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Abstract
Voters and selectorates tend to prioritize domestic policy, so when and why do national political leaders choose to spend their time at international organizations (IOs)? Heads of state only began to address international assemblies such as the UN in recent decades; their appearances are puzzling, considering that leaders rarely get direct political benefit from multilateral cooperation, whose gains tend to be diffuse and slow-moving. This paper presents a theory of the motivations behind leaders’ appearances at IOs. We argue that because multilateralism tends to be incidental to survival in office, heads of state tend to use IOs for prestige, not policy. But prestige is a luxury: both democrats and autocrats tend to prioritize international cooperation only when they can afford to do so domestically. Autocrats and democrats alike face domestic constraints—namely, the end of a term or gridlock in democracies, or under-institutionalized regimes in autocracies—when they consider international appearance, although the presence of other leaders amplifies the prestige value of a visit to an IO. Novel data on speakers at the United Nations General Assembly support our argument on leader appearances. We show that for the majority of leaders, domestic constraints temper their ability to appear at the UN, despite the draw of other leaders in recent years.
Sabemos que los votantes y los selectorados tienden a priorizar la política interna, entonces, ¿cuándo y por qué eligen los líderes políticos nacionales pasar su tiempo en las organizaciones internacionales (OOII)? Los jefes de Estado solo comenzaron a dirigirse a asambleas internacionales como la ONU en las últimas décadas y sus apariciones en ellas aún resultan desconcertantes, teniendo en cuenta que los líderes rara vez obtienen beneficios políticos directos de la cooperación multilateral. Este artículo presenta una teoría con relación a las motivaciones existentes detrás de las apariciones de los líderes en las OOII. Argumentamos que, debido a que el multilateralismo tiende a ser incidental a la supervivencia en el cargo, los jefes de Estado tienden a utilizar a las OOII como una forma de ganar prestigio y no por motivaciones políticas. Sin embargo, el prestigio es un lujo: tanto los demócratas como los autócratas tienden a priorizar la cooperación internacional solo cuando pueden permitírselo a nivel nacional. Tanto los autócratas como los demócratas se enfrentan a limitaciones internas (por ejemplo, el final de un mandato o el estancamiento en las democracias, o los regímenes poco institucionalizados en las autocracias) cuando consideran una aparición internacional. Sin embargo, la presencia de otros líderes aumenta el valor en materia de prestigio que ofrece una visita a una OOII. Los nuevos datos sobre los oradores en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas respaldan nuestro argumento acerca de las apariciones de los líderes. Demostramos que, para la mayoría de los líderes, las limitaciones internas atenúan su capacidad para comparecer en la ONU, a pesar de la atracción que han podido ejercer otros líderes durante los últimos años. Nuestras conclusiones tienen implicaciones importantes para el estudio de cómo los incentivos de los ejecutivos afectan a la atención que estos prestan a la cooperación internacional.
Les électeurs et les sélectorats ont tendance à s’intéresser davantage à la politique nationale, alors pourquoi et quand les dirigeants politiques nationaux choisissent-ils de passer du temps dans des organisations internationales (OI) ? Les chefs d’État ne s’adressent aux assemblées internationales, comme l’ONU, que depuis ces dernières décennies. Leurs apparitions sont déconcertantes, étant donné que les dirigeants ne bénéficient que rarement sur le plan politique d’une coopération multilatérale. Cet article présente une théorie des motivations qui se cachent derrière les apparitions des dirigeants aux OI. Nous affirmons que puisque le multilatéralisme a tendance à ne pas avoir d’incidence sur un mandat, les chefs d’État utilisent les OI pour gagner en prestige, et non pour la politique. Or, le prestige est un luxe : tant les démocrates que les autocrates n’ont tendance à privilégier la coopération internationale que lorsqu’ils peuvent se le permettre sur le plan national. Autocrates comme démocrates sont confrontés à des contraintes nationales quand ils envisagent une apparition internationale : la fin d’un mandat ou les blocages politiques dans les démocraties, et les régimes sous-institutionnalisés dans les autocraties. Néanmoins, la présence d’autres dirigeants décuple la valeur prestigieuse d’une visite dans une OI. Des données inédites sur les intervenants lors de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies soutiennent notre argument quant aux apparitions de dirigeants. Nous montrons que pour la majorité des dirigeants, les contraintes nationales restreignent leurs possibilités d’apparition à l’ONU, malgré le succès d’autres dirigeants ces dernières années. Nos conclusions s’accompagnent d’implications importantes pour l’étude des conséquences des motivations de l’exécutif sur son attention à la coopération internationale.
Notes
1 But see Kleine and Minaudier (Citation2019); Schneider (Citation2019); Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Matush (Citation2021).
2 In a move that was at the time groundbreaking, countries’ delegates could even speak in their nation’s own language, as long as they provided a translation in either French or English, and the debate was open to media outlets, which was novel at the time.
3 Selassie spoke at the UN again in 1963, saying “When I spoke at Geneva in 1936, there was no precedent for a head of state addressing the League of Nations. I am neither the first, nor will I be the last head of state to address the United Nations, but only I have addressed both the League and this organization in this capacity.” Only two other world leaders spoke at the UNGA that year, but Selassie’s appearance had a profound cultural impact; his speech formed the basis of Bob Marley’s song “War,” later memorably covered by Sinead O’Connor on Saturday Night Live.
