The dynamics of the Republic of Serbia’s cooperation with China via the Belt and Road Initiative and the “Sixteen plus One” platform

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we examine what factors played a determining role in creating new and dynamic bilateral relationships between the “sixteen” smaller European states and China, particularly the Republic of Serbia. Our research will notably examine the expressed capacity of the local actors in Serbia and their main drivers to accept and support China’s initiatives. A new chapter in cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) resulted from the one-sided PRC initiative. Vulnerable to the consequences of the global economic crises and neglected by Brussels, member states among the “sixteen” were attracted to China’s promise of market access for their products and investment. The Balkan states, severely affected by the civil war in the 1990s and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, were in an even grimmer condition and even further from substantial developmental assistance from Brussels. The domestic economic and somewhat political drivers were the main ones that existed with all the local agents and their willingness to engage. In the case of Serbia, there were also powerful peace and security issues. Additional drivers come from international relations, and major power rivalries became increasingly apparent with the rise of project numbers and values and China’s growing political clout over the included countries.

KEYWORDS:

• PRC
• Serbia
• “16 plus 1”
• EU
• development
• rivalry

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

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2. Mitrovic, “Six Years of 16+…”14.

3. Takahara, “Introduction to the special issue on ….” 157-161.

4. Cooperation between China and Central… CEEC.orgeec.org/eng/

5. Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) on the situation relating to Kosovo. https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-resolution1244.

6. “Vucic thanks China …” TANJUG, November 30, 2022.

7. Joint Statement of the Republic of Serbia and the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (signed June 18, 2016).

8. NIDS, Tokyo, China Security Report 2020, 22-24.

9. Xinhua, “Chinese martyr’s family …” June 19, 2016.

10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Agreement(s) between the Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic.All agreements are available from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, https://www.mfa.rs/sites/default/files/inline-files/kina.pdf.

11. Bzganovic, “Chinese security forces …” AP, November 28, 2019.

12. On July 16, 2020 the Ambassador of the PRC, Chen Bo, attended the handover of donated medical supplies for pandemic prevention and control.

13. The Government of the Republic of Serbia, “Visit of Chinese Minister …” Belgrade, March 27, 2021.

14. Ministry of Defence, Republic of Serbia, “New unmanned aerial …” August 5, 2020.

15. Reuters, “Serbian purchase of missile defence …” August 3, 2020.

16. Liu &Guo, “Spotting of six Y-20 cargo planes in Serbia …” April 10, 2022.

17. Lau & Bermingham. “China delivered FK-3 missile system to Serbian military…” April 11, 2022.

18. Liu &Guo. “Spotting of six Y-20 cargo planes …” April 10, 2022.

19. Regarding the military equipment of the Serbian Army. Additionally, it is still primarily based on former Soviet technology and hardware.

20. Agreement on Cooperation between the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Republic of Serbia and the Ministry of the Public Security of the PRC from December 8, 2009.

21. Živanović. “Serbia and China … “November 28, 2019.

22. Dragojlo, “Serbia, Croatia, Deny …” December 5,2022.

23. TANJUG, “Serbia, China sign …” December 17, 2014.

24. Huawei News &Events, “Serbian President-elect Aleksandar Vucic…” May 14, 2017.

25. Ibid.

26. EDRI, “Unlawful facial recognition.” December 4, 2019.

27. Huawei Investment& Holding Co. Ltd, 2017 Annual Report.

28. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on mutual visa, December 28, 2016.

29. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of Cultural Centres, July 8, 2015).

30. Mitrovic, “Political Economy of …”181.

31. Mitrovic, “Sixteen Plus One” in 2015/2016 – upgrading, 14.

32. Avakumovic, “Sporazum o …” December 13, 2022, 11.

33. Pencea, “Sixteen plus One …” Institute for Asian Studies Conference, Belgrade, April.

34. Value of bilateral trade was 1.13 US$ billion, with Serbian export to China of US$177 million and imports from China at US$953 million.

35. In 2021 value of bilateral trade between Serbia and China was 5.28 billion US$, according to the Serbian Statistical Bureau.

36. By purchasing 65% of the former RKB on December 18, 2018, China’s Zijin Mining Group took control of a gold and copper mining and smelting complex in Bor, eastern Serbia.

37. Xinhua Silk Road Database, HBIS Group Serbia, April 26, 2019.

38. [Dominance of Chinese…]. BETA, November 25, 2022.

