach Yigzaw Kassa (Eskezia, 2017, p. 4).

Gessesse Belew slaughtered Dejjach Mesfin’s sons and took control of Enjibara after Ras Imiru Haile Selassie and his nation had left him. Later, he informed the Italians that he was to serve their officers and soldiers in Bure Damot. He also traveled to Debre Markos and engaged in combat with the Italians, causing damage to the nation and fostering an atmosphere that allowed fascist forces to attempt to colonize Ethiopia, despite being thwarted by the local populace’s resistance to their attempts (Selassie, 2002, p. 279). From then on, many from Gojjam in general and Qolla Dega Damot in particular had adopted Gessesse Belew’s ways. As a result, a large number of people in various parts of Qolla Dega Damot awrajja joined the enemy force as bandas. The bandas of Bure Damot were represented by the Hailemichale family, which included Mamo, Gebeyehu, Kebede, and Darmyelesh. They left their nation, worked for the Italians, and eventually became the patriots’ ongoing issues. As a result, Yamato, the Italian governor of Bure and the surrounding regions, employed these previously mentioned bandas in Bure Damot as his servants.⁵ The following battlefields should be used to identify the Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja bandas that actively opposed other Ethiopians while fighting as combatants on the Italian side on various battlefields:

4.1.1. The Battle of Gomerta

The Qolla Dega Damot patriots, led by Dejjazmach Bekele Kassa, Qegnazmach Shiferaw Jembere, and Demis Tachbele, battled the Italians in the Battle of Gomerta in 1936. The patriots were primarily from Bure. Despite their valiant resistance, Qegnazmach Shiferaw Jembere and Demis Tachbele were killed by the fascist soldiers (HAACDMU. Folder No.0083). Because of the actions of their allies, the Italians prevailed in this terrible battleground. Furthermore, after fleeing their nation, the bandas of the study region, primarily Bure Damot, such as Mamo and Gebeyehu Hailemichale, served their masters.⁶ Going on, the political and economic betrayers of their country hindered the patriotic resistance movement of Gojjam and Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja in particular.

4.1.2. The Battle of Tilili and Zagra Michael

The Italians and patriots fought each other in the Battle of Tilili in January 1937. Fitawurari Bekele Ambaye and Qegnazmach Shiferaw Engida, two well-known patriots from Bure Shikudad and Guagusa Womberma, led their troops in combat against the Italians. Shiferwa Engida, though, lost his life in battle strongly fought against the enemy force. Likewise, from 1936 to 1938, Fitawurari Bekele Ambaye, Qegnazmach Mesfin Kassa, and Qegnazmach Tilahun Kassa engaged in combat with the fascist army in many small-scale battlegrounds, including Zagra Michael, Shakua Yohannes, and Tiyatiya Michale (HAACDMU. Folder No.0083).

There were traitors from Gojjam in particular, and from the study region as well, in the ongoing war against the Italians. Woizero Darmyelesh Mamo also paved the way for Italian success by actively collaborating with Italy. These bandas from the research region bore the burden of the death of a patriot named Alemu Akalat. Darmyelesh Hailemichale assassinated Alemu Akalat in secret, despite the fact that he was actively involved in the patriotic resistance effort.⁷ Because Ethiopians who sided with fascist warriors helped the Italians by fighting hard on the side of the enemy force, the patriotic resistance fighters had to contend with fierce opposition from their fellow Ethiopians.

4.1.3. The Battle of Gomt

As soon as the Italians took over Bahir Dar, they advanced into Adet and took over Quarit, which is a portion of Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja. After that, Melese Tadege, Geremew Wodawuk, Bizuneh Assress, and Abebe Ayele led a strong patriotic opposition. Despite being hindered by the bandas of Quarit, these patriots fiercely opposed the Italian attempts of colonizing Ethiopia. As a result, the resistance struggle was hampered by Wassie Jembere and Zeleqe Chekol, who abandoned their nation and supported the adversaries. On September 5, 1937, Italians, with the help of their allies, had captured and executed 28 men at Gomt Mountain. Above all, the mountain had been completely destroyed by Wassie Jemberie and Zeleqe Chekol, working with the Italians. But the famous Quarit patriots, under the command of Geremew Wondawuk, faced the Italians on Gomt Mountain, where the Italians, aided by their allies known as the bandas of the region, launched a dangerous offensive. The two well-known bandas whose identities were previously explained were primarily responsible for organizing these dangerous attacks by the fascist army on the Quarit resistance fighters.⁸

