Historical Analysis of the Semarang-Joana Tram Company or Stoomtram Maatschappij (SJS) From Colonial to Indonesian National Management in Central Java

Abstract

This text aims to conduct a historical analysis of the development of the Semarang-Joana Tram Company or Stoomtram Maatschappij (SJS) in the railway map of Indonesia from the Dutch Colonial era to the Post-Independence period. The analysis employed historical methods, relying on primary sources obtained from Dutch and Indonesian archives and libraries, as well as interviews, site visits, and focus group discussions. The results showed that historical situation factors significantly determined the culture and performance of SJS companies. During the Dutch Colonial period, this situation strongly supported the growth and development of the company due to being assisted by ‘an open-door policy’ that provided foreign capital. Furthermore, the external factors that benefited the success of the SJS company at the beginning of its development included the following: (1) the ease of processing land for the railway, (2) the establishment of a previously designed railway, (3) the growth of plantation companies, (4) plantations, and (5) urban population improvement. The political changes during the Japanese military occupation led to the integration of SJS management into the government railway management under the Rikuyu Sokkyoku Administration. After Indonesia gained independence, SJS was nationalized and managed under the same administration as the Government Railway Department, which later became PT Kereta Api Indonesia. The shift in management from a private company to a government entity resulted in a decline in SJS performance.

Keywords:

• Management change
• Dutch Colonialism
• tram
• nationalisation
• decline

Reviewing Editor:

• Adu-Gyamfi Samuel, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology College of Arts and Social Science, Ghana

Subjects:

• Political Economic Studies
• Asian History

Introduction

The history of land transportation in Indonesia, especially on Java Island, is primarily determined by changes in political and economic interests. In the early twentieth century, the massive construction of a road, known as the postal highway, was observed on the north coast of Java when Daendels, the Dutch-India General Governor, was elected in the region. However, the road was used for military mobility and it supported transportation facilities for plantation products in coffee and sugar, which were in the post-highway network from Anyer (West Java) to Panarukan (East Java). In the 1870s, this highway was deemed inadequate for the mobility of the plantation industry products in Java. The political changes from conservative Dutch colonial politics to liberal colonialism also led to the construction of a railroad connecting plantation areas with ports, to distribute products abroad, especially to the European market. From the end of the nineteenth century until the third decade of the twentieth, the train was the most crucial mass transportation on Java island, commuting goods and people (Hartatik, 2018). Despite these developments, the highway still existed, indicating that even Daendels’ road had synergized with the tram route SJS since the end of the 19^th century. This was prioritized in the use of highway space on the northern coast of Java.

According to historical evidence, the train was the essential land transportation in Java, Indonesia, from the late 19th century to the 1960s. During that period, this mode of transport was capable of carrying many passengers at a relatively reasonable time. The development of trains is a legacy of the private and public Dutch railway companies. After the independence of Indonesia, these companies changed ownership through institutional shifts or nationalization for government and private railway companies, respectively (Wasino, 2014a).

The development of railway companies on Java island is also related to the economic growth of the plantation industry, especially the sugar sector. This explained that the first railway line was built in the Semarang-Surakarta area at the request of sugar entrepreneurs, where the sector was invested in since the early 19^th century. They also required transportation facilities connecting the sugar factory to Semarang port. From this context, the construction of the railway line was funded by a private company known as the NIS. Although the connection consumed decades to materialize, the construction of this private railway network was successfully linked between royal plantation areas and the Port of Semarang since the 1870s (Wasino, 2008; Hartatik, 2019).

Besides the government railway company founded in 1875, the successful construction of the NIS Semarang-Local Kingdom line also incentivized external organizations to open rail networks in other Java islands. The launch of these lines was supported by the issuance of the 1870 Agrarian Law, which provided great opportunities for private companies to lease land to indigenous people in the long term, from 25 to 75 years. This portrayed the SJS company as one of the affected private organizations (Susilowati, 1984). Moreover, trans are classified as land transportation modes, due to being trains whose railways mostly use the highway. This shows that land use is often crushed between the road and the tram track. During the Dutch colonial period, the state and the private sectors controlled the railway network. From this context, the network owned by the state was known as the Staats Spoor (SS), while the private channel consisted of several companies. In this case, the rail transportation companies included (1) NISM (Nederlandsch India Spoorweg Maatschappij), which began building a railway line in 1863, (2) Staats Spoorweg Maatschappij (SS) launched the line in 1875, (3) SJS, (4) Serajoedal Spoorweg Maatschappij (SPM) in1896, (5 (Semarang-Cheribon Stoomtram Maatschappij (SCS), and (6) Oost Java Stoomtram Maatschappij (OJS). These companies controlled the main routes on the North Coast of Java and their branches (Purwanto, 2008).

Tram in Indonesia is a unique mode of transportation due to its frequent association with trains. This is because it existed after the development of railways in Java, which are only supposed to meet the needs of close-range transportation in urban areas. Tram is also developed to transport people and goods over medium and long distances. During the post-independence period in Indonesia, the trams and trains’ management reportedly worked together. This indicated that the public perceived trams highly compared to trains (Focus Group Discussion with the management of PT Kereta Api Indonesia Persero Daop IV and Railway Observers). From this context, the historical analysis of trams equates to that of railroads in the country.

After Indonesian independence, the management and ownership of colonial companies, including railways, were transferred to the Indonesian government. The transition also occurred through two events, namely institutional change and nationalization. The institutional change is mostly found in companies managed by the Dutch government that did not provide compensation. Meanwhile, nationalization occurred in Dutch colonial private companies, including railway transportation organizations. In this process, the government provided a balance to the private company (Wasino, 2017). After the nationalization of Dutch-owned foreign companies by the Indonesian government, new problems emerged, especially in the transportation sector. This conflict was triggered by the authoritative policies ignoring post-nationalization assets and mainly occurred since the inauguration of the New Order, where the economic policy changed the land transportation system. During this era, food agriculture policies, especially rice, were the focal point in the agricultural sector. However, the decision differed from the colonial periods, where the agricultural industry, especially sugar cane, supported the economy. Reprioritized transportation also penetrated people’s economic centres, namely motorized vehicles (Hartatik, 2014).

The change in food economic policy is in line with the land transportation regulation. In this case, the train that became the ‘prima donna’ during the Dutch colonial period was not the focus of transportation development during the New Order era. This indicated that the emphasis on land transportation shifted to roads, due to the lender’s economic message (Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia/IGGI) and practical considerations. From this context, road construction in remote areas of the village was emphasized, where production was conducted by food agriculture centres, especially rice. This proved that the changes in transportation policy during the New Order era led to the decline of trains supporting mass transportation in Java, including Central Java. Meanwhile, the increasing number of land transportation used roads such as buses, colts, trucks, and motorbikes. Based on this policy, the former colonial railway was built for the agricultural industry, while short-distance lines such as Semarang-Grobogan and Blora were not considered. The Indonesian Railways Company has also neglected its building and land assets in many places. Subsequently, these assets have not been managed or controlled for decades by the community and the district government, leading to the emergence of conflict (Hartatik, 2018).

