The Role of Verification in Supporting Irreversible Nuclear Disarmament

ABSTRACT

The links between verification and irreversibility are not well understood. We show that verification and irreversibility are deeply linked and mutually supporting. To support this, we map activities through stages of a disarmament process, and consider how these contribute to irreversibility both individually and in aggregate, and how each is impacted by verification. We then re-examine verification concepts to identify qualities of verification processes that are especially relevant to irreversibility. We conclude with reflections on how irreversibility could be applied in practice and additional research questions that could progress this issue.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear disarmament
• irreversibility in nuclear disarmament
• nuclear disarmament verification
• arms control verification

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Action 2 of the 64 Point Action plan from the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference states that “All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations”. This formulation has been adopted and maintained since the agreement of the 64-point action plan.

² The science of nuclear fission and nuclear physics is standard for many undergraduate degrees in physics and engineering. Design and engineering information for sensitive topics such as advanced centrifuges and weapons design are highly restricted. Nuclear technology is a combination of core knowledge, restricted knowledge and skill and tacit knowledge required for design, construction, maintenance and operation. Yet there is a limit to the notion that no technology can be uninvented or forgotten. For nuclear weapons, this concept is explored in (Bourne 2016).

³ It should be noted that this is a very broad and top-level characterisation, and the practical aspects of implementing a disarmament treaty would likely not be as neatly divided; however, it is useful to consider the changing needs and priorities of a verification regime.

⁴ It has been noted that the faster disarmament goals are achieved, the easier it is reach and maintain a general level of irreversibility in case conditions change mid-process. See for example (Cliff, Elbahtimy, and Persbo 2011)

⁵ For example, both an initial declaration and a state-specific plan for disarmament activities are included in the Chemical Weapons Convention, under Art. III par.1; this process is expanded on in Part IV (A) of the Convention’s Verification Annex.

⁶ In the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) section A para. 7, Iran could possess up to 300 kg of uranium enriched to 3.67%. The excess could be sold on international markets or downblended. The IAEA reported that Iran initially downblended to satisfy the JCPOA before later violations.

⁷ This proposal mirrors existing practices in IAEA safeguards, such as the use of Acquisition Pathway Analysis to identify and prioritise safeguards activities.

⁸ For example, the US National Laboratories support international nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security through the development of equipment and techniques and expert contribution to capacity-building; moreover, both the US National Laboratories and the UK’s Atomic Weapons Establishment have historically worked on nuclear disarmament verification methodologies, in the context of initiatives such as the UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI), the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership (with Sweden and Norway), and bilateral US-UK cooperation.

⁹ As is argued by Herzog, the risk-calculus by other states is best understood by the nuclear progression of a state – if they are in a “danger zone” for proliferation or not (Herzog 2020). Hymans examines the technical and political calculus that inform a state’s path to a nuclear weapon (Hymans 2012). The decision of a state to abandon nuclear ambitions and pursue a disarmament arrangement follows a comparable logic.

¹⁰ As an additional caveat, discussion of deterrence in verification necessarily raises the issue of enforcement: indeed, for a verification regime to be an effective deterrent, would-be cheaters must be assured that non-compliance would result in enforcement action. A full discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by King’s College London under a consortium grant from the UK Government’s Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre.

Notes on contributors

Alberto Muti

Alberto Muti is Co-Programme Director for VERTIC’s Verification and Monitoring Programme. He leads the programme’s work on IAEA Safeguards, and carries out research and analysis on nuclear disarmament verification and irreversibility, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear verification, as well as verification and monitoring of biological weapons. Alberto carries out research on Iran and DPRK nuclear issues and has also contributed to projects on other issues, including chemical security, conventional and cyber security. Alberto’s work and expertise encompass planning and delivering capacity-building programmes, conducting workshops, designing tabletop simulations and “serious games” for research and training purposes, and developing innovative tools to facilitate and enhance research and analytical work.

Grant Christopher

Grant Christopher is Co-Programme Director for VERTIC’s Verification and Monitoring Programme. He researches nuclear disarmament verification using software modelling, non-proliferation in East Asia and the role of emerging technologies in nuclear proliferation.

Noel Stott

Noel Stott joined VERTIC in November 2016 after more than 14 years as a Senior Researcher and then Senior Research Fellow at the South African-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS). He has extensive experience in all aspects of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation having worked on the challenges facing African states by the proliferation of conventional weapons. In particular, Stott has knowledge of small arms and light weapons. In 2007, he established and led ISS’ programme on ‘Africa’s Development and the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction’. This programme aimed to enhance Africa’s role in international efforts to strengthen weapons of mass destruction disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives in the context of Africa’s developmental imperatives through the provision of primary research, policy recommendations and training activities.