Road safety beyond the automobility norm? Can Swedish road safety policy escape the automobility norm and facilitate cycling instead – lessons from the Netherlands

ABSTRACT

Road safety policy rules us in both visible and invisible ways and prioritising one mode often means downgrading another. It has been argued in previous research that road safety policy prioritises car traffic and in that way sustains the automobility norm. This paper focuses on the automobility norm that permeates Swedish road safety policy and how this hampers planning for cycling. It aims to contribute to ongoing debates about the need for a radical change in road safety policy towards the inclusion of broader societal and policy goals. The theoretical foundation for this paper is found in the mobilities approach, which acknowledges that (im)mobility and safety are subject to discursive power struggles and differentiated depending on, for instance, modes, groups, age, origin, and gender. The paper aims at obtaining a broader understanding of how mobility and safety are understood in Swedish road safety policy and secondly at identifying windows of opportunity for a change towards a road safety policy that facilitates and encourages cycling. These aims are achieved by a focus on the conceptualisations of problems – instead of on solutions – and a cross-cultural comparison with Dutch road safety policy. In the concluding discussion, it is argued that road safety policy should embrace more goals besides safety, that the discourse around cycling has to be disrupted and that feelings of unsafety and fear need to be problematised.

KEYWORDS:

• Vision zero
• sustainable safety
• road safety policy
• velomobility
• mobilities

1. Introduction

Road safety policy governs us in both visible and invisible ways. It locates us in space, it allocates space, it lets us share it or it separates us from one another. In addition, it controls our speed, movement, and subjectifies us as either pedestrians, cyclists or drivers, or as vulnerable, reckless or (in)capable. These governing processes are not arbitrary; instead they are embedded in an automobility norm, a “complex of interlocking machines, social practices and ways of dwelling”, which over time has affected our conceptions of time, space, movement and speed, resulting in a total reconfiguration of social life (Urry 2000, 190). As such, the dominance of the car cannot be explained as simply being a result of automobility’s supposed capability of extending human freedom and autonomy. Rather, it is the consequence of states deliberately privileging the car over other transport modes (Paterson 2006), including the production of “hybrid subjectivities which are the particular meshing of humans and machines” (Paterson 2006, 139).

Automobility has violent effects (Balkmar 2007, 14) and although safety has been high on the agenda for some time, current developments in digitalisation and automation – with an ever stronger entanglement of driver, car, and road – ask for ever more safety systems (Paterson 2006, 141). Yet, despite its violent effects, it is argued that road safety policy prioritises automobility and that too many safety solutions facilitate and induce automobility and speed (Beckmann 2004; Blank-Gomel 2019; Böhm et al. 2006). In other words, the primary goal of road safety policy is to deal with the negative effects of car traffic – often with technical, behavioural, and symptomatic measures – without abandoning the promises of the car in supplying mobility. This begs the question: how can we imagine a road safety policy that does not set automobility centre stage?

This paper has been developed in tandem with on-going critical debates on the need to broaden the current safety paradigm. Its value, methods, and solutions are challenged by both academics, practitioners, and civil society, as well as by new conceptualisations of what entails well-being and good public spaces (see e.g. Kimberlee 2014; Schönfeld, Carlotta, and Bertolini 2017). Sustainable development has become a main item on the agenda of national governments and the destructive effect of inactivity on human health is not questioned anymore. Add to that the persistent inequality in road casualties (Kimberlee 2014; Mullen et al. 2014) and it can be concluded that a fundamental, “deep change” is needed (Murray, Tranter, and Warn 2011, 1425). May et al. argue that such a change might include abandoning the limited focus in road safety on the transport system as an interdependency of human, road and vehicle. Instead, the perspective should be broadened to include “wider health, social and environmental concerns” (Murray, Tranter, and Warn 2011, 1425).

A decisively less violent mode of transport is cycling. Moreover, it is commonly considered a healthy, affordable, and sustainable transport mode (Whitelegg 2020). As such, it is not only a tool towards achieving broader societal goals but also an appropriate gauge to assess road safety policy. The first aim of this paper is to demonstrate how mobility and safety are understood in Swedish road safety policy and analyse how this may hamper the facilitation and encouragement of cycling. To achieve this, problematisations (understood as conceptualisations of problems (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 4) in Swedish road safety policy will be scrutinised. A second aim is to identify windows of opportunity for change. In order to achieve this, the analysis will broaden its perspective to include a cross-cultural comparison with problematisations in Dutch road safety policy. Not because Dutch policy is considered ideal or something that should be copied but rather because it is a country with one of the highest overall cycling shares and an established velomobility norm next to an automobility norm.

The following section presents previous literature on Swedish road safety policy and critical debates on key points. Next, the method and empirical material that are used for the analysis are described. Before presenting the analyis, it is important to place both Swedish and Dutch policies in their context. After presenting key problematisations in Swedish road safety policy, the concluding discussion summarises the main findings and offers some constructive reflections on the potential for change.