4 The king of Saudi Arabia addressed the UNGA for the first time in 2020, through pre-recorded video. and are based on pre-pandemic, in person attendance.
5 Among the top sending countries in terms of percentage of delegates who are leaders of especially small nations, such as Samoa or Nauru. This may be because their national governance structures are relatively thin, and they lack a “deep bench” of officials to send. However, generally speaking, in our models country size is not a significant predictor of leader attendance.
6 Bill Clinton, for example, was criticised in his first term for prioritizing international affairs over domestic ones: “Mr. Clinton … travels to the UN to address the 50th anniversary of the UNGA, has summits with the Russian and Chinese leaders and then travels to Europe and Japan—so much for the domestic president.” From “Reaction to Presidential Focus Full of Controversy,” CNN News, October 6, Citation1995. But, see Malis and Smith (Citation2021) on leader visits and political survival.
7 As Keohane (Citation1965–1967, 65) wrote, “prestige is essential if a small or medium-size state is to be influential in the Assembly.”
8 In the US, foreign travel has been shown to improve a president’s standing (Darcy and Richman Citation1988; Simon and Ostrom Citation1989).
9 Generally, alongside dominance, seeking prestige serves as a viable route to high social rank in all social groups (Henrich and Gil-White Citation2001).
10 “Before leaving for the US, Erdogan publicly stated that he would meet with US President Donald Trump in New York. … But as of Tuesday night, no such meeting had occurred, and none was on the list of meetings Trump is slated to have in New York. … Indeed, Erdogan was slated to sit at Trump’s table for lunch on Tuesday, but when he saw Sisi was also seated there, he moved to another table, the Turkish press reported.” “Erdogan challenges US on northeast Syria, Israel,” Kurdistan 24, September 25, Citation2019.
11 “Turkish, U.S. Presidents Hold Talks on Syria, Bilateral Issues over Phone,” Xinhua General News Service, September 24, Citation2019.
12 Presidency of the Republic of Turkiye. Citation2019. “President Erdogan Holds Press Conference at Istanbul Ataturk Airport,” Presidency of the Republic of Turkiye, September 26, Citation2019.
13 From Carlson (Citation2009, 382), “Macmillan visited Nkrumah, who visited Tito, who visited Nehru. Nkrumah breakfasted with Nehru, who lunched with Macmillan and Diefenbaker. Macmillan met with Nasser and Khrushchev. Khrushchev met with Tito, Nehru, and Nasser. Eisenhower met Macmillan, Tito, Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah.” After Castro made a point of moving his reservation from the posh midtown hotel to Harlem, Khrushchev also made sure the press attended a meeting with Castro at his new Harlem hotel a few hours prior to the session. Once the session opened, Khrushchev made a point of hugging him on camera and went on in his speech to praise “courageous Cuba” for nationalizing American businesses.
14 See Borch (Citation2012) for a sociological treatment of crowds, and Schubert, Zsindley, and Bruan (Citation1983) for an application to academic conferences. Importantly, in economic models of herd behavior (Banerjee Citation1992)—in which actors follow the crowd rather than using their own information—the resulting equilibria are often inefficient ones; in this case, it implies that even if crowds suggest heightened prestige, it may or may not actually deliver results or suggest efficient outcomes; see also Gray (Citation2013).
15 On social aspects regarding the need to belong to peer groups in human behaviour, see also Baumeister and Leary (Citation1995).
16 After George Bush gave a 2002 speech at the UNGA, Tony Blair wrote to him, “The reception has been very positive with everyone now challenged to step up to the mark. Well done. Yours ever, Tony. “The Blair-Bush Memos: What PM Told President,” Sky News, 6 July Citation2016.
17 This does not translate to autocracies where term limits are rarely binding, and leaders seldom announce their departure in advance (Baturo Citation2010). However, it may apply to hybrid regime: as Mikhail Gorbachev’s domestic agenda went off the rails in 1990–91, he increasingly turned to international visits so that there were “ ‘two Gorbachevs’: one was a world figure with a striking vision, the other was a lame-duck domestic politician” (Zubok Citation2021, 172).
18 It takes the value of one for 1956, when both the Suez and Hungarian crises took place, 1973–74, for the global oil crisis triggered by the Arab–Israeli war, 1985–86 for important USA-USSR summits which ultimately led to the end of the Cold war, 2001 for the 9/11 (when the beginning of annual UNGA session was also postponed from September to November), 2008 for onset of the Great Recession, and 2015, the Paris climate change accords.
19 If costs were a concern for leader travel, poorer countries would rely on heads of national missions to the UN, who are based in New York, rather than sending ministers of foreign affairs—who equally would have to travel from national capitals. We however find that in percentage terms the national representation by heads of diplomatic missions has remained relatively steady since 1970s and leaders tend to substitute their foreign ministers.
20 The representative of the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library confirmed the absence of specific resolutions calling for more high-level participation (correspondence with the authors, May 25, 2021). That said, the UN undertook several initiatives aimed at revitalizing the UNGA, including calls to increase high-level meetings (see, for example, UNGA, Citation2013, p. 17).
21 “The United States in the United Nations: 1960—A Turning Point?” CFR report, Senators George D. Aiken and Wayne Morse, February 1961—although it proved not to be so.