Consciousness as a Process for Explaining Behavior: A Theoretical Outline

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to propose an outline of a new methodological theory for psychological explanations. Since (a) there is still no theory that explains how consciousness is produced from neurophysiological processes in the brain, and (b) a large part of behavior is endowed with consciousness, the following demand arises. One has to explain behavior with the aid of two types of explanations: mentalistic (based on conscious states and processes) and mechanistic (based on concepts used in the sciences). To realize this methodological requirement, the article develops a theoretical approach based on: (1) a mentalistic model of explanation, the {motivation, belief}; (2) a method that suggests which explanatory model to use: mentalistic or mechanistic, given a particular behavior; and (3) a theory that explains how a non-conscious state changes into a conscious one and vice versa. This theory is required to explain how concepts such as will/belief used by the mentalistic model of explanation are endowed with consciousness.

Keywords:

• Cognitive systems
• consciousness
• explanation
• mental states
• psychological theory

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The philosophical discussion of Hume's approach includes a rich literature on the complicated connections among will, belief, action, and rationality. For example, can the explanation (will, belief) be interpreted as anchored to justification, intention (purpose), causality or should it be seen as a purely predictive device? I will refrain from discussing these and other questions for two main reasons. First, the formulation of {motivation, belief} is very general, therefore different types of 'motivational states' can be placed in it, such as desires, feelings, sensations, intentions, plans, as well as various relevant 'beliefs'. For this reason, it can be said that part of the discussion in the philosophical literature related to the nature of the explanation (will, belief) is covered by the generality of {motivation, belief}. However, I should point out that while in Rakover (2018) I tended to perceive the mentalistic model will/belief as expressing a goal, here I prefer to leave this mentalistic model at the general methodological level, that is, as an explanatory model in which different mentalistic states can be placed. Second, the discussion of these issues, despite their great importance, is above and beyond the goals of the present article (e.g., Paul, 2020; Nottelmann, 2011).

2 There are interesting arguments named after the two philosophers Duhem and Quine, according to which the totality of the theory and the auxiliary hypotheses that are required to derive from this theory the prediction, is being tested, that this, the totality is disconfirmed and therefore it is not possible to know which of its components is to blame for the refutation. The discussion of this topic is beyond the goals of this article. (Rakover, 2003 proposed a practical solution to this problem within the framework of experimental psychology.).

3 The other-mind problem: I will not be able to discuss this problem and other related questions as they are beyond the goals of the present paper.

4 In the present article I will not refer to the very interesting cases where the individual is aware of his/her awareness, because this issue will take me to areas that are not within the goals of the current article.