Explaining the Bayraktar Paradox

Abstract

The conflicts in Libya, Syria and the Caucasus catapulted Turkey to the status of a ‘drone power’ thanks to its armed Bayraktar TB2. Owing to its reputation as a low-budget and combat-tested drone, Ukraine added it to its arsenal to counter Russia’s escalating aggression. When the invasion started in February 2022, the so-called ‘game changer’ drone was expected to help defeat the Russian army. The drone was less successful than anticipated and yet, in the same year, Baykar (the drone’s manufacturer) registered the best sales ever. Spyridon Plakoudas and Vasileios Sofitis explore this paradox and how it might be explained.◼

Notes

1 Stephen Witt, ‘The Turkish Drone that Changed the Nature of Warfare’, New Yorker, 16 May 2022; Times Aerospace, ‘Turkish Drones Emerge as Middle East Game-Changer’, 13 April 2022, <https://www.timesaerospace.aero/features/defence/turkish-drones-emerge-as-middle-east-game-changer>, accessed 10 August 2023.

2 Daily Sabah, ‘Ukraine’s Use of Turkish Drones Could be a “Game Changer”: Fukuyama’, 28 November 2021, <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/ukraines-use-of-turkish-drones-could-be-a-game-changer-fukuyama>, accessed 12 August 2023.

3 Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, ‘A Monument Of Victory: The Bayraktar TB2 Kill List’, Oryx, 23 February 2022, <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/12/a-monument-of-victory-bayraktar-tb2.html>, accessed 30 June 2023.

4 Witt, ‘The Turkish Drone that Changed the Nature of Warfare’.

5 Although Turkey grossly exaggerated the total losses of the Assad Regime, no one can doubt the deadly effects of this blitz. Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, ‘The Idlib Turkey Shoot: The Destruction and Capture of Vehicles and Equipment by Turkish and Rebel Forces’, Oryx, 28 February 2020, <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/02/the-idlib-turkey-shoot-destruction-and.html>, accessed 30 June 2023; Gregory Waters, ‘The Syrian Regime’s Combat Losses in Spring 2020 and What Lies Ahead’, policy paper, Middle East Institute, June 2020, p. 6.

6 Times Aerospace, ‘Libya’s Deadly Game of Drones’, 19 March 2020, <https://www.timesaerospace.aero/features/defence/libyas-deadly-game-of-drones>, accessed 15 November 2023; Alex Gatopoulos, ‘“Largest Drone War in the World”: How Airpower Saved Tripoli’, Al Jazeera, 28 May 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/28/largest-drone-war-in-the-world-how-airpower-saved-tripoli>, accessed 30 June 2023.

7 Hülya Kınık and Sinem Çelik, ‘The Role of Turkish Drones in Azerbaijan’s Increasing Military Effectiveness: An Assessment of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War’, Insight Turkey (Vol. 23, No. 4, 2021), pp. 169–91.

8 David Axe, ‘How Turkey Became a Drone Superpower’, National Interest, 29 January 2022, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/how-turkey-became-drone-superpower-199998>, accessed 12 June 2023.

9 James Marson and Brett Forrest, ‘Armed Low-Cost Drones, Made by Turkey, Reshape Battlefields and Geopolitics’, Wall Street Journal, 3 June 2021; Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, ‘Turkey’s Drones: Assessing Capability, Goals and Implications’, event recording, RUSI, 28 May 2021.

10 Isabelle Khurshudyan and David L Stern, ‘Why Ukraine’s Turkish-Made Drone Became a Flash Point in Tensions with Russia’, Washington Post, 15 January 2022.

11 Defense Mirror, ‘Russian Oniks Missiles Destroy Ukrainian Hangars with Bayraktar TB2 Drones’, 3 May 2022, <https://www.defensemirror.com/news/31866/Russian_Oniks_Missiles_Destroy_Ukrainian_Hangars_with_Bayraktar_TB2_Drones>, accessed 10 June 2023; Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds and Jack Watling, ‘The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence’, RUSI Special Resource, 7 November 2022, p. 26.

12 Ashish Dangwal, ‘Bayraktar TB2 Drones “Out Of Action” From Ukraine War; Russia’s Air Defense Or Diplomacy Behind Their Disappearance?’, Eurasian Times, 4 December 2022, <https://www.eurasiantimes.com/bayraktar-tb2-drones-out-of-action-from-ukraine-war-russias/>, accessed 10 June 2023.

