‘Perfidious Albion’? British Foreign Policy in an Age of Strategic Choice

Abstract

This essay criticises recent calls for the mobilisation of the British Army in anticipation of an ‘immediate’ continental war, and instead asserts that, as the world’s geopolitical centre of gravity progressively shifts south and east, Britain can expect to enjoy a strategic position further removed from the frontlines of potential conflict than at any time in recent history. Re-evaluating threats from Russia and China, Joseph Reilly advocates for a strategic reset, with a greater emphasis on leveraging industrial capabilities to support allies instead of the present focus on building large land forces ill-suited to Britain’s contemporary strategic environment.

Notes

1 .HM Government, ‘Chief of the General Staff Speech at RUSI Land Warfare Conference’, 28 June 2022, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chief-the-general-staff-speech-at-rusi-land-warfare-conference>, accessed 31 October 2023.

2 .For ‘visceral’, see Charles Collins, ‘Mobilising the British Army’, British Army Review (No. 182, Spring 2023), p. 7; for ‘institutional recuperation’, see Chris Barry and Matt Lewis, ‘Effecting Change from the Line of March: The Pathway to 2026’, British Army Review (Vol. 183, Summer 2023), p. 12.

3 .For ‘expended first’ see Colin Weir, ‘No One Said it Would be Easy … How We Will Fight in 2026’ [emphasis in original], British Army Review (Vol. 183, Summer 2023), pp. 8–9; for ‘NATO commitments’ see Patrick Sanders, ‘Mobilise Building Momentum but “More to be Done”’, British Army Review (Vol. 182, Spring 2023), p. 4; for ‘win in Europe’ see James Bowder, ‘The Land Operating Concept–a New Way of Winning’, British Army Review (Vol. 185, Autumn 2023), pp. 7–8; for ‘lessons of WWII’ see Barry and Lewis, ‘The Pathway to 2026’, p. 11; for ‘conscription’ see Matthias Strohn, ‘Building an Army: Some Lessons From History’, British Army Review (Vol. 182, Spring 2023), p. 11.

4 .British Army, ‘Chief of the General Staff’s RUSI Speech’, 26 June 2023, <https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2023/06/army-chief-says-one-year-on-and-we-are-rising-to-the-challenge/chief-of-the-general-staff-rusi-speech/>, accessed 31 October 2023.

5 .NATO, ‘Vilnius Summit Communiqué’, 11 July 2023, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm>, accessed 31 October 2023.

6 .Or variants thereof, including compete, competitive, competing, among others. HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, CP 403 (London: The Stationery Office, 2021). For specific analysis of great power competition, see p. 27.

7 .HM Government, Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a More Contested and Volatile World, CP 811 (London: The Stationery Office, 2023), p. 53.

8 .James Cartlidge, ‘Keynote Speech’, paper presented to First Sea Lord’s Sea Power Conference 2023, London, UK, 16 May 2023.

9 .HM Government, Integrated Review Refresh 2023, p. 40; Anne-Marie Trevelyan, ‘Keynote Speech’, speech to the First Sea Lord’s Sea Power Conference 2023, London, UK, 16 May 2023.

10 .Mike Wigston, ‘Chief of the Air Staff Speech’, speech to the Global Air and Space Chiefs’ Conference, 14 July 2022, London, UK; Mike Wigston, ‘Maintaining Our Leading Edge’, Air and Space Power (2022), p. 22.

11 .HM Government, Integrated Review Refresh 2023, p. 8.

12 .James Cleverly, ‘British Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’, speech to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 12 December 2022, London, UK.

13 .Andrew Ehrhardt, ‘The Fifth Marquess of Lansdowne and Britain’s Grand Strategic Reset’, Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, 1 May 2020, <https://chacr.org.uk/2020/05/01/1-may-2020-the-fifth-marquess-of-lansdowne-and-britains-grand-strategic-reset-1900-1905/>, accessed 31 October 2023.

14 .Lord Palmerston, as cited in Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War (London: Pimlico, 1997), p. 144.

15 .Ibid., pp. 212–13.

16 .Ibid., p. 213.

17 .For ‘missive’ see Kagan, Origins of War, p. 332; for ‘Rhine’ see Stanley Baldwin, ‘Armaments’, House of Commons (Hansard, Vol. 292), 30 July 1934, <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1934-07-30/debates/d996e7e9-fe28-4ddd-8cb0-1a661c1e4ab1/Armaments>, accessed 31 October 2023.

18 .Hansard, House of Commons Debate, Vol. 927, Cols 196–326, 1 March 1977.

19 .Andrew Lambert, The British Way of War: Julian Corbett and the Battle for a National Strategy (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 2021). For the pervasive (and mistaken) view of continental as opposed to maritime strategy, see Paul Kennedy, ‘The Continental Commitment and the Special Relationship in 20th Century British Foreign Policy’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 128, No. 3, 1983), pp. 9–12; Field Marshal Lord Carver, ‘Continental or Maritime Strategy? Past, Present and Future’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 134, No. 3, 1989), pp. 61–69; Alan Macmillan, ‘Strategic Culture and National Ways in Warfare: The British Case’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 140, No. 5, 1995), p. 35; Robert Fry, ‘End of the Continental Century’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 143, No. 3, 1998), pp. 15–18.

20 .Oliver Bullough, Butler to the World (London: Profile, 2022).

21 .Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2019), p. 268.

22 .Lukas Milevski, ‘A Collective Failure of Grand Strategy’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 156, No. 1, 2011), pp. 30–33.

23 .Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment Revisited’, National Interest (No. 70, 1 December 2002), pp. 5–18.