2. Previous literature

In his excellent thesis and book “Bilsamhället” [The Car Society] Lundin ([2008] 2014) performs a historical study of Swedish transport and road safety policy. He demonstrates the rise of the automobility norm in Swedish transport policy and shows that the emergence and sustainment of this norm has been the result of conscious, targeted actions of national authorities. There is an explicit problematisation of safety measures hampering automobility:

Since motorised traffic is a very important prerequisite for Swedish business and for the development of society in general, the solution to the road safety problem can never consist of obstructing the progress of automobility. (Kommunikationsdepartementet 1948, quoted in Lundin ([2008] 2014, 156)

Lundin describes that problematisations that target the safety problem have been alternating between different explanations. Causes have been sought in individual behaviour, the traffic environment, or the abilities of the car to prevent a crash or limit the consequences of an accident. The “roads-and-planning” explanatory model – emphasising the traffic environment – won the competition eventually and was institutionalised in the so-called SCAFT regulations. The result was a standardised infrastructure that prioritised the flow of motorised traffic and marginalised cycling and walking (Koglin 2015, 576). Pedestrians were removed from the road through separation and cyclists were given little thought (and later directed to a part of the footpath that was often separated with only a painted line). Separation in relation to cycling has frequently been discussed in the wider literature. There are cycling advocates who prefer separation and there are those who despise it (see e.g. Blank-Gomel 2019). Several researchers argue that separation serves the construction of cycling as dangerous; it suggests that the road is too dangerous and no place to be for cyclists (Bonham and Cox 2010). Separation also substitutes fear for cycling with fear of the cyclist, as they are perceived as dangerous for road users like children and pedestrians (Horton 2007).

Vision Zero is the offical Swedish road safety policy since 1997 and it has extensively been described in previous research. The vision seeks the problem in the transport system: the interdependent system of people, road and vehicles (Hughes, Anund, and Falkmer 2016; Peter, Dekker, and Tingvall 2010). The safety standard of the road or street and of the vehicle have to be adapted to the “psychological and physical conditions and limitations of the human” (Peter, Dekker, and Tingvall 2010, 1168). This view of the transport system has been criticised as too narrow and discursively excluding problems and solutions that lie outside this system (See Murray, Tranter, and Warn 2011, 1425; Whitelegg 1983, 153).

Another point of criticism is the centrality of speed in the Swedish approach: “The total injury mitigation of these [above mentioned] components determine the safe speed of the system. If a higher speed is desired, the safety performance of the vehicles, roads/streets and/or road user must be increased … ”(Peter, Dekker, and Tingvall 2010, 1168). A struggle around the meaning of speed is illustrated in research by Svensson, Summerton, and Hrelja (2014) who documented different Swedish local and regional actors’ views on speed limits and traffic safety. Respondents were mainly politicians, town planners, traffic planners, administrators, and experts. The authors distinguished two groups in the process of interviewing: a mobility alliance and a traffic safety alliance. Actors in the mobility alliance prioritise accessibility and car mobility before traffic safety and therefore support higher speed limits. Actors in the traffic safety alliance feel that their mandate and influence is palpably less and that higher speed limits can count on more societal support than reductions in speed limits. In their eyes, safety is often used as argument for measures where increased accessibility for drivers actually seems to be the main motivation.

A third point of critique is the consequentialist – utilitarian – approach of Vision Zero: Vision Zero aims at eliminating the number of traffic-related deaths and seriously injured (Forstorp 2006, 101) and not on the distribution of those. Such an approach can result in a disregarding of other values because “the end justifies the means” (Elvebakk 2005, 22). Moreover, Vision Zero explicitly states that safety (and health) cannot be traded off for other values (Ibid.). Elvebakk (Ibid.) argues that Vison Zero tries to escape utilitarianism in two ways: firstly, it targets the number of fatalities and serious injuries instead of accidents, which is unlikely to be the most cost-efficient policy; secondly, it proposes driving speeds that are below the economic optimum, which urges least time loss and lowest costs. However, the focus on reducing the number of deaths and seriously injured implies at the same time that the usual aim of fairness is abandoned (Ibid., 23). Moreover, Vision Zero does explicitly accept cost-benefit analysis for prioritising between safety measures (Tingvall and Lie 2002). Hence, it is the number of serious casualties that counts, not the – social and spatial – distribution of them. In the literature, attention is raised to a possible compensation of different levels of risk experienced by, for instance, the elderly, children, and people cycling or walking (Elvebakk 2005). It would also be possible to take into account that some groups do not pose as many risks to others as other groups. Perhaps, the innocent or the “heavily exposed” should be protected more (Elvebakk 2005; Hokstad and Vatn 2008, 1442).

