How do smaller countries in the Indo-Pacific region proactively interact with China? An introduction

ABSTRACT

What factors have contributed to the evolution of bilateral relations between the smaller states in the Indo-Pacific region and China? How much agency do the smaller nations have vis-à-vis the superpower candidate? This paper introduces the pentagonal model, the analytical framework of a joint study organized by the JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development on these topics. The pentagonal model identifies five factor areas: domestic politics, economy, international relations (global), international relations (regional), and peace and security. Applying this common framework allows us to identify and compare the dynamics of the evolving relationships between China and the smaller states.

KEYWORDS:

• Indo-Pacific
• bilateral relations with China
• agency of smaller countries
• four-factor model
• pentagonal model

1.

Over a generation has passed since the end of the Cold War, and it seems we are again in an age without a sense of direction. The world faces a set of compounded crises, including climate change that constitutes an existential threat to human beings, a once-in-a-century pandemic that lasted for over three years, and deep and wide divisions and disagreements in a number of democratic societies. In addition, geopolitical issues have reemerged, such as an intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China that few countries can avoid getting involved in. On top of all these, a blatant breach of the United Nations Charter by a member of its Security Council, that is the Russian invasion of Ukraine, inflicted a huge blow to peoples’ trust in the international order. The world order is in flux, exclusive nationalism is rife again in many countries, and many of us are looking for a guiding beacon.

In the search for a way forward, we must base our judgment on objective facts and avoid following the agitation and fake news that easily go viral in this era of the internet and Social Networking Services. This means we researchers, equipped with appropriate theoretical orientations and analytical frameworks, must go out into the field and engage ourselves in the empirical study of pressing questions to find out what is actually going on and why it is so. Few would disagree that one of the most important questions of the day is the rise of China and how that is changing the international order. For any national leader, a most immediate question today is how they should handle their relations with China to survive and prosper in the changing world. In looking for an answer, it is imperative to investigate first how countries are actually dealing with the economic juggernaut and rising military power under the compounded crises they face.

1. The four-factor model: analytical framework 1.0

In the previous comparative study of Asian countries’ bilateral relations with China, organized by scholars at The University of Tokyo and also featured in the Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, we adopted a four-factor model as our analytical framework¹ This four-factor model was based on an earlier study of the history of Japan-China relations since their normalization in 1972. It classified the factors that shape bilateral relations into four areas: domestic politics; economic interests; international environment and security; and people’s emotions, perceptions and identity. The image of the four areas and their interaction is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The four-factor model.

This analytical framework is based first on the understanding that a balanced and comprehensive approach is needed in the study of bilateral relations. In fact, “bilateral relations” are difficult to define. If narrowly defined, they would only point to government-to-government, diplomatic relations. In the common use of the term, however, they include relations in other areas, most notably economic and people-to-people relations that involve enterprises and societal associations. We also know that even within governments, cooperative relations between economic or environmental or health ministries could coexist with the friction and tension between defense and foreign ministries. Bilateral relations can be and should be considered, therefore, as a bundle of relations between multilevel actors of the two nations in a variety of areas. If we only focused on one area, such as security or business, we would have a lopsided image and easily misjudge the overall state of bilateral relations.

This leads us to another characteristic of this framework, namely the combination of IR and area studies. We have identified that one trend in IR studies has been to move away from a narrow focus on international power structures as the determinant of states’ external behavior. Focusing on internal factors and advocating “analytical eclecticism” are part of this change,² together with the contributions mainly from Southeast Asia to shifting the focal point of studies from big power relations to the dynamic relations between China and the smaller nations.³ In addition, more works have argued that the state is not always the only actor in international relations, and the role of other actors such as international organizations, local government, and huge state-owned enterprises should be looked into. In presenting the four-factor model, we pointed out that all these require a close collaboration between IR and area studies.