4.1.4. The Battle of Shiti Abo

The Qaurit patriots moved to Shiti Abo on August 29, 1937, and fought the Italian soldiers there. Geremew Wondawuk led the patriots during this conflict, but the opposing army also killed Temesgen Fekade, Yihun Chekol, and Cherie Wondhunegn (HAACDMU. Folder No.0083). There were Ethiopians who sided with the Italians in the ongoing Shiti Abo conflict, despite the Ethiopians valiant efforts to free their nation from fascist oppression. Therefore, it was important to acknowledge Ademe Woldye’s contribution to Italians by leaving Ethiopia. His people’s banda, Ademe Woldye, was a member of the opposing army. As a result, the Italians gave Ademe Woldye the order to command their force and reveal the patriots’ trenches. At the battle of Shiti Abo, he marched to fight against the patriots because he fully trusted the Italians. This treacherous individual had aggressively challenged his fellow Ethiopian nationalists and posed a threat to the movement of patriotic resistance. This is as a result of Ademe Woldye leading the Italian forces to victory.⁹

4.1.5. The Battle of Taeme

My informants said that in a particular location in Dega Damot called Taeme, the Italian fascist soldiers had encountered fierce patriotic resistance. Italian soldiers and Dejjazmach Haileyesus Filate’s Dega Damot nationalists engaged in the Battle of Taeme in 1937. The patriots struggled, but were hindered by the bandas of the study area. Dejjazmach Haileyesus Filate, Qegnazmach Kebede Desta, and Mekonnen Teshale battled the enemy troops hard. The Italian collaborators Gebeyehu and Seyoum Yigzaw, who were traitors of Dega Damot, were actively participating in the armed conflict on the Italian side. Above important, as was already indicated, the opposing soldiers’ practical destruction of several churches was made possible by their accomplices.¹⁰

Churches including Teame Giorgis, Aqlat Mariam, Senebo Giorgis, and Gedeb Giorgis were destroyed by fire during the conflict. Two clergymen who fiercely opposed the fascist troops were similarly burnt alive. Furthermore, the deserters of Dega Damot, a section of the study region, were aware of the dangerous attack carried out by the Italian forces against these priests and churches. Numerous locals had perished as a result of the enemy troops’ backing for Gebeyehu and Seyoum Yigzaw.¹¹ Henceforth, the bandas of the study area had damaged different infrastructures and challenged the patriotic resistance movement.

4.1.6. The Battle of Gobo

On December 20, 1937, the Italian garrison center was the scene of pandemonium organized by the inhabitants of Dega Damot. Under the general commandership of Bitwoded Negas Bezabih, it was evident that the Ferese Bet patriots, including Grazmach Belay Ayne, Grazmach Alemneh Asress, Mekonnen Fenta, and others, engaged in coercive military engagements with the Italians. Despite the Italian forces’ murders of Grazmach Belay Ayne, Gessesse Chekol, Grazmach Alemneh Assres, and Alemu Chekol, these patriots fiercely resisted the Italian armies (HAACDMU. Folder No.0083). Strangely enough, the Italians who killed the aforementioned patriots were conducted by those who abandoned their homeland and sided with the Italians. There were bandas that aided the enemy force and posed a threat to the resistance movement of patriotism, even though their identities were not disclosed.¹²

4.1.7. The Battle of Shina

The Quarit patriots began their battle with the enemy on a tiny river called Shina by encircling the river and obstructing the Italian route that led to water supplies. As a result, in 1939, the patriots under the command of Geremew Wondawuk engaged in fierce combat with the fascist armies. The inhabitants of Qolla Dega Damot were troubled by the battle of Shina because, after three days of combat with the enemy force, Geremew Wondawuk, a well-known patriot, was killed. Nine other people had been slain by the Italians’ aerial bombardment, including Geremew Wondawuk (Eskezia, 2017, p. 8).