A fourth discussion highlights how (auto) mobility and safety in the Swedish context can be understood as “being unequally distributed along lines of gender, age and able-bodieness … ” (Balkmar 2007, 3). The statistical overrepresentation of men in dangerous driving practices – such as speeding and drunk driving – opens up for addressing how this is entangled with identity construction and “societal relations of power” (Ibid., 11). Gender differences are acknowledged in Swedish policy but at the same time, driving behaviour of adult men is normalised rather than problematised. Balkmar (Ibid.) observes that the road safety discourse entails a conflict between a vision of freedom through mobility and the right to safe mobility. Road safety policy discourse should, so Balkmar argues, start to acknowledge “automobility as producing limiting and controlling effects on the safety, mobility and sense of ontological security of other road users” (Ibid., 20).

Finally, quantification – in the form of both statistics and cost-benefit analyses – is a crucial part of Vision Zero, yet criticised. It helps to steer towards “zero” and decide which consequences could (or should) be prevented or mitigated, as well as where, how and for whom. The point of critique is that only problems and solutions that can be quantified and represented in statistics are taken into consideration, which results in a “governing by numbers” (Forstorp 2006). It is not always realised that numbers “create norms”, “which are among the gentlest and yet most pervasive forms of power in modern democracies” (Porter 1996, 45). This emphasis on quantification also results in a neglect of perceived risk (Hokstad and Vatn 2008). The significance of perceived safety has been raised in the broader literature on cycling. It is demonstrated, for example, that there is a relation between perceived safety, fear, and the uptake or prolongation of cycling (Aldred and Crosweller 2015; Jacobsen, Racioppi, and Rutter 2009).

Summing up, several researchers observe in Swedish road safety policy a tension between on one hand normalising automobility and its damaging effects, and on the other hand acknowledging the right to safe mobility for all. Mobility is mainly understood as automobility, and safety measures have to facilitate it. The safety problem is understood as originating from a deficiency in the interplay of road and vehicle on one side with the limited mental and physical abilities of the human on the other. Safety is not understood in relation to danger imposed on others or fairness but as a statistical entity referring to the number of deaths and seriously injured. It seems that structural causes are downplayed in road safety policy in favour of symptomatic causes. The great emphasis on quantification can be seen as reinforcing this.

A partial aim of this paper is to demonstrate how mobility and safety are understood in Swedish road safety policy, which makes these issues pivotal to start with. This paper will build on these former foundings and explore more in detail how recent policy supports or undermines earlier conclusions; it goes a step further by explicitly focussing on the position of cycling and searching for alternative problematisations that at the same time might facilitate cycling.

3. Method, empirical material, and research questions

This paper positions itself within critical mobilities research, in which tracking the power of discourses and knowledge fields take centre stage (Endres, Manderscheid, and Mincke 2016). Discourse and knowledge are not understood as a representation of a “real world” but rather as “preconditioning practices” and “governing of movement” (Ibid., 3). This implies that an analysis of road safety policy cannot consist of merely investigating how an already existing safety problem appears on the political agenda or how well a policy solves a safety problem. Instead, this paper starts from the view that it is road safety policy that produces (defines) problems, objects, and categories in “ongoing interactions with discourses and other practices” (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 4). Policy governs and exercises power not only by its actions but also by the conceptualisation of problems – problematisations – and the categorisation of objects and people (Ibid., 6). This Foucault-and-Bacchi-inspired approach to policy is used to achieve the first aim of this paper: to demonstrate how mobility and safety are understood in Swedish road safety policy and how this affects cycling. The research question that is formulated for this purpose is as follows:

What are the problematisations in Swedish road safety policy and vision that play a key role in sustaining the automobility norm and hampering a facilitation of cycling?

Problematisations are a tool to unpack discourses, make power visible and open windows for considering change (Ibid.). Hence, a focus on problematisations can result in suggesting to disrupt the “production and circulation” of certain discourses (Vick 2006, 7) or it can result in suggesting new problematisations in order to make certain solutions thinkable.

To explore alternative problematisations that might induce change – the second aim of the paper – Sweden’s policy will be compared with the Dutch policy. Cross-cultural research can be conducted in different ways and for different purposes (see e.g. Baistow 2000; Gómez and Kuronen 2011). In this case, the analysis will consist of a qualitative, in-depth comparison, which offers a holistic understanding of the perspectives that frame road safety policy in the two countries (Gómez and Kuronen 2011). Hence, a statistical comparison of cycling and safety is not a purpose of this paper. What could be interesting in the context of this paper are differences in the way statistics are collected and made available; it is apparent, for example, that statistics on bicycle use are much easier to obtain for the Netherlands than for Sweden. The comparison with Dutch policy serves two purposes: (i) it is used as a mirror to critically scrutinise Swedish policy, and (ii) it is used to investigate how road safety policy can relate to bicycle-friendliness. Choosing those contexts also has a very practical reason (See Gómez and Kuronen 2011). The author has inside knowledge of both societies, cultures, languages, and road safety policy practices, which has the advantage of being able to take the viewpoint of both an insider and a “professional stranger” at the same time (Gómez and Kuronen 2011, 688). The research question guiding this part of the analysis is:

What are the most important differences in problematisations between Swedish and Dutch policies and visions related to the facilitation and encouragement of cycling?