The previous study covered countries such as Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam, and compared their bilateral relations with China by applying this common analytical framework.⁴ It proved effective in showing the different distribution of weight and importance among the four areas as factors in defining and developing relationships. Generally speaking, economic interests, as expected, weighed heavily in all cases. But security, domestic politics and people’s emotions played important roles in countries with territorial issues and significant clusters of overseas Chinese. Although this exercise shed light on the state of the political economy of the countries that were studied, it was unavoidable that the depth of analysis varied between countries and factor areas. The interactions between the four areas, that is developments in one area impacting another, were often observed but were not always easy to gauge and verify due to the lack of data. It was also a challenge to analyze the policy making process on the Chinese side, although that is vitally important in acquiring a balanced view of the bilateral relations involved.⁵

2. The pentagonal model: analytical framework 2.0

This time, in this special issue of the Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, a new study group organized by the JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development (JICA ORI) focuses on the countries along the “Belt and Road” that are mostly situated in the Indo-Pacific region. Specifically, these are Bangladesh, Laos, the Philippines, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, and Zambia, countries whose relations with China have developed significantly in recent years. In this new study, the team at JICA ORI expanded the analytical framework into what we call the pentagonal model (Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3). Using this framework, the study attempts to identify the factors that have contributed to the evolution of the relationship between these countries and China. Ultimately, the study aims to compare a diverse range of bilateral relations and to illuminate the patterns of those relations and the mechanisms through which they emerge. Following the pioneering works by Kuik and others,⁶ the study group in this new round explores the agency of the smaller countries vis-à-vis China. In this context, agency generally can be defined as the capacity and deftness of relevant actors to behave autonomously and independently vis-à-vis their counterparts in China in pursuit of their own missions, interests, and ambitions.

Figure 2. The case of country A.

Figure 3. The case of country B.

Table 1. Examples of factors in the five areas of the pentagonal framework.

	Area of Factors	Examples of contents
i	Domestic politics	political institutions (democratic or authoritarian regime) political issues (power struggle among political elites, corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, ethnic and religious issues, influx of Chinese business migrants, people’s perception toward China, etc.)
ii	Economy	macroeconomic conditions in the country economic interests of relevant actors development strategy (infrastructure development, poverty reduction, rural development, trade facilitation, FDI promotion, etc.)
iii	Peace and security	security issues (territorial issues, cyber security, illegal fishing, piracy, natural disasters, etc.) security policies (procurement of weapons, military training, provision of infrastructure of strategic importance to foreign states, etc.)
iv	International relations (global)	global political structure (US-China rivalry) relations with great powers other than China (US, Japan and EU, etc.) relations with international organizations (WB, IMF, etc.)
v	International relations (regional)	relations with neighboring countries (including regional powers such as India and the Russian Federation) politics in regional institutions (such as ASEAN, AU, EU)

The difference between the four-factor model and the pentagonal model exists in the following points. First, the international environment and security has been split into three areas, regional international relations, global international relations, and peace and security. Our understanding is that for many countries, relations with their neighbors, especially any big neighbors, can play an important role in shaping their relations with China. For example, in dealing with China, smaller countries in South Asia may find their relations with India a substantial factor they cannot ignore, while East European countries may take their relations with Russia or the EU into consideration. In the case of an African democracy such as Zambia, it may rather be relations with the IMF or the United States that play a role in deciding its policy toward China. We are also interested in security cooperation between the smaller countries and China and how important this is in defining their relationships.

Second, unlike the East Asian countries with a history of war and peace with their huge neighbor and close people-to-people contact, people’s emotions and perceptions in the smaller nations in the Indo-Pacific and beyond do not necessarily constitute an independent factor in defining their relations with China. While it is true that an influx of Chinese workers and merchants have caused friction with the locals in a number of countries, Chinese investment and construction of economic infrastructure has generally contributed to enhancing a positive image of the country in others. In this study we do not treat local people’s emotions and perceptions as a common, independent factor but instead investigate their impact on other factors such as domestic politics and economics where and when that is appropriate. For instance, anti-Chinese sentiments among the populace, or the benefits that have accrued from Chinese-built infrastructure, can provide political ammunition to politicians in their election campaigns.⁷

