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ABSTRACT
This article explains how and why limited use of force contributed to the surprising elimination of Somali piracy that no-one had expected. It proposes an analytical framework identifying four conditions for limited force success derived from the existing literature: (1) great power leadership, (2) Support at the international, regional and local levels, (3) Effective military forces capable of establishing escalation dominance, and (4) Limited use of force minimising collateral damage and adversary casualties. The analysis demonstrates that these four factors apply in the Somali case and explains how and why they were created even though implementation was costly and incentives for free-riding high. Although the Somali success will be hard to replicate, this case remains important because it improves our understanding of the conditions under which limited use of force can contribute to sustainable outcomes.
Acknowledgments
The authors thanks the government officials and military officers for their willingness to talk to us on and off the record. We would also like to thank colleagues at the Royal Danish Defence College, the editors and the three anonymous reviewers for providing constructive criticism of earlier versions of this article. Their input improved its quality significantly.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 AFP, ‘UN authorization to fight piracy in Somali waters ends’, 11 Mar. 2022.
2 Harry Dempsey, Andres Schipani and Aanu Adeoye, ‘Shipping industry says piracy off coast of Somalia is no longer a threat’, The Financial Times, 22 Aug. 2022.
3 William Gortney, Testimony of the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command before the House Armed Services Committee, 5 Mar. 2009.
4 UN Doc. SC/10164.
5 EU Naval Force, Somalia Operation ATALANTA, 24 June 2022.
6 Sarah Percy & Anja Shortland, ‘The Business of Piracy in Somalia’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36/4 (2013), 541–78.
7 EU Naval Force, Somalia Operation ATALANTA.
8 For an extended discussion on the definition of limited force, see Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Coercive Diplomacy as Crisis Management’, in Oxford Encyclopedia of Crisis Analysis online, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1624. Accessed 19 May 2023.
9 This obviously applies to all types of military intervention, but the primacy of politics was the principal recommendation made in the Report of the High level Independent Panel on Peace Operations in 2015, UN Doc A/70/95S/2015/446. It was also emphasized in the contributions the special issue on UN Peacekeeping published in this journal: 37/5 (2014).
10 David H. Ucko, ‘Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 39/5–6 (2016), 847–77.
11 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Deterrence in Peace Operations: Look Beyond the Battlefield and Expand the Number of Targets and Influence Mechanisms’, in Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (eds.), NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century: Insights from Theory and Practice (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021), 327–45. Fielding forces capable of meeting this requirement has proven extremely hard for the UN unless great powers have been willing to provide them. Demands for such forces have been made repeatedly – most recently in the so-called Cruz report, Improving Security of UN Peacekeepers (New York, 2017).
12 The requirement for minimum force underpins the traditional UN approach to peacekeeping as well as the UN doctrine for ‘robust peacekeeping’ allowing for the proactive use of force against spoilers at the tactical level. See the UN, Principles and Guidelines of UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York, 2008), 35; UN, DPO Policy on The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (New York, 2019), para. 59.
13 UN Doc. S/RES/1772.
14 WFP, ‘WFP welcomes French offer to protect ships from Somali pirates’, Reliefweb, 26 Sept. 2007.
15 Folketinget, ‘B32 Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om dansk sømilitært bidrag til ledsagelse af skibe med nødhjælp til Somalia chartret af FN’s Verdensfødevareprogram’, 15 Jan. 2008.
16 NATO, Counter-piracy operations (2008–2016), 19 May 2022.
17 Hylke Dijkstra, International Organizations and Military Affairs (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2016), 178–79.
18 UN Doc. S/RES/1816.
19 Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘Piracy off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and IMO Regional Counter-Piracy Efforts’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 57/3 (2008), 694.
20 National Security Council, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan, Washington DC, Dec. 2008.
21 Danielle A. Zach et al., Burden-Sharing Multi-Level Governance: A Study of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future Foundation 2013), 19.
22 Security Council Report, Monthly Forecast 8 November 2008; Security Council Report, The Penholder System, Research Report, 6 Dec. 2018.
23 In the 2009–2013 period, the UK chaired Working Group (WG)1 on operational coordination and regional capacity-building, Denmark chaired WG2 on legal issues, the US chaired WG 3 focusing on self-protection of the shipping industry, Egypt chaired WG4 on public diplomacy in Somalia, and Italy chaired WG5 (established in 2011) targeting the flow of illegal funds facilitating piracy. The US handed over the chairmanship of WG3 to South Korea in early 2012. See Zach et al., Burden-Sharing Multi-Level Governance, 21–26.
24 UK Maritime Trade Operations, Operational Summary, 1 Nov. 2022.
25 Combined Maritime Forces, CTF 151: Counter-piracy, 5 Nov. 2022; NATO, Counter-piracy operations (2008–2016); EU Naval Force, Somalia Operation ATALANTA.