Many studies have been conducted on the history of railway transportation in Indonesia. According to Suhartono, two topics were emphasized on the history of railways, namely (1) rail transportation and its development in Central Java (Suhartono, 1976), and (2) the presence of the Vorstenlanden Railway and its impact in 1850–1900 (Suhartono, 1985). The first article described the company of railway lines, regarding the need to transport plantation products in several locations within Central Java. These lines were built from Semarang-Tanggung, Semarang-Yogya through Magelang, and Semarang-Joana. In the article, the competition between the construction of roads and railways was explained, to become a liaison for the developing agro-industrial areas in this region. Based on the second article, the social transportation changes on the Semarang route to the Vorstenlanden (Royal Lands) area were explored from the traditional vehicle. This was conducted by using roads such as gerobag (carts pulled by animals) turned into railway lines driven by locomotive engines.

As part of the transportation network and regional development in Java, a study on rail commutation was conducted by Howard Dick. Similar to the report of Suhartono, this analysis explained that a rail transportation network became necessary due to the agroindustry development in Java, where establishment had been observed since the mid-19th century. In this case, the presence of rail had replaced the old transportation network, regarding the leading river channel and highways. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, a large-scale railway line on Java connected the plantation industry areas (Dick, 2000). Completing Howard Dick’s study, Endah Sri Hartatik also evaluated the role of transportation networks in developing agroindustry in Java. Based on statistical data, the presence of trains in this region was due to the encouragement from plantation entrepreneurs, especially in the sugar industry. From the end of the nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth, the plantation industry rapidly developed, partly because of the distribution ease by rail (Hartatik, 2014).

According to N J Utama and Atno, the presence of trains in Central Java was analyzed, especially in Semarang City. In the paper, the development of tram lines in this region was evaluated. This showed that the construction of the tram line to the town was a continuation of the cross-Java railway structure crossing Semarang City. Meanwhile, the tram channel facilitated the mobility of city dwellers and connected with the railway network, such as those managed by the NIS and SJS lines. These lines connected Semarang with Joana (north coast of Java) and several related areas, such as Purwodadi to Blora (Utama, 2021). The study of rail history was also associated with urban planning, where N Solikah evaluated the construction of the Semarang-Ambarawa Railway. This was explained by mapping the development of the stations passed and the surrounding area improvement. On this line, the structure of the railway station was related to military interests, for the vicinity of Ambarawa to become an army city. However, several small stations passed became plantation development areas (Solikhah, 2019).

An analysis of the railway line was also carried out for the western part of Java, where Agus Mulyana analyzed related infrastructure construction in the Priyangan area, West Java. From a dissertation in the Department of History, the University of Indonesia, the focus of the analysis was the reason for the railway line construction, regarding the plantation interests and the dynamics of the railroad design process. This subsequently led to the development of the railway network in West Java, which became a medium of transporting plantation products (Mulyana, 2017). Meanwhile, Iwan Hermawan highlighted the linkage of the railway line from Jakarta to Cilacap, concerning the Dutch East Indies defense system on the island of Java. This article explored the importance of Jakarta as the centre of government, to build the route for the distribution of weapons from the Port of Jakarta to Cilacap. In these areas, the Dutch fortifications in southern Java were then developed (Hermawan, 2016).

The history of railways in Indonesia also emphasizes the social aspects of the transportation industry’s existence. This shows that the railway sector has reported developed industrial relations based on class relations. According to John Engelson, the impact of this unequal relationship was evaluated with the emergence of railroad workers and the strike in 1923. Additionally, the labour unions initiated this strike under the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (Engleson, 1981). The historical analysis of railways in Indonesia, especially on Java island, has subsequently impacted the lives of citizens to the present. This leads to a report on the effect of the colonial rail network legacy, which was conducted by Aloysius Gunadi Brata. Based on the historical data and spatial analysis, a relationship was found between population density and economic activity in the former railway line areas, especially at Dutch stations (Brata, 2017).

Susilowati (2022) also analyzed the relationship between trains and trams. In this article, the role of "SJS" was evaluated in transporting people and plantation crops within the Semarang Residency area and its surroundings in the late 19th to the early 20th century. It also described that the presence of the trams in the region was part of the development of previously designed trains, namely NIS (Nederlands Indische Spoorweg Maatschappij) and SCS (Semarang-Cheribon Stoomtram Maatschappij).

Based on these previous reports, three aspects were frequently prioritized, namely (1) transportation networks, (2) trains and economic development relationship, especially the plantation industry sector, and (3) railways and urban planning, as well as the social aspects of the transportation companies’ emergence. In addition, all aspects of the historical study time focused on the Dutch colonial period described as the glory of the train and tram industry. Several unanswered questions from these studies are as follows: (1) How was the management and performance of SJS during the Dutch Colonial period? (2) How was the management of SJS during the political changes in Indonesia from Dutch colonization to occupation? (3) How did the political changes following Indonesia’s independence influence the management and performance of the SJS company?

Theoretical review

Contingency theory states that situational circumstances from external and internal factors influence organizational characteristics, including structure, leadership, decision-making processes, and human resources management (Chen Xiao & Wanxin, 2021). According to Fred Fiedler, the theory emphasized several aspects of adaptation to the changing situations carried out by company management. This showed that corporate leadership was successful when the leading style prioritized the present development and the affected region. In this case, a corporate organization was led according to the upcoming changes (Shala et al., 2021).

Based on the contingency theory perspective, a company’s organizational performance is often determined by several factors, including culture, market failure, and democratic deficits. The history of these affected factors commonly led to changes in corporate culture and management. Therefore, this study aims to combine narrative aspects from historical and organizational management analyses (Maclean et al., 2016). In this integrated study, the management assessment of the SJS used an analysis of organizational structure, ethos, and historical behaviour, which changed from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. From this context, a political change from Dutch colonialism to Japanese military occupation was observed, accompanied by the formation of an independent state, the Republic of Indonesia. These changes hugely impacted the management of train and tram companies in the country.

The change in tram management was related to the administrative transformation from private to state authority. According to Fowler and Gillett (2021), these changes affected the organizational structure and performance. The performance transformation also occurred due to the changing situations in the different historical phases. Moreover, the changes in the country’s history of tram management include the Dutch colonial era managed by private companies, the Japanese military occupation period, and the Republic of Indonesia’s independence term coordinated by the state.

The changes in management due to contingency factors influenced the transformation of institutional logic, which emphasized the symbol patterns and material practices, assumptions, values, and beliefs. These variables are frequently used as guidance in managing the organization through the actors and behavioral tendencies (Instinton & Ocasio, 2008; Li, 2009). Based on Friedland and Alford (1991), the theory of institutional logic was initially introduced. This argued that the knowledge of institutional actors was not only understood as individual thoughts and behaviours. In this case, the thinking and behavioural patterns influenced by institutional values need to be considered. Furthermore, the organizational history of SJS influenced the institutional logic through the political change from the Dutch East Indies, the Japanese occupation, and the Indonesian authorities. From this description, the institutional logic of the Dutch Government was influenced by capitalism and liberalism values in managing companies. This was different from the Japanese occupation phase, where the logic changed from capitalism-based to militarism. After nationalization or the takeover of the institutional logic, the organizational behaviour and actors were guided by the values of nationalism and socialism.