The pentagonal model effectively illustrates factors in various bilateral relations in multiple ways. First, the weight or the relative importance of factors can be expressed by the size of their circles, and the degree of interaction between the factors are shown by the size of the arrows that connect them (examples are shown in Figures 2 and 3). Figure 2 illustrates the case in which the largest factor in Country A’s relations with China is domestic politics (area i). In this case Country A faces security challenges from China while simultaneously benefits from its economic partnership with the latter. Therefore, it has to strike a delicate balance between its security consideration (area iii) and economic development (area ii), which both constitute important issues in domestic politics, indicated by the big arrows connecting areas ii and iii and area i. Figure 3 illustrates the case in which Country B’s relations with China are shaped largely by the domestic political factor (area i) and the economic factor (area ii) that are significantly influenced by great power rivalry (area iv) and relations with its neighbors (area v). Second, dynamic changes in the bilateral relations can be expressed by the enlargement or the reduction in the size of the circles and arrows in a series of figures that depict the relations at different points in time.

3. Five factors and smaller countries’ agency in the seven bilateral relations

In the following papers of this project, readers will find that all or most of the five factors are relevant in the seven countries’ relations with China. Economic interests are important in all the cases, which is understandable when China is one of their largest trading partners and Chinese companies are making dynamic advancements into those countries, while alternative sources of loans and investments are scarce. The smaller countries’ agency diminishes when there are no alternative countries to turn to, such as the case in Laos.⁸

Here you cannot miss the link between economics and politics. Infrastructure projects funded and constructed by the Chinese banks and construction firms occupy a central place in the smaller countries’ relations with China, and domestic political factors loom large in their decision-making process. Especially when other powers are unwilling to put their money in those countries, the political elite enthusiastically welcome Chinese investors who care less about the due process of project design and formulation. In many cases this involves corruption and the lack of transparency and accountability as well as attention to economic viability and environmental impact of the projects.⁹ The pattern of the problem varies. For example, politicians exclude bureaucrats and experts from deciding projects and ignores national interests so as to get their personal benefits out of the deals.¹⁰ Infrastructure projects are appealing to the constituency, and close relations with China provide a valuable political resource for the politicians.¹¹ In other cases, the government dominates the formulation and implementation of the projects and the parliament is unable to participate and monitor them.¹² At the level of the local communities, NGOs and small business associations in some countries raise their voices and protest at issues such as environmental degradation and breaching of business regulations, although often in vain.¹³ However, democracies such as the Philippines and Zambia, in which governments change through elections, tend to have more notable agency vis-à-vis China.¹⁴

Security issues for some countries are related more directly with regional international relations than global ones. When those countries have issues with their neighbors, they tend to turn to China, which is a big provider of arms and military training and a permanent member of the UN Security Council.¹⁵ For example, cooperation with China provides a leverage in Serbia’s dealings with the EU.¹⁶ Serbia faces the question of Kosovo’s secession and China, together with Russia, is its supporter in the UN Security Council and thus constitutes a protector of its national integrity.¹⁷ Security ties could originate in the military assistance that China provided when those countries were still struggling for independence. Even today, such assistance in the past is remembered by the recipient nations such as Zambia.¹⁸ On the other hand, the Bangladeshis remember their independence was not supported by China, but the regional security environment has induced them to strengthen their military ties with it.¹⁹

Further analysis is required to compare the seven cases in detail, but clearly the degree of agency varies among the countries studied. For the smaller nations that used to rely on European, North American or Japanese investments and assistance, Chinese companies and banks have emerged as more daring and willing economic partners that are fast in making decisions.²⁰ China’s assistance gained traction also because it was offered without any political conditions. Once the projects are fixed, however, there seems to be little room for the recipients of loans and investments such as Laos to exert much agency.²¹

This does not mean all is well for China. Countries such as Sri Lanka and Zambia have defaulted on their foreign debt, and the Chinese must cooperate with other lenders to get them out of trouble. However, the lack of transparency in their lending deals and insistence on bilateral negotiations have widely attracted critical attention.²²

Topics that need further study include China’s internal dynamic that sometimes promoted overly ambitious projects without prudent or accurate feasibility studies. One of the key questions in this regard is the little-studied relationship between the Chinese banks and contractors. With the increase in bad loans, there seems to be an intensifying tug-of-war between cautious banks and ever-hungry construction firms in search of new projects. However, there is hardly any study that has looked into this delicate partnership. This most intriguing issue in the political economy of China’s infrastructure development looms on the horizons for dauntless researchers.