39. OEC.5.0. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/srb

40. Ibid.

41. BETA, “Mitrovic: Chinese ‘investments’ …” May 14, 2017.

42. Ibid.

43. National Bank of Serbia, Macroeconomic Developments… December, 2022.

44. Ibid.

45. Bjelotomic, “China the biggest foreign investor …” October 24, 2022.

46. Tanjug, “Vucic discusses free trade …” February 5, 2022.

47. Ibid.

48. Kobierski, “Public Opinion on China …” December 23, 2020, presents the result in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic where between 70% and 80% of respondents expressed a negative or neutral attitude towards China.

49. The Government of the Republic of Serbia, “Serbia…” Belgrade, September 21, 2019.

50. IEA, Attitudes of Serbian citizens, September 2, 2022.

51. CeSID and IRI in 2021 showed very similar outcomes, “Perception of citizens …”

52. Vierecke & Rujevic, “Serbia as China’s …” February 18, 2021.

53. Xinhua, “China-Serbia friendship…” October 29, 2021.

54. Zagreb Summit, November 24, 2000, Final Declaration.

55. At that time, the country’s name was the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On February 4, 2003, the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia created a confederacy—the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Finally, in 2006, both countries became independent states again. Interestingly, both countries were the only ones among the former republics of socialist Yugoslavia (SFRY) that had statehood before it succeeded the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1945.

56. Financial Times, “Brussels rattled as …” November 26, 2017.

57. Direktno, “Serbia, the first…” February 14, 2021.

58. Kurir, [Good Economic Cooperation…], March 21, 2017.

59. The Government of the Republic of Serbia, “The Gratitude to China…” May 1, 2020.

60. Hopkins, “Brussels says EU …” March 5, 2019.

61. Dedeić, [Construction of high-speed…], November 10, 2022.

62. Railway Pro Magazine, “Serbia and China signed …” May 2, 2019.

63. Papatolios, “Europe pours billions …” RailFreight.com.

64. Ibid.

65. МFA, Republic of Serbia, International bilateral agreements. Agreement on…No. 42,5.

66. Radović & Krasić, “Chinese constructors…” October 18, 2017.

67. Official Gazette of RS, Number 9, February 4, 2020.

68. Anonymous. Chinese middle-level officials were prone to offer corruption to local Serbian sub-constructers’ technical personnel in exchange for turning a blind eye towards lower-class material or ignoring specific technical standards.

69. Curic & Kalman, “From Budapest to …” December 28, 2021.

70. Tanjug, “Belgrade-Budapest railway-related…” Belgrade, December 17, 2014.

71. Xinhua, “Chinese companies start …” November 23, 2021.

72. Ralev, “Russia’s RZD signs …” December 28, 2020.

73. Xinhua, “Budapest-Belgrade rail …” July 17, 2014.

74. Preferential Buyer Credit, December 17, 2014.

75. Xinhua, “China, Serbia sign …” February 4, 2010.

76. Ibid.

77. Balkans.com, “Serbia: construction of a …” November 22, 2013.

78. Kalmar, “Kostolac B3 …” January 16, 2015.

79. Šarić, “Kostolac: Chinese loan …” July 21, 2016.

80. Serbian Monitor, “Court orders EPS …” November 2, 2022.

81. Reuters, “Chinese company starts …” November 20, 2017.

82. Bankwatch & Sustainable Energy, “Chinese-financed coal …” December 10, 2019.

83. Bankwatch Network, “Serbia pushes ahead…” November 20, 2017.

84. Ibid.

85. Novosti, “Kostolac: Za termoblok B3 …” September 5, 2019.

86. Balkan Green Energy News, “Serbia to put coal plant Kostolac …” November 28, 2022.

87. Ministry of Mining and Energy, “Mihajlovic to the Chinese company …”

88. Šaric, Ibid.

89. The Government of the Republic of Serbia, “Desulfurization …” July 17, 2017.

90. According to Comply or Close.com, the 2020 health burden from Serbia’s non-compliance is 2,326 deaths, 666,939 workdays lost, and 5.16 billion EUR.

91. Comply or Close, “Serbia Country Report 2020.”

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Dragana Mitrović

Dragana Mitrović Full-time professor, founder and director of the Institute for Asian Studies (www.ias.rs). Teaches Political Economy, Political Economy of International Relations, Political Economy of PR China and East Asia, Geopolitics and Geo-economics. Author of six books and seventy papers. Participated in more than forty international academic conferences as an invited speaker. Member of the Board of Economic Science of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences.