ABSTRACT
This article investigates Republic of China Navy (ROCN) ‘defection mutinies’ during the Chinese Civil War where mutineers seized ROCN vessels and defected to the Chinese Communists. Examining the memoirs of defection mutiny ringleaders and participants, this paper postulates the determinant that enabled ROCN defection mutinies was Chinese Communist covert action that capitalised on ROCN internal conflicts, weakened the collective action problem’s effect on pre-empting mutinies and provided the necessary support to conspirators that led to defection mutinies based on Communist preferences. This research contributes to the military studies sub-field by exposing the intersection between covert action and wartime military unrest.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Only 20 per cent of ROCN vessels defected – a sizeable minority but not a majority as Elleman asserted.
2. Chinese Communist sources expressed no such embarrassment. The CCP takes pride in the fact that many ROCN vessels abandoned the Kuomintang and joined its ranks, which reinforced the CCP’s argument that the Kuomintang-led government was a failed regime.
3. The escort frigate Huang’an was the first ROCN ship to successfully defect, on 12 February 1949. The Chongqing defected two weeks later on 25 February.
4. This assertion is again problematic as the Chinese Communists have provided overwhelming evidence with regards to CCP intelligence’s extensive involvement in planning and executing ROCN defection mutinies. Taiwanese sources also call into question Elleman’s claims by giving the CCP credit in instigating the mutiny on Chongqing, see Yao (Citation2017, p. 83) and (Citation2020, p. 89).
5. In addition to ROCN commanders’ memoirs, this point is evident in Taiwanese subject matter expert Yao Kai-yang’s works, see Yao (Citation2017) and Yao (Citation2020).
6. During the Chinese Civil War, the ROCN killed and injured 21,823 CCP personnel, sunk 426 vessels and captured 241 vessels. For additional information on ROCN combat performance, see Kuo (Citation2020, p. 88).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Zi Yang
Zi Yang is a PhD candidate in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). His research interests include civil–military relations, China’s security issues and Chinese intelligence history. Mr. Yang’s recent publications include an International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence article “The Enigmatic Intelligencer: Deng Fa and the Chinese Communist Secret Police Profession” (2022), a Small Wars & Insurgencies article “Securing the keystone: the suppression of anti-communist insurgents in Southern China, 1949–1952” (2021) and an Intelligence and National Security article “The Chinese communist party’s exploitation of the second united front: intelligence and counterintelligence on a middle force territory” (2021).