https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4082-8411
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ABSTRACT
How does the Philippines form its foreign policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? Existing work on the Philippine foreign policy toward China explains the country’s stance solely through geopolitical or domestic factors. By examining the political calculus of, and the policy formulation by, the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016), Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022), and Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (2022-) administrations, I argue that a combination of domestic politics, geopolitical considerations, and economic realities have shaped the approach of the Philippines toward China. Rather than focus on one factor to explain the Philippines’ foreign policy, I suggest that the combination and interaction of these three factors accounting for how various Philippine administrations have operated explains the Philippines’ China policies. Furthermore, I nuance these three factors through the lens of political survival. I suggest that leaders stay in power by accumulating political power and staving off challengers. In the Philippines, I suggest that leaders capitalize on criticizing or deviating from the prior administration’s China policies, which have resulted in economic or political effects that generate resentment from the population. As a result, Presidents often reverse or modify the policies set about by the previous administration, resulting in a new set of approaches toward China. Data on this paper was facilitated by years of fieldwork conducted in the Philippines between 2017 to 2020. I interviewed officials in the Aquino, Duterte, and Marcos administrations, Filipino oligarchs, political brokers, lawyers, political party representatives, and in-country observers.
Acknowledgement
I am grateful to the JICA Ogata Research Institute for inviting me to be part of this projcet. I am particularly thankful to Takahara Akio, Asada Ray, Imai Natsuko, Shiga Hiroaki, and Kitano Naohiro. I am also grateful to the research participants for sharing their time and knowledge of the subject matter as well as the participants of the round table workshop on ”The New Dynamics of Peace and Development in the Indo-Pacific: How Countries in the Region Proactively Interact with China.”
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Takahara, “Introduction to the special issue on the comparative study.”
2 de Mesquita, “Ruminations on Challenges.”
3 U.S. Department of Defense. Philippines, U.S. Announce Four New EDCA Sites.
4 Goh, “Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge.”
5 De Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy;” “The Duterte Administration’s Appeasement Policy on China and the Crisis in the Philippine – US Alliance.”
6 Yamazaki and Osawa, “Asymmetry Theory and China.”
7 Chao, “The Philippines’ Perception and Strategy”.
8 Kreuzer, “A Comparison of Malaysian and Philippine Responses.”
9 Wu and Velasco, “Examining the Philippines’ China Policy”.
10 Tran, “Presidential Turnover and Discontinuity.”
11 Lischin, “The Future of the US-Philippines Alliance.”
12 Glaser, and Poling, “China’s Power Grab in the South China Sea.”
13 Wang and Fu, “Local Politics and Fluctuating Engagement with China.”
14 Grossman, “China has Lost the Philippines Despite Duterte’s Best Efforts.”
15 Ibid.
16 Takahara, “Introduction to the Special Issue on the Comparative Study.” Takahara adds one more factor and modifies the initial list in this special issue.
17 Kuik, “Asymmetry and Authority: Theorizing Southeast Asian Responses.”
18 Camba, “Inter-state Relations and State Capacity.”
19 Takagi, “The Politics of Grand Strategy in an Emerging State.”
20 Interview, Political broker, Liberal Party, Quezon City, August 11, 2017.
21 Official Gazette, “The Prosecution’s Response to Chief Justice Corona’s Statement.”
22 Ibid.
23 BBC, “Philippines Ex-leader Gloria Arroyo Arrested for Fraud.” November 18, 2011.
24 Aquino III, “The Mission for Manila.”
25 Interview, Former Arroyo official, August 20, 2017.
26 Interview, Philippine Chinese Oligarch, Makati, August 13, 2027.
27 Interview, Vice President, ZTE Philippines, Makati City, July 24, 2017.
28 De Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Foreign policy.”
29 Takagi, “The Politics of Grand Strategy in an Emerging State.”
30 De Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Appeasement Policy.”
31 Interview, Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 De Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy.”