These values influenced the logic of managing transportation companies during the Dutch Colonial capitalist system, which was characterized by the following, (1) the legal system supported the expansion of individual rights, as well as the freedoms to possess, buy, and sell personal properties, (2) the expansion of commodity exchange and markets involving money, (3) the ownership of the production utilities by the private companies to generate profits, (4) the separation of personal assets and family in the managed company, (5) job performance based on a contract and agreed wage system, and (6) the use of bank institutions to support the company’s development (Hodgson, 2015).

The militaristic perspective also impacted the institutional logic of transportation company management during the Japanese occupation era. This explained that the organizational management was controlled by the military (state) and used to support their activities. In this era, the aspect of individual ownership, competition, and profit generation was ignored. Meanwhile, the values of economic nationalism influenced the institutional logic of transportation companies after the Independence of Indonesia. From this context, the economic-nationalism concept contained in Article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945 Indonesia) stated that ‘earth, water, and the production branches affecting the people’s livelihood were controlled by the state’. This confirmed that the transportation company management during this period was considered due to meeting the people’s necessities. In this case, the private colonial transportation companies should be adequately nationalized.

The nationalization of Dutch colonial private companies also originated from the concept of ‘Indonesianization’. This concept was developed in other currents of anti-colonial perspectives, such as ‘progress’, ‘nation formation’, ‘independence’, ‘democracy’, and ‘populist’. The ideal principle was also inspired by the movement figures living in the Dutch East-Indies colonial world and considered an anti-foreign political concept (Wasino, 2016). Moreover, the conceptual dissemination of Indonesia reportedly originates from the political process, which has implications for the economic process. This indicates that the Indonesianization of the economy begins with the efforts to become independent as a nation, from the dependence on foreign economies (Sutter, n.d.).

Nationalization is the abolition of supervision by the Dutch and is a fundamental reorientation of the Indonesian economy during the decolonization and subsequent periods. This is due to the recognition of the country’s independence in 1949. It is also interpreted as the replacement of Dutch employees and Indonesian managers in the bureaucracy and companies, with its legality observed in 1958. Nationalization is responsible for providing structural changes in the broader context (Lindblad, 2011), although it legally has a fairly specific interpretation. This concept is distinguished from similar and misunderstood principles, namely ‘confiscation, onteigening, and revocation of rights’. According to Erades, nationalization was a rule to accept (dwingt te gedogen) the transfer of several personally or cooperatively-possessed elements to the state. Regarding this argument, Gautama also declared that nationalization was a pattern of forcibly moving rights from the private sector to the state. This indicated that the phenomenon was a ‘species’ from the origin of onteigening (Gautama, 1975). Theoretically, the institutional logic of managing the train and tram companies during the independence of Indonesia was a hybrid element. Based on Gillett and Tennent (2018), the logic originated due to a combination of different rationalities, to achieve distinguished outcomes and overlapping goals. After nationalization, various companies began to generate profits, as well as carefully consider the people and the state.

Institutional logic was supported by the political mobility of people and goods (Vigar, 2013). This highlighted that human mobility was encouraged by the increased number of people and the changing work location. The goods’ mobility was also related to the producers’ area and the distribution process, which required transportation services. During the Dutch colonial era, political mobility emphasized the interest in transferring goods and people to develop more capital and economic exploitation. Meanwhile, the mobility of goods and people was dominant in supporting war and the struggle for freedom during the Japanese occupation and the Independence revolution. This led to the consideration of political mobility in public welfare. The transformation of institutional logic and political mobility also influenced transportation company performances (Lijewski, 1996). This was in line with the argument of contingency theory in management, where organizational development was determined by internal and dynamic external factors. In this case, the company management need to consider external circumstances such as politics (Okereka, 2015). Moreover, political changes are capable of influencing the company’s performance in various aspects, such as the transformation in state policies, suppliers, supporting banks, shareholders, creditors, and social conditions of society.

Study method

This study is a long-term historical analysis combining historical narratives with management and organizational models. In this article, a required periodization showed changes from the developing stages of management and organization (Karsten, 2014). This indicated that the implemented historical narrative emphasized the background of SJS development, management, and organizational structure from the Dutch colonial era to post-independence Indonesia.

This history-based article included four analytical stages, namely (1) heuristics or source tracing, (2) source criticism or assessment, (3) historical interpretation, and (4) historiography or historical writing (Tosh, 1987; Wasino & Hartatik, 2020). The process of source tracing began with mapping and digital data collection (Dougherty & Nawrotzki, 2016), where secondary information was obtained through the exploration within google scholar and several web journals. This was accompanied by the acquisition of data from the libraries containing the secondary information, although the manuscripts were accessed through several digital media. These media include (1) Jakarta National Library, (2) PT Kereta Api Library Collections in Bandung, and (3) the Rare Collections from the Leiden National Library. Meanwhile, the primary sources from newspapers and contemporary publications were digitally browsed on the web Delpher N.L. For those not digitally traceable, data were directly obtained through historical source locations, namely (a) Suara Merdeka Newspaper in Semarang, (b) Contemporary Newspapers and Publications at the Surakarta Press Monument, (c) Newspapers at the National Library of Jakarta, and (d) Newspapers and Contemporary Publications at the ex-KITLV Leiden Rare Collection. This was accompanied by the acquisition of the archival sources from the Indonesian and Dutch National Archives in Jakarta and The Hague, respectively. In addition to oral sources, this research is also supported by oral and artifact sources. Oral sources are obtained through interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with railway employees. Meanwhile, artifact sources are obtained from sites related to the history of the former SJS office and the railway lines traversed by the tram.

The written sources obtained were also assessed regarding their authenticity and credibility. In this case, authenticity was used to assess the authentic or falsified levels of the data, especially for the digital sources that need to be ascertained by the associated institution. Source assessment was also carried out to evaluate trustworthiness of the data, by comparing one source to another, as well as triggering the logic and spirit of the surrounding publication information period. In addition, the accuracy of the statistical sources during the Dutch colonial era was highly assessed than the Japanese occupation and the physical revolution. These written sources are compared with oral information and artifacts that were successfully found at the research site. Based on the authenticity and credibility of the assessed sources, a written statement about the occurrences in a specific historical period was emphasized. This statement was known as a historical fact, which was interpreted or used to produce a unity of interpretation. Moreover, the process of interpretation and analysis used a reflective method through the comparison with broader context of the historical events. In this case, the events encompassed the data behind these factual sources (Bell & Taylor, 2013). The broader historical context also prioritized changes in political and economic policies, which influenced the development of SJS management during the Dutch colonial, the Japanese occupation, and Indonesian independence era.

At the stage of interpreting the relationship between historical facts, the theoretical framework of contingency management and institutional logic was used. The theory was implemented to map changes through the development of an ideal type model, as exemplified by Weber (Grønning, 2017). This was to understand the history of SJS in Indonesia, from the Dutch colonial era to Indonesian independence. Based on the results, the relationship between the facts was used for writing the history of SJS, as the ideal types of management development. This writing model combined the narrative and explanation about the following principles, (1) the management of the train industry and its impact on company performance during the Dutch Colonial era, (2) the influence of political changes due to the Japanese occupation and independence on trains and trams management, and (3) the effects of political and management changes on the institutional logic and performance of the train and tram industry in Indonesia.