The documents used for the analysis is displayed in Table 1. Only national documents related to the visions and policies are used, because in both countries, road safety policy is disseminated at first hand from the national level. In the Swedish case, two academic papers, which more or less describe Vision Zero, are important parts of the empirical material. These papers are used as first-hand evidence since Claes Tingvall, the first author of these papers, is considered one of the founders of Vison Zero. The documents are read in their original language. This resulted in a satisfactory picture of the problematisations, after which rereading filled in the details for each observed problem.

Table 1. Documents used and for the analysis (full reference in appendix 1), not all quoted in text.

Document	Kind of organisation
Sweden
Traffic Safety Bill 1997 – Sweden	Government
Policy document traffic safety 2016	Governmental Agency
Policy document cycling safety 2018	Governmental Agency in cooperation with other organisations
Policy document traffic safety 2016	Governmental Agency
About Vision Zero – 1999 – Academic paper used as primary material
About Vision Zero – 2002 Conference paper used as primary material
Vision Zero – 2012	Governmental Agency
Netherlands
Policy document 2018	Govermental in cooperation with regional and local governments
Policy document Action Plan Governmental	Govermental
Policy document safe cycling 2012	Governmental in cooperation with other organisations
About Sustainable Safety – 1992	National research institute
About Sustainable Safety – 2018	National research institute
About Sustainable Safety – 2018	National research institute
About development of safety indicators – 2020	National knowledge platform attached to the national SPV (Strategic Plan Traffic Safety) 2030, commissioned by the ministry

Complementary interviews were held with the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, the Dutch Institute for Road Safety Research (SWOV), and the Swedish Transport Administration (STA or Trafikverket) (see Table 2). The interviews were used to confirm and complement the chosen material, but also to de-mystify possible enigmas in the material. Four out of five interviews were recorded and transcribed; one of the interviews was not recorded but manually documented and transcribed. All translations are performed by the author.

Table 2. Interviewees.

Country	Role of interviewee	Interviewee
Sweden	Director of Vision Zero Academy, Swedish Transport Administration	1
	Senior project leader, Swedish Transport Administration	2
	Project leader, Swedish Transport Administration	3
Netherlands	Senior policy advisor, Ministry of Infrastructure and Water management	4
	Policy Advisor, Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management	5
	Expert traffic safety, Institute for Road Safety Research (SWOV)	6
	Expert cycling, Institute for Road Safety Research (SWOV)	7

4. Contextualising the study

The overall share of cycling in the number of trips in Sweden is around 10% at a national level, with large differences between urban and non-urban areas (Trafikverket 2020). Sweden is juxtaposed with the Netherlands, which has a high level of cycling at the national level, 28% of the number of trips and 8% of the number of kilometres (De Haas and Hamersma 2020, 1). Both countries have a goal to increase cycling: in Sweden, the aim is that in 2025, 25% of total kilometres be done by walking, cycling, and public transport together (Miljö- och Energidepartementet 2018). The Netherlands wishes to increase the number of cycling kilometres in 2027 by 20%, compared to 2017, when 15.3 billion bicycle kilometres were travelled (Tour de Force 2019).

The national visions (Vision Zero in Sweden and Sustainable Safety in the Netherlands) form an important foundation of the policies, albeit stronger in Sweden than in the Netherlands. Both visions have been updated recently. The Swedish Vision Zero was developed at the (predecessor of the) Swedish Transport Administration and adopted in the traffic safety bill from 1997. In Sweden, the state and the municipalities, of which the last own most roads inside built-up areas, are important agents for implementation of infrastructural safety measures. Regions in Sweden are not road authorities but finance regional – state owned – infrastructure. Non-infrastructural safety measures are primarily carried out by non-governmental organisations that are subsidised by the Government.

In the Netherlands, the Institute for Road Safety Research (SWOV) launched Sustainable Safety in 1992. The Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management is responsible for the principal policy document – the Strategic Plan for Road Safety 2030 – which is co-authored with many other organisations. On the strategic and implementary level, road safety policy is more decentralised than in Sweden. State, provinces, and municipalities are all road authorities and important agents for implementation of infrastructural measures. Municipalities own most road inside their built-up areas but also the minor roads outside built-up areas. Both the Ministry and the provinces are deeply involved in the development of non-infrastructural measures.

While thorough comparisons between national history and the development of automobility, (different types of) velomobility and road safety would certainly be elucidating, they are beyond the scope of this paper (see e.g. Charlotte, Leroy, and Hagenzieker 2014; Cox 2019; Dekker 2022; Emanuel 2015; Hagson 2004; Oldenziel and Albert de la Bruhèze 2011; Oosterhuis 2019; Stoffers 2012).

5. Analysis

A number of problematisations are detected in Swedish road safety policy. In this paper, the focus is on those that can be considered of pivotal importance for the facilitation and encouragement of bicycling. This results in three problematisations: (i) a concern for hampering accessibility and speed, (ii) cycling is dangerous and (iii) objective safety. Each one starts with a presentation of Swedish material. It is mirrored against the Dutch policy in a separate figure that gives a concise account of the different Dutch position on just that issue. This is followed by a broader discussion about the differences and a reflection about which other possible problematisations are lacking in Swedish policy. If possible, a link is established with the broader literature.