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Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

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Notes on contributors

Akio Takahara

Akio Takahara is Professor of Contemporary Chinese Politics at the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics at The University of Tokyo, and Senior Research Adviser of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development. He received his DPhil in 1988 from Sussex University. Before joining The University of Tokyo, he taught at J. F. Oberlin University and Rikkyo University. He served as President of the Japan Association for Asian Studies, Dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy at The University of Tokyo, and Director of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development. His publications in English include The Politics of Wage Policy in Post-Revolutionary China, (Macmillan, 1992), Japan-China Relations in the Modern Era, (co-authored, Routledge, 2017), and “Introduction to the special issue on the comparative study of Asian countries’ bilateral relations with China”, Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, Volume 10, Issue 2 (2021).

Notes

1. Takahara, “Introduction to the Special Issue on the Comparative Study of Asian Countries’ Bilateral Relations with China.” The following description of the framework, including Figure 1, is from the same source.

2. For the neo-classical realists’ focus on the internal factors that impact external policy-making and implementation, see Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. On analytical eclecticism and an inclusive and practical dialogue between IR and comparative politics, see Sil and Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics.”

3. For example, Goh, Rising China’s Influence in Developing Asia; Kuik, “How do Weaker States Hedge?”; Oh, “Power Asymmetry and Threat Points.”

4. For the specific papers please see the Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 2021, Vol.10, No.2.

5. As far as Japan-China relations are concerned, however, further studies have been conducted using the four-factor model. Takahara et al., Nittchu Kankei 2001–2022 applies the framework in their analysis of bilateral relations since the beginning of this century to the end of Xi Jinping’s second term as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. They argue that while economic interests were the dominant factor that affected other areas in 2001, this is no longer the case and the security factor strongly impacted people’s emotions and domestic politics in 2022.

6. For example, Kuik, “How do Weaker States Hedge?” and “Asymmetry and Authority.” See also Kuik and Rosli, “Laos-China Infrastructure Cooperation,” his contribution to this special issue.

7. We do not undervalue the importance of people’s perceptions and they are studied independently in this special issue by Asada, “How does the Development Frontline View the Major Powers?” A related and intriguing question is that of the mass media, which is taken up by Imai, “What does the Media of a Smaller State Say about Bigger States.” Other papers on specific bilateral relations also discuss people’s perceptions of China, in many cases in relation to domestic politics.

8. Kuik and Rosli, “Laos-China Infrastructure Cooperation.”

9. Attanayake, “Unveiling Sri Lanka’s Agency”; Hampwaye et al., “China-Zambia Engagements.”

10. Ibid., Mitrović, “The Dynamics of the Republic of Sebia’s Cooperation”; Dadabaev and Sonoda, “Nudging not Nagging.”

11. Attanayake, “Unveiling Sri Lanka’s Agency”; Camba, “From Aquino to Marcos.”

12. Hampwaye et al., “China-Zambia Engagements.”

13. Ibid., Kuik and Rosli, “Laos-China Infrastructure Cooperation.”

14. Camba, “From Aquino to Marcos”; Hampwaye et al., “China-Zambia Engagements.”

15. For a discussion of the delicate Bangladeshi-India-China relations, see Yasmin, “Understanding Bangladesh-China Relations.”

16. Ibid.

17. Mitrović, “The Dynamics of the Republic of Sebia’s Cooperation.”

18. Ibid.

19. Yasmin, “Understanding Bangladesh-China Relations.”

20. For a discussion on the evolution of Japanese ODA and how it has affected the agency of the developing countries, see Shiga, “The New Dynamics of Japan’s Official Development Assistance.”

21. Kuik and Rosli, “Laos-China Infrastructure Cooperation.”

22. For an estimate of China’s international aid from 2001 to 2022, see Kitano and Miyabayashi, “China’s Foreign Aid as a Proxy of ODA.”