13 Reuters, ‘Turkey’s Baykar to Donate Three UAVs to Ukraine After Crowdfunding Campaign’, 27 June 2023.

14 @ClashReport, ‘Unwavering Turkish Military Support to #Ukraine. #Turkiye has been resolutely assisting Ukraine in its legitimate & valiant fight against the invading Russian forces. More to come’, Twitter post (now known as X), 20 January 2023, <https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/1616505078277410822?t=Kii9uBX4lVTOi_-9mxzv5w&s=03>, accessed 4 July 2023.

15 For example, a Bayraktar TB2 shot down in July 2023 @UAWeapons, ‘#Ukraine: In the vicinity of Heroiske, #Kherson Oblast, Russian forces shot down a Ukrainian Bayraktar TB-2 drone. As can be seen, it was carrying at least one MAM-L munition’, Twitter post (now known as X), 18 July 2023, <https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1681211191887110144>, accessed 8 August 2023.

16 Nathan Rennolds, ‘Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2 Drones Appear to be Back in Combat – And With Devastating Effect, Reports Say’, Business Insider, 10 September 2023.

17 Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022’, RUSI Special Resource, 30 November 2022, pp. 26, 29.

18 Ibid., p. 30.

19 Indeed, the density of Russia’s EW was ‘up to 10 complexes per 20 km of frontage’. Ibid., p. 37; Alia Shohaib, ‘Bayraktar TB2 Drones Were Hailed as Ukraine’s Savior and the Future of Warfare. A Year Later, They’ve Practically Disappeared’, Business Insider, 28 May 2023.

20 Jakub Janovsky et al., ‘Defending Ukraine – Listing Russian Military Equipment Destroyed by Bayraktar TB2s’, Oryx, 25 March 2022, <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/defending-ukraine-listing-russian-army.html>, accessed 10 June 2023.

21 Aaron Reich, ‘Ukraine: 3 Russian Ships by Snake Island Destroyed with Bayraktar Drone – Report’, Jerusalem Post, 8 May 2022, <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-706105>, accessed 10 June 2023.

22 David Axe, ‘Kherson’s Airport Was a Death Trap or Russian Troops’, Forbes, 13 November 2022.

23 Yagil Henkin, ‘The “Big Three” Revisited: Initial Lessons from 200 Days of War in Ukraine’, Expeditions with MCUP (Vol. 4, November 2022), pp. 1–36.

24 For example, the destroyed tanks from the Armenian side alone totalled 146. Stijn Mitzer et al., ‘The Fight for Nagorno-Karabakh: Documenting Losses On the Sides of Armenia and Azerbaijan’, Oryx, 27 September 2020, <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/09/the-fight-for-nagorno-karabakh.html>, accessed 8 July 2023.

25 Vikram Mittal, ‘The Ukrainian Military is Changing its Tactics with Bayraktar TB2 Drones’, Forbes, 23 June 2022.

26 Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting’, p. 37.

27 David Hambling, ‘Ukraine’s Bayraktar Drone Helped Sink Russian Flagship Moskva’, Forbes, 14 April 2022.

28 Léo Péria-Peigné, ‘TB2 Bayraktar: Big Strategy for a Little Drone’, IFRI, 2023, p. 12.

29 Defense View, ‘Turkish Bayraktar TB2 Drones Not Effective in War with Russia: Zelensky’, 25 April 2023, <https://www.defenceview.in/bayraktar-drones-not-decisive-in-war-with-russia-zelensky/>, accessed 12 July 2023.

30 To add insult to injury, he confessed: ‘I was personally against it because they are extremely vulnerable to air defense systems. They were all shot down within a week. [The drone] is not a self-sufficient weapon [it cannot work by itself as it] gets shot down by air defense systems in a flash and has no combat effectiveness at all’. Press United, ‘Ukrainian Official Slams Bayraktar Drones in Prank Call’, 18 October 2022, <https://thepressunited.com/updates/ukrainian-official-slams-bayraktar-drones-in-prank-call/#google_vignette>, accessed 12 July 2023.

31 Selçuk Bayraktar tweeted angrily that the Ukrainians should ‘go fight on their own then’ but deleted the tweet a few moments later. Parth Satam, ‘Bayraktar Dream Ends For Ukraine; “Angry” Ankara Backs Out Of Setting Up TB2 Factory In War Zone – Reports’, Eurasian Times, 31 October 2022, <https://eurasiantimes.com/bayraktar-dream-ends-for-ukraine-angry-ankara-backs-out-of-setting-up-tb2-factory-in-war-zone-reports/>, accessed 10 June 2023.