Ironically, though, it was the bandas of the study area—primarily Quarit—that executed Geremew Wondawuk and other patriots. Because he had made the conditions favorable for the Italians to launch successful airstrikes against the freedom fighters, Ademe Woldye, the well-known banda who worked with Italians, prepared the path for the murders of patriots. Above all, this banda had let the enemy troops know where the patriots’ trenches were.¹³

4.1.8. The Battle of Yimalog

On March 26, 1939, a battle took place in Yimalog, a particular location in Tehnan woreda, between the Italian forces and the woreda’s patriots. During the conflict, airstrikes were used by Galiani’s Italian army to target civilian targets. The Italian army penetrated several areas of Bure Damot through Tehnan since the patriots had somewhat postponed their face-to-face confrontation due to Galiani’s force’s air strikes and their dread of the banda. Despite their valiant resistance, renowned patriots like Fitawurari Baleh Kassa and Qegnazmach Mekonnen Kassa were routed and forced to retire by the bandas of the woredas, who had sided with the Italian soldiers and emerged triumphant. Their collaborators were mostly responsible for the Italian airstrikes on the independence fighters (HAACDMU, Folder No. 0052).¹⁴

Consequently, the bandas in Jabi Tehnana woreda were Fitawurari Jembere Derso, Fitawurari Bayih Kidanemariam, and Qegnazmach Birhanu Kassa. They had actively participated in the conflict with other Ethiopians and given the Italians important information. Though ultimately ineffective, these bandages had impeded the resistance movement (HAACDMU, Folder No. 0052).¹⁵

4.1.9. The Battle of Bure Yohannes

To stop the patriotic resistance movement, the Italians set up a military camp close to the location of the present Saint Yohannes church in Bure Damot. They built their campsite and christened it Campu from that point on. Prominent patriots like Qegnazmach Yehualaw Engida and Dejjazmach Bekelle Kassa were detained in this military camp, along with twenty-three others. Above all, even if Woizero Wuditu Wube’s actions led to the inmates’ release from custody, the Italians were ready to kill them. Even though Mengiste Seyoum was assassinated by the Italians, the aforementioned patriots valiantly battled against the Italians at the Battle of Bure Yohannes in 1937 after being released from prison (HAACDMU, Folder No.0083).

The Italian collaborators made the assassination of Mengiste Seyoum by the fascist armies obvious. The Italians had enlisted their accomplices, as previously mentioned. Consequently, Mengiste Seyoum and other patriots were killed as a result of Kebede Hailemichael’s strong support for the Italians; he also exposed the patriots’ trenches to the enemy army and impeded their resistance.¹⁶

4.1.10. The Battle of Yechereka

Yechereka, a tiny river in Dembecha woreda, was the site of a bloody conflict between Italians and patriots. The final stage of the movement of patriots resisting the enemy force was the fight of Yechereka. Meanwhile, the fight of Yechereka demonstrated the British government’s support for the patriot cause. Thus, from 1940 to 1941, the Gideon Force, under the command of the British officer and war commander Major Orde Wingate, launched an offensive against the Italians in the direction of the province of Gojjam (Alula, 2011, p. 56).

Prominent patriots including Grazmach, Debela, Mengesha Sebere, Nigatu Debela, Kebede Wolde Giorgis, Asrat Tegegne, Kassa Haile, and Feleke Woldesadik were slain by the opposing forces at the bloodiest fight, Yechereka (Alula, 2011, p. 60). Their allies provided help to the fascist army at the Battle of Yechereka. Dejjach Mamo Hailemichael, the banda who betrayed his nation and fought with the enemy army, rallied his supporters and supported the Italians at the Battle of Yechereka. From that point on, the fascist forces fortified their military position and fiercely resisted the Gojjam patriots in general and Qolla Dega Damot in particular. Despite having escaped and joined the Italians at Debre Markos, Mamo Hailemichael was wounded in the combat by the patriots’ bullets.¹⁷

