Unveiling Sri Lanka’s agency: empowering infrastructural transformation in China-Sri Lanka relations

ABSTRACT

Sri Lanka’s relations with China have been under wide discussion since Beijing’s rapid engagement with the island nation in early 2000s. Recent studies of this bilateral relationship often explore the evolution of ties with surrounding economic and trade relations and provide economic and strategic explanations. This paper views China-Sri Lanka bilateral relations through the thematic lens of infrastructure finance in four cases of infrastructure investment: ports, energy, transport, and water and sanitation. It explores Sri Lanka’s agency vis-à-vis China, and the extent and forms of this factor in planning, negotiating and implementing infrastructure, and suggests that the agency exerted is interrelated and dependent upon specific economic, political, bureaucratic and international contexts.

KEYWORDS:

• China’s infrastructure investment
• political elite agency
• infrastructure

Acknowledgments

The author would like to acknowledge the research and editorial assistance given and the assistance given by the interviewers in collecting data and information.

Disclosure statement

In accordance with Taylor & Francis policy and my ethical obligation as a researcher, I am reporting that the research was funded by JICA Ogata Research Institute for Peace and Development.

Notes

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26. Rathnasekara, “ගල් අඟුරු කියන තරම් කළුද.? පරිසරය රකිමු. තුලිතව බලමු [Is Coal that bad?].”

27. Rathnasekara, “විදුලියෙන් රටක් දික්විජය කළ හැටි. දැනටමත් හතර ගුණයක ඉතිරියක් [How Electricity Efficiency Was Achieved. Cost of Generating Electricity Is Saved by Four Times].”

28. Ceylon Electricity Board, “Statistical Digest 2022.”

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34. “Norochcholai Coal Power Plant.”

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36. Wignaraja et al., “Chinese Investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka.”

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38. “Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset.”

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48. “Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset;” General Manager of National Water Supply and Drainage Board and Additional General Manager of Policy and Strategy of National Water Supply and Drainage Board, interview.

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56. Attanayake, “India’s Answer to China’s Ports in Sri Lanka.”

57. “Sri Lanka: ‘Business as Usual’ at Hambantota Port despite Crisis.”

58. Ibid.

59. Khurana, “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications”; Butt, Kharal, and Bhatti, “String of Pearls;” Himmer and Rod, “Chinese Debt Trap Diplomacy”.

60. Hillman, “Game of Loans;” Abi-Habit, “How China got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.;.”

61. Carrai, “China’s Malleable Sovereignty Along the Belt and Road Initiative: The Case of the 99-Year Chinese Lease of Hambantota Port.”

62. Abeysinghe and Arangala, interview, December 2, 2022.

63. A comparison across the election manifestos of Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005, 2010 and 2015), Maithripala Sirisena (2015), Gotabaya Rajapaksa (2019), and Sajith Premadasa (2019) reveal that all the political leaders were pledging to prioritize electricity, housing, water and sanitation and road connectivity.

64. Presenting the winning political party’s election manifesto as the government’s national policy framework determining the policy directions has become a common practice in Sri Lanka. For instance, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s election manifesto in 2005, popularly known as “Mahinda Chinthana, the Ministry of Finance and Planning published a discussion paper titled “Mahinda Chinthana: Vision for New Sri Lanka” as a ten-year development framework for the period of 2006–2016. His election manifesto in 2010, when the government changed in 2015, the election manifesto of Maithripala Sirisena became the policy document guiding the country. In 2019, then President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s election manifesto became the National Policy Framework.

65. “Mahinda Chinthana 2005 Election Manifesto,” 23–24.

66. “Mahinda Chinthana 2005 Election Manifesto,” 58.

67. Department of National Planning, The Development Policy Framework 2010, Government of Sri Lanka.

68. Wang, “Presidential Extraversion.”

69. Fernando, interview.

70. The Economics and Legal Research Team, “The Lure of Chinese Loans.”

71. The Economics and Legal Research Team.

72. The Economics and Legal Research Team; Abeysinghe and Arangala, interview, December 2, 2022.

73. The Economics and Legal Research Team, “The Lure of Chinese Loans;” Abeysinghe and Arangala, interview, December 2, 2022.