32 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, ‘Zelenskiy Meets CEO of Turkish Drone Maker, Discusses Construction of Factory in Ukraine’, 10 September 2022, <https://www.rferl.org/a/zelensky-turkish-drone-maker-ukraine-factory/32027416.html>, accessed 12 July 2023.

33 For example, Turkey was awarded a contract a few years ago for two Ada-class corvettes by Ukraine, whereas Kyiv supplies Ankara with engines for its growing fleet of unmanned vehicles. Dorian Jones, ‘Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with its Ukraine Partnership’, VOA, 4 February 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/6426727.html>, accessed 20 July 2023.

34 According to the press leaks, in October 2022, Vladimir Putin suggested transforming Turkey into an energy hub with Russian natural gas, as long as Erdoğan discontinued the deliveries of Bayraktar TB2 to Ukraine. Satam, ‘Bayraktar Dream Ends’.

35 John Mahon, ‘“Corruption Won”: Turkey Refuses to Build a Marching Factory “Bayraktar” in Ukraine after Request “Shameless”’, Asumetech, 2 July 2023, <https://asumetech.com/corruption-wonturkey-refuses-to-build-a-marching-factory-bayraktar-in-ukraine-after-request-shameless/>, accessed 20 July 2023.

36 MEPA News, ‘Ukrayna’daki Bayraktar Fabrikası Için Hedef 2025’ [‘Target 2025 for Bayraktar Factory in Ukraine’], 23 June 2023, <https://www.mepanews.com/ukraynadaki-bayraktar-fabrikasi-icin-hedef-2025-60964h.htm>, accessed 8 August 2023.

37 Henkin, ‘The “Big Three” Revisited’.

38 Karla Adam, ‘In UK and France Visits, Zelensky Asks for Fighter Planes to Counter Russia’, Washington Post, 8 February 2023.

39 For example, see James M Page, ‘Drones in Ukraine: Claims, Concerns and Implications’, RUSI Newsbrief, 10 June 2022; Ahmed Daifullah al-Garni, ‘Drones in the Ukrainian War: Will They Be an Effective Weapon in Future Wars?’, International Institute for Iranian Studies, 30 August 2022, <https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/centre-for-researches-and-studies/drones-in-the-ukrainian-war-will-they-be-an-effective-weapon-in-future-wars%ef%bf%bc/>, accessed 12 July 2023.

40 Lynna E Davies, Michael McNernay and Daniel Byman, ‘Armed Drone Myth 1: They Will Transform How War is Waged Globally’, RAND Corporation, 17 February 2015.

41 Aaron Stein, ‘The TB2: The Value of a Cheap and “Good Enough” Drone’, Atlantic Council, 30 August 2022, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/airpower-after-ukraine/the-tb2-the-value-of-a-cheap-and-good-enough-drone>, accessed 7 September 2023; Frank Christian Sprengel, Drones in Hybrid Warfare: Lessons from Current Battlefields, Hybrid COE Working Paper 10 (The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, June 2021).

42 Alexander Stronell, ‘Learning the Lessons of Nagorno-Karabakh the Russian Way’, IISS, 10 March 2021; Hecht Eado, ‘Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Analyzing the Data’, Military Strategy Magazine (Vol. 7, No. 4, 2022), pp. 31–37.

43 Jason Pack and Wolfgang Pusztai, ‘Turning the Tide: How Turkey Won the War for Tripoli’, policy paper, Middle East Institute, November 2020, pp. 10–11, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/turning-tide-how-turkey-won-war-tripoli>, accessed 10 July 2023; Can Kasapoğlu, ‘Techno-Geopolitics and the Turkish Way of Drone Warfare’, Atlantic Council, March 2022, p. 4, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Techno-Geopolitics_and_the_Turkish_Way_of_Drone_Warfare.pdf>, accessed 10 July 2023.

44 In fact, nearly 70% of the arms imports by Azerbaijan in the last five years originated from Israel. Seth Frantzman, ‘Did Azerbaijan’s Use of Israeli Weapons Make the War Worse or Better?’, Jerusalem Post, 18 March 2021, <https://www.jpost.com/international/did-azerbaijans-use-of-israeli-weapons-make-the-war-worse-or-better-662442>, accessed 10 July 2023.

45 In fact, the Kremlin expected that the invasion would end in a matter of days with an outright Russian victory, as captured classified documents attest to. Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting’, pp. 7–8, 12. See also Eugene Rumer, ‘Putin’s War Against Ukraine: The End of The Beginning’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 February 2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/17/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-end-of-beginning-pub-89071>, accessed 4 August 2023.