26 Political and Security Committee, ‘EUCAP NESTOR/1/2012’, Official Journal of the European Union, L 198/16, 25 July 2012; House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee – Eighth Report of Session 2013–14, 22 FCO(35109) The EU and the Horn of Africa 2013.
27 BBC World, ‘Somali piracy: Armed guards to protect UK ships’, 30 Oct. 2011; Eva Fabian, ‘French Participation in EUNAVFOR Somalia’, Hungarian Defence Review, 147/1–2 (2019), 123; Reuters, ‘France to allow armed security guards on its ships’, 3 Dec. 2013; Reuters, ‘U.S. ships must post guards if sailing off Somalia’, 12 May 2009.
28 UN Doc. S/2009/590, 8.
29 INTERPOL, ‘INTERPOL to create task force against maritime piracy, landmark maritime piracy financing conference hears’, INTERPOL, 19 Jan. 2010; Zach et al., Burden-Sharing Multi-Level Governance, 26.
30 Robin Geiss and Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Oxford, Oxford UP 2011), 198.
31 Christian Bueger and Anders Wivel, ‘How do small island states maximize influence? Creole diplomacy and the smart state foreign policy of the Seychelles’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 14/2 (2018), 178–79; Robert McCabe, ‘Policing the Seas: Building Constabulary Maritime Governance in the Horn of Africa – The Case of Djibouti and Kenya’, African Security, 12/3–4 (2019), 330–55.
32 Most of the works referenced in this article highlight these factors. See also Christian Bueger, ‘Learning from piracy: future challenges of maritime security governance’, Global Affairs, 1/1 (2015), 33–42; ICS, Lessons Identified From Somali Piracy, 2014.
33 Jon Huggins and Liza Kane-Hartnett, Somali Piracy – Are we at the End Game? (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2013), 3.
34 World Bank, The Pirates of Somalia. Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation (Washington, DC 2013), 15.
35 Russia acted as penholder on UNSRC 1918 (2010), 1976 (2011) and 2015 (2011) focusing on the legal issues and the problem of prosecution.
36 Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, No Substitute for Experience (Newport: U.S. Naval War College 2013), 60–62; Olivia Gippner, ‘Antipiracy and Unusual Coalitions in the Indian Ocean Region: China’s Changing Role and Confidence Building with India’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 45/3 (2016), 120; Simon Saradzhyan, ‘The Dynamics of Russia’s Response to the Piracy Threat’, Connections, 9/3 (2010), 19–44.
37 Zhou Bo, ‘Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Implications for PLA Navy’, CHINA US Focus, 30 Dec. 2013,
38 Saradzhyan, The Dynamics of Russia’s Response to the Piracy Threat.
39 The Economist, ‘The ungoverned seas’, 27 Nov. 2014.
40 Zach et al., Burden-Sharing Multi-Level Governance, 35.
41 Christian Bueger, ‘Orchestrating the Response: Somali Piracy and Ontological Complexity’, Global Policy, 4/1 (2013), 98.
42 James A. Caporaso, ‘International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations’, International Organization, 46/3 (1992), 607; Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1982); Miles Kahler, ‘Multilateralism With Small and Large Numbers’, International Organization, 46/3 (1992), 681–708.
43 E.g. Christian Bueger, ‘Drops in the bucket? A review of onshore responses to Somali piracy’, WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 11 (2012), 15–31; Filip Ejdus, ‘Here is your mission, now own it!’, European Security, 26/4 (2017), 1–24; Thierry Tardy (ed.), Fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia: lessons learned from the Contact Group (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies 2014), 38–39, 71–77.
44 World Bank, The Pirates of Somalia.
45 Sarah Percy and Anja Shortland, ‘Contemporary Maritime Piracy: Five Obstacles to Ending Somali Piracy’, Global Policy, 4/1 (2013), 65.
46 Tardy, Fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia, 36.
47 Ibid., 35–40.
48 Jonathan Bellish, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy, 2012 (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2013), 18.
49 Glen Forbes, ‘Replicating Success? A Military Response to Maritime Piracy, the Somalia Experience’, in Tuesday Reitano et al. (eds.), Militarised Responses to Transnational Organised Crime, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2018), 115.
50 Lauren Ploch et al., Piracy off the Horn of Africa, CRS Report for Congress, 28 Sep. 2009, 20.
51 Calculations based on Andreas Westberg, ‘Princes of Predation, Thieves of Disorder – A Study of Somali Piracy, 1991–2015’ (Odense: University of Southern Denmark, PhD dissertation, 2019).
52 Percy & Shortland, ‘The Business of Piracy in Somalia’.
53 Karl Sörenson and J.J. Widen, ‘Irregular Warfare and Tactical Changes: The Case of Somali Piracy’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 26/3 (2014), 414.
