ABSTRACT
With its rise will India be a responsible stakeholder or uphold US interests? These questions have occupied analysts since the turn of the century when India started featuring prominently in US grand strategy as a future great power. Two assumptions were laid out: (a) India's rise will have salutary effects in Asia, and (b) India's strong sense of neutrality, known as “strategic autonomy,” and its newfound “strategic proximity” with the US will have to coexist. Amidst this came the Russia-Ukraine War. India's steadfast reluctance to take sides and its imports of Russian oil reignited the debate from which two camps emerged which (a) suggested “patience” with India as there is a bigger prize in the Indo-Pacific, and (b) advocated “punishment” by downsizing investments in and expectations from New Delhi. I point out how both these recommendations are flawed and do not aid in US grand strategic objectives. I advocate a third view of “leveraging” neutrality, which argues two major points. First, given the strong sense of strategic autonomy, both countries must agree to a larger room for disagreements. Second, instead of expecting absolute allegiance, US policy planners should strive to leverage India's size and autonomy in cases like Russia, Iran, Myanmar, and others in the global south.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Soul Park for his feedback and support.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Only votes directly concerning the war are listed.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Chirayu Thakkar
Chirayu Thakkar is a doctoral candidate with the National University of Singapore. Most recently, he was a visiting fellow with the Stimson Center, Washington DC. His research interests include Indian foreign and security policies.