46 It was estimated that only one third of the drones’ missions were successful during that period. Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting’, pp. 37–38.

47 As certain scholars argued, ‘the average life expectancy of a fixed-wing UAV was around six flights’. Ibid., p. 37.

48 As regards the Libyan Civil War, it was rumoured that one drone was downed and shipped to Greece, even though Athens has denied the claim. Ekathimerini, ‘Defense Ministry Denies Report that Greece Possesses Turkish UAV that Fell in Libya’, 7 September 2022, <https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1192765/defense-ministry-denies-report-that-greece-possesses-turkish-uav-that-fell-in-libya/>, accessed 10 June 2023.

49 Chris Cole and Jonathan Cole, ‘Libyan War Sees Record Number of Drones Brought Down to Earth’, Drone Wars Net, 1 July 2020, <https://dronewars.net/2020/07/01/libyan-war-sees-record-number-of-drones-brought-down-to-earth/>, accessed 10 June 2023; Linday Kay, ‘Russian Pantsir Systems Shot Down 40 Drones Over Syria, Libya’, Defense World, 19 December 2021, <https://www.defenseworld.net/2021/12/19/russian-pantsir-systems-shot-down-40-turkish-drones-over-syrian-libya.html>, accessed 10 June 2023.

50 Dan Sabbagh, ‘“War-Enabling, Not War-Winning”: How Are Drones Affecting the Ukraine War?’, The Guardian, 15 May 2022.

51 Stein, ‘The TB2’.

52 Naila Bagirova, ‘Exclusive: After Ukraine, “Whole World” Is a Customer for Turkish Drone, Maker Says’, Reuters, 30 May 2022.

53 Jaroslaw Adamowski, ‘Poland to Buy Turkish Bayraktar TB2 Drones’, Defense News, 24 May 2021, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/05/24/poland-to-buy-turkish-bayraktar-tb2-drones/>, accessed 10 July 2023.

54 The contract, signed in December 2022, marked the most successful year to date for Baykar as Albania became the 27th operator of the drone. Daily Sabah, ‘Albania Becomes 27th Buyer of Turkish Pioneering Bayraktar Drones’, 21 December 2022, <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/albania-becomes-27th-buyer-of-turkish-pioneering-bayraktar-drones>, accessed 10 July 2023; Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, ‘Romania Awards $321 Million Contract for Turkish TB2 Combat Drones’, Defense News, 25 April 2023, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/04/25/romania-awards-321-million-contract-for-turkish-tb2-combat-drones/>, accessed 10 July 2023.

55 KN Pandita, ‘Japan Recorded 1000+ Intrusions in 2021; Now It Plans To Thwart Invasion Attempts with UAVs ike Bayraktar TB2’, Eurasian Times, 14 March 2023, <https://eurasiantimes.com/japan-recorded-1000-intrusions-in-2021-now-it-plans/>, accessed 14 August 2023.

56 There were discussions amidst the conflict for the takeover of Motor Sich – the company that powers Antonov airplanes and ‘Mi’ and ‘Ka’ type military helicopters with its engines – by a Turkish defence company. Linda Kay, ‘Ukrainian Motor Sich to Sell 50% to Turkish Firm’, Defense World, 15 April 2021, <https://www.defenseworld.net/2021/04/15/ukrainian-motor-sich-to-sell-50-stake-to-turkish-firm.html#.YLes-6gzbIU>, accessed 10 August 2023.

57 New Arab, ‘“Bayraktar!”: Ukrainian Army Shares Song Celebrating Turkish-Made Drone Fighting Back at Russian Invasion’, 2 March 2022, <https://www.newarab.com/news/bayraktar-ukraine-army-shares-song-hailing-turkish-drone>, accessed 10 June 2023.

58 For example, see Sibel Düz, ‘Unpacking the Debate on Turkish Drones’, SETA, 27 April 2022; @clashreport, ‘#Bayraktar TB2 Armed UAVs have caused great losses to the Armenian Armed Forces. The total cost of the destroyed military vehicles has exceeded $1.9 Billion USD’, Twitter post (now known as X), 9 November 2020, <https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/1325535044455313409>, accessed 10 June 2023.

59 Yusuf Kenan Küçük, ‘Turkish Drones in Africa: A Risky Turn in Turkey’s Africa Policy’, Wilson Center, 11 November 2021, <https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/turkish-drones-in-africa/>, accessed 10 July 2023.