Results and discussion

SJS management at the Dutch colonial era

The first tram company in Java was SJS. This was inseparable from the capitalist development in the Netherlands’ transportation aspect, which impacted the colonies. As the continuation of the train industry in Java, capitalism had been developed in the tram sector since the 1870s. In this case, the transportation companies were established to serve the distribution of human and plantation crops, especially sugar. Moreover, SJS served the developing transportation industry market, due to the improvement of people’s mobility and plantation crops (Hartatik, 2014). This company presented the appropriate situation when the Dutch Colonial Government was eager to improve the train system in the Netherlands and its colonies. The Dutch East Indies also marked the issue of Railway Laws in 1878. However, the laws only regulated train speed above 15 km/h, which generally applied to long-distance transportation.

The big railway company also did not also prioritize the local transportation mode, due to being expensive for exploitation and operation expenses, leading to unprofitability. Irrespective of this disadvantage, local transportation was still essential to facilitate people’s mobility over short distances. This proved that the tram industry emerged to overcome the business gap from the railway companies. The construction of the tram lines was also more affordable for short-distance transportation than the railway, because most of the track was attached to the road. From this context, the Dutch East Indies supported the appearance of the tram industry managed by transportation companies (Gerlings, 1907).

Based on the results, the domestic tram company was founded in Den Haag, the Netherlands, on 17 October 1881. This indicated that the SJS head office was in Jakarta, due to the company’s operational activities in Indonesia (Dutch East Indies). The person in charge of the company was the Reyns & Vinju Firm, which was recognized by the Dutch East Indies Government based on the decision dated 17 January 1882, number 5 (Regeering, 1993). This tram company started operating in Semarang City in 1881, two years after establishment. This showed that Semarang was the first city to build a tram line on Java island, with Semarang-Joana initially constructed by the SJS company along 87.6 km. The line construction emphasizedthe northern coastal route of Central Java, which was built adjacent to the existing highway. From this description, Semarang City and route followed the urban streets and the phenomenal Dandeles highway, respectively. However, some lines were outside the road, especially those connecting sugar factories and plantation industries (Suryo, 1982). By using the development model coinciding with the street, SJS did not encounter any difficulty in the land acquisition for rail line construction. This differed from the railway station’s construction process, where problems were observed with land use. In this case, the street side grounds used for the station construction were generally controlled by the owners of the capital, especially Chinese and Arabs. This led to more expensive costs for land acquisition (Susilowati, 1984).

The European management standard was also used by the authority of the company. Initially, the management of the tram line only managed SJS with the first director, HMA Barin van der Goes van Dirxland, whose reign lasted from 1881 to 1888. In this case, the director was generally appointed regarding the experience in the tram or transportation industry. The substitute of HMA Barin van der Goes van Dirxland was C.L.C. Matrtens (1888–1893), which previously became the leader of the first-row establishment of SJS in 1886. From this context, the director led two companies through OJS (1888) and the railway expansion in East Java, namely SJS and OJS. Meanwhile, the operational head of SJS and OJS was under the director (Gerlings, 1907).

The expansion of tram management in Java became stronger under one director after the other two private companies, SCS (1894) and Soerajudal Stoomtram Maatschappij (1895). For coordination with the director, the expansion process was also led by the head of the operation. However, the company that managing the tram in Java was SJS (Gerlings, 1907). This tram line had become a medium of short-distance transportation, such as ‘mini trains’, in the early years of its operation, earning quite a lot of profit. In this case, the tram company was rapidly expanding its network with branch lines. Based on this expansion process, the first branch line was the Mayong district route (11.6 km), which was launched on 6 September 1887. This was accompanied by the second line known as the Demak, Wirosari district route, which was observed through Purwodadi along 60.1 km and completed in 1889. Moreover, the third and fourth lines were the Wirosari-Blora in 1891 and Purwodadi-Gundih, respectively. This Purwodadi-Gundih line was along 17.1 km, purchasing a concession or takeover from another company, Poerwodadri-Goendih Stoomtram Maatschappij, in 1891. Another launched route was the Wirosari-Kradenan line, which completed construction in 1898 (Reitsma, 1916).

The SJS route was managed in two routes, namely, the main and the city. The main route was an out-of-town infrastructure that connected the city of Semarang with the interior. Meanwhile, the city route included the stations in the area (Semarang City). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the two lines developed rapidly and yielded significant profits for the company. This development was observed from the number of passengers and income. In Table A1, the number of passengers and payment was very high on the mainline. This showed that the number of first and second-class passengers was only 3,807 and 209,789 in 1884, respectively. These values significantly increased continuously for five years (1889), with the values of the first and second-class passengers becoming 11,850 and 451,157 people, respectively. From these results, the increase in the number of passengers was commensurate with revenue elevation. In 1884, the total incomes from classes 1 and 2 tram were f11973.80 and f108.024.50, respectively. In five years, the payments for classes 1 and 2 tram were f20,420.70 and f122,960.14, respectively. Meanwhile, the number of passengers and revenue for tram lines within the city of Semarang tended to stagnate.

Besides transporting passengers, the main tram also transported the goods loaded in carriages. In this case, the goods transported included many elements, especially agricultural products and the population’s basic needs. The maximum amount of goods loaded in the carriage was also sugar. The remaining materials mainly transported were in succession, namely gravel, coal, wood for building materials, cooking oil, and fertilizers. Based on this result, sugar was the ‘prima donna’ among goods transportation because some routes passed by SJS were carbohydrate factories (Statuten van Naamlooze Vennootschap SJS, 1884-1889, n.d.). Until the third decade of the twentieth century, SJS and other railroad companies played an essential role in the transportation of sugar production. This indicated that existence and performance of the sugar industry was one of the causes of SJS development. At that time, the organizational network tied the network with 11 industries, namely Besito, Kaliwungu, Pakis, Cepiring, Gemu, Langse, Rendeng, de Hoop (Mayong), Trangkil, Banyuputih, Tanjung, and Mojo (Table A2). These factories were subsequently distributed across the North Coast of Java, from Demak, Kudus, Pati, Jepara, to Joana (Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1. Tramwegen Semarang Joana

Figure 2. Map of Semarang Joana Stoomtrammatschappij.

Table A3 shows the development of goods transported with sugar, from the early to the third decade of the twentieth century. This was observed before the world economic crisis in 1930. Based on the results, SJS experienced a peak in the transportation of goods, including sugar, until 1921. However, the number of freight transportation continuously declined since 1922. This was in line with the experience of other railway companies, although not as much as the decline experienced by SJS sugar. During the third decade of the twentieth century, the general decline in freight transport was interpreted as the emergence of competition from the motorized vehicles commuting goods over short distances on the SJS route. In contrast to freight transport, the number of passengers transported by SJS in the early to the third decade of the 20th century continuously increased. This increase aligned with the number of passengers carried by other railway companies, namely NIS and SCS. In 1910 and 1912, the passengers transported by SJS were 351014 and 801092, respectively. This proved that an increase of 128.2% was observed in 19 years (Table A4).