4.2. Non-combatants

As previously discussed, strong patriotic opposition followed the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. Similar to this, Qolla Dega Damot in particular and Gojjam in general both had strong patriotic resistance movements. The bandas of the study region, however, hindered the resistance movement. As non-combatants, the Italian collaborators had fulfilled many roles for their masters. These bandas also performed espionage, supplied logistical support, and attended to the injured Italian soldiers.¹⁸

4.2.1. Espionage

There were difficulties during the five-year patriotic resistance campaign. The actions of the bandas, or Italian collaborators, posed one of the biggest obstacles for the resistance fighters. In addition to trying to gain economic leverage by giving the enemy the necessary food supplies, Banda sent the enemy intelligence about the patriots’ movements. As a result, the populace used various means to express these bandas who worked with the opposing force. Above importantly, the poem that follows provides more details on the bandas’ activities:

እነ ልበ ጥፉ፡

ያገለግላሉ እየተገረፉ፡

ጣሊያንም ታዝቦ ስሙን አለው ባንዳ፡

እንዳህያ ጭኖ ፊትፊት እየነዳ፡

ያውም አሸክሞ አስራ ሁለት ኮዳ፡፡(Eskezia, 2017, p. 10)

This poem has translated in to English as follows: The enemy whips the inattentive, and the Italians gave them the nickname ‘banda’, made them carry twelve water bottles, and drove them like donkeys.

Ethiopians provided spy services to the fascist army, which greatly hampered the patriotic resistance campaign by revealing the patriots’ trenches and escorting the enemy forces on their march to destroy the resistance movements. While the bandas of Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja were active in the underground work for their masters, they temporarily hampered the resistance activity even if the patriots were committed to the evacuation of Italians from Ethiopia.¹⁹

4.2.2. Logistic supply

The Qolla Dega Dega Damot Awrajja patriotic resistance movement has been put to the test by the Italian collaborators logistical supply to the enemy armies. Because they supported the fascist army for the above stated reasons, the research area’s population carried out these logistic supplies. Furthermore, because they had gathered military supplies and given them to the Italian soldiers, the awrajja bandas, led by Gebeyehu Hailemichael and Mamo Bekelle, had put the resistance effort in Bure Damot in danger. Above all, they had challenged the resistance effort and given food and ammunition to the enemy force.²⁰

The fascist forces’ collaborators in various regions of the study area also carried out the logistic supplies to the Italian soldiers. From then on, Melese Asress and Dejjazmach Workneh Aka gave the Italians military supplies, just like the other bandas had. They therefore provided the enemy soldiers with the required supplies, and from that point on, they actively backed the Italian armies as non-combatant combatants. The Italians received food and traditional battle materials from the previously named accomplices in Italy.²¹

4.2.3. Propaganda

During their military preparations and invasion of Ethiopia, Italian propaganda was used to win the allegiance of the Ethiopian people. As a result, Italians residing in Ethiopia for a variety of reasons had been involved in numerous propaganda activities to enable their nation’s takeover of Ethiopia. From this point on, the Italian propaganda proved successful in enlisting accomplices, particularly from the regions of Gojjam and Qolla Dega Damot. Some bandas from the study region backed the fascist army because they were duped by Italians into believing they could gain control and flourish economically. These bandas of Qolla Dega Damot awrajas had helped the Italians to totally dominate and administrate the region, despite their eventual failure. Dejjazmach Seyoum Yegzaw and Dejjazmach Wubishet was the banda that was long forgotten.²²

5. Conclusion

The Italian use of poison gas, superiority in modern weaponry, and aerial bombardment made it obvious that the country’s capital, Addis Ababa, and other metropolitan centers were under Italian possession in1936. In parallel with these, the Italians were trying to annex the state and win the support of Ethiopian local chiefs for their military effort against that country. Additionally, a number of regional leaders who had left Ethiopia and aided the fascist forces provided help to the Italians. Henceforth, the Dejjazmach Haileselassie Gugsa, the rulers of western Tigray, was responsible for the invasion of several northern Ethiopian provinces. He gave the Italians great assistance.