54 Interview with Christian Rune, Commodore for Task force 508 Ocean Shield 2010, Copenhagen, 8 Nov. 2019.
55 Carmen Gebhard and Simon. J. Smith, ‘The Two Faces of EU – NATO Cooperation: Counter-piracy Operations off the Somali Coast’, Cooperation and Conflict, 50/1 (2015), 107–27,
56 Interview with Christian Rune; Arthur ten Cate et al., Qua Patet Orbis: The Netherlands Marine Corps in an age of conflict (The Hague: The Netherlands Institute of Military History 2017), 260.
57 EU Naval Force – Somalia Operation ATALANTA.
58 Ibid.
59 ten Cate et al., Qua Patet Orbis, 263.
60 Interview with Christian Rune.
61 Interview with Aage Buur Jensen, Commodore Combined Maritime Force 151, 2012 and Dec. 2013-Feb. 2014 and Commodore Task Force 508 Ocean Shield, 2014, 7 Nov. 2019.
62 Edward H. Lundquist, ‘EU NAVFOR Helicopters Attack Somali Pirates Ashore’, DefenseMediaNetwork, 15 May 2012.
63 Calculations based on Westberg, ‘Princes of Predation’.
64 Jan Stockbruegger, ‘US Strategy and the Rise of Private Maritime Security’, Security Studies, 30/4 (2021), 597
65 Ibid.
66 Interview with member of the Frogman Corps, patrol leader 2008–2010, 28 Nov. 2019.
67 Andreas Westberg, ‘Anti-piracy in a sea of predation: the interaction of navies, fishermen and pirates off the coast of Somalia’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 12/2 (2016), 209–26, 215–16.
68 VOA, ‘Somalia Says Relations With Russia May Be Harmed Over Pirates’ Treatment’, 20 May 2010, https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-says-relations-with-russia-may-be-harmed-over-pirates-treatment-94592344/159884.html. Accessed 26 May 2023.
69 Member of the Frogman Corps, leader Speciel Maritim Indsatsenhed 2008–2012.
70 Interview with Christian Rune.
71 Interview with Carsten Fjord-Larsen.
72 Interview with member of the Frogman Corps, leader Speciel Maritim Indsatsenhed 2008–2012,
73 Troels Burchall Henningsen, ‘Frogmen and pirates: the utility of special operations forces for small states against for-profit, illicit networks’, Defence Studies, 21/3 (2021), 292–311.
74 UN Doc. S/2011/360 (2011), para 64.
75 Cited in Associated Press, ‘No Somali pirate hijacking in nearly a year, says UN’, The Guardian, 3 May 2013.
76 Justin V. Hastings and Sarah G. Phillips, ‘Maritime Piracy Business Networks and Institutions in Africa’, African Affairs, 114/457 (2015), 555–76; Chijioke J. Nwalozie, ‘Exploring Contemporary Sea Piracy in Nigeria, the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea’, Journal of Transportation Security, 13 (2020), 159–78; UNODC, Pirates of the Niger Delta (Vienna: 2021), 73–82.
77 Justin V. Hastings and Sarah Philips, ‘Order beyond the state: explaining Somaliland’s avoidance of maritime piracy’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 56/1 (2018), 5–30.
78 World Bank, Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa (Washington, DC 2013), 61–63; UN Doc. S/2019/867.
79 Robert Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’, American Political Science Review, 97/3 (2003), 343–61.
80 World Bank, Pirate Trails, 61–63; UN Doc. S/2019/867.
81 Dennis M. Zogg, Why The U.S. Navy Should Not Be Fighting Piracy Off Somalia (Newport: Naval War College 2009); Timothy E. Newsome, Are we Making a Mountain Out of a Molehole? (Newport: Naval War College 2010).
82 Ucko, Can Limited Intervention Work?
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Peter Viggo Jakobsen
Peter Viggo Jakobsen (PhD) is Associate Professor at the Institute for Strategy and War Studies at the Royal Danish Defence College, and Professor (part time) at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark. He has advised several governments and international organizations, is a frequently used media commentator on defence and security issues, has won awards for his teaching and public dissemination skills and he has written extensively on defence and security related issues. His most recent publication is: ‘Causal Theories of Threat and Success – Simple Analytical Tools Making it Easier to Assess, Formulate, and Validate Military Strategy’, Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 5/1 (2022), 177–91.
Troels Burchall Henningsen
Troels Burchall Henningsen is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College, where he teaches military strategy. His is the author of the book Western Intervention and Informal Politics: Simulated State building and Failed Reforms (Routledge 2022), and has published in journals such as Contemporary Security Policy, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Small Wars & Insurgencies, and Defence Studies on proxy wars, civil wars, counter-piracy, Special Operations Forces, and stability operations in the Middle East and the Sahel region.