Until the year 1940, the SJS company continued to survive as a independently managed transportation company despite facing competition from buses and trucks that began to develop in the 1920s and the influence of economic crisis pressure in 1930. At the onset of the crisis, the company had bonds amounting to f 2,809,000 with an interest rate of 4 ½% and f 6,635,000 with an interest rate of 4%. Since 1934, the company no longer paid interest on these bonds, so that four years later (1939), when the reorganization was completed, the cash flow was in a favorable position with a balance of f 300,000 in the account (Tramwegwaarden, 1943).

Based on the description above, it can be analyzed that the management of SJS during the Dutch Colonial era was separate from the management of other railway transportation, both government-owned railway companies and private railway companies. The control of the company was in the hands of shareholders in Den Haag, but operationally it was managed by Indonesian management. The growth of the company was greatly influenced by external factors, namely the Dutch Government’s policy of implementing an Open Door Policy for foreign investors since the 1870s, resulting in the growth of investments in plantation companies and impacting land transportation companies, including railways and trams.

SJS transportation management coordinated a well-performing commutation company during the Dutch colonial period. This emphasized the company’s expansion on the Semarang-Joana line while opening its branches to some areas connecting small towns with Semarang City. Moreover, the tram company had developed into a significant public transportation link between Semarang City settlements. This explained that rapid development of the tram was due to the fiscal ‘situation’ of the Dutch East Indie in the decades before the 1930s economic recession. In this case, Java Island was specifically prioritized, regarding the successful implementation of the CV SJS management in the area. This situation subsequently considered the application of the Liberal Colonial political policy marked by the Agrarian Law issuance in 1870. Since this period, the Dutch East Indies Government had opened up foreign capital to invest in various economic sectors.

From this context, many foreign investors, especially the Dutch private sector, invested in Java, especially in plantations such as coffee, tea, indigo, and sugarcane. Furthermore, the sugar industry was built in some residencies on Java island, including Semarang and its surroundings. The development of agricultural companies also led to the establishment of towns around the plantations, causing a rapid population increase. This increased plantation commodities and population then required faster transportation mobility facilities with a large carrying capacity. Rail line transportation such as trains and trams was also developed in market demand, for the land commutation capable of connecting settlements and plantation production centres to ports. In addition, the agrarian law easily influenced foreign companies to buy land and lease it long-term for up to 75-95 years, through a system known as ‘erpacht rights’. Based on these results, the development of the SJS tram company was framed by strengthening the capitalism growth in the Dutch East Indies, replacing the monopoly of the colonial government during the Plantation System (1830–1870). In this capitalism culture, an institutional logic was observed based on competition, market demand, and efficiency. This indicated that company’s expansion was carried out on the contingency and institutional logic aspects.

Changes in management from Japanese occupation to Indonesia

The management of SJS underwent changes during the Japanese occupation, as the company’s administration was consolidated with that of other railway companies. Japanese military leaders in Indonesia planned to unify the railway transportation management on Java Island under the control of the Japanese Army Government. The management of land transportation fell under Rikuyu Sokkyoku (Land Transport Affairs) under the command of Mayor Takashi, the Head (Manager) of Dai Nippon Railway Lines. SJS, initially independently managed as a Dutch private company, was subsequently consolidated with the management of other tram and railway companies (Nansin, 1942; Pandjie Poestaka, Number 29, October 24, 2602; Wasino, 2014b).

Under a single government management, the railway lines were divided into three regions:

1. Seibu Kyoku, covering the West Java region, which included the former Staatsspoorwegen (SS) operational area led by J.P. Ader. Ader served as the head of the railway company on Java Island, with its headquarters in Bandung.

2. Tobu Kyoku, covering the East Java area, which included the former operating areas of private railway companies led by H.R. Beukelman. These companies were NISM, Malang Stoomtram Maatschappij (MS), Kediri Stoomtram Maatschappij (KSM), Mojokerto Stoomtram Maatschappij (MSM), Probolinggo Stoomtram Maatschappij (Pb.SM), and Pasuruan Stoomtram Maatschappij (Ps.PM).

3. Chubu Kyoku, covering Central Java, which included the former operational areas of SCS, SJS, Serajudal Stoomtram Maatschappij (SJS), and OJS. These areas were subsequently unified by Boekhuysen (Spoorweg bedrijf op Java, Mededeling van Bevelhebber van het Nipponsche Leger No.1 1942).

The management of employees also underwent changes. Initially, employees from the pre-Japanese occupation period were retained, with most Europeans being preserved. However, some were replaced by Japanese and Indonesian personnel. Because of integrated management, the salaries of railway employees, which initially varied among companies, were then standardized (Nansin, 1942; Poestaka, 2602).

In 1944, the Japanese military government wanted tighter control over transportation modes, including trains. This indicated that the railway company was placed under the power of the military, including SJS (Nusantara, 1997). In this case, many rail lines were dismantled because of their diversion to construct other tracks in Thailand and Burma for war logistics. Several SJS rail lines were also considered for dismantling, such as the Demak-Blora line. However, the lines were very crowded with passengers and were required by the community. M.Ph. Broekhuijsen subsequently lobbied the Japanese military leader, Major Asaya, and finally dismantled the SJS lines for other tracks, namely the northern, the Kudus-Mayong-Pecangaan, Mayong-Welahan, and partly Purwodadi-Gundih routes (Broekhuijsen, 1947).

The railway company’s status was still legally controlled by the Japanese army after Indonesia’s Independence on 17 August 1945. As the loser of the war, Japan handed over the country’s territory to the worthy Allied troops (winners), including the railway management. Feeling independent, the young fighters, especially the AMKA (Young Railway Force) that initially worked in the railroad company environment under the Japanese occupation, attempted to confiscate the railway organization management. In Central Java, where the SJS route was located, Sukmasi and Munadi initiated the confiscation process, formulating a committee to impound this management from the Japanese army. This committee contained the Head of the Central Java Railway Board (DKA) with the chairman, Mr. Sukardan (PNKA, 1970).

Since this proposed development did not perform adequately, it was replaced by the Struggle Committee under Prawito Koesoemo on 12 September 1945. This new development formed the Central Java Railways emergency leadership through the following organizational structure, (1) Head of Service, Mr. Sukardan, (2) Head of Administration, R. Abdullah Judokoesoemo, (3) Head of Engineering (roads, buildings, and traction), Ir. Husein, (4) Head of Traffic, Mr. Sumarlan, and (5) Head of Inspection, M. Marsid, M. Rasiman, and R. Kardono Sumodinoto. This committee, supported by the Young Railways Force, conducted negotiations with the Japanese. In this case, the Japanese army was willing to hand over the railway management in the Central Java region to Indonesian control on 26 September 1945 (Ekajati, 1995).

The formation of the Indonesian Railways management was officially performed on 28 September 1945, under the Indonesian Railways Department (DKARI). However, the official leadership appointment only occurred in early 1946, regarding the Decree of the Minister of Transportation during the Syahrir Cabinet No.1/KA dated 23 January (Perhubungan, 1946). This emphasized the leadership of the DKARI Organization from the central to regional levels. The ex-SJS route was also included in the exploitation area of Central Java, under the supervision of Prawito Kusumo and Ir. Hussein. Since this period, the railway management had been handled by the Indonesians. The control of the railways also included handling the Dutch private companies, including SJS.

