![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the heightened risks of a nuclear catastrophe are being seriously felt around the world. Over the past decade, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – the central instrument of the global non-proliferation regime – has been rife with divisions among its members and has been undermined by the failure of two consecutive Review Conferences (RevCons) to adopt a consensus outcome document. The basic assertion underlying this Special Issue is that there is growing criticism or contestation from countries in the Global South about the role and future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in particular with regard to the obligations imposed by the NPT and the lack of a reciprocal benefit for these countries. This contestation could hinder the optimal functioning of the NPT, for instance through reduced cooperation in the implementation of its provisions. As such, a serious examination of the Global South’s criticism of the NPT and what this means for the future of the non-proliferation regime is both timely and necessary.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the editors of the journal, Leo Goretti and Daniela Huber, for their support in the production of this Special Issue from the beginning, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their comments, which have undoubtedly helped to enrich this Introduction.
Notes
1 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
2 The agreement was signed in 2015; the United States (US) withdrew from it in 2018.
3 The Treaty entered into force in 2021 and at the time of writing has 92 state parties.
4 As a conceptual clarification, we understand contestation as the social practice by which international actors (in this case states) express in a factual or discursive way their disapproval of norms (and actions that conform to them) (Herrera Citation2020).
5 This refers to Nuclear Weapons States as recognised by the NPT; that is, the US, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), France and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
6 We define Global South as developing countries with emerging economies. The term emphasises that while developing nations possess a wide range of economic, social and political characteristics, they collectively face common vulnerabilities and challenges in terms of human progress in comparison to the wealthier nations of the world (UNDP Citation2004). For the purposes of this Special Issue, we categorise all NNWS as well as all non-NPT NWS that meet this definition as Global South countries.
7 Article VI of the NPT indicates that “each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” (UNODA Citation2023).
8 Articles I and II of the NPT, respectively, oblige NWS “not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices”, and for NNWS “not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (UNODA Citation2023).
9 For the purpose of this Special Issue, based on the abovementioned definition, the guest editors have decided not to consider the PRC as a Global South country because it is an NWS recognised by the NPT. As such, its needs and limitations within the regime are very different from those countries of the Global South. For example, the PRC is not required to comply with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and does not have any restrictions on access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy or limitations on military applications of nuclear energy.
10 As per the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254, Part 1), the fundamental principles concerning safeguards and export controls must be enforced when transferring peaceful nuclear technologies to NNWS. Similarly, these principles should also be applied to transfers to any state with regard to regulating retransfers. Consequently, suppliers have established a trigger list, which outlines the guidelines for nuclear transfers. This comprehensive list encompasses various aspects, such as physical protection, safeguards, specific controls on sensitive exports, special provisions for the export of enrichment facilities, controls on materials applicable for nuclear weapons, controls on retransfers and supporting activities (IAEA Citation2019).
11 This is part of both a discourse and a much broader perception of the existence of widespread US neo-colonialism in Latin America, especially in the Southern Cone countries (that is, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay and occasionally Brazil).
12 The main reason for the NPT’s omission of the issue of restitution to communities affected by nuclear testing is that the Treaty itself was initially conceived by two countries that were in fact conducting nuclear tests in territories whose communities were being affected by those tests: the US and the Soviet Union. Likewise, the Committee of Eighteen Nations, the group that was in charge of negotiating the NPT between 1965 and 1968, was also mainly made up of countries from the Western and Eastern blocs, leaving very little room for the so-called Third World countries to be visible.
13 This was true initially, less so over time as a result of decolonisation.
14 In the case of Africa, it is relevant to mention that South Africa played a leading role (notably, being the only non-NTP nuclear-weapon state to have completely disarmed voluntarily) in the creation of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (also known as the Pelindaba Treaty) in 1996, becoming one of the first members in 1997.
15 While in other cases, such as the creation of the Middle East WMDFZ, it remains a controversial issue, which caused the 2015 NPT RevCon to fail.
16 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is an international grouping that aims to curb the spread of nuclear weapons by regulating the export and transfer of materials that could be utilised for nuclear technology development, while also enhancing security measures for current nuclear materials.
17 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a grouping of states formed during the Cold War. The aim of the NAM was to maintain its neutral position and not to ally itself with any of the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union.
18 The Humanitarian Initiative is an informal group of states formed within the framework of the NPT and nuclear weapons diplomacy in general. Since 2013, this group has met regularly in a series of conferences exploring the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which culminated in the Humanitarian Pledge, issued by the Austrian government in 2015. The Humanitarian Initiative is seen as a direct response to the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Manuel Herrera
Manuel Herrera is a Researcher in the Multilateralism and Global Governance programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy.
Tanvi Kulkarni
Tanvi Kulkarni, based in India, is a Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN). Email: [email protected]
Vicente Garrido
Vicente Garrido is Professor of International Relations and Director of the ‘Francisco Villamartín’ Chair of Security and Defence at the Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain. Email: [email protected]