5.1. Problematisation I: A concern for hampering accessibility and speed

As noted in previous studies, the material shows a concern that safety solutions might hamper car mobility. The Swedish policy states that:

The better the road design and the safer the vehicles, the higher the speeds that can be accepted … (Kommunikationsdepartementet 1997, 17)

It is also expressed by the Swedish Transport Administration that:

… road safety initiatives have often been considered to limit access and mobility in road traffic. An important aspect of the work on Vision Zero is to demonstrate instead that safety is a precondition for good mobility. It is possible to design the road transport system so that it is safe, even at current speed limits. (STA (Swedish Transport Adminstration) 2012, 18)

Finally, the strong hold of automobility on road safety policy is still very visible in the 2016 revision of Vision Zero:

The government considers further development of driver support systems, digitalisation and automation in cars important for achieving Vision Zero. Vehicle and infrastructure should be developed in tandem to optimise safety measures in each component. Regulations should be adapted so that automation and digitalisation of the vehicle is promoted and thereby foster sustainable development of the transport system. (Näringsdepartementet 2016, 18)

Recently, attention on cycling safety has increased and a separate publication of the Swedish Transport Administration is devoted to safe bicycle and moped traffic (Trafikverket 2018). A concern for the accessibility of other road users is detected:

An important future challenge is to create a safe interplay between public transport, bicycle traffic, moped traffic and pedestrian traffic, while at the same time the accessibility is not unnecessarily limited for these more sustainable modes of transport. (Trafikverket 2018, 14)

However, this quote raises a number of questions. Why is the car omitted from the list of transport modes that need to “interplay”? Is the car still supposed to have its own space, while everything else has to share with one another? When is a limitation of accessibility necessary and when is it unnecessary? The mentioned modes are described as “more sustainable”. This seems to imply that the car is also seen as sustainable, albeit less.

Figure 1 presents the differences from the Dutch policy regarding this issue.

Figure 1. Dutch policy on the issue of problematisation I.

An important difference is the inclusion of another value alongside safety in Dutch policy: liveability. Traffic liveability is linked to both subjective and objective elements, and situations both inside and outside the built-up area. It is in the Netherlands often associated with, for example, the amount of traffic, possibilities to cross infrastructure and the barrier effect of infrastructure. (Simms and Wood 2009). It is in Sustainable Safety operationalised, for instance, through the design of large 30 km/h areas inside built-up areas and large 60 km/h areas outside built-up areas.

Automobility itself it not problematised and an awareness that road safety policy influences the amount of traffic and its composition is lacking in Swedish policy. In the renewed commitment to Vision Zero, it is explicitly stated that the volume of traffic and its composition are not affected by road safety policy but rather by regulations and policies from other fields (Näringsdepartementet 2016, 13). Neither is the trend towards the use of ever more heavier cars, such as Sports Utility Vehicles – SUV (problematised, despite considerably negative effects on the seriousness of injuries of pedestrians and cyclists after a collision (Monfort and Mueller 2020; Simms and Wood 2009). This makes targeting this an “unthinkable” solution.

Summing up, mobility is still predominantly understood as automobility in Swedish policy; its position is sovereign. There seem to be no other obstructions to automobility’s progression besides safety, such as, for example, equality, liveability, or health. Automobility is not problematised as something that imposes danger on others, which is in line with Balkmar’s (2007), – earlier discussed – conclusions. There is an emerging discourse about not obstructing other road users unnecessarily, so the understanding of mobility is about to be broadened. Safety is understood as something that should not hinder (auto)mobility and something that can be achieved within the boundaries of the traffic system. Defining additive goals for road safety policy that condition safety measures, seems to be a window of opportunity for changing the discourse.

5.2. Problematisation II: cycling is dangerous

In the early documentation on Vision Zero, little attention is given to cycling. It is not mentioned in the documentation on the vision, with the exception of the need for cyclists to wear a helmet (see Tingvall and Haworth 1999; Tingvall and Lie 2002). In the traffic safety bill from 1997, cycling in built-up areas is discussed, and a wish is expressed that in the long term the speed limit should – for safety reasons – not exceed 30 km per hour in places where “it is planned that pedestrians and cyclists mix with car traffic” (Kommunikationsdepartementet 1997, 31). One of the interviewed persons expressed that

20-25 years ago, when we started Vision Zero, when we listened to our traffic safety experts … they preferred to ban cycling, they found it too dangerous. This is surely not the case today. (interviewee 1)

The interviewee adds that this must be seen against the backdrop of the automobility norm that developed in Sweden after the Second World War. Traffic safety experts were really concerned about cyclists’ safety but were not able to think outside the prevailing paradigm.