Based on the results, the new management of post-independence Indonesian railways encountered several problems. Firstly, the destruction of the railway infrastructure during the Japanese occupation. Secondly, the relationship issues with the shareholders (owners) of the railroad company in the former Dutch East Indies. This indicated that the railway infrastructure was constructed with the patchwork and operation of available rail lines and locomotives. In addition, two shareholders were observed, namely (1) the Government of the Netherlands East Indies for public railway companies, and (2) the Western private sector for independent railway lines. SJS also belonged to companies whose shares were wholly owned by the private sector.

The Dutch Government did not recognize the presence of the new state of the Republic of Indonesia, including the formulated railway institution. In Semarang, Dutch troops (NICA) were also presented with the allied soldiers, AFNEI, under the leadership of General Bethel, which attempted to disarm the Japanese army. This explained that the Dutch Army company opened up space for the dualism of rail management on Java Island, including SJS. Meanwhile, the Indonesian government had established DKARI, with the NICA considering railway management through the status quo of the Japanese occupation.

In this essential land sector, the condition of the railways in the former Dutch East Indies led to the stipulation of the NICA policy. Since 1 January 1946, all state and private train as well as tram companies were confiscated with their subsidiaries in Java and Madura. These organizations were then designated as the property of the NICA. Based on this decision, the management of the railway company government (Staatsspoor, abbreviated SS) and private trains were combined under the leadership of the Netherlands East-Indies Transportation and Waterworks Department Director (National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia) (ANRI, 1950). From this context, the management of these private trains were the members of the Combined Railway Company (Vereenigde Spoorweg Bedrjijven; VS). Moreover, the authority of the former private and public Dutch colonial train companies was "heard" in the Netherlands. In this case, "heard" emphasized the nationalization process, where all assets of PT Kereta Api (Indonesian State Train Company) became the Indonesian state properties. This included the SJS News of the Nationalization of Dutch private holdings, as one of the causes of the colonial military aggression (21 July–5 August 1947). Based on these descriptions, the aggression was carried out with the message of a ‘product operation’, to protect the production of Dutch-owned companies that Indonesia was supposed to have de facto nationalized.

From 1946 to 1949, railway management was split into two, with the line in the Republic of Indonesia under the command of Dakari-DKA. Meanwhile, the Dutch Railway Company managed those under the NICA. During this period, the SJS track was under the management of the NICA Railways. This was because the SJS and other private railway lines were widely used by the Dutch for military and political purposes. The public and private tracks were also connected through joint work performances (mede werking). Furthermore, the Dutch military was responsible for protecting the private capital embedded in the railway companies belonging to VS, including SJS. The previously inoperable routes such as Semarang-Demak, Kedung Jati, and Gubug, were also reopened for public traffic on 3 November 1947 (Locomotief, 1948).

To ensure the safety and sustainability of trains in the Dutch territory within Indonesia, the highest military authority issued a regulation on 14 February 1948. This prioritized the determination of temporary train ownership in the Dutch East Indies. In this regulation, the military asked for approval from a private company’s shareholder, to temporarily submit ownership to the Dutch East-Indies Government. This led to the shareholders’ meeting on 24 March 1948, which was attended by the directors of private railway companies in Central Java, SJS, OJS, SSM, and SCS. From this meeting, the results obtained led to the approval of the Dutch Government’s policy. Regarding this ownership confiscation, all costs of exploitation and profits during the temporary license were the state’s responsibility.

Based on the confiscation consequences, the state provided compensation to these companies for three years, from 1946 to 1948. Table A5 illustrates the compensation obtained by SJS and other tram companies in Java (Alting, 1948). From these data, the decline in the performance of CV SJS was due to the changing political situation and economic policies during the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian independence period. Since the Japanese occupation, the state had impounded company management, namely the military government. In this case, the function of a transportation company was used for war mobilization compared to public interest services. The management of SJS and other state-run railway companies continued after the independence of Indonesia. During this period, the NICA managed CV SJS and some railroad companies until the recognition of sovereignty by the Netherlands against the United States of Indonesia, on 27 December 1949. Besides this, several others were managed by the Indonesian government.

The change in the management of a private company to a government organization also caused corporate culture transformation. From this information, the previously market-oriented and profit-oriented culture were transformed into the public and state services less concerned with profit. This situation was accompanied by a break in the supporting chain for developing the rail transportation industry, namely the plantation sector. In this case, many plantation companies stopped operating during the Japanese occupation era, especially the closure of several sugar factories. This was due to the transformation of sugar cane plantations into paddy fields for rice cultivation.

From nationalization to abandonment

The dynamics of Indonesia-Netherlands political relations affected railway companies’ ownership and management status throughout the country, including SJS. Firstly, change occurred after the ‘Confession of Sovereignty by the Netherlands on Indonesian Independence’, based on the Round Table Conference within The Hague. In the early 1950s, the policy of nationalizing the Dutch railways in Indonesia was initiated. This indicated that the Minister of Transportation, Energy, and Public Works of the R.I.S. (United States of Indonesia) issued announcement number 2/6 January 1950, concerning the transfer of the former SS and VS assets to the Indonesian Railways Department (Marihandono et al., 2018). This DKA had responsibilities in the following, (1) managing national railways, including the manufacture and operation of government trains, (2) supervising private railway companies, (3) organizing education to acquire experts, and (4) providing materials for setting tariffs and general rail transportation regulations (Rizaldi & Susilowati, 2020).

Secondly, Dutch Railway Companies had been nationalized since 3 December 1957. This was only legalized in the following years, through the Law on Nationalization of Dutch Companies No. 86/1958 and Government Regulation number 40/1959, including NV SJS (The Indonesian Constitution Number of 86, 1958; Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number of 40, 1959, Article 2, n.d.). The railway infrastructure was also damaged when the SJS company was nationalized into the Indonesian government’s property. Although the state attempted to improve the company, failure was still achieved due to limited funds (Nusantara, 1997). This indicated that the rehabilitation targets focused on significant or main routes, such as Semarang-Jakarta, Semarang-Surabaya, and Semarang-Solo. From this descriptions, small or branch lines such as Semarang-Joana, Demak-Purwodadi, and Purwodadi-Blora, were less considered (Rizaldi & Susilowati, 2020). Despite this low consideration, the former SJS railway line in the 1960s was still a land transportation channel connecting Semarang-Demak and its linked lines. During the occurrence of a flood in Demak at the end of February 1965, the relationship between the affected region and other areas, including Grobogan, became disturbed (Suara Merdeka, 25 February 1965, n.d.).

The tram line also underwent a nationalization process with other private Dutch companies after the independence of Indonesia. This nationalization was physically controlled by freedom fighters since the early years of the independence. However, legal centralization was only carried out after 1958, because of the implementation of Law number 86/1958 concerning the Nationalization of Dutch companies. To nationalize these companies, the Indonesian government primarily aimed to strengthen the national economic potential (Lindblad, 2008). The management of railway companies, including trams, was also under the responsibility of the State Authority (Wasino, 2008). Subsequently, this organizational administration was under the Ministry of Transportation and was technically carried out by the DKA presently known as the Indonesian Railways Company.