60 Paul Iddon, ‘Can TAI Challenge Baykar in the Turkish Drone Export Market?’, Gercek News, 24 November 2022.

61 Politics Today, ‘Haluk Bayraktar Criticizes Kılıçdaroğlu for Slandering Baykar’, 26 May 2023, <https://politicstoday.org/haluk-bayraktar-kemal-kilicdaroglu-baykar-makina/>, accessed 8 August 2023.

62 Brendon Cannon, ‘Turkey’s Defense Industry and Military Sales in Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends, Rationale, and Results’, TRENDS Consultancy, 20 December 2021, <https://trendsresearch.org/insight/turkeys-defense-industry-and-military-sales-in-sub-saharan-africa-trends-rationale-and-results/>, accessed 10 August 2023; Paul Melly, ‘Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 Drone: Why African States are Buying Them’, BBC News, 25 August 2022.

63 Sivan Tavsan, ‘Turkey Unleashes Hard Power Wave in Africa with Drone Sales’, Nikkei Asia, 3 November 2021, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Turkey-unleashes-hard-power-wave-in-Africa-with-drone-sales>, accessed 10 July 2023; Emel Parlar Dal and Samiratou Dipama, ‘Assessing Turkey-Africa Engagements’, Afripoli, 27 April 2023, <https://afripoli.org/assessing-turkey-africa-engagements>, accessed 4 September 2023.

64 Soner Cagaptay, ‘Unpacking Turkey’s Non-Binary Ukraine War Policy’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7 May 2023, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/unpacking-turkeys-non-binary-ukraine-war-policy>, accessed 1 June 2023.

65 Indeed, ‘the media coverage of Bayraktar drones […] can be viewed as an instrument in contributing to the foreign policy profile of Turkey functioning more of a diplomatic tool enabling the country’s rise’. Begum Burak, ‘How Does the Media Coverage of Bayraktar Drones Affect Turkish Foreign Policy Image?’, Modern Diplomacy, 29 October 2022, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/10/29/how-does-the-media-coverage-of-bayraktar-drones-affect-turkish-foreign-policy-image/>, accessed 1 June 2023.

66 Jared Szuba, ‘Outgoing Syria Envoy Reflects on Turkey, the Kurds and What Everyone Got Wrong’, Al Monitor, 9 December 2020, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/12/trump-syria-envoy-jeffrey-mideast-policy-turkey-erdogan.html>, accessed 1 June 2023.

67 Levent Kenez, ‘Erdoğan Uses “Drone Diplomacy” to Silence Opponents Abroad’, Nordic Monitor, 28 September 2022, <https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/09/erdogan-uses-drone-diplomacy-to-silence-opponents-abroad/>, accessed 10 June 2023.

68 Hugh Pope, ‘The Battle of the Turkish Centuries’, Politico, 11 May 2023, <https://www.politico.eu/article/turkish-century-elections-recep-tayyip-erdogan-mustafa-kemal-ataturk/>, accessed 10 June 2023.

69 Natasha Turak, ‘Killer Drones and Multi-Billion Dollar Deals: Turkey’s Rapidly Growing Defense Industry is Boosting its Global Clout’, CNBC, 28 March 2023.

70 Declan Walsh, ‘Foreign Drones Tip the Balance in Ethiopia’s Civil War’, New York Times, 20 December 2021.

71 Fergus Kelly, ‘Qatar Signs Deals for Armed Drones, Armored Vehicles and Ships from Turkey’, Defense Post, 14 March 2018, <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2018/03/14/qatar-turkey-drones-armored-vehicles-ships-deals/>, accessed 10 June 2023.

72 Fuad Shahbazov, ‘What’s Behind Turkey and Poland’s Growing Strategic Alliance?’, New Arab, 7 June 2021, <https://www.newarab.com/analysis/whats-behind-turkey-and-polands-growing-alliance>, accessed 10 June 2023; Stanislav Stremidlovsky, ‘Russia Wary of Polish Overtures to Turkey, But Expects Erdoğan to Prioritize Turkish Interests’, MEMRI, 1 June 2021, <https://www.memri.org/reports/russia-wary-polish-overtures-turkey-expects-erdogan-prioritize-turkish-interests>, accessed 2 August 2023.

73 Matthew Karntischnig and Wojciech Kość, ‘Meet Europe’s Coming Military Superpower: Poland’, Politico, 21 November 2022, <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-military-superpower-poland-army/>, accessed 10 June 2023.