The Common Strategy for Safe Traffic with Bicycle and Moped (Trafikverket 2018) marks a greater attention to cycling safety. It is noticeable that the strategy groups bicycle and moped traffic together. The strategy expresses concern about the rise of casualties when cycling increases. This demonstrates a tension between committing to both safety and increased cycling, which is visible in this quote:

For cycling to increase, people need to change from a safer mode (such as public transport or car) to cycling … .Increased cycling will result in more casualties unless very effective safety measures are taken at the same time. (Trafikverket 2018, 18)

Swedish law requires children up to 15 years old to wear helmets when cycling. The policy puts great emphasis on the bicycle helmet as a tool to extend the crash tolerance of the human body, and uses strong wording:

Cycling without a helmet entails a great safety risk for the cyclist and means that the journey cannot be considered safe (Trafikverket 2018, 20). To achieve Vision Zero for cyclists, cyclists need to wear a helmet. (Ibid., 49)

Other lack of protection is also mentioned in the safety strategy:

There is therefore a need to design body protection for cyclists. If all cyclists wore arm and leg protection, the number of serious injuries could be reduced by 30 per cent. (Trafikverket 2018, 51)

In the Swedish documents, people who are cycling are depicted with helmets. Cyclists are frequently labelled as “unprotected road-users” and sometimes as “vulnerable” (see e.g. Näringsdepartementet 2016; Trafikverket 2018).

Figure 2 describes the different position of the Netherlands regarding this issue. The most important difference is the much weaker wording about the bicycle helmet. In the original version of Sustainable Safety (Koornstra et al. 1992) the bicycle helmet is barely mentioned. The document only reports an increasing use of helmets by sports cyclists and successful campaigns to increase helmet use in, for example, Denmark (Koornstra et al. 1992, 127). In the wider mobilities literature, it is argued that promoting the bicycle helmet (or making it mandatory) and visibility clothing is a way of constructing cycling as dangerous (Aldred and Woodcock 2015; Culver 2020; Horton 2007). Culver (2020), who studied the discursive effects of the fixation with bicycle helmets in the USA, argues that “the helmet fixation is ultimately tied to the (re)production of unfettered automobility” (149). It assists in the denial of the “overarching problem of vehicular violence”, “it redistributes blame”, and it “signals a societal lack of will to make the necessary changes”, such as lower speeds for car-traffic and more space for bicycle traffic (Ibid., 149). The Swedish focus on protection can be related to the emphasis in Vision Zero on the limited human physical tolerance (seeTingvall and Haworth 1999), which highlights the crash and injury prevention. The Dutch vision seems to show greater attention to the adaption of the road environment to the mental limitations of the human (See SWOV 2018).

Figure 2. Dutch policy on the issue of problematisation II.

Collective risk is left unproblematic. Road safety policy is in both countries solely concerned with individualised risk; this individualised perception of safety can be traced back to the dominance of utilitarianism in national transport policy and its fit into the practice of cost-benefit analysis. The attribution of risk to the victim also distracts from the dangers of automobiles to cyclists and pedestrians, earlier raised by Aldred (2016), Balkmar (2007) and Horton (2007).

Summing up, Swedish policy problematises cycling as dangerous in very strong wording. The Dutch minister calls the Netherlands a “safe, healthy and sustainable cycling country”, without denying that it is under pressure. Although the Netherlands and Sweden both struggle with increasing numbers of seriously injured cyclists, one country denotes cycling still as safe while the other country denotes it as not safe. Fear is constructed and it has been raised in previous literature that the constant propagation of danger helps to construct fear (Horton 2007).

5.3. Problematisation III: objective safety

The Swedish Transport Administration uses “safety performance indicators” to monitor objective safety and to steer towards the ultimate goal of zero deaths and seriously injured. A milestone for 2030 is halving the number of fatalities and decreasing the number of seriously injured with 25% compared to 2017–2019. The same goals applies to cyclists. There are no quantitive goals related to the safety of weaker grupps such as the elderly or children. The safety performance indicators present measurable and quantifiable indicators of safety, for instance, the percentage of safe bicycle crossings or the degree of bicycle helmet use (Lindberg et al. 2016). Related to this, as will be shown later, is the problematisation of serious accidents but not of minor accidents.

Vision Zero addresses fatalities and those injuries where the victim does not physically recover within a certain period. This means that common, but not long-term disabling injuries and non-injury accidents are more or less outside the scope of the Vision. (Tingvall and Haworth 1999, 1-2)

This emphasis is also confirmed in the road safety bill of 1997 (Kommunikations departementet 1997).

The Dutch position on this issue is demonstrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Dutch policy on the issue of problematisation III.

Quantitative safety performance indicators are also becoming more and more important in the Dutch approach (see Kennisnetwerk SPV 2020). Quantification, as discussed above, has side-effects. A possible discursive effect of the great emphasis on quantifiable causes is the use of statistics to enforce a discourse. This is manifested in the presentation of statistics that support helmet use. The Swedish “Common Strategy for Safe Traffic with Bicycle and Moped” (Trafikverket 2018) claims that in accidents where cyclists die when being hit by a “car” (notice that the car is attributed agency) on a road with a speed limit of 70–90 km/h, 43% would have survived if they had been wearing a helmet. The underlying report (Folksam 2018), however, states that in only 8% of these cases would the helmet have been the only relevant measure: infrastructure measures would have prevented 86% of fatalities, and measures on the motor vehicle 75%. The strategy seems to present neutral statistics but only highlights the role of the helmet, an indication of what Vardi calls (2014, 347–8) “numerical claims-making”; this sets the frame for possible solutions.