The locals in Gojjam, in particular, fiercely resisted the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in general and Gojjam in particular. However, through their allies, known as bandas, fascist armies attempted to thwart this resistance movement. As a result, the local bandas presented internal obstacles for Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja’s patriotic resistance campaign. Dejjazmach Gessesse Belew, the leader of the banda in the study region, was the first to leave the Fitawurari Kinfe Manyaheleha soldiers, led by Ras Imiru Haile Selassie, when they marched to face the Italians. Their spies escorted the Italian attempts to dominate Qolla Dega Damot. The Hailemichale family, including Mamo, Darmyelesh, and Gebeyehu, were foremost strong supporters of Italy. Ademe Woldye and additional bandas from the study area had provided both combat and non-combat support to the Italians. Thus, despite their lack of success, these Italian collaborators prevented the patriotic resistance effort.

Even though little had been written about the roles of the bandas in the patriotic resistance movement, many historical sources confirmed that the Italian collaborators, known as bandas, were the main obstacle to the patriotic resistance movement in Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja because they had abandoned their country and actively supported the enemy force for political and economic reasons until the country’s final liberation in 1941, despite some scholars attesting that the Italian collaborators were ultimately the inner patriots and thus strongly leading the movement. Thus, this document contended that even if the bandas of Qolla Dega Damot Awrajja were unable to stop the country’s independence, they had managed to avert the patriotic resistance movement. In 1941, Emperor Haile Selassie was reinstated in Ethiopia following the Italians’ final evacuation from Ethiopian territory. Emperor Haile Selassie recognized the well-known Ethiopian patriots and granted pardons to those who had betrayed the country by siding with the enemy army after his return.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Tesfaw Abebaw Ejigu

Tesfaw Abebaw Ejigu received BA degree in history from Mekelle University in 2007. His research grade was an A. Following his graduation, he worked as a history teacher at several high schools. In light of this, he worked as a high school teacher from September 2007 till 2020. He completed his MA at Aksum University in 2019 while serving in the highs, graduating with an excellent result in his thesis. He taught history at Dilla University from 2020 till 2022. As of 2022, he is a lecturer at Bahir Dar University and he also conducts historical research. Above all, he would like to do historical study and publish it in international publications like Cogent Arts and Humanities. In terms of research, he has conducted several historical investigations both alone and in collaboration, however they were never published. In addition, he was very dedicated to doing research, mostly on historical topics as well as other topics that would be helpful to readers and vital for future research. Above all, he has actively participated in a variety of historical studies up to this point, and he plans to continue doing so in the future as well.

Notes

1 Informants: Semeneh Abebe and Kebede Bayleyegn.

2 Informants: Ayalew Desta and Simeneh Abebe.

3 Informants: Ayalew Desta, Kebede Bayleyegn and Amare Anteneh.

4 Informants: Kebede Bayleyegn and Amare Anteneh.

5 Informants: Amare Anteneh, Kebede Bayleyegn and Shimeka Gereme.

6 Informants: Kebede Bayleyegn and Amare Anteneh.

7 Informants: Amare Anteneh, Sileshi Abate, Aemiro Awoke.

8 Informants: Yeshaneh Tsega, Abebe Alebachew and Kiflemariam Mihret.

9 Informants: Yeshaneh Tsega, Abebe Alebachew, Kiflemariam Mihret, Ayalew Desta and Simeneh Abebe.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Informants: Ayalew Desta, Amare Anteneh and Worku Kassie.

13 Informants: Abebe Alebachew, Yeshaneh Tsega.

14 Informants: Simeneh Abebe and Kebede Bayleyegn.

15 Ibid.

16 Informants: Amare Anteneh, Sileshi Abate and Kebede Bayleyegn.

17 Informants: Kebede Bayleyegn, Amare Anteneh and Shimeka Gereme.

18 Ibid.

19 Informants: Amare Anteneh, Aemiro Awoke, Yeshaneh Tsega, Ayalew Desta, Birhanu Mekonnen, Simeneh Abebe and Shimeka Gereme.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.