74 The Economist, ‘Romania Fears That Whatever Happens in Ukraine, It Will End Up More Vulnerable’, 22 March 2022.

75 Adam Balcer, ‘A Polish-Romanian-Turkish Triangle and the Black Sea Triangle – A New Driving Force of Regional Integration?’, policy paper, Center for International and European Studies, June 2015, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/192079/NeighbourhoodPolicyPaper(14).pdf>, accessed 10 June 2023.

76 Turkey ranks as the country’s top trade partner outside the EU and the two countries work closely on the Southern Gas Corridor (GSC) and the Costantza LNG Terminal (with the blessing of the EU and NATO). Marika Karagianni, ‘The Second Phase of the EU Southern Gas Corridor: Which Role for Azerbaijan?’, ELIAMEP, 1 April 2022, <https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/%CE%B7-%CE%B4%CE%B5%CF%8D%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%81%CE%B7-%CF%86%CE%AC%CF%83%CE%B7-%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85-%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%84%CE%AF%CE%BF%CF%85-%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%B1%CE%B4%CF%81%CF%8C%CE%BC%CE%BF%CF%85-%CF%86%CF%85/>, accessed 10 June 2023.

77 Maxim Suchkov, ‘Russia and Turkey: Flexible Rivals’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 20 March 2020, <https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/81330>, accessed 10 June 2023.

78 Galip Dalay, ‘Turkish-Russian Relations in Light of Recent Conflicts: Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh’, SWP Research Paper (No. 5, August 2021).

79 Steven Erlanger, ‘Erdoğan and Putin: Complicated Relations With Mutual Benefits’, New York Times, 11 August 2022.

80 Galip Dalay, ‘Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in its Relations with Russia’, SWP Comment (No. 35, May 2022).

81 Burak Ege Bekdil and Matthew Bodner, ‘No Obliteration: Western Arms Embargo Has Little Impact on Turkey as it Looks East’, Defense News, 24 October 2019, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2019/10/24/no-obliteration-western-arms-embargo-has-little-impact-on-turkey-as-it-looks-east/>, accessed 10 July 2023.

82 Umar Farooq, ‘“The Drone Problem”: How the US Has Struggled to Curb Turkey, a Key Exporter of Armed Drones’, ProPublica, 12 July 2022, <https://www.propublica.org/article/bayraktar-tb2-drone-turkey-exports>, accessed 10 June 2023.

83 Middle East Eye, ‘Top US Senator Introduces Amendment to Track US Drone Parts to Turkey’, 5 November 2021, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/top-us-senator-introduces-legislation-track-us-drone-parts-turkey>, accessed 10 June 2023.

84 Farooq, ‘“The Drone Problem”’.

85 Binkov’s Battlegrounds, ‘How Did Turkey Become an UAV Superpower?’, Youtube video, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bnyHqizpSQ>, accessed 10 June 2023.

86 ‘Combat-tested’, ‘game changer’, ‘Made in Turkey’ and ‘low budget’ were the key messages that the media promo campaign contained and they were catchy enough. Denis Fedutinov, the editor-in-chief of the magazine Unmanned Aviation, claimed ‘the myth of the extraordinary effectiveness of the Bayraktar TB2 UAV was created by Turkish marketers’. Irina Alshaveva, ‘The Myth Has Finally Burst’, VPK, 13 April 2022, <https://vpk.name/en/594652_the-myth-has-finally-burst-on-bayraktar-i-put-the-point-calm.html>, accessed 2 August 2023.

87 Antonio Calcara et al., ‘Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare’, International Security (Vol. 46, No. 4, 2022), pp. 130–71; Andrea Gilli, ‘Drone Warfare: An Evolution in Military Affairs’, Defence Industry Europe, 4 November 2022, <https://defence-industry.eu/drone-warfare-an-evolution-in-military-affairs/>, accessed 2 August 2023.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Spyridon Plakoudas

Spyridon Plakoudas is an Assistant Professor of Homeland Security at Rabdan Academy (Abu Dhabi, UAE). He specialises in the civil wars of the Middle East and his latest book, Proxy Warfare on the Cheap: The Partnership Between the USA and the Syrian Kurds (Lexington Books), examines the usage of the Syrian Kurds by the US as proxy warriors in the fight against the Islamic State.

Vasileios Sofitis

Vasileios Sofitis serves as an Army Engineering Officer in the Hellenic Army at the rank of Lt Colonel. He received training in Construction and Combat Engineering and Explosive Ordnance Disposal in the US. He also holds a BA and MA in International Affairs and International Organizations from the University of the Aegean, and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Athens.