Related to this limitation to objective safety is the fact that solutions that are not based on easily measurable quantitative information are out of sight. Here, it is also relevant to note that cycling casualties are heavily underreported and this counts especially for non-injury accidents (Elvik and Mysen 1999; Winters and Branion-Calles 2017). Further, perceived safety, minor accidents, and near-misses are not easily measurable. Dutch policy demonstrates greater attention to perceived safety in several ways: through the problematisation of liveability and through the involvement of the national government in projects that aim to increase cycling by increasing perceived safety. When people judge safety to be insufficient they might reduce their cycling. Near misses and non-injury accidents have an emotional impact and contribute to a feeling of unsafety, in particular, when motor vehicles are involved (see Aldred 2016; Lee, Underwood, and Handy 2015), suggesting that near misses and non-injury accidents cannot be neglected when there is a wish to facilitate and increase cycling. The result is a considerable burden in the form of fear, emotional impact, and material damage that is not accounted for in road safety policy.

An important issue in earlier literature, related to the interpretaton of safety as a total number of fatalities and injured, was the disregarding of fairness or distributional effects. Neither Swedish nor Dutch policy show “tougher” goal for reducing casualties among cyclists (or pedestrians or the elderly or children); in that sense policy treats the weakest equally but not equitably. However, Dutch policy prioritises pedestrians, cyclists and the elderly in the design principles that condition underlying risks. The ignorance of perceived safety also has a gender component, in the sense that women and older people often perceive safety as a larger barrier to cycling than others (Buehler and Dill 2016; Ravensbergen, Buliung, and Laliberté 2019).

Concluding discussion

This paper aimed to demonstrate how mobility and safety are understood in Swedish road safety policy and how this may hamper the facilitation and encouragement of cycling. It also searched for windows of opportunity for change by comparing with the Dutch policy. The empirical material was used to select key problematisations. The first key problematisation is the concern about hindering automobility. This is visible in both countries. Swedish policy problematises the obstruction of car speed. There is a tension between a vision of economic utility (or growth) versus a vision of zero deaths and seriously injured. Dutch policy produces car and bicycle congestion as a problem and wishes safety measures to help solve this. In the new commitment to Vision Zero there is a concern for unnecessarily obstructing accessibility for other road users; however, it is not related to the interplay with car traffic but referring to an interplay between those other road users. The car seems to maintain its privileged position and its devastating effects on safety and mobility of others are not problematised. Defined as a window of opportunity for change is the assignment of other goals to road safety policy as a tool for safety policy to engage with multiple goals from the sustainability agenda. In the Dutch policy, liveability is an important policy concern within the field. This is in agreement with the recommendation of Koornstra et al. (1992) (see Figure 1) and an earlier proposal of Murray, Tranter, and Warn (2011), who argue for a reframing of road safety policy in such a way that multiple policy goals can be integrated. A way to accomplish that could be the involvement of stakeholders from other fields in road safety policy, such as health, climate, and equity.

The second problematisation concerns the understanding of cycling as dangerous. Where Sweden denotes cycling as unsafe, the Netherlands calls it, under comparable circumstances, safe. Swedish policy places great emphasis on individual protection gear, which could be related to their larger focus on mitigating consequences instead of preventing. Sweden frequently uses the term “unprotected” for cyclists, while in the Netherlands the more neutral “two-wheeler” is dominant. In light of conclusions in earlier literature, it seems important – and at the same time easy – to disrupt that discourse.

Thirdly, there is the problematisation of safety as merely an objective and quantified feature, in particular in Sweden. The Dutch government recognises liveability as important and attempts are made to facilitate cycling by increasing perceived safety. It is also recognised in Dutch policy that design must in the first place be adapted to more vulnerable groups. A way to take account of perceived safety – which cannot be neglected when aiming at an increase of cycling and an inclusive policy – is to include it in road safety policy and to pursue an active policy to facilitate and encourage cycling. In both countries road safety policy is guided by the individualised perception of safety, which fits in the automobility norm with its strong association with economic utilitarianism and cost-benefit analyses. Aldred (2016) argues that safety statistics should contribute accidents where motor vehicles are involved to car traffic instead of to the victim. This can be seen to be in line with Te Brömmelstoet’s suggestion to change the concept of “traffic safety” to “traffic danger” (Te Brömmelstoet 2020). This would require a radical change of discourse and cannot be incorporated in cost-benefit analysis as it is used today. It requires, as Caimotto proposes, that the economic argument is reduced in favour of a different worldview in which well-being and fairness plays a much more important role (Caimotto 2020).