An upside-down cross in managing railway land assets was observed after nationalization. This indicated the division of administration between the Ministries of Defense, Transportation, and State-Owned Enterprises, as well as the local Government. Meanwhile, almost all railway lines were operational until the 1960s. Since the 1980s, several short-distance railway lines were not functional because they were economically unprofitable. These lines were then strengthened due to the New Order Government policy, which changed mass transportation to roads, allowing the conveyance of passengers closer to residential areas. Based on this policy, short-distance railway lines, such as the former SJS, were not functioning due to being unprofitable (Kusuma & Purnomo, 2018). Form the closure of the tram line until the end of the New Order administration, the assets of the former SJS managed by the Indonesian Railways Company were neglected. This led to the occurrence of a support seizure, such as the occupation of station land and railroad track thefts. Moreover, the community occupied the grounds around the railway stations and channels for residential and business purposes. They had also become permanent settlements around the railroad tracks over the decades.

Based on the results, the Indonesian government attempted to revitalize the closed railway lines after reformation during the New Order era, with Semarang-Demak-Purwodadi-Wirosari-Blora tram a considered track. However, the plan failed to materialize because residents had occupied almost all stations, with many rail lines becoming residential areas. The Grobogan Regency Government and the people also rejected the revitalization process due to the development of potential conflict between the Indonesian Railways Company, the Regional Authority, and the Residents. This subsequently led to the occurrence of tension and conflict between the organizational management and the residents of the former SJS land. Although the Grobogan Regency Government and Indonesian Railways Company attempted to develop a conflict resolution pattern, success was not achieved in determining a common ground. PT Indonesian Railways Company also attempted to conduct legal action, while the Regional Government considered a political route. Meanwhile, the residents focused on occupying the site because they felt that buying land from a third party and paying taxes to the state authority was a priority. In this case, conflicts, potential hazard, and dispute mediation need to be mapped out based on realistic local wisdom based on this reality.

The decline in the function of small railway lines such as SJS, has also decreased since the 1970s. This was because the New Order government determined economic development priorities in the agricultural food sector, especially rice. During the Dutch Colonial and Old Order eras, rice fields were still observed as sugarcane plantation areas. Therefore, the new decision led to the collapse of the sugar industry within Indonesia in the 1980s, which initially supported the railway industry management. This condition had been reinforced by the public transportation policy since the 1970s, emphasizing commutation. For rural areas where rice production was manufactured, the construction of an highway was considered. This was accompanied by increasing transit accessibility for people through buses. It also improved the transportation of goods to previously underserved areas by using trucks and colts, which supplemented the existing small and short-distance rail network (Hartatik, 2018).

According to the change in transportation policy of the 1970s, the railway line of Semarang-Demak-Purwodadi-Blora was closed around the 1980s. In this case, the rampant construction of the highway caused several losses for the Railway Company due to a lack of passengers. However, long-distance railway lines were maintained, with Central Exploitation PJKA only prioritizing rehabilitation on the Cirebon-Semarang-Cepu and Cirebon-Purwokerto-Yogyakarta crossings (Suara Merdeka, 1 August 1978, n.d.). Regarding the results, the line primarily located in the highway area was often disturbed by road transportation, especially when a truck slips and hits the rail track (Suara Merdeka, 6 June 1984, n.d.).

The SJS line, including the one through Grobogan Regency, namely Godong, Purwodadi, and Wirosari stations, experienced a total death in 1986. This was because the railway line was previously used to transport goods and people from the area covered by the train route. In previous periods, the goods transported include teak wood from a stockpile (TPK) in the Blora and Grobogan regencies, as well as rice and other secondary crops. These goods were often transported by road fleets with the development of transit routes. Since this line functioned for decades, the land assets such as rails and station emplacements were untreated by the Railway Department. This indicated that the retired railway employees and descendants occupied some buildings, while residents inhabited land assets for business and residential purposes.

Based on these historical data, the recognition of sovereignty was not profitable for the management of rail-based transportation companies, namely, train and tram organizations. The SJS company and other Dutch colonialism railroads were decolonized and nationalized. Moreover, the domestic political situation, anti-Dutch, caused the consideration of all Dutch companies as colonizers. This led to the departure of foreign investment, including the plantation companies that were initially the driving factors for the development of transportation organizations. From the results, the change in the management of CV SJS to the Indonesian government caused the company’s decline, and it was finally merged with PT Kereta Api. The management of PT Kereta Api by the government did not also prioritize an efficient and market-oriented corporate culture. However, a government bureaucratic culture was emphasized to serve the public interest. In this case, the company continuously experienced long-term losses, with its operations closed due to bankruptcy.

Conclusion

Based on the results, the contingency factor primarily determined the performance of the SJS transportation company. This situation encompassed the presence of the company, with contingencies observed as external factors, namely the economic condition and political changes.

The success of CV SJS from the end of the 19th century until the 1930s was also determined by several external factors, such as Liberal Colonial policies from the NICA. This opened up large-scale inflows of foreign capital into the Dutch East Indies. Furthermore, the benefits of SJS management was observed due to the availability of the supporting factors for organizational success. These factors included a connecting network of roads, railroads, ports, and proliferated plantation companies, especially on the north coast of Java with its transportation node in Semarang City. Asides from the infrastructure network aspect, the supporters of SJS success were the ease of licensing and the Dutch East Indies Government. The company, initially established in the Netherlands, was launched by the Dutch East Indies Government, to complement the rail transportation network extensively developed on Java island. This was specifically prioritized for the benefit of transporting people and goods over short distances. In this case, building and expanding the rail line for SJS easily obtained support from the Dutch East Indies government to the local authority level. As a private corporation with an international network, the institutional logic developed was capitalism, which emphasized the service aspects of market interests, profits, and efficiency. Subsequently, these three aspects became the dominant factors of the company’s cultural values. Two contingency factors and the institutional logic of this capitalistic company were also the causes for the development of the SJS operating in the Semarang-Joana route and its branches.

Political change from the Netherlands to Japanese and Indonesian militarism became an external factor that destroyed the SJS transportation company. At that time, the management of SJS was consolidated within the Government Railway Company. This led to the confiscation of the company’s management, where a private organization initially managed to switch to a government type. In this case, the change in management caused corporate culture and institutional logic transformation. Moreover, the corporate culture initially prioritizing market profit changed into a public service custom. This change subsequently impacted corporate governance, which initially emphasized efficiency and profit development before transforming to inefficiency and service providers for governmental benefit, especially the military and community.

The change of government from the Dutch East Indies to Indonesia, after the recognition of sovereignty, was also accompanied by the Indonesianization and nationalization of foreign companies, including CV SJS. This process was based on a decolonization and anti-foreigner approach, especially the Dutch, indicating that all colonial assets in the company were transferred to the State Authority. The change was also accompanied by a management transformation that unified the train and tram organizations under the Indonesian Government’s Railroad Company. In addition, the transformation of a private company to a state type impacted the organizational logic, which prioritized the service aspect more than the profit and market expansion phases.

