Who Does Deterrence?

Abstract

Integrated deterrence is a new concept in current US National Security Strategy. The concept itself reflects today’s strategic reality. Yet, deterrence today is not at all ‘integrated’; there is no agreement on what is to be deterred and how to use collective resources to deter it. It is also unclear which organisation should oversee the integration process. And, given the panoply of military services, government organisations and allied and partner nations involved, who is responsible for devising, articulating and executing this global deterrence strategy? To answer this question, James Wirtz and Jeffrey Larsen first describe the concept of deterrence to explain how answering the question ‘who does deterrence’ reveals the very essence of deterrence as a strategy. They then turn to providing an answer to that question as a step forward in the process of integrating deterrence. ◼

The opinions expressed here are those of the authors alone and do not reflect the positions of any government, government agency or commercial firm

Notes

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Additional information

Funding

This research is funded by the Naval Postgraduate School Naval Research Program (NRP).

Notes on contributors

James Wirtz

James J Wirtz is a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School. He is co-author of War, Peace and International Relations, 3rd edition (Routledge, 2024).

Jeffrey Larsen

Jeffrey A Larsen is a research professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School and president of Larsen Consulting Group. He is co-editor of Arms Control at a Crossroads: Renewal or Demise? (Lynne Rienner, 2024).