This analysis suggests the addition of new problematisations – related to other values besides safety – to make new solutions possible. It also recommends the inclusion of perceived safety as a problematisation. The goal to increase cycling has to be more closely entwined with the goal to increase safety. On the other hand, it suggests the disruption of the discourse that problematises cycling as dangerous.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the interviewees for participating in the study and freely sharing their knowledge; the anonymous reviewers and Malene Freudendal-Pedersen for their useful comments and suggestions and finally Dalia Mukhtar-Landgren and Till Koglin for constructive dialogues and reviewing the paper. Finally, I wish to express gratitude to the Swedish Transport Administration for making this study possible.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Appendix 1

Table

Type of document and organisation	Reference
Sweden
Traffic Safety Bill 1997 – Sweden Governmental	Kommunikationsdepartementet 1997. Nollvisionen och det trafiksäkra samhället. Proposition 1996/97:137. Nollvisionen och det trafiksäkra samhället Proposition 1996/97:137 – Riksdagen
Policy document traffic safety 2016 Governmental Agency	Näringsdepartementet 2016. Nystart för Nollvisionen. Ett intensifierat arbete för trafiksäkerheten i Sverige. N2016.30. trafiksakerhet_160905_webb.pdf (regeringen.se). Availabe in English: trafiksakerhet_160927_webny.pdf (government.se)
Policy document cycling safety 2018 Governmental Agency in cooperation with others	Trafikverket 2018. Gemensam Inriktning för Säker Trafik med Cykel och Moped. Available in English: The common strategy for safe bicycle and moped traffic 2018. Trafikverket.diva-portal.org
Policy document traffic safety 2016 Governmental Agency	Lindberg, Johan, Strandroth, Johan., Ekman, Lars, Persson, Sofia, Malmström, Therese. 2016. Översyn av etappmål för säkerhet på väg till 2020 och 2030, med en utblick mot 2050. Borlänge:Trafikverket. Trafikverket.diva-portal.org
About Vision Zero 1999 Academic paper used as primary material	Tingvall, Claes and Narelle Haworth. 1999. ”Vision Zero – an Ethical Approach to Safety and Mobility.” In 6^th ITE International Conference Road Safety & Traffic Enforcement: Beyond 2000. Retrievcd from https://eprints.qut.edu.au/134,991/
About Vision Zero 2002 Conference paper used as primary material	Tingvall, Claes, and Anders Lie. 2002. “Vad är Nollvisionen? Några Reflektioner kring Nollvisionens Grundprinciper”. Paper presented at Expertseminar in Stockholm 27-28th of November 2001. Retrieved from www.spolander.se
About Vision Zero 2012 Governmental Agency	Trafikverket. 2012. Vision Zero on the Move. Trafikverket.diva-portal.org
Netherlands
Policy document 2018 Govermental in cooperation with others	Ministerie van IenW, Ministerie van JenV, het interprovinciaal overleg, de Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, Vervoersregio Amsterdam, Metropoolregio Rotterdam Den Haag. 2018. Strategisch Plan Verkeersveiligheid 2030: Veilig van Deur tot Deur. Den Haag: Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat. https://rijksoverheid.nl. Available in English: kennisnetwerkspv.nl/getmedia/ce0099b7-ce77-4ce2-98c8-a7810662ef
Policy document Action Plan Governmental	Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat. 2018. Landelijk Actieplan Verkeersveiligheid 2019-2021. Rijksoverheid.nl
Policy document safe cycling 2012 Governmental in cooperation with other organisations	Arends, Pieter, Susan van Hees, Nicole Bunschoten. Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, Vereniging van Nederlandse gemeenten, Fietsberaad, Twynstra Gudde. 2012. Modelaanpak Veilig Fietsen. Retrieved via swov.nl/feiten-cijfers/fact/fietsers-welke-maatregelen-zijn-er-genomen-om-de-fietsveiligheid-te-verbeteren
About Sustainable Safety 1992	Koornstra, M.J., M.P.M. Mathijssen, J.A.G. Mulder, R. Roszbach, and F.C.M. Wegman. 1992. Naar een Duurzaam Veilig Wegverkeer. Leidschendam: SWOV. Swov.nl
About Sustainable Safety 2018	SWOV – Instituut voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid. 2018. DV3 – Visie Duurzaam Veilig Wegverkeer 2018-2030. Den Haag. Available in English on swov.nl/en/publication/sustainable-safety-3rd-edition-advanced-vision-2018-2030
About Sustainable Safety 2018	Aarts, L.T., and A. Dijkstra. 2018. DV3 – Achtergronden en Uitwerking van de Verkeersveiligheidsvisie; De visie Duurzaam Veilig Wegverkeer voor de periode 2018-2030 onderbouwd. Den Haag: SWOV. https://swov.nl
About development of safety indicators	Kennisnetwerk SPV (SWOV, CROW). 2020. Definitie van “voldoende veilige” weg- en fietsinfrastructuur voor de ontwikkeling van risico-indicatoren. KN SPV 2020-8