The change in management from the Dutch private sector to an Indonesian government company also caused the destruction and closure of the primary and additional rail lines, which were initially the SJS operational areas. The main routes, namely the inner-city and the Semarang-Joana lines, had also been closed since the 1980s. Similarly, branch lines such as Demak-Purwodadi-Wirosari-Blora to Rembang at the easternmost tip of SJS operations were closed. From these results, PT Kereta Api Indonesia attempted to revitalize these rail lines for tourism purposes, although most former routes were converted into shops, residential areas, and office buildings. Therefore, the idea of revitalization had not been realized until presently.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Universitas Diponegoro.

Notes on contributors

Endah Sri Hartatik

Endah Sri Hartatik is a professor in the Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, Diponegoro University. She graduated from the doctoral program at the Department of Humanities, Gadjah Mada. Her research focus is the history of transportation.

Wasino

Wasino History Department, Faculty of Social Sciences, Universitas Negeri Semarang. He graduated from Gadjah Mada University with a research focus on Social and Economic History.

Fitri Amalia Shintasiwi

Fitri Amalia Shintasiwi is a PhD student at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Sydney, with a research focus in Culture and Globalization.

Sri Indrahti

Sri Indrahti is a lecturer in the Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, Diponegoro University. Her research focus is Social and Economic History.

Appendix

Table A1. Number of passengers and revenue of the main line SJS Company at the end of the XIX century.

Year	The Number of Passengers		Income
	Class 1	Class 2	Class 1 (f)	Class 2 (f)
1884	3.807	209.789	11.937,80	108.024,50
1885	6.996	349.446	16.557,10	131.053,15
1886	8.637	368.173	16.042,70	118.596,72
1887	9.637	368.173	16.590,30	111.296,77
1888	9.934	398.705	17.650,10	110.812,61
1889	11.850	451.157	20.420,70	122.960,14

Source: Statuten van Naamlooze Vennootschap SJS (1884-1889, n.d.)

Table A2. Railway networks and locations of sugar mills, late XIX and early XX centuries.

Railway Company	Sugar Industry	Residency
SJS	Besito, Kaliwungu, Pakis, Cepiring, Gemu, Langse, Rendeng, de Hoop (Mayong), Trangkil, Banyuputih, Tanjung, Mojo	Semarang
S.C.S.	Niew Losari, Arjawinangun, Karangsuwung, Jati Piring, Luang Gajah, Niew Tersana, Gempol, Sendang Laut, Surawinangun	Cirebon
	Adiwerna, Banjardawa, Kalimati, Patarukan, Balapulang, Banjaratma, Pagongan, Jati Barang, Duku Waringin, Pangkah, Kemanglen, Kemantren, Sragi, Comal (Wonopringgo dan Tirto), Sumberharjo, Ketanggungan Barat	Pekalongan
	Besito, Kaliwungu, Pakis, Cepiring, Gemu, Langse, Rendeng, de Hoop (Mayong), Trangkil, Banyuputih, Tanjung, Mojo	Semarang
NIS	Klampok (Bojong), Kalibagor, Kalirejo, Purwokerto)	Banyumas
	Besito, Kaliwungu, Pakis, Cepiring, Gemu, Langse, Rendeng, de Hoop (Mayong), Trangkil, Banyuputih, Tanjung, Mojo	Semarang
	Purwareja, Prembun	NIS Kedu
	Bantul, Beran, Demak Ijo, Kedaton (Plered), Volharding, Barongan, Medari, Gondang Lipura, Sewugalur, Gesikan, Wonocatur, Pundung, Cebongan, Sendang Pitu, Rewulu, Tanjung Tirto, Randu Guntingan	N.I.S. Yogyakarta
	Bangak, Ceper (Maja), Kartosura, Karang Anom, Prambanan, Dlanggu, Kedungbanteng, Gondang Winangun, Candi Sewu, Krajan Reja, Tasik Madu, Colomadu, Ponggok, Manis Harjo, Wonosari, Cokro Tulung	N.I.S. Surakarta

Source: Hartatik (2018), Dua Abad Jalan Pantura Sejak Era Kerajaan Mataram Islam, Yogyakarta: Nurmahera, pages 81.

Table A3. Railway companies and transported sugar cane plantations.

Year	Goods and products from the sugar industry (sugar, seeds, sugar cane stalks, and Melase) transported in 10,00 tons
	NIS		SCS		SJS
	Total item	sugar	Total item	sugar	Total item	sugar
1918	1.949.419	480.587	NA	NA	NA	NA
1919	2.073.819	454.784	NA	NA	NA	NA
1920	2.190.069	411.757	1.020.711	394.969	643.517	101.420
1921	2.377.454	475.990	1.115.869	408.447	663.599	109.631
1922	2.098.000	506.700	1.041.379	448.269	494.003	99.467
1923	2.040.000	491.000	1.015.075	466.780	489.344	91.848
1924	2.354.000	599.300	974.422	456.574	507.438	95.009
1925	2.412.000	657.100	1.098.333	545.728	574.080	112.949
1926	2.519.000	623.300	1.025.664	498.196	525.133	92.704

Sumber: H.CH. G.J. van der Mandere, 1928, de Javasuikerindustrie in Heden en Herleden, Gezien in het Bijzonder in Hare Sociaal-Economische Beteekenis, Amsterdam: Bureau Industria Druk Ipenbuur & van Seldaam, hlm.106.

Table A4. Passenger transport by railway company from Semarang to several places in Java.

Years	Company name/Number of Passengers transported
	NIS	SJS	SCS
1910	148785	351014	ttd
1915	262023	603810	241343
1918	487299	824855	307615
1925	281438	763472	157399
1929	381065	801092	275412

Source: Verslag de Handels Vereeneging te Semarang: 1910, 1915, 1918 ,1925, 1929.

Note: ttd = Data are unavailable.

Table A5. Payment of compensation for Dutch Railway Companies by DAKARI post-independence Indonesia.

Company	1946	1947	1948
	(f)	(f)	Smallest (f)	Highest (f)
N.V. Kediri Stoomtram	18.950	47.375	47.375	75.800
N.V. Madoera Stoomtram Maatschappij	52.050	130.125	130.125	208.200
N.V. Malang StoomtramMaatschappij	38 300	95.750	95.750	153.200
N.V. Modjokerto Stoomtram Maatschap	13.950	34.875	34.875	55 800
N.V. Nederlandsch-Indische Spoorw	777.825	1.944.562	1.944.562	3.111.300
N.V. Oost-Java Stoomtram Maatsc	70.750	176.875	176.875	288.000
N.V. Pasoeroean Stoomtram Maatschapp	6975	17.438	17.438	27.900
N.V. Probolingo Stoomtram Maatschappij	11.850	29.625	29.625	47 400
N.V. Samarang-Joana Stoomtram-Maatschappij	107.275	268 187	268.187	429.100
N.V. Semarang-Cheribon Stoomtram-Maatschappij	265.950	664.875	664.875	1.063.800
N.V. Serajoedal Stoomtram-Maatsch	46.125	115.313	115.318	184.500
Total	1.410,000	3.525 000	3.525.000	5.640.000

Source: A. S. Carpentier Alting (1948), “Het vereenigd Spoorwegbedrijf op Java en Madoera”, SPOOR EN TRAMWEGEN, 21e JAAR Nr. 10, 6 Mei 1948, page. 146.