74. Colombo Telegraph, “Always Breakdown Norochchalai Chinese Firm To Build Massive Water Plant In Basil’s Base.”

75. Government of Sri Lanka, “Regaining Sri Lanka.”

76. The feasibility report was rejected by the Ministerial task force on the grounds that it was not bankable and was incomplete since the study overlooked the port’s potential impact on Colombo Port. The report by Ramboll adopted a more optimistic view of the potential of Hambantota Port. It projected that dry and bulk cargo would constitute the main traffic for the port until 2030. Hambantota Port was expected to handle approximately 20 million twenty-foot equivalent units by 2040.

77. ADB Road Sector Development Project Plan, 2002.

78. Project Manager, Greater Kurunegala Water and Sanitation Project and Project Engineer, Greater Kurunegala Water and Sanitation Project, interview; Deputy General Manager (Wayamba) of National Water Supply and Drainage Board, interview.

79. Project Manager, Greater Kurunegala Water and Sanitation Project and Project Engineer, Greater Kurunegala Water and Sanitation Project, interview; Chief Engineer, Kandy North Water Project, interview; Deputy General Manager (Wayamba) of the National Water Supply and Drainage Board, interview.

80. Kumarage, “The Cost and Benefits of Expressway Building.”

81. Kumarage, “Road Building or Rip-Off?” Kumarage, “Expressways; Kumarage, “The Cost and Benefits of Expressway Building.”

82. Senior Project Engineer, Central Expressway Project, interview.

83. Abeysinghe and Arangala, interview, December 2, 2022.

84. Member, Colombo Port City Economic Commission, interview.

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86. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank, Sri Lanka: Improving the Rural and Urban Investment Climate.

87. The amount is calculated according to the exchange rate in December 2000.

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90. Biller and Nabi, Investing in Infrastructure, 2013, 16.

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92. Senior Official of Planning and Monitoring, Ministry of Transport and Highways, interview.

93. Shiran Fernando, Chief Economist, Chamber of Commerce Sri Lanka, interview.

94. Abeysinghe and Arangala, interview, December 2, 2022; Naazima Kamardee, Senior Lecturer, University of Colombo, interview.

95. Group Interview, External Resources Department of Sri Lanka, interview.

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98. Kaplan, Monsoon : The Indian Ocean and the Battle for Supremacy in the 21st Century; Kaplan, “Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean..”

99. Sun and Payette, “China’s Two Ocean Strategy: Controlling Waterways and the New Silk Road.”

100. White, “China’s Indian Ocean Ambition: Investment, Influence, and Military Advantage;” Dravid, “China’s Rise And Indian Ocean Ambitions.”

101. Moramudali, “The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities;” Brautigam and Rithmire, “The Chinese ‘Debt Trap’ Is a Myth.”

102. Group Interview, External Resources Department of Sri Lanka, interview.

103. Sinha, “China-Myanmar Energy Engagement: Challenges and Opportunities for India;” Sharma, “China’s Interests in the Indian Ocean RIM Countries and India’s Maritime Security;” Pant, “India-Iran Cooperation at Chabahar Port.”

104. “SRI LANKA: RECHARTING U.S. STRATEGY AFTER THE WAR.”

105. Attanayake and Atmakuri, “Navigating the Sino-Indian Power Struggle in the Indian Ocean: The Case of Sri Lanka.”

106. Attanayake, “India’s Answer to China’s Ports in Sri Lanka.”

107. Attanayake, China in Sri Lanka.

108. Attanayake and Atmakuri, “Navigating the Sino-Indian Power Struggle in the Indian Ocean: The Case of Sri Lanka.”

109. Moramudali and Panduwawala, “Evolution of Chinese Lending to Sri Lanka Since the Mid-2000s – Separating Myth from Reality,” 2022.

110. Environmental Justice Atlas, “Norocholai Coal Power Station, Sri Lanka.”

111. Abeysinghe and Arangala, interview, December 2, 2022.

112. Takahara, “Introduction to the Special Issue on the Comparative Study of Asian Countries’ Bilateral Relations with China”.

113. Oh, “Power Asymmetry and Threat Points.”

Additional information

Funding

This work was funded by JICA Ogata Research Institute for Peace and Development.

Notes on contributors

Chulanee Attanayake

Chulanee Attanayke is a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.