34 Camba, “Inter-state Relations and State Capacity.”
35 See NEDA, “List of Active ODA Grants (March 2010);” “Overseas Development Aid List (2010–2016).”
36 Interview, Adviser, Manila, August 21, 2017.
37 Interview, Ex-Cabinet Member in Aquino III’s regime, San Juan, October 29, 2018.
38 Interview, Ex-Cabinet Member during Aquino III, San Juan, October 29, 2018.
39 Interview, Executive of Chinese SOE, Manila, November 3, 2018.
40 Official Gazette, “The Prosecution’s Response to Chief Justice Corona’s Statement.”
41 Lema, “Philippine Tax Sheriff Takes Aim at Cheats to Hit Target.”
42 Official Gazette, Economic Development.
43 Llanto, Adoracion and Ortiz, Development Finance and Aid in the Philippines.
44 IMF. Global Financial Stability Report.
45 Montecillo, “PH Credit Rating Upgraded.”
46 IMF. Global Financial Stability Report.
47 See Camba, “Inter-state Relations and State Capacity.”
48 Mitra, “Leveraging Service Sector Growth in the Philippines.”
49 Camba, et al., “Strongmen Politics and Investment Flows.”
50 Blanchard, “Duterte Aligns Philippines with China, says U.S. has lost.”
51 Camba and Epstein. “From Duterte to Orbán: The Political Economy of Autocratic Hedging.”
52 Interview, Duterte’s Former Advisor, Davao City, March 8, 2023.
53 Camba, “How Chinese Firms Approach Investment Risk.”
54 Camba and Li. “Chinese Workers and Their ‘Linguistic Labour’.”
55 BI. Tourists and Special Work Permits.
56 Interview, Duterte’s political broker, Quezon City, September 20, 2019.
57 Interview, Philippine Senator, Manila, March 15, 2023.
58 Camba, “The Sino‐centric Capital Export Regime.”
59 Interview, Local Investor, Manila, January 18, 2020.
60 Perper, “The Body Count of Mayors in the Philippines.”
61 Interview, Corporal, Philippine Coastguard, January 20, 2020.
62 Ibid.
63 Camba, “How Chinese Firms Approach Investment Risk.”
64 CSIS. Who is Taking Sides after the South China Sea Ruling.
65 Interview, Philippine Senator, Manila City, March 14, 2023.
66 Baker, “Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature Trade Deal.”
67 Interview, Aquino III, Quezon City, January 18, 2020.
68 Interview, Filipino political broker, Quezon City, February 28, 2023.
69 BBC. “That ‘Awkward Moment’ when Obama Met Duterte after ‘whore’ spat.”
70 Zengerle, “Exclusive: U.S. stopped Philippines rifle sale that senator opposed.”
71 Tahara-Stubbs, “Philippines: Aquino’s PPP Legacy is a Bulging Pipeline.”
72 NEDA. “List of Active ODA Grants (March 2010).”
73 Camba, “Cementing Development and (un) Steeling Decarbonization.”
74 NEDA. “List of Active ODA Grants (March 2010).”
75 Ibid.
76 Camba, “How Duterte Strong-armed Chinese Dam-builders but Weakened Philippine Institutions.”
77 Ramirez, “Philippines expects 2 M Chinese tourists this year.”
78 Interview, Local Politician, Davao City, March 8, 2023.
79 U.S. Department of Defense. Philippines, U.S. Announce Four New EDCA Sites.
80 Japan Times. “Marcos Takes Relations with Japan to New Heights.”
81 Camba, “How Chinese Firms Approach Investment Risk.”
82 Interview, Local Politician, Laoag, March 1, 2023.
83 Interview, Political Broker, Pasig City, February 28, 2023.
84 Interview, Poltiical Broker, Quezon City, March 9, 2023.
85 Ibid.
86 Mercado, “Duterte Says Biden Invited him, Other ASEAN Leaders for Summit in Washington.”
87 Interview, Philippine Senate, Manila, March 13, 2023.
88 Tomacruz, “Defense Chief Vows more Navy, Coast Guard Ships in West Philippine Sea.”
89 Interview, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, March 1, 2023.
90 Felipe, “6 other Philippines-China projects delayed; Senate reviewing deals.”
91 Bottolier-Despois and Revise, Philippines Joins UN Demand for Russia to Withdraw from Ukraine.
92 Martina, Durfee and Brunnstrom. “Marcos says Philippines Bases could be ‘useful’ if Taiwan Attacked.”
93 Interview, Quezon City, March 11, 2023.
94 Venzon, “Philippines” Marcos backs probe on China-owned power grid company.”
95 Camba, ““Marcos should revive Chinese-backed rail projects on new terms.”
96 Benar News Staff. “Philippines drops funding deal with China.”
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Alvin Camba
Alvin Camba is an Assistant Professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. He received his PhD in Sociology from the Johns Hopkins University. He is a faculty affiliate at the Center for International Environment & Resource Policy and the Climate Policy Lab at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. His research has been awarded multiple best research paper awards by several academic networks (International Studies Association, American Sociological Association, GRADNAS), has been published in top development and political economy journals (e.g., Review of International Political Economy, Development and Change, Energy Research and Social Science, etc.), and has contributed to widely-circulated think tank policy papers (e.g. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the International Republican Institute, and Center for International Private Enterprise) on China’s activities in Southeast Asia. He has been cited and/or interviewed by The Financial Times, Bloomberg, the Wall Street Journal, NPR, and other news outlets, and invited to speak at The World Bank, the US State Department, AidData, etc. Most recently, Dr. Camba is part of the Carnegie Corporation of New York-funded Responsible Public Engagement project at the Korbel School. The project investigates, among others, China’s disinformation strategies and investments in rare earths.