24 .Maggie Farley, ‘War Still Not the Answer, Say France, Russia, China’, Los Angeles Times, 6 February 2003; Philip H Gordon, ‘“Punish France, Ignore Germany, Forgive Russia” No Longer Fits’, Brookings Institute, 1 September 2007; Gary Younge, ‘Wimps, Weasels and Monkeys–The US Media View of “Perfidious France”’, The Guardian, 11 February 2003.

25 .Max Bearak and Adam Taylor, ‘“I Will be With You, Whatever”: Read Blair’s Secret 2002 Memo to Bush on Iraq’, Washington Post, 6 July 2016.

26 .Kagan, Origins of War, p. 213.

27 .Weir, ‘How We Will Fight’, p. 8; for ‘Trojan Horse’ see William F Owen, ‘The False Lessons of Modern War: Why Ignorance is Not Insight’, British Army Review (Vol. 185, Autumn 2023), p. 27.

28 .Smith, The Utility of Force, p. 267.

29 .Harald Edinger, ‘Offensive Ideas: Structural Realism, Classical Realism, and Putin’s War on Ukraine’, International Affairs (Vol. 98, No. 6, 2022), p. 1882; Lawrence Freedman, ‘Absolute Ends with Limited Means: Putin’s Self-deception’, Comment is Freed, 1 May 2022, <https://samf.substack.com/p/absolute-ends-with-limited-means>, accessed 31 October 2023.

30 .Ryuta Ito, ‘Hubris Balancing: Classical Realism, Self-deception and Putin’s War Against Ukraine’, International Affairs (Vol. 99, No. 5, 2023), p. 2054; Angela Stent, ‘Putin’s World is Now Smaller Than Ever’, Foreign Policy, 1 October 2022.

31 .Natalia Antonova, ‘Putin’s War was Never about NATO’, Foreign Policy, 5 July 2022.

32 .Owen, ‘Ignorance is Not Insight’, p. 30.

33 .Robert Fry, ‘British Strategy: Is it August 1911 All Over Again?’, The Article, 18 September 2023, <https://www.thearticle.com/british-strategy-is-it-august-1911-all-over-again>, accessed 31 October 2023.

34 .Sławomir Sierakowski, ‘The Strongest Army in Europe?’, RUSI Newsbrief, 25 August 2023.

35 .Peter Hartshorn, I Have Seen the Future: A Life of Lincoln Steffens (London: Counterpoint, 2011).

36 .James Cleverly, ‘Our Position on China’, speech at Mansion House, London, UK, 25 April 2023, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/our-position-on-china-speech-by-the-foreign-secretary>, accessed 31 October 2023.

37 .Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2021).

38 .For ‘when … in motion’, see Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (London: Profile, 2013), p. 150; for ‘unsustainable’ see ibid., p. 128.

39 .Ibid, p. 450.

40 .Yang Jisheng, Tombstone: The Untold Story of Mao’s Great Famine (London: Penguin, 2012), pp. 125, 17.

41 .Kerry Brown, ‘Will Xi’s Anti-corruption Campaign Become an Outright Purge?’, The Diplomat, 7 April 2015.

42 .Zhang Yi, ‘New Rules for Official Appointments Issued’, China Daily, 19 March 2019, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/19/WS5c903e50a3106c65c34ef4f5_11.html>, accessed 31 October 2023; Kacie Miura, ‘Strongman Politics and China’s Foreign Policy Actors’, International Affairs (Vol. 99, No. 5, 2023), p. 2013.

43 .Yang, Tombstone, p. 367.

44 .Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, p. 438.

45 .Jennifer Wang, ‘Disappearing Billionaires: Jack Ma and Other Chinese Moguls Who Have Mysteriously Dropped Off the Radar’, Forbes, 7 January 2021; Kinling Lo, ‘The Military Unit That Connects China’s Secret “Red Phone” Calls’, South China Morning Post, 21 July 2017.

46 .Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, p. 130; Qiang Ker-ching, ‘How to Measure China’s True Economic Growth’, The Economist, 9 March 2023.

47 .Yang, Tombstone, p. 266.

48 .Ben Tomlinson, ‘NATO at 75: What it Means for the British Army’, CHACR In-Depth Briefing (No. 66, September 2023), pp. 1–4.

49 .Will Freer, ‘Adapting the British Army for a Maritime Century’, Britain’s World, 16 October 2023, <https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world/adapting-the-british-army-for-a-maritime-century/>, accessed 31 October 2023.

50 .Ito, ‘Hubris Balancing and Putin’s War Against Ukraine’, p. 2036; Jake Sullivan, ‘The Sources of American Power: A Foreign Policy for a Changed World’, Foreign Affairs, 24 October 2023.

51 .Freer, ‘Adapting the British Army’.

52 .Ben Bland, ‘More Future Than Past in UK Connection’, Lowy Institute, 14 January 2022, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/more-future-past-uk-connection>, accessed 31 October 2023.

53 .Patrick Sanders, ‘Chief of the General Staff Speech’, speech to RUSI Land Warfare Conference, 28 June 2022, London, UK, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chief-the-general-staff-speech-at-rusi-land-warfare-conference>, accessed 31 October 2023.

54 .Patrick Sanders, ‘Chief of the General Staff’s RUSI Speech’, speech to RUSI Land Warfare Conference, 26 June 2023, London, UK, <https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2023/06/army-chief-says-one-year-on-and-we-are-rising-to-the-challenge/chief-of-the-general-staff-rusi-speech/>, accessed 31 October 2023.

55 .A R D Sharpe, ‘Ukraine–Early Lessons or Too Early to Tell?’, CHACR Commentary, 31 March 2022, p. 4, <https://chacr.org.uk/2022/03/31/ukraine-early-lessons/>, accessed 31 October 2023.

56 .Kagan, Origins of War, p. 416.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Joseph Reilly

Joseph Reilly is a Midshipman in the Royal Navy